I cite again this passage from the Encyclopædia of Laws of England, vol. 3, p. 313:

"A Court of justice without power to vindicate its own dignity. would be an anomaly which could not be permitted to exist in any civilized community . . . without such protection, Courts of justice would soon lose their hold upon public respect, and the maintenance of law and order would be rendered impossible."

As may be seen, the right of the Courts themselves to punish without the intervention of a jury, contempts of which anyone has been guilty against them, is a right essential to their very existence. It is also necessary for the maintenance of the dignity of the Court, for the respect which is due to them, and for the confidence which the public should have in the impartiality and integrity of the Judges, that the liberty of the press is necessary for the performance of the work that it is called upon to fulfil.

The Judges should protect the press, and the latter should respect the Bench. Liberty implies responsibility; duty involves obligation. I do not claim that the right of the Court in cases of contempt should not be regulated. It is actually unlimited, and can be exercised in an arbitrary manner. But the difficulty is to establish proper limits to the exercise of this right.

Pursuant to the judgment rendered in Gray's case, a motion was made in 1910, to the House of Commons in England, for the appointment of a special committee to inquire into the question, and in the course of the debate which took place upon this motion, Mr. Gladstone promised to introduce a bill to amend the law in cases of contempt of Court (Hansard, third series, vol. 274, col. 36). However, as a matter of fact, no such measure has since been passed.

In 1906, the Commons in England adopted the following resolution:

"That the jurisdiction of Judges in dealing with contempt of Court is practically arbitrary and unlimited, and

calls for the action of Parliament with a view to its definition and limitation."

A similar resolution was also passed by the same body in 1908. Bills were introduced to this effect in 1883, 1892, 1894, and 1908, but these bills were not passed. (See 25 Law Quarterly Review, p. 371.)

These measures were not intended to suppress the right of the Court to punish for contempt of Court, but to define it clearly and surround it with precautions; for example, to give a right of appeal in every case; to fix a limit to the penalty and to the period of imprisonment, etc.

The question also came before our House of Commons at Ottawa, in 1894, in the famous Ellis case.

One of the most distinguished members of the House, Mr. D'Alton McCarthy, made a remarkable speech upon the question. Here is what he said, among other things:

"I do not think that it can be denied that in the actual condition of the law in England and in Canada, when a case of this kind is brought to the attention of the Court, the latter has not only the power but it is its duty-I employ this word deliberately-its duty, not discretionary, but absolute, to apply the law of the country, which says that offences of this nature should be punished in the manner followed in this case.

"There is no question here of privileges conferred on the Judges as individuals, when they sit in a Court of justice, it is not themselves that they represent; they represent the majesty of the law; they represent the body of the citizens, whose agents they have been constituted to see to the administration of the laws of the country. It is in this capacity that we demand that they should be respected, and it is for this purpose that from the most remote times, this right to punish for contempt of Court forms part of the common law.

"This right does not exist by virtue of a written law. It

has existed from the most remote period as a power inherent in the Courts to enable them to fulfil the high duties which have been entrusted to them. And I would add that if this is so in old countries, the matter is still more important here than anywhere else. To what can one appeal in this country, if not to the Courts? It is not merely to determine the rights of the citizens, but it is our constitution itself, and it is the decisions of our Courts which determine these questions. It is then the duty of the public to protect the dignity of the Court, and to protect our Judges in the performance of their high and important functions.

"The Court has not the power, whenever there is contempt of Court, to refuse to hear the matter and punish the guilty person. I will go farther. I fully concur in the citation from a judgment which was read this afternoon. I do not conceive that it can be compatible with the dignity of a Chief Justice who has been insulted and slandered, to descend from the high position that he holds to go before the Grand Jury, and afterwards into Court with his witnesses, in order that his cause may be decided, as it is said, in the ordinary mode." (See Hansard of 1894, pages 3352 to 3354.)

As we see then, the question has been discussed by the Chamber of Representatives of the people in England and in Canada. In both countries the existence of the right has been recognized, and any innovation thereupon has been refused.

Another ground raised by the appellant against the judg ment is that the Superior Court was not competent in the

matter.

According to the appellant the Criminal Courts only could decide the case. This ground has been discussed at some length along with the first objection of the appellant, and I will say nothing further of it at present.

In the third place the appellant claims that the Superior Court of Quebec had no jurisdiction in the matter.

I am of opinion, against this contention, that not only had the Superior Court at Quebec jurisdiction, but that it was the only Court which had jurisdiction in the case.

The Court did not act under any provision of the Criminal Code, nor under the Code of Procedure. The right to punish for contempt of Court does not exist by virtue of a written law; it exists as a power inherent in Courts of justice, and absolutely essential to their very existence. It has always formed part of the common law of England, and as it arose here from a question of public right, English law is our law.

The proceedings could have been by information, and in such case the ordinary rules applicable to the jurisdiction of the Court would have had to be followed, but the AttorneyGeneral chose, as he had a right to do, the summary proceeding by rule nisi, and it was only the Court slandered, or whose Judges were slandered, which could proceed in this manner. Odgers, Libel and Slander, p. 493

"It is a misdemeanour to speak or publish of any Judge of a Superior Court words which would be libellous and actionable 'per se,' if written or published of any other person holding a public office.

"Such words spoken or written, are punishable on indictment or information, with fine or imprisonment or both. They are also a contempt of Court punishable summarily by the Court itself with fine or commitment. In a case of Ex parte Burns (2 L.T.R. 352), decided in 1886, Judge Hawkins says "The Court can only punish for contempt of itself."

In the present case, it is two Judges of the Superior Court of Quebec who have been slandered, and it is the Superior Court, sitting at Quebec, who alone can punish the guilty person by the proceedings of the rule nisi.

The place of residence of the accused is of little importance; it is of little importance where the order has been served upon him. It is not necessary either to allege or to prove

that the slanderous writing has circulated in the district of Quebec. Those are rules applicable in matters of libel, but which are not applicable to the procedure adopted.

The appellant claims that the only contempt of Court is with regard to the slanders against the Court itself, and that there is none in the case of insult to the Judges. That is an error, as all the authorities that I have cited establish. Insults addressed to the Judges constitute contempt of Court, like those addressed to the Court itself.

It is claimed that there is only one Superior Court for the whole Province, and that the appellant would have to be summoned before the Superior Court sitting at Montreal, that is to say, in the district of his residence. I am of opinion that the Court, sitting at Montreal, had no jurisdiction in this case.

The argument that there is only one Superior Court for the Province, sitting in the different districts, could not be applied here.

The Judges slandered exercise their functions at Quebec. It is there that the guilty person should be brought forward and punished, to serve as an example in the very place where the authority of the Judges and the respect due to them have been attacked, and might have been weakened.

The very nature of the procedure adopted imposes this doctrine, and I do not hesitate to give it judicial sanction.

The appellant claims, again, that the article in question was published in good faith; that it could not be considered an attack on the administration of justice, and that the sentence given against him is excessive. Such a declaration on the part of the appellant is truly extraordinary.

Two honourable Judges are accused of partizanship and of political fanaticism in the performance of their high duties. It is said that no one has ever assisted in a more complete and more cynical prostitution of justice. The article itself is intituled, "The Prostitution of Justice."

In shewing cause against the rule served upon him, the