but that it must be preferred and the trial had at the place where it would take place had this section not been passed, that is, in the judicial district in which the offence was committed, unless an order of the Court is first obtained directing the trial to take place in some other district, as provided in section 884.

Sections 557, 580 and 584 (c) were also cited as giving authority to the Crown to charge the accused at this sittings of the Court. Sections 557 and 580 are to the effect that this Court, being a superior Court of criminal jurisdiction, has power to try any indictable offence in the province, no matter where the offence was committed. The jurisdiction of the Court is not denied. Mr. Frame expressly admits it, but contends that that jurisdiction will not be exercised to deprive the accused of his right unless the interests of justice require it, and the proceedings required by section 884 have been taken. Section 584 (c) provides that where the offence is committed upon any vehicle employed in a journey, the person accused shall be considered as having committed such offence in any magisterial jurisdiction through which such vehicle passed in the course of the journey or voyage during which the offence was committed, and it is contended that this gives the Crown a right to prefer the charge before a Court of competent jurisdiction within this judicial district. The charge itself is in my opinion a complete answer to this contention. The charge alleges that the journey on which the offence was committed was one from Swift Current to Parkbeg, both within the judicial district of Moose Jaw. So far as we can gather from the charge, the train, while on the journey during which the offence was committed, did not pass through any judicial district other than the judicial district of Moose Jaw. If the charge had alleged that the offence was committed on the train in the course of a journey from Swift Current to Regina, I could see some force in the contention that this section enabled the Crown to proceed here, because in that case the offence would be considered as having been committed in the judicial district of Regina, as well as in the judicial district of Moose Jaw. As, however, the charge itself limits the course of

the journey to one wholly within the judicial district of Moose Jaw, I cannot see how this section can assist the Crown.

On the whole, I am of opinion that the cases above cited establish that both at common law and under the Code a person accused of an indictable offence has a right to be tried in the judicial district in which the offence was committed, unless an order of the Court is first obtained under section 884 directing that the trial be held elsewhere. As no such order has been

obtained, I hold that the Crown is not entitled to prefer the charge at this sittings of the Court.

Charge quashed.

[COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO.]

BEFORE MOSS, C.J.O., AND GARROW, MACLAREN, MEREDITH AND MAGEE, JJ.A.

THE KING v. SAM SING.

Carnal knowledge-Inducement by householder to girl under eighteen to resort to his premises for illicit intercourse "with any man"-Knowledge of age not essential to offence-Illicit intercourse with the householder not included-Cr. Code (1906) 217.

1. On a charge against a householder of inducing or suffering a girl under eighteen to be upon his premises for the purpose of illicit carnal knowledge, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused knew the girl to be under the age of eighteen.

2. Where such a charge is brought under Cr. Code sec. 217 against a man the prosecution must prove that the accused induced or suffered the girl to be on the premises for the purpose of being carnally known by some man other than himself.

ARGUED: November 24, 1910.

DECIDED: December 31, 1910.

CASE stated by the Judge of the County Court of Carleton. The following statement of the facts is taken from the judgment of GARROW, J.A. :

The charge was of an offence under sec. 217 of the Criminal Code, which reads as follows:

"Every one who, being the owner or occupier of any premises, or having, or acting or assisting in, the management or control thereof, induces or knowingly suffers any girl under the age of eighteen years to resort to or be in or upon such premises for the purpose of being unlawfully and carnally known by any man, whether such carnal knowledge is intended to be with any particular man, or generally, is guilty of an indictable offence, and is liable,—

24-c.c.c. XVII.

"(a) to ten years' imprisonment if such girl is under the age of fourteen years;

"(b) to two years' imprisonment if such girl is of or above the age of fourteen years."

And the questions reserved were:

"1. Was it necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused knew the girl was under the age of eighteen years in order to support the charge?

"2. Was it necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused suffered the girl to be in the premises for the purpose of being carnally known by some man other than himself?" The evidence is not made part of the case.

TORONTO, November 24, 1910.

G. F. Henderson, K.C., for the prisoner, dealing in the first place with the second question raised in the case, argued that the judgment in Rex v. Karn (1909), 15 Can. Cr. Cas. 301, 20 O.L.R. 91, did not apply to the case at bar, nor was the point covered by The Queen v. Webster (1885), 16 Q.B.D. 134. He also referred to Regina v. Prince (1875), L.R. 2 C.C.R. 154. On the other branch of the case, reference was made to the following authorities: Brooks v. Mason, [1902] 2 K.B. 743, 744; Emary v. Nolloth, [1903] 2 K.B. 264; Sherras v. DeRutzen, [1895] 1 Q.B. 918, 921; Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 4th ed., pp. 146-160, where the law as to mens rea is summarised.

J. R. Cartwright, K.C., and E. Bayly, K.C., for the Crown, argued that the word "knowingly" in sec. 217 cannot be attributed to knowledge of the girl's age, and referred to the French version of the section in support of this view. As to the second point, there is no ground for the suggested exception from the absolute prohibition in the section. In this connection, reference was made to secs. 215 and 216 (a), (g), (i).

TORONTO, December 31, 1910.

GARROW, J.A. (after setting out the facts as above) :-I would answer the first question in the negative.

The second is not so easily answered, largely because of its somewhat peculiar form. I assume, however, that what it really means is-is it an offence, within the section, for the owner of the premises to have illicit connection upon the premises with a girl within the prescribed age? And to such a question I would answer, "No."

A somewhat similar question was recently before this Court in the case of Rex v. Karn, 20 O.L.R. 91, 15 Can. Cr. Cas. 301, but with this vital distinction, that in that case there was, in addition to the act of the prisoner, himself the occupier of the premises, a similar act, with his knowledge, by another man with another girl.

The section is not, in my opinion, aimed at the mere act of illicit intercourse. The offence would be, I think, complete, although perhaps not easily proved, without any evidence of actual illicit intercourse, if it was established that the girl was induced or knowingly permitted to be upon the premises for the unlawful purpose. A connection with a man following is merely in the nature of evidence of the unlawful purpose. If, for instance, an owner or occupier of premises was knowingly to permit a girl to be upon his premises under an appointment made with her to there meet her paramour for the purpose of illicit connection, the offence of the owner or occupier would be complete, although the man failed to appear. And it is, of course, apparent that the statutory offence may be committed by a woman, as was the case in The Queen v. Webster, 16 Q.B.D. 134. The language of the section is, no doubt, purposely made wide, but its plain object is, I think, to forbid the use, either occasionally or habitually, of premises as assignationhouses, or houses of that nature, to which young girls may or may be induced to resort. The girls need not, as in sec. 211, have been of previously chaste character. They may even, for anything that appears, be leading a life of prostitution.