The case was considered by Lord Chief Justice Alverstone to be a hard one in view of the steps taken by the defendants to verify the quality of the goods before selling them but he proceeded to say:

"These facts do not in my opinion constitute any defence to the charge under sec. 3, sub-sec. 1 (b), of the Act. In my opinion, the view expressed by Wills, J., and myself in Korten v. West Sussex Co. Council is correct, namely, that a person who causes or permits the invoice or descripItion of the article sold to be false in any material portion although he may have no personal knowledge of the falsity, is, nevertheless guilty of an offence under that section." Lastly, a recent decision under the Public Health Act of 1875 of Great Britain, may be referred to.

It is provided in section 308 of that Act that any person who sustains damage by reason of the exercise by a local sanitary authority of its powers in relation to "any matter, as to which he is not himself in default," shall be entitled to full compensation. In Hobbs v. Winchester Corporation (1910), 26 T.L.R. 557, the question was whether the plaintiff, who was claiming compensation for meat destroyed by the sanitary authority under the Act, was a person "not himself in default" within the meaning of section 308 or not. It was taken as proved that a portion of the meat was unsound, but that the plaintiff was not aware of this; and that the unfitness of the meat for the food of man could not have been discovered by any examination which the plaintiff or his servants could reasonably have been expected to make.

It had been held by the trial Judge (Channell, J.), in the King's Bench, Hobbs v. Winchester (1910), 26 T.L.R. 378, that if the Act imposed upon the plaintiff the duty of finding out at his peril before he sold the meat that it was sound, the plaintiff might be considered in default but that in fact the Act did. not impose such a duty upon him, and he proceeded to say:

"That being so, the question was whether the statute involved in the offence which it created, that mens rea should exist. That question had been discussed in a considerable number of cases and he apprehended the principle to be that, whenever a thing was made an offence, the presumption was that mens rea must be an element of it, and that, further, the presumption was that proof of mens rea must be part of the proof which must be produced by the prosecution. Both these matters, however, were nct infrequently varied by legislation in modern times. For instance, under the Merchandise Marks Act, although, under certain sections, mens rea was an element of the offence, yet it was a matter which the prosecution were not compelled to prove, but the defendant might, if he could, prove an absence of mens rea. There were other cases where the Legislature, desiring absolutely to prohibit certain things from being done, had done so in terms and had made the person who infringed the statute liable to punishment, at any rate in the way of a penalty, notwithstanding the fact that he himself was innocent, because there was an absolute prohibition against doing the act at all. The presumption, however, was against that being the case, and anyone who desired to put that interpretation upon the statute must shew the Court clearly that there had been a statutory enactment to that effect."

The action for compensation was accordingly maintained. The judgment, however, was reversed in the Court of Appeal, and it was held that the plaintiff had been "in default" under section 308. In giving judgment the Master of the Rolls referred to the object of the Act as being to prevent danger to the public health from use of meat unsuitable for human consumption and intimated that it was of no use for the butcher to say that he was unaware of the unsoundness of the meat and that his servants could not have discovered it. He proceeded to refer to decisions, and, as if to express disagreement with the above.

quoted opinion of Channell, J., cited the remarks of Mr. Justice Stephen, a high authority upon the subject in Mallinson v. Carr (1891), 1 Q.B. 48, to this effect:

"It was argued that this construction would render liable to conviction persons who were ignorant of the fact that the meat found in their possession was unfit for human food, and it was said to be an unreasonable intention to impute to the Legislature. I do not think that is the proper way to interpret an Act of Parliament. The true rule is to take the words used in their ordinary and actual sense and to construe them accordingly, without reference to any supposed intention of the Legislature which cannot be gathered from the natural and ordinary meaning of the words."

He also referred to the case of Firth v. McPhail, 21 T.L.R. 403, another case which arose under the Health Act and in which the Lord Chief Justice is reported as having said :

"I think that, having regard to the particular language of the section and to the object of the Legislature, there is no reason why the person who has actually in his possession the article intended for the food of man should not be liable to the penalty, and that was the view which this Court took in Wieland v. Butler-Hogan, 73 L.J.K.B. 513, though we held that there was no evidence of the article having been intended for the food of man after it had become bad. I therefore do not think that we can give effect to the argument that mens rea or guilty knowledge is necessary in every offence under the section.'

And thereupon the Master of the Rolls added:

"It had been urged that this was a criminal offence, and that such a construction ought not to be given to a section which created a criminal offence that might involve imprisonment. The answer was that the Legislature trusted to the good sense of the magistrates, who might be trusted not to send a man to prison on a summons when neither

he nor his servants were aware of the condition of the meat, and might impose only a nominal fine or no penalty at all.” With such assistance as is to be had from these decisions, I return to the question whether the defendant in this case is or is not liable to be fined because without his assent the machinist at the garage took out the vehicle and violated the enactment as to speed.

The weight of judicial opinion is to the effect that, in applying the provisions of an Act such as this motor vehicle law, the doctrine of guilty intent or mens rea is more of a philosophical abstraction than a serviceable rule of statutory construction.

It may be argued against the effect of the decisions which have been referred to, that there is a good reason for holding a vendor of food-stuffs or drugs responsible penally for the state and quality of the things which he has for sale because he has them in his charge and keeping, or for holding an innkeeper responsible penally for what is sold in his premises even in his absence against his orders, because it is his business that is concerned, but that that reason cannot operate to subject a vehicle owner to penal responsibility for the unforeseeable infractions which may be committed with his vehicle anywhere and by anybody.

The Legislature may nevertheless have been told that these vehicles were driven by persons who were not the owners oftener than by the owners; and that when a person was knocked down in the street the vehicle would be made to vanish before he could pick himself up and take observations. I need not, however, speculate upon what may have led the Legislature to act, when I have before me what it has actually made into law.

It is clear that the Legislature has made it a serious thing for a person to become owner of a registered motor vehicle.

It may be observed that while the general scheme of the Act here in question is the same as that of the Motor Car Act, 1903, of Great Britain, 3 Edw. VII. ch. 36, the specification of offences is different. There is in the latter no declaration of responsibil

ity on the part of the owner for infractions committed in respect of the vehicle such as there is in article 1406, but merely a provision to the effect that the owner is guilty of an offence under the Act if, upon request, he fails to give such information as is within his power which may lead to the identification and apprehension of the driver when the latter gives a false name and address or refuses to give a name and address. The owner of a car who is sitting next to a driver who proceeds at a dangerous speed is taken to be aware of the dangerous speed and is held to be guilty of abetting a violation of the law, in DuCros v. Lambourne (1906), 22 T.L.R. 3, but this is merely the expression of a legal proposition applicable in the case of any penal offence. It may, however, be added that, in conformity with the principles applied in the decisions above cited, it has been held under the Imperial Motor Car Act in Provincial Motor Cab Co. v. Dunning (1909), 2 K.B. 599, that the vehicle owner could be convicted if the vehicle had been sent out by persons for whom he was responsible in a condition which did not comply with the law.

With us, a much greater responsibility is thrown upon the owner. The scheme of our Act, shortly stated, is as follows: A number of specific prohibitions are directed against various persons, the operator, the chauffeur, the meddler and the mere stranger. Then there is article 1406 which has to do with the owner, and what it does is to decree responsibility for violations of the Act and not penalties for acts of violation, that is to say, it deals not with acts of prohibition but with declaration of responsibility.

The meaning is further made clear by the double declaration of responsibility in the same sentence. The owner "shall be held responsible" for violations and "shall be responsible" for accidents and damages. Then, to supplement and complete this statutory responsibility, it is further provided that the penalties are made a lien and can be levied out of the machine (article 1433).