a search warrant issued by the defendant and delivered by him to a constable for execution under the Canada Temperance Act on the 14th day of April, A.D. 1909, on the ground of want of jurisdiction, that the authority of the plaintiff who was appointed under R.S.N.S., ch. 33, was terminated by the passing of Acts, N.S., 1905, ch. 11.

The defence justified under the search warrant and that the search warrant had not been quashed before action as provided by sec. 6, ch. 40, R.S.N.S., 1900.

The plaintiff joined issue and claimed as points of law that the search warrant was not such an order as was contemplated by the statute and that the stipendiary had no jurisdiction for the reasons raised by the objection in R. v. Townsend (No. 1.), 11 Can. Cr. Cas. 94, 39 N.S.R. 172.

The points of law were set down for argument before the Court in banco by order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Russell, but the Court declined to consider the point that the subsequent appointment of stipendiary magistrates for the municipality under ch. 33, R.S.N.S., as amended, revoked the plaintiff's commission, as these appointments raised issues of fact, and this point in the reply was subsequently abandoned under order of Mr. Justice Meagher of June 13th, 1910, with the object of making the judgment hereon final.

HALIFAX, N.S., March 24, 1910.

John J. Power, K.C., for the motion.

W. B. A. Ritchie, K.C., for the defendant.

HALIFAX, N.S., April 9, 1910.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

GRAHAM, E.J.:-The plaintiff has put in objections in point of law to a defence pleaded by a stipendiary magistrate for the county of Pictou. The defendant has set out a search warrant under the Canada Temperance Act to search for liquors upon

the plaintiff's premises granted by him upon an information duly laid by the inspector.

The point of law is this. It appears that the defendant was appointed under the Act "of Stipendiary Magistrates" R.S. N.S., 1900, ch. 33, and under that Act he had by sec. 4 "jurisdiction, power and authority throughout the whole of the county for which he was appointed" in this case the county of Pictou. Afterwards there were amendments substituting the word "municipality" for "county" in the principal Act, namely 1903-04, ch. 37, sub-secs. 2 and 3, as to the county of Pictou repealed, 1905, ch. 28; and as to all of the counties, 1905, ch. 11.

It appears that in this case the plaintiff resided and that the warrant was issued in the town of Westville, which is presumably not a part of the municipality, but is a part of the county of Pictou. It is contended in the words of the objection that this defendant "was deprived and by reason of such enactment lost his authority or commission as a stipendiary magistrate in' and for the county of Pictou." I am of opinion that this is not so and that the majority of the Court held that this was not the effect of that legislation in the case of The King v. Townshend (No. 1), 11 Can. Cr. Cas. 94, 39 N.S.R. 172. It only applies to magistrates to be afterwards appointed.

The plaintiff seeks to make another contention in respect to the statement of defence, but he cannot make it because the facts are not stated there; he is obliged to resort to the statement of facts in his own reply. This he cannot do.

The defendant has, in addition to the defence already indicated, pleaded another, namely, that the search warrant has not first been quashed under Revised Statutes, 1900, ch. 40, sec. 6.

That provision in my opinion applies only to "convictions" and "orders" and warrants to procure appearance followed by a conviction or order. It does not cover the case of a search warrant and I think that the extension of the word "order" to a search warrant is forcing the statute too far.

The objections will be overruled as to the statement of de

fence except the 8th paragraph thereof and as to that paragraph so much of the 4th paragraph as constitutes an objection in law to it will be allowed. Each with costs to be set off and apportioned by the taxing master.

TOWNSHEND, C.J., MEAGHER, LONGLEY, and DRYSDALE, JJ.,

concurred.

Order accordingly.

[HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, ONTARIO.]

BEFORE TEETZEL, J., IN CHAMBERS.

THE KING v. QUICK.

Sunday observance Gambling-Playing cards-Conviction-Motion

quash-C.S.U.C., ch. 104, sec. 3.

to

The unrepealed Lord's Day Act, C.S.U.C., ch. 104, sec. 3, in force in Ontario, makes it a criminal offence to be engaged in playing cards for money in a private place, on a Sunday.

ARGUED: November 4, 1910.

DECIDED: November 4, 1910.

Motion by defendant, Dilbert Quick, for an order to the magistrate to state a case on an application to quash a conviction for gambling on the Lord's Day.

Defendant, a Kingsville youth, sat in with other youths at a game of draw poker, in a private office on a Sunday, for which he was summoned before the local police magistrate and fined $20 and costs under C.S.U.C., ch. 104, sec. 3, which reads as follows:

"(3) It is not lawful for any person on that day to play at skittles, ball, foot-ball, racket, or any other noisy game, or to gamble with dice or otherwise, or to run races on foot, or on horseback, or in carriages, or in vehicles of any sort."

The magistrate was asked to state a case and refused.

TORONTO, November 4, 1910.

J. D. Bissett, for the defendant, contended that playing cards for money was not an offence under the common law, and that the above statute prohibiting "gambling with dice or otherwise" did not include poker: that the English Act read "gambling with dice or cards," and that the Act of Upper Canada did not cover gambling in private places.

Featherston Aylesworth, for the magistrate.
J. R. Cartwright, K.C., for the Crown.

TORONTO, November 4, 1910.

TEETZEL, J.-I think the Act covers gambling in private places. It does not say where, therefore it means anywhere. The law aims at gambling, that is the offence, whether by dice or otherwise. It is a pretty hard law and certainly interferes with a man's freedom in his own house on Sunday. The law aims at private houses and it is trying to make people moral by Act of Parliament. If we do not give effect to it, we challenge the wisdom of our legislators.

Motion dismissed with costs.

[DISTRICT COURT OF SUDBURY, ONTARIO.]

BEFORE HIS HONOUR JUDGE KEHOE.

THE KING v. HARRINGTON.

Judicial districts—Jurisdiction of magistrate on formation of new district out of that for which he was appointed-Algoma and Sudbury districts-Information laid by telephone-Last day of statutory limit― Subsequent transmission by mail-Liquor License Act (Ont.)-Police Magistrates Act. R.S.O. 1897, ch. 15.

1. The creation by statute of a new judicial district gives to the officers of the new district exclusive jurisdiction and there is not concurrent jurisdiction remaining in judicial officers of the former territory from part of which the new district was formed.

2. A magistrate for Algoma has no jurisdiction to entertain a

charge for

an offence under the Liquor License Act (Ont.) committed at a place formerly in Algoma but now in Sudbury judicial district.

3. An information laid by telephone message to the magistrate on the last day and transmitted by mail to reach the magistrate on a later day is irregular.

DECIDED: June 3, 1910.

Appeals by the Crown from order of Stephen Fournier, police magistrate for district of Sudbury, dismissing informations for infractions of the Liquor License Act.

G. E. Buchanan, for the Attorney-General, appellant.
J. A. Mulligan, for the respondents.

SUDBURY, ONT., June 3, 1910.

KEHOE, J.-The first question in these cases is whether the informations were laid before a competent authority. They were laid before Mr. Williams, police magistrate for Algoma, whose commission is dated the 4th of May, 1905. At this date the locality where the offences are alleged to have been committed was in the district of Algoma but is now in the district of Sudbury. At the time of the informations it was also in the Sudbury district. The question of territorial jurisdiction was raised and the cases on being heard by Mr. Fournier were dismissed by him on the ground that Mr. Williams had no jurisdiction to take the informations.

There is no direct general statement in any statute or in any reported decision as to whether on the creation of a new judicial district or county the authority of the officers in the district or county out of which the new district or county is created retain their powers in the new district or county. Apart from what may