vania statute as to the voluntary bankruptcy of a farmer. Dictum: that the same is true of involuntary bankruptcy. Closser v. Strong, 35 Am. Bank. Rep. 864 (U. S. Dist. Ct., Western Dist. of Pa.). State legislation, dealing with the subject of bankruptcy, though admittedly within the power of the state, is superseded by a national exercise of the power granted to Congress by Art. 1, Sec. 8, of the Constitution. Tua v. Carriere, 117 U. S. 201. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 122, 196. The extent to which it is superseded, however, is disputed, the cases appearing to set forth four views. First, that the state act is not suspended unless the federal courts can at the very time actually take jurisdiction over the case. See Lace v. Smith, 34 R. I. 1, 12, 86 Atl. 268, 272; Geery's Appeal, 43 Conn. 289, 303; Singer v. National Bedstead Co., 65 N. J. E. 290, 294, 295; Sturges v. Crowninshield, supra, 195. Second, that where the National Act either expressly or by necessary implication excepts a class of cases from its operation, Congress did not intend to interfere with state legislation on this subject. See Herron v. Superior Ct., 136 Cal. 279, 282, 68 Pac. 814, 815; Simpson v. Savings Bank, 56 N. H. 466, 475. Third, that unless the National Act provides for both voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy on a set of facts, the state insolvency law is not in any respect superseded. See In re Rittenhouse's Estate, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 468, 470; McCullough v. Goodhart, 3 A. B. Rep. 85, 86; Miller v. Jackson, 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 31, 39. Fourth, that the state courts are precluded from entertaining any petition under a state bankruptcy act. See Parmenter Mfg. Co. v. Hamilton, 172 Mass. 178, 180, 51 N. E. 529, 530; Harbaugh v. Costello, 184 Ill. 110, 118, 56 N. E. 363, 365. Cf. Ketcham v. McNamara, 72 Conn. 709, 46 Atl. 146. The fourth view, adopted in the principal case appears preferable. For surely Congress intended to create a complete system of bankruptcy, and when it made certain exceptions it did so because it seemed wise that in such cases bankruptcy proceedings should not be permitted at all. See S. Williston, "Effect of a National Bankruptcy Law upon State Laws," 22 HARV. L. REV. 547, 553; REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY, § 1630. See contra, Singer v. National Bedstead Co., supra, 296. And the general tendency of decisions as to other matters, denies to the states the right to supplement federal legislation on a subject. See Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 22, 23; Southern Ry. Co. v. Ry. Comm., 236 U. S. 439, 446; Erie Ry. Co. v. New York, 233 U. S. 671, 683. Yet the decision of the principal case is contrary to the holding of the Pennsylvania state courts. Citizens National Bank v. Gass, 29 Pa. Super. Ct. 31; Miller v. Jackson, supra. And the dictum is opposed to previous holdings of state courts. Old Town Bank v. McCormick, 96 Md. 341. See In re Rittenhouse's Estate, supra. BILLS AND NOTES - DELIVERY — DELIVERY TO PAYEE IN TRUST FOR SPECIAL ENDORSEE BONA FIDE PURCHASER. The maker of a check, without relinquishing control over it, procured the payee's special indorsement to the plaintiff. He then gave it to the payee to give to the plaintiff. The former indorsed the latter's name, and negotiated the check to a bonâ fide purchaser. The purchaser deposited it in the defendant bank, which, having collected it, is now sued by the plaintiff who claims the proceeds as owner of the check. Held, that the plaintiff may recover. Wolfin v. Security Bank of New York, 156 N. Y. Supp. 474. At common law, and by the Negotiable Instruments Law, actual or constructive delivery of a negotiable instrument is necessary to vest title in an indorsee. Clark v. Boyd, 2 Ohio, 56. See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, §§ 30, 191; I DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 6 ed., § 63 a. Nor is the mere delivery to the transferor's agent effective as a constructive delivery to the transferee. Brind v. Hampshire, 1 M. & W. 365; Talbot v. Bank of Rochester, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 295. See contra, Gordon v. Adams, 127 Ill. 223, 226, 19 N. E. 557, 558. And delivery to a third person to deliver to another constitutes such person the agent of the remitter, and not of the remittee. See Jones v. Jones, 101 Me. 447, 452, 64 Atl. 815, 817. As there was therefore no effective delivery to the plaintiff, though the beneficial interest vested in him, he did not acquire legal title. It passed to the payee. Hence, though the payee's indorsement of the plaintiff's name was ineffective, the delivery of the instrument to the purchaser operated as an assignment. Hughes v. Nelson, 29 N. J. Eq. 547; Freund v. Importers and Traders, etc. Bank, 76 N. Y. 352, 357. The defendant, by collecting the check, converted this equitable right into legal title to the money. Thus, though his equity was subsequent to the plaintiff's, since he gave value for the very right which he has now in good faith made legal, he should prevail. BILLS AND NOTES - INDORSEMENT BY JOINT PAYEES TO ONE OF THEM.The defendant made a negotiable note payable to himself and the plaintiff. Both of them indorsed it in blank and the plaintiff now sues as holder of the note. Held, that he cannot recover. Dotson v. Skraggs, 87 S. E. 460 (W. Va.). Since a man cannot contract with himself, a note of which the maker and the payee are the same person is a nullity until indorsed. Pickering v. Cording, 92 Ind. 306. See I DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 7 ed., 130. The same result would logically follow when the maker is one of joint payees. Since there is no contract, even if the procedural difficulty involved in the identity of plaintiff and defendant is removed, there can be no recovery. See Edison Electric Illuminating Co. v. De Mott, 51 N. J. Eq. 16, 19, 25 Atl. 952, 953. Hence, in the principal case, the plaintiff could not recover as payee. However, as such a note is rightly treated as payable to the person to be designated as indorsee, a valid indorsement will create an original obligation between the maker and such indorsee. Ewan v. Brooks-Waterfield Co., 55 Oh. St. 596, 45 N. E. 1094. But when there are other payees, all must indorse to render the indorsement valid. Ryhiner v. Feickert, 92 Ill. 305; Kaufman v. State Savings Bank 151 Mich. 65, 114 N. W. 863. However, in the principal case this was done, both payees indorsing in blank. Now a note payable to the order of the maker. indorsed in blank, is payable to bearer. Wilder v. De Wolf, 24 Ill. 190; Bank of Lassen County v. Sherer, 108 Cal. 513, 41 Pac. 415. Thus, as the plaintiff in the principal case comes within that description, he should have been allowed to recover. Smith v. Gregory, 75 Mo. 121. Though he is named as payee and his indorsement was necessary, as the instrument became effective subsequently and as even on its face he was then without title, he is really an anomalous indorser and as such not remitted to his former position. Hence, the fact that he is described as joint payee with the maker is no impediment to his recovery. CONFLICT OF LAWS - FOREIGN CORPORATION EFFECT OF DISSOLUTION -STATUTORY SUCCESSOR.- A Pennsylvania insurance corporation was dissolved by an order of a court in that state under a statute which provided for dissolution in case of insolvency and vested title to the assets in the State Insurance Commissioner. (1911 LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA, 600.) The plaintiff brought an action in New York against the corporation and the Insurance Commissioner on a claim due him from the corporation and attached debts due the corporation in New York. Held, that the attachment is invalid. Martyne v. American Fire Insurance Co., 110 N. E. 502 (Court of Appeals of New York). A corporation duly dissolved by the state of incorporation ceases to exist everywhere, and a judgment against it after dissolution is of no more effect than a judgment obtained against a dead man. Sturges v. Vanderbilt, 73 N. Y. 384; Mumma v. Potomac Co., 8 Pet. (U. S.) 281, 286. The assets become a trust fund for creditors and stockholders. See BEALE, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS, § 825. Many jurisdictions, however, provide by statute for a successor to the dissolved corporation, and vest title to its assets in him. His title and his right to sue on claims of the corporation, unlike those of an ordinary receiver, assignee in bankruptcy, or executor, are fully recognized outside of the state. Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U. S. 222; Bockover v. Life Ass'n, 77 Va. 85. Cf. Willetts v. Waite, 25 N. Y. 577. See BEALE, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS, § 799; see 29 HARV. L. Rev. 442, 443. The distinction rests on the theory that the statutory successor does not assume the position of a mere representative, but takes all the rights of the deceased as a universal successor. But since the law of the domicile cannot pass title to realty situated abroad, he does not take title to such property. City Insurance Co. v. Commercial Bank, 68 Ill. 348. As to personalty, however, he takes precedence over creditors of the corporation even in a foreign jurisdiction. Parsons v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 31 Fed. 305. In the principal case the plaintiff proceeded on the basis of an action quasi in rem, since a judgment against the corporation could not be obtained. But the commissioner having obtained title under the laws of Pennsylvania, no attachment could be made on the property to subject it to claims directly against the corporation. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS OF LAW EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS STATUTE PROHIBITING USE OF TRADING STAMPS. State statutes imposed a prohibitive license tax on the use of trading stamps redeemable in merchandise. Held, that the statutes are constitutional, as a proper exercise of the police power. Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., Sup. Ct. Off., No. 41; Tanner v. Little, Sup. Ct. Off., No. 224; Pitney v. State of Washington, Sup. Ct. Off., No. 242. The great weight of authority has hitherto held such statutes unconstitutional. People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 17 N. E. 343; Ex parte Drexel, 147 Cal. 763, 82 Pac. 429. See 2 L. R. A., N. S. 588, note. The cases went on the ground that since there was no element of chance in the trading stamp business, it did not partake of the nature of gambling, but was a legitimate form of advertising, and as such could not be prohibited. See FREUND, POLICE POWER, § 293. But it is at least arguable that such schemes, by tempting the ignorant with the hope of getting something for nothing, lure them to improvidence and extravagant expenditure. Furthermore, unlike ordinary advertising, the trading-stamp system serves no useful purpose. See FREUND, POLICE POWER, p. 279. It thrusts an additional and unnecessary cost on distribution which must ultimately be borne by the entire public, and under our competitive system it cannot be successfully resisted by individuals. And it would be a perversion of the Fourteenth Amendment to say that it prohibits the remedy of community action in these otherwise incurable diseases of competition, detrimental to the whole public. For the police power embraces all regulations designed to promote the general welfare or prosperity. See Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. Drainage Commissioners, 200 U. S. 561, 592; Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 111; Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U. S. 137, 142. Such legislation will not be overthrown by the courts unless utterly unreasonable or purely arbitrary. Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539. See Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578, 587, 588. Likewise, if there is any reasonable ground for the classification adopted, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61; International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199. Nor need a statute cover the whole field of possible abuses in order to hit what the legislature deems an evil. Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157; Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224. There clearly is sufficient difference in fact between the use of trading stamps and ordinary advertising to afford a reasonable basis for a legislative discrimination. It is to be hoped that the principal cases mark the turning of the tide on this question. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEPARATION OF POWers — DelegatION — STARE DECISIS. A Texas statute punished as a crime the operation of pool rooms in any district that voted to prohibit them. This statute had been held unconstitutional by the Texas Supreme Court, contrary to a prior decision of the co-ordinate Court of Criminal Appeals. Cf. Ex parte Mitchell, 177 S. W. 953, with Ex parte Francis, 72 Tex. Cr. R. 304, 165 S. W. 147. The question of the constitutionality of the statute is now brought once more to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Held, that the statute is constitutional. Ex parte Mode, 180 S. W. 708. The constitutionality of liquor local option laws is now well settled. See JOYCE, INTOXICATING LIQUORS, §§ 368, 371. Most courts have rested their decision on the ground that the statutes are not a delegation of legislative power but are laws to take effect on a contingency. Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 491; People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865. However, as the voters pass on exactly the same question as the legislature and relieve it of responsibility, it is submitted that such a statute is in fact a delegation, and the same courts have so decided in case the referendum is to the voters of an entire state. State v. Hayes, 61 N. H. 264; Opinion of the Justices, 160 Mass. 586, 36 N. E. 488. Contra, State v. Frear, 142 Wis. 320, 125 N. W. 961. The law is better justified as a delegation within the field of those local regulations which it is proper for the legislature to delegate. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 108 Mass. 27. Cf. Feek v. Township Board of Bloomingdale, 82 Mich. 393, 47 N. W. 37. See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 7 ed., 173, 174; 19 HARV. L. REV. 203. This argument applies even more emphatically to pool rooms than to liquor establishments, as the former are everywhere recognized as a proper subject of local control. City of Burlingame v. Thompson, 74 Kan. 393, 86 Pac. 449; Cole v. Village of Culbertson, 86 Neb. 160, 125 N. W. 287. Hence, the Court of Criminal Appeals was justified in treating the statute as constitutional unless it was precluded from so doing by the decision of the Supreme Court. Prior to this decision, the Supreme Court had held itself bound by the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal on criminal matters. Green v. Southard, 94 Tex. 470, 61 S. W. 705; Commissioners' Court v. Beall, 98 Tex. 104, 81 S. W. 526. To have continued such a course would have avoided the absurd anomaly of two conflicting laws in a single state which has now resulted from treating the question of what decision is binding as one, not of subject matter, but solely of the court where the action is brought. However, as the question in the principal case was one of criminal law, the Court of Criminal Appeals properly disregarded the decision of the Supreme Court and followed their former holding. CORPORATIONS - DISSOLUTION - DEVOLUTION OF PROPERTY ON DISSOLUTION: CHOSES IN ACTION. After the expiration of the charter of a corporation, the business was continued by the single stockholder in the corporate name. By statute an expired corporation continued in existence for an indefinite period for the sole purpose of winding up its business. (1915, KY. STAT., § 561.) After the dissolution certain deposits which were held by foreign banks in the name of the corporation were assessed for taxation both at the corporate home and at the domicile of the stockholder. Held, that the tax should be collected at the stockholder's domicile. Ewald's Executor v. City of Louisville, 181 S. W. 1095 (Ky.). By the old common law rule debts due a corporation were extinguished by its dissolution. I BL. COMM. 484; Bank of Mississippi v. Duncan, 56 Miss. 166. Later the rule in regard to personalty, that it reverts to the Crown as bona vacantia, was extended to apply to the debts of an extinct corporation. In re Higginson and Dean, [1899] 1 Q. B. 325. See 19 HARV. L. REV. 610. The hardship of such a rule is now largely obviated by statutes authorizing the courts to dispose of the assets of the corporation, usually by the appointment of receivers. But in our courts, even in the absence of a statute, equity, apparently ignoring the claim of the state, has regarded the corporate assets as a trust fund for the benefit of the stockholders and creditors. Connecticut Life Insurance Co. v. Dunscomb, 108 Tenn. 724, 69 S. W. 345; Craycraft v. National Building & Loan Ass'n, 117 Ky. 229, 77 S. W. 923. Cf. Bacon v. Robertson, 18 How. 480. Where there is no insolvency the title to the corporation property on dissolution is regarded as in the stockholders as tenants in common, subject, of course, to the rights of the creditors to have it applied in satisfaction of the corporation debts. Baldwin v. Johnson, 95 Tex. 85,65 S. W. 171. See 15 HARV. L. REV. 743. In the principal case it would seem that title passed to the stockholder immediately upon dissolution. The statute it is submitted makes no difference. Where there is no intention to wind up the business, and no winding up was desirable or necessary, it is hard to see why the indefinite extension in the statute should postpone the vesting of title in the stockholder. DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT· STATUTORY LIABILITY ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL: DEATH OF BENEFICIARY. - A Massachusetts statute provides that the administrator of one killed by a negligent act can maintain a suit for the benefit of the deceased's next of kin, the amount of recovery to be proportionate to the defendant's negligence. (1910, MASS. REV. LAWS, SUPPLEMENT, 1378.) While an action under this statute was pending, the next of kin died. Held, that the action is not abated, since the statute is punitive. Johnston v. Bay State Street Ry. Co., 111 N. E. 391 (Mass.). At common law it finally became settled that a person pecuniarily injured by the death of a relative had no right of action against one wrongfully causing the death. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493; Carey v. The Berkshire R. Co., 1 Cush. (Mass.) 475. See TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT, 2 ed., §11. Cf. Hermann v. The New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 11 La. Ann. 5, 22. Statutes now generally authorize the deceased's administrator to sue for the benefit of financially dependent relatives, recovering only the pecuniary loss they have actually sustained. TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT, 2 ed., § 153. Again, though at common law actions of tort usually did not survive the plaintiff's death, statutes now invariably provide that actions for injuries to property rights shall survive. See I WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS, 8 ed., 797, 798. And an injury to property, within the meaning of the statutes, is whatever is an injury to the estate of the deceased plaintiff. Nettles v. D'Oyley, 2 Brev. (S. C.) 27. Since the beneficial plaintiff in an action for wrongful death can only recover for the actual financial loss he has incurred, his cause of action arises from an injury to his estate. Matter of Meekin v. Brooklyn, etc. R. Co., 164 N. Y. 145, 58 N. E. 50; Union Steamboat Co. v. Chaffin's Admrs., 204 Fed. 412. Accordingly, the action should not be abated by his death, although, by showing the actual brevity of the period of loss, the beneficiary's death may be evidence tending to diminish the amount of damages. Cooper v. Shore Electric Co., 63 N. J. L. 558, 44 Atl. 633; Shawnee v. Cheek, 41 Okla. 227, 248, 137 Pac. 724, 731. See TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT, 2 ed., § 87. Cf. Morris v. Spartanburg Ry., etc. Co., 70 S. C. 279, 49 S. E. 854; Billingsley v. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co., 84 Ark. 617, 107 S. W. 173. Contra, Gilkeson v. Missouri, etc. R. Co., 222 Mo. 173, 121 S. W. 138; Harvey v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 70 Md. 319, 17 Atl. 88. In the principal case the action is brought under a unique punitive statute, which is merely a substitute for indictment and fine. See Brown v. Thayer, 212 Mass. 392, 398, 99 N. E. 237, 240. See TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT, 2 ed., § 44. And as punitive actions aim to punish the tortfeasor, not to redress the injury, they should survive the death of the incidental beneficiary. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Scircle, 103 Ind. 227, 2 N. E. 604. Cf. Prescott v. Knowles, 62 Me. 277, 280. DEEDS CONSTRUCTION GRANTEE. - DEEDS TO GROWING TIMBER: RIGHTS OF THE - The defendant granted, by deed, the timber then standing on his |