will have a conciliatory appearance, and you, citizen First Consul, will govern the negotiation, in which, I trust, nothing will be proposed on my part, that will not be equally beneficial to both France and the United States.

I have the honor, citizen First Consul, to remain, with the most profound respect and the highest consideration, your most obedient, humble servant,

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

The Secretary of State to Messrs. Livingston and Monroe.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, March 2, 1803. GENTLEMEN: You will herewith receive a commission and letters of credence, one of you as Minister Plenipotentiary, the other as Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, to treat with the Government of the French Republic on the subject of the Mississippi, and the territories eastward thereof, and without the limits of the United States. The object in view is to procure, by just and satisfactory arrangements, a cession to the United States of New Orleans, and of West and East Florida, or as much thereof as the actual proprietor can be prevailed on to part with.

The French Republic is understood to have become the proprietor, by a cession from Spain, in the year of New Orleans, as part of Louisiana, if not of the Floridas also. If the Floridas should not have been then included in the cession, it is not improbable that they will have been since added to it.

It is foreseen that you may have considerable difficulty in overcoming the repugnance and the prejudices of the French Government against a transfer to the United States of so important a part of the acquisition. The apparent solicitude and exertions, amidst many embarrassing circumstances, to carry into effect the cession made to the French Republic; the reserve so long used on this subject by the French Government, in its communications with the Minister of the United States at Paris, and the declaration finally made by the French Minister of Foreign Relations, that it was meant to take possession before any overtures from the United States would be discussed, show the importance which is attached to the territories in question. On the other hand, as the United States have the strongest motives of interest, and of a pacific policy, to seek by just means the establishment of the Mississippi, down to its mouth, as their boundary, so there are considerations which urge on France a concurrence in so natural and so convenient an arrangement.

Notwithstanding the circumstances which have been thought to indicate, in the French Government, designs of unjust encroachment,

and even direct hostility, on the United States, it is scarcely possible to reconcile a policy of that sort with any motives which can be presumed to sway either the Government or the nation. To say nothing of the assurances given both by the French Minister at Paris, and by the Spanish Minister at Madrid, that the cession by Spain to France was understood to carry with it all the conditions stipulated by the former to the United States, the manifest tendency of hostile measures against the United States to connect their councils and their colossal growth with the great and formidable rival of France, can neither escape her discernment, nor be disregarded by her prudence, and might alone be expected to produce very different views in the Government.

On the supposition that the French Government does not mean to force or to court war with the United States, but, on the contrary, that it sees the interest which France has in cultivating their neutrality and amity, the dangers to so desirable a relation between the two countries which lurk under a neighborhood modified as is that of Spain at present, must have great weight in recommending the change which you will have to propose. These dangers have been always sufficiently evident; and have, moreover, been repeatedly suggested by collisions between the stipulated rights or reasonable expectations of the United States and the Spanish jurisdiction at New Orleans. But they have been brought more strikingly into view by the late proceeding of the Intendant at that place. The sensibility and unanimity in our nation, which have appeared on this occasion, must convince France that friendship and peace with us must be precarious until the Mississippi shall be made the boundary between the United States and Louisiana; and consequently render the present moment favorable to the object with which you are charged.

The time chosen for the experiment is pointed out also by other important considerations. The instability of the peace of Europe, the attitude taken by Great Britain, the languishing state of the French finances, and the absolute necessity of either abandoning the West India islands, or of sending thither large armaments at great expense, all contribute at the present crisis to prepare in the French Government a disposition to listen to an arrangement which will at once dry up one source of foreign controversy, and furnish some aid in struggling with internal embarrassments. It is to be added, that the overtures committed to you coincide in great measure with the ideas of the person through whom the letter of the President of April 30, 1802, was conveyed to Mr. Livingston, and who is presumed to have gained some insight into the present sentiments of the French Cabinet.

Among the considerations which have led the French Government into the project of regaining from Spain the province of Louisiana,

and which you may find it necessary to meet in your discussions, the following suggest themselves as highly probable:

First. A jealousy of the Atlantic States, as leaning to a coalition with Great Britain not consistent with neutrality and amity toward France, and a belief that, by holding the key to the commerce of the Mississippi, she will be able to command the interests and attachments of the western portion of the United States, and thereby either control the Atlantic portion also, or, if that can not be done, to seduce the former into a separate Government and a close alliance with herself.

In each of these particulars the calculation is founded in error. It is not true that the Atlantic States lean toward any connexion with Great Britain inconsistent with their amicable relations to France. Their dispositions and their interests equally prescribe to them amity and impartiality to both of those nations. If a departure from this simple and salutary line of policy should take place, the causes of it will be found in the unjust or unfriendly conduct experienced from one or other of them. In general, it may be remarked, that there are many points on which the interests and views of the United States and of Great Britain may not be thought to coincide, as can be discovered in relation to France. If less harmony and confidence should, therefore, prevail between France and the United States than may be maintained between Great Britain and the United States, the difference will lie, not in the want of motives, drawn from the mutual advantage of the two nations, but in the want of favorable dispositions in the Government of one or other of them. That the blame, in this respect, will not justly fall on the Government of the United States, is sufficiently demonstrated by the mission, and the objects with which you are now charged.

The French Government is not less mistaken, if it supposes that the Western part of the United States can be withdrawn from their present union with the Atlantic part into a separate Government, closely allied with France.

Our Western fellow-citizens are bound to the Union, not only by the ties of kindred and affection, which for a long time will derive strength from the stream of emigration peopling that region, but by two considerations which flow from clear and essential interests.

One of these considerations is, the passage through the Atlantic ports of the foreign merchandise consumed by the Western inhabitants, and the payment thence made to a treasury, in which they would lose their participation by erecting a separate Government. The bulky productions of the Western country may continue to pass down the Mississippi; but the difficulties of the ascending navigation of that river, however free it may be made, will cause the imports for consumption to pass through the Atlantic States. This is the course through which they are now received; nor will the impost to which

they will be subject change the course, even if the passage up the Mississippi should be duty free. It will not equal the difference in the freight through the latter channels. It is true that mechanical and other improvements in the navigation of the Mississippi may lessen the labor and expense of ascending the stream; but it is not the least probable, that savings of this sort will keep pace with the improvements in canals and roads, by which the present course of impost will be favored. Let it be added, that the loss of the contributions thus made to a foreign treasury would be accompanied with the necessity of providing, by less convenient revenues, for the expense of a separate Government, and of the defensive precautions required by the change of situation.

The other of these considerations results from the insecurity to which the trade from the Mississippi would be exposed by such a revolution in the western part of the United States. A connection of the Western people, as a separate State, with France, implies a connexion between the Atlantic States and Great Britain. It is found, from long experience, that France and Great Britain are nearly half their time at war. The case would be the same with their allies. During nearly one-half the time, therefore, the trade of the Western country from the Mississippi would have no protection but that of France, and would suffer all the interruptions which nations having the command of the sea could inflict on it.

It will be the more impossible for France to draw the Western country under her influence, by conciliatory regulations of the trade through the Mississippi; because regulations which would be regarded by her as liberal, and claiming returns of gratitude, would be viewed on the other side as falling short of justice. If this should not be at first the case, it soon would be so. The Western people believe, as do their Atlantic brethren, that they have a natural and indefeasible right to trade freely through the Mississippi. They are conscious of their power to enforce this right against any nation whatever. With these ideas in their minds, it is evident that France will not be able to excite either a sense of favor, or of fear, that would establish an ascendency over them. On the contrary, it is more than probable, that the different views of their respective rights would quickly lead to disappointments and disgusts on both sides, and thence to collisions and controversies fatal to the harmony of the two nations. To guard against these consequences is a primary motive with the United States. in wishing the arrangement proposed. As France has equal reasons to guard against them, she ought to feel an equal motive to concur in the arrangement.

Secondly. The advancement of the commerce of France, by an establishment on the Mississippi, has, doubtless, great weight with the Government in espousing this project.

The commerce through the Mississippi will consist, first, of that of the United States; second, of that of the adjacent territories to be acquired by France.

The first is now, and must for ages continue, the principal commerce. As far as the faculties of France will enable her to share in it, the article to be proposed to her, on the part of the United States, on that subject, promises every advantage she can desire. It is a fair calculation that, under the proposed arrangement, her commercial opportunities would be extended rather than diminished; inasmuch as our present right of deposit gives her the same competitors as she would then have, and the effect of the more rapid settlement of the Western country, consequent on that arrangement, would proportionally augment the mass of commerce to be shared by her.

The other portion of commerce, with the exception of the island of New Orleans, and the contiguous ports of West Florida, depends on the territory westward of the Mississippi. With respect to this portion, it will be little affected by the cession desired by the United States. The footing proposed for her commerce, on the shore to be ceded, gives it every advantage she could reasonably wish, during a period within which she will be able to provide every requisite establishment on the right shore, which, according to the best information, possesses the same facilities for such establishments as are found on the island of New Orleans itself. These circumstances essentially distinguish the situation of the French commerce in the Mississippi, after a cession of New Orleans to the United States, from the situation of the commerce of the United States, without such a cession; their right of deposit being so much more circumscribed, and their territory on the Mississippi not reaching low enough for a commercial establishment on the shore, within their present limits.

There remain to be considered the commerce of the ports in the Floridas. With respect to this branch the advantages which will be secured to France by the proposed arrangement ought to be satisfactory. She will here also derive a greater share from the increase which will be given, by a more rapid settlement of a fertile territory, to the exports and imports through those ports, than she would obtain from any restrictive use she could make of those ports as her own property. But this is not all. The United States have a just claim to the use of the rivers which pass from their territories through the Floridas. They found their claim on like principles with those which supported their claim to the use of the Mississippi. If the length of these rivers be not in the same proportion with that of the Mississippi, the difference is balanced by the circumstance that both banks, in the former case, belong to the United States.

With a view to permanent harmony between the two nations, a cession of the Floridas is particularly to be desired, as obviating serious