morning; but it being Sunday, they were delayed till to-day. We are now detained by a snowstorm and contrary wind, but I shall sail as soon as it clears up, & the wind shifts.

The resolutions of Mr. Ross proved that the federal party will stick at nothing to embarrass the adm"., and recover its lost power. They nevertheless produce a great effect on the publick mind and I presume more especially in the western country. The unanimity in the publick councils respecting our right to the free navigation of the river, and its importance to every part of the U States, the dissatisfaction at the interference of Sp". which will not be appeased while the power of a similar one exists, are calculated to inspire the hope of a result which may put us at ease forever on those points. If the negotiation secures all the objects sought, or a deposit with the sovereignty over it, the federalists will be overwhelmed completely: the union of the western with the Eastern people will be consolidated, republican principles confirmed, and a fair prospect of peace and happiness presented to our country. But if the negotiation compromises short of that, and leaves the management of our great concerns in that river, which comprise everything appertaining to the western parts of the U States, in the hands of a foreign power, may we not expect that the publick will be disappointed and disapprove of the result. So far as I can judge, I think much would be hazarded by any adjustment which did not put us in complete security for the future. It is doubtful whether an adjustment short of that would be approved in any part of the union; I am thoroughly persuaded it would not to the westward. If they were discontented, there would grow up an union of councils and measures between them and the Eastern people which might lead to other measures & be perverted to bad purposes. The Eastern towns, which govern the country wish war for the sake of privateering: the western would not dislike it especially if they were withheld from a just right, or the enjoyment of a privilege necessary to their welfare, the pursuit of which by force would create a vast expenditure of money among them. Their confidence is now reposed in the adm". from the best of motives, a knowledge that it is sincerely friendly to their interests: it is strengthened by a distrust of these new friends; but an inquietude has been created by the late event, an inquiry has taken place which has shown that every part of the union especially the Eastern, is deeply interested in opening the river; that the attempt to occlude it on a former occasion was a base perhaps a corrupt intrigue of a few; their hopes and expectations have been raised, and it is probable they expect from the mission by a peaceful course everything which their enemies promised by war. The consequences of a disappointment are not easily calculated. If it restored the federal party to power and involved us in war, the result might be fatal. It therefore highly merits consideration whether we

should not take that ground as the ultimatum in the negotiation which must in every possible event preserve the confidence & affection of the western people. While we stand well with them we shall prosper. We shall be most apt to avoid war, taking ten years ensuing together; and if we are driven by necessity into it, it is much better that it be under the auspices of a republican than a monarchial adm". These ideas are expressed in haste for y'. consideration for I have not time to give them method or form. I shall most certainly labor to obtain the best terms possible, but it is for you to say, what are the least favorable we must accept. You will have time to weigh the subject & feel the publick pulse on it before anything conclusive may be done. I hope the French govt. will have wisdom enough to see that we will never suffer France or any other power to tamper with our interior; if that is not the object there can be no reason for declining an accommodation to the whole of our demands.

[Extract.]

James Madison, Secretary of State, to Charles Pinckney, Minister to Spain.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, March 8, 1803.

SIR: My last letter was of January 18. Yours since received are of the 6th and 28th of November.

Our latest authentic information from New Orleans is of January 20. At that date the edict of the Intendant against our right of deposit had not been revoked, although the letters to him and the Governor from the Spanish Minister here had been previously received. And it appears that the first outrage had been followed by orders of the most rigid tenor against every hospitable intercourse between our citizens navigating the river and the Spanish inhabitants.

This continuation of the obstruction to our trade, and the approach of the season for carrying down the Mississippi the exports of the Western country, have had the natural effect of increasing the Western irritation, and imboldening the advocates for immediate redress by arms. Among the papers enclosed, you will find the propositions moved in the Senate by Mr. Ross, of Pennsylvania. They were debated at considerable length, and with much ardor, and, on the question, had 11 votes in their favor against 14. The resolutions moved by Mr. Breckinridge, and which have passed into a law, will, with the law itself, be also found among the enclosed papers.

These proceedings ought more and more to convince the Spanish Government that it must not only maintain good faith with the United States, but must add, to this pledge of peace, some provident and effectual arrangement, as heretofore urged, for controlling or correcting the wrongs of Spanish officers in America, without the necessity of

crossing the Atlantic for the purpose. The same proceeding, will show, at the same time, that, with proper dispositions and arrangements on the part of Spain, she may reckon with confidence on harmony and friendship with this country. Notwithstanding the deep stroke made at our rights and our interests, and the opportunity given for selfredress, in a summary manner, a love of peace, a respect for the just usages of nations, and a reliance on the voluntary justice of the Spanish Government, have given a preference to remonstrance, as the first appeal on the occasion, and to negotiation as a source of adequate provisions for perpetuating the good understanding between the two nations; the measures taken on the proposition of Mr. Breckinridge being merely those of ordinary precaution, and precisely similar to those which accompanied the mission of Mr. Jay to Great Britian in 1794. Should the deposit, however, not be restored in time for the arrival of the Spring craft, a new crisis will occur, which it is presumed that the Spanish Government will have been stimulated to prevent, by the very heavy claims of indemnification to which it would be otherwise fairly subjected. The Marquis de Casa Yrujo does not yet despair of receiving from New Orleans favorable answers to his letters; but the remedy seems now to be no more reasonably expected from Madrid. If the attention of the Spanish Government should not have been sufficiently quickened by the first notice of the proceeding, from its own officers, we hope that the energy of your interpositions will have overcome its tardy habits, and have produced an instant despatch of the necessary orders.

Mr. Monroe was to sail from New York to Havre de Grace yesterday. He carries with him the instructions in which you are joined with him, as well as those which include Mr. Livingston.

The convention signed with Spain in August, though laid before the Senate at an early day, had no question taken on it till the close of the session. It was then postponed till the next session, which is to commence in November. More than a majority, but less than twothirds, which the Constitution requires, would have acquiesced in the instrument in its present form; trusting to the success of further negotiations for supplying its defects, particularly the omission of the claims founded on French irregularities. But it is understood that it would have been a mere acquiescence; no doubt being entertained that Spain is bound to satisfy the omitted as well as the included claims. In explaining, therefore, the course taken by the Senate, which mingles respect for the Spanish Government with a cautious regard to our own rights, you will avail yourself of the opportunity of pressing the reasonableness and the sound policy of remodeling the convention in such a manner as to do full justice. I need not repeat the observations heretofore made on the Spanish responsibility for the conduct of French citizens within Spanish jurisdiction; but it may be of use

to refer you to the enclosed copy of a royal order, issued by the Spanish Government, in 1799, which will enable you to remind them of their own view of the subject at that time. In this document it is expressly declared that the French consular jurisdiction was not admitted, and that French Consuls, in Spanish ports, were in the same condition as those of every other nation. After such a declaration against the authority of French Consuls the Spanish Government would be chargeable with no less disrespect to the French Republic than to itself, in saying that Spain was not left at liberty to prevent an exercise of the usurped authority; and, if at liberty, she is indisputably answerable for the consequences of not preventing it.

With sentiments, &c.,

CHARLES PINCKNEY, Esq.

JAMES MADISON.

R. R. Livingston to James Madison, Secretary of State.

PARIS, March 11, 1803.

DEAR SIR: I have a few days since written to you, transmitting a letter addressed to the First Consul: for though I had numerous notes and observations under his eye, in an informal way, yet I have reason to fear that what I wrote to the Minister, particularly on the subject of the debt, had not reached him; besides that, I believed that he could not pass over a more direct address to him personally. I found, upon conversing with some of the Ministers here, that they considered my direct address as improper, and likely to offend the Minister, if not the Consul. But our situation was such as to require something decisive; and as I daily found the dispositions of M. Talleyrand were friendly to our views, I promised the Minister to write, and offered to submit my letter to him before I sent it. He was pleased with this mark of confidence, and promised not only to deliver it, but to support my application. When I showed him the letter, he seemed to think that all relating to the debt was hopeless. 1, however, could not abandon this important object, but immediately upon sending it, took care to have that part of it supported by Consul Le Brun, who has the principal direction of the affairs of finances, with whom I am upon a very friendly footing, and between whom and my friend Marbois, there is a family connexion, strengthened by the marriage of their children. have the pleasure to enclose you an answer to that letter; you will find in it such strong and such satisfactory assurances on the subject of the debt, as I think gives us the firmest prospects of its speedy payment. I have thought it necessary to communicate this to the Americans here, in order to prevent their parting with their claims at an insignificant price. I have, also, as I know that this account would reach

I

America by private conveyances, before you could communicate it, thought it proper to mention it generally to one of my friends, with directions to speak of it publicly, in order to prevent the creditors from suffering by the speculations of those who were in the secret.

I told you that M. Talleyrand had assured me that no sale would be heard of. You will find a passage in the note which was doubtless intended to convey that idea in very strong terms. As I know it to be the fixed determinatian of this Government to treat only in America, I have nothing more to do on this subject than to endeavor to get the right of depot left upon the footing it was till your negotiations are concluded. This I shall endeavor to effect. If, upon the arrival of Mr. Monroe, he can suggest anything better, I shall heartily concur with him. In treating with General Bernadotte, you will have every possible advantage. The nearer he views the object, the less he will value it. His dispositions are as friendly as possible to our Government and country; and his ideas relative to our connexion, and the little importance of Louisiana, exactly such as I would wish. My conversations with him on that subject were frequent and interesting; as well with Mr. Adet, who is much in his confidence, and who thinks exactly as I do. The great object that he will be instructed to keep in view will be, I think, from what I learn here, to keep the British out of the river, and to secure as much as possible of the carrying trade to France. Dupont de Nemours has shown me a plan that he gave to Consul Le Brun, of which I send you a copy. I have endeavored to convince those who may be consulted of its impracticability. The reasons are too obvious to make it necessary for me to state them to you. I have hinted at making the island of New Orleans an independent State, under the Government of Spain, France, and the United States, with a right of depot to each, subject to a duty on imports of one and a half per cent. in lieu of storage, wharfage, &c., suggesting the advantage that France would derive from being the only manufacturing nation of the three. The advantages of this to our carrying trade (while it left our revenue untouched) are obvious. And in such a treaty, arrangements might be made extremely advantageous to the Western people. The new nation must always feel its dependence upon us, and, of course, respect our rights. I should not have thought it worth while to mention this, had it not been that I gave an unsigned and informal sketch of it to Joseph Bonaparte: it may possibly be given to General Bernadotte. If, as I begin to believe, they do not get the Floridas, they will put the less value on New Orleans.

Things every day look more towards a rupture between this country and Britain; and though the politicians think otherwise, I believe a war not very distant. The stocks here have been sixty-five; they are now sixty-one. This, however, is an artificial operation; money being