United States this important privilege, which they considered themselves entitled to by the best of all guaranties, the good faith of His Catholic Majesty? You will easily see, sir, that if a naked cession has been made to France, without attention to these articles, how much reason the United States will have to complain of the measure: and I trust, sir, that you will see the propriety of their forming one of the parties to any treaty in which their rights may be so materially affected. I know, sir, that observations might, and I doubt not will be made officially to your Court by the Minister of the United States at Madrid; but, in the meantime, sir, as it is my intention to address myself upon this subject to the Government of France, I wish to receive from you every information which might throw light upon the subject, and the rather as knowing the confidence that His Catholic Majesty reposed in your talents and patriotism; and seeing, at the same time, that in everything that related to this object our respective nations had a joint interest. I have believed that you will receive with pleasure this unofficial note as a mark of my confidence, and afford me your aid in giving efficacy to a treaty which has served as a basis of friendship between our respective nations. R. R. L. [Extract.] Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State. PARIS, June 8, 1802. Enclosed is the answer of the Spanish Ambassador to my letter, a copy of which was forwarded on the 28th ult. It accords with the conclusions I drew from the delay of the expedition, and the conduct of the Minister of Exterior Relations. I have had a conversation with Collot and Adet, separately. I find that, though they both consider their going in official characters to Louisiana as settled, yet that they have neither seen the treaty, nor know precisely the boundary of the territory acquired. Pensacola and Mobile, they say, are expressly given: as to the rest, or whether it includes West Florida, they can not say. That France intended that it should, I have no doubt; and I still think it probable that she will make it yield to her intentions: for in Europe she does what she will, and it will require firmness and exertion to prevent her doing so in America. The Chevalier d'Azara, Ambassador of His Catholic Majesty, near the French Republic, to Mr. Livingston, Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States. PARIS, June 2, 1802. SIR: I pray you to excuse my not having been able to see you when you were so good as to call at my dwelling; the ill state of my health for the last ten days has deprived me of that honor. I return you thanks for the frankness disclosed in your unofficial note of the 28th May; and, in adopting the same friendship and equal frankness, I have the honor to inform you that the affair concerning which you have addressed me, not having passed through my hands, I am unable to give you all the information which you have desired. It appears certain, however, that a treaty ceding Louisiana has been concluded; but I am of opinion that the Floridas are not comprised in the cession. As the Minister of the United States at Madrid will be required, (agreeably to what you have had the goodness to inform me), to demand explanation of my Court concerning the treaty in question, your Government will receive, through him, all the information which may be proper. Nevertheless, I will write to my Court, and will not fail to communicate all that I may learn, for the purpose, as far as depends on me, of removing your doubts and dispelling your inquietude. J. NICOLAY D'AZARA. [Extract.] James Madison, Secretary of State, to Rufus King, Minister to England. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, July 23, 1802, The subject of your letter of May 7th, namely, your correspondence with Lord Hawkesbury on the cession of Louisiana and the Floridas to France will receive from the President all the consideration which its great importance demands; and as soon as an answer can be founded on the result of his reflections no time will be lost in transmitting it. [Extract.] James Madison, Secretary of State, to C. Pinckney, Minister to Spain. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, July 26, 1802. The information from Paris renders it certain that the cession of Louisiana to France has actually been concluded, and that the cession comprehends the two Floridas. In this state of the business, it seems unnecessary to decide on the price which Spain might be led to expect for a cession of the Floridas, including New Orleans, to the United States; and the more so, as it would be of use for us previously to know the value she places on the guaranty proposed in my letter to you of the 25th of September last. For the present, the cession wished by the United States must be an object of negotiation with the French Government. It will, notwithstanding, continue to be proper for you to cultivate the good dispositions of Spain in relation to it, both as they may not be entirely disregarded by France, and as, in H. Doc. 431 -3 the turn of events, Spain may possibly be extricated from her engagements to France, and again have the disposal of the territories in question. [Extract.] Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State. PARIS, July 30, 1802. I have received your dispatches and the President's by M. Dupont de Nemours. I shall reply more particularly to them at the next opportunity, as I am now very much engaged in preparing a lengthy memoir on the subject of the mutual interests of France and the United States, relative to Louisiana, by which I hope to convince them that, both in a commercial and a political view, the posession of it would be disadvantageous to France. In my last, I hinted to you my suspicions that France and Spain did not understand each other on the subject of Louisiana, and communicated to you my letters to the Spanish Ambassador, calculated to sound this business, and interpose some difficulty to its execution. His answer confirmed my opinion. I have since received, verbally, his explicit assurance that the Floridas are not included in the cession; and I have been applied to, by one of the Ministers here, to know what we understand, in America, by Louisiana. You can easily conceive my answer. I have just received a letter from Mr. Graham, in which he communicates the Spanish Minister's answer to Mr. Pinckney's application upon the same subject, in these words: "If the King should think proper to cede Louisiana, he will take care that the interest of the United States shall not be affected by it." It appears also, by the fifth article of the Treaty of Madrid, March 21st, 1801, that the cession had been made of Louisiana generally. The French, you know, have always extended it to South Carolina and all the country on the Ohio. Since the possession of the Floridas by Britain, and the Treaty of 1763, I think there can be no doubt as to the precise meaning of the term. I find a certain degree of raideur in the Spanish Ambassador, on that subject, which it will be our interest to cherish at the Court of Spain unless we should have a prospect of purchasing the Floridas. In the present state of things, until the point is settled, I think it probable the expedition to Louisiana will be postponed. In the meantime, all that can be done here will be to endeavor to obtain a cession of New Orleans, either by purchase, or by offering to make it a port of entry to France, on such terms as shall promise advantages to her commerce, and give her hopes of introducing her manufactures and wines into our western country. An arrangement of this sort, if they listen to it, would certainly be beneficial to both countries and only hurtful to Britain. If to this we could add a stipulation that she shall never possess the Floridas, but, on the contrary, in case of a rupture with Spain, and a conquest of them, cede them to us, our affairs in that quarter would stand as well as I would wish; and the colonies that France might attempt to establish on the west side of the Mississippi would be too feeble to injure us. I find them very anxious to have the ports of Pensacola and St. Augustine, as they dread our having command of the Gulf. I confess this appears to me no very important object; and if they would be content with these, and give us West Florida and New Orleans, even at a large price, we should not hesitate. I am sorry that you have not communicated to me what are precisely the utmost limits of the sum I may venture to offer in cash, or in our own demands. As the Minister has been absent some time, and has but just returned, I can not state precisely to you what we may hope on this subject; but be persuaded that I am fully impressed with the importance of the subject, and that nothing will be left undone which I can do to effectuate your wishes. I saw him last night, and was very cordially received. His health is so much amended by the waters, that I hope he will be able to go through business more speedily than he has done. [Extract.] Mr. Livingston to the Secretary of State. PARIS, August 10, 1802. Our own affairs have advanced but little, since the whole attention of those in power are turned to objects nearer home. I have had several conferences on the subject of Louisiana, but can get nothing more from them than I have already communicated. I have thought it best, by conversation and by writing, to pave the way, prior to any direct application, till I know better to what object to point. For this purpose, I have written the enclosed essay, which I have had translated, and struck off twenty copies; I have just got them finished; I have placed some of them in such hands as I think will best serve our purposes. Talleyrand has promised me to give it an attentive perusal; after which, when I find how it works, I will come forward with some proposition. I am very much, however, at a loss, as to what terms you would consider it as allowable to offer, if they can be brought to a sale of the Floridas, either with or without New Orleans: which last place will be of little consequence, if we possess the Floridas, because a much better passage may be formed on the east side of the river. I may, perhaps, carry my estimate of them too high; but when I consider, first, the expense it will save us in guards and garrisons, the risk of war, the value of duties, and what may be raised by the sale of 36 lands, I should think them a cheap purchase. I trust, however, that you will give me some directions on this head, and not leave the responsibility of offering too much or too little, entirely at my door. I speak, in all this business, as if the affair of the Floridas was arranged with Spain; which, I believe, is not yet the case. But I took occasion to touch on the subject three days ago, with the Spanish Ambassador, with whom I was dining, and think he appeared to have somewhat relaxed on that ground, but would say nothing decisive; nor were the time and place proper to press him. Memoir, referred to in the preceding dispatch. Whether it will be advantageous to France to take possession of Louisiana? This question presents itself in two points of view: First, as it affects the commerce and manufactures of France. Colonies are never cherished for themselves, but on account of the influence they may have upon the general prosperity of the nation. And as one man at home, contributes more to this than two at a distance, no wise nation colonizes but when it has a superfluous population, or when it has a superfluous capital that can not otherwise be rendered productive. The population of France, though very considerable, has by no means attained the point which renders it necessary to colonize. The soil, climate, and local situation, give it advantages as a commercial and more particularly as a manufacturing, nation, over every other part of Europe. The ingenuity, taste, and industry of the inhabitants have placed them in the highest rank; but these advantages are very much restricted by the want of a sufficient capital to bring them into operation. A rival nation, inferior in all the circumstances I have mentioned, by the single effect of a large capital, has attained a superiority both in commerce and manufactures which, in return, those circumstances enable it to maintain by continually adding to that national wealth. Capital increases manufactures by the introduction of machines, by the regular payment of workmen, by reducing the interest of money, and, above all, by forcing new markets. The wealthy mechanic alone can afford those expensive and slow operations which, in many cases, give perfection to a fabric. And the rich merchant, alone, can afford to make long voyages, from which he has slow returns; or give such extensive credits as will tempt those of foreign countries to purchase his commodities in preference to such as are offered by nations who expect more speedy payment. Such is the want of capital in France, that no manufacturer has any quantity of |