not authorize the United States to take sides with one or the other party in the intestine troubles of that nation. (Opinions Attorney-General, vol. xi, pp. 392-3.) Four years after the signature of this treaty and two years after its ratification the United States and Great Britain, April 19, 1850, executed the treaty which is generally known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. The necessity for this treaty having arisen from the complication of the interests of Great Britain and the United States in Central America, its special provisions were confined to the adjustment of such questions in that region as seemed to threaten the amicable relations of these two powers, and provided that neither Great Britain nor the United States would ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over a ship canal through the territory of Central America, erect or maintain any fortification commanding the same or in the vicinity thereof, occupy, fortify, colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America, nor make use of any alliance, connection, or influence with any of these States to obtain any unequal advantages in regard to commerce or navigation through such canal. These stipulations, it will be observed, were confined to Central America, and were finally carried out by negotiations with the states of Central America themselves. These negotiations were sometimes under the joint recommendation of the United States and Great Britain, sometimes separate with Great Britain, but, as I shall have occasion to show hereafter in some detail, were known in their progress to the United States, and, with some differences of opinion, frankly and amicably discussed between the two governments, were considered as generally satisfactory. But besides these stipulations, confined to Central America, the 8th article of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty provided: The Governments of the United States and Great Britain having not only desired in entering into this convention to accomplish a particular object, but also to establish a general principle, they hereby agree to extend their protection, by treaty stipulation, to any other practicable communications, whether by canal or railway, across the isthmus which connects North and South America, and especially to the interoceanic communications which are now proposed to be established by the way of Tehuantepec and Panama.. It is evident from the language of this article that the special stipulations in reference to Central America were not thus made obligatory in relation to Mexico and New Granada, as indeed they could scarcely have been without the diplomatic intervention of those powers themselves. But the United States undertook by this provision to extend to Great Britain such participation in the general benefits of any interoceanic connection which might be opened in these countries as was afforded by the principles of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty; and these were to be secured by treaty stipulations," to be made at the proper time and under such conditions as might appear wisest and best when that time should come. This declaration, therofore, of a general principle to be put in practice, could not and did not modify either the rights or obligations which the United States had acquired or assumed by the treaty with New Granada of 1846, and which still exist in all their binding effect. The concession, the building, and the administration of the Panama Railroad are a sufficient illustration of the correctness of this view. In April, 1856, occurred the riot at Panama, by which the lives of many American citizens were sacrificed and a vast amount of valuable property was destroyed by a mob, which, if not instigated, were certainly not restrained by the New Granadian authorities. This atrocious outrage excited universal indignation, and the Government of the United States was forced to consider whether it would not be obliged to assume a position of more direct and vigorous authority on the isthmus. In December, 1856, Mr. Marcy, then Secretary of State, sent two special ministers to Bogota with instructions to submit to the considertion of the New Granadian Government the project of a treaty, with the draft of which they were furnished. Those instructions and the project of treaty are herewith submitted to you. (Inclosure No. 1.) The necessity for this new arrangement, Mr. Marcy explained, sprung from the utter inability or unwillingness of the New Granadian Govment to afford the necessary protection to the transit of the isthmus, and the consequent imposition upon the United States of its obligations of guarantee. He proposed the creation of a belt of territory twenty miles broad, running from the Atlantic to the Pacific on lines equidistant from the line of the Panama road. The sovereignty of New Granada was to be formally admitted, but the government of the territory was to be placed in the hands of two municipalities, one at the Atlantic, the other at the Pacific terminus of the Panama Railroad. The authorities of these municipalities were to be selected by the inhabitants of the territory and charged with the police protection of persons" and property. He further proposed that the United States should acquire either the possession or control of certain islands in the harbors at each terminus, where they could make naval stations, keep supplies, and be in condition to enforce effectively the guarantee of the isthmus. He was careful to disclaim all intention of seeking any commercial advantages over other nations, expressed his willingness 10admit them to a participation in the benefits of the treaty, and declared his conviction that the terms of the projected treaty did not conflict with the general and generous principles which the United States had joined Great Britian in declaring. This treaty was unacceptable to the New Granadian Government. In 1868 another attempt was made by Mr. Seward to negotiate a treaty which should more precisely define and regulate the relations between the United States and New Granada. You will find herewith [inclosure No. 2] his instructions covering a draft of projected treaty, and he was so anxious to conclude some satisfactory arrangement, that Mr. Caleb Cushing was sent as special agent to join the minister resident at Bogota and endeavor to procure its adoption. You will find herewith [Inclosure No. 3] the treaty which was signed, and which appears to be in conformity with his instructions, but for reasons of which I am iguorant it was not ratified by the Senate. In 1870 another effort was made through Mr. Hurlbut to reach the same desirable end, and you will find herewith the treaty which he negotiated and the history of its negotiation [inclosure No. 4]. The treaty was acceptable to the United States, but was so extensively and so seriously modified by the Congress of New Granada, to whom it was in due course submitted for ratification, that it could not be accepted by this government. These amendments are included in inclosure No. 4. This was the last effort on the part of the United States to negotiate with New Granada on the subject of an interoceanic canal. Congress abolished the mission to that power in 1876, and diplomatic relations were not renewed until the restoration of the mission and the appointment of the present minister in the summer of 1878. During all this time there have been various concessions by the Colombian Government to parties professing the desire and ability to execute a canal. I do not deem it necessary to call them specially to your attention. They have the same general character, and do not seem to have ever had any real vitality. But I think it proper to send herewith [inclosure No.5,] the last concession, namely, that to Lieutenant Wyse, made March 28, 1878, and with the consent of the Colombian Govern. ment transferred to Mr. de Lesseps, a distinguished citizen of France, and universally known as the projector and founder of the Suez Canal. No treaty relations in reference to an interoceanic canal through the territory of Nicaragua were established by the Government of the United States prior to the execution of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. The attention of this government seems for a long period to have been given chiefly to such connection by way of the Isthmus of Panama. But as the engineering difficulties of that plan attracted its consideration, and the acquisition of territory on the Pacific coast gave more and more practical interest to the completion of some such connection, the importance of the route through Nicaragua seemed to impose upon the government the necessity of some direct arrangement. The great diffi culty in the way was, that, owing to circumstances which are too well known to need recapitulation, the Government of Great Britain had assumed a protectorate over that part of the coasts of Nicaragua and Costa Rica in which lay the Atlantic terminus of any possible connection through those countries, and had given practical effect to its claim of protectorate by the occupation of the port of St. Juan. Mr. Clayton opened negotiations with the British Government for the purpose of adjusting these differences. The object of the negotiations thus initiated cannot be better set forth thau in the language of Mr. Rives, who, under the instructions of Mr. Clayton, submitted the views of the Government of the United States to Lord Palmerston. No. 3.] Mr. Rives to Mr. Clayton. LONDON, September, 25, 1849. SIR: Yesterday I called upon Lord Palmerston, at his house in Carlton Gardens, for the purpose of holding the interview with him which had been previously arranged. He gave me a very cordial reception, and took occasion to say that he had come up to London from the residence of Viscount Melbourne in the country, where he had been passing some days, solely for the sake of seeing and conversing with me. After some conversation of a general nature, I stated to him that there being a sort of interregnum at present in the usual diplomatic relations of the two countries, owing to the departure of Mr. Bancroft and the postponement for a few weeks of Mr. Lawrence's arrival, you had instructed me, while on my way to Paris, to call upon his Lordship and converse with him on a matter which was more than ordinarily urgent and critical; that it was quite unnecessary, I persuaded myself, to assure his Lordship that the President was anxious to preserve the most cordial good understanding with her Britannic Majesty's Government; that in proportion as that desire was sincerely felt, it was seen with no little concern that there was one question which, unless great prudence and caution were observed on both s des, might involve te two governments unwittingly in collision; that shortly before I left the United States a letter from the British consul at New York had been published, asserting iu very positive and unqualified terms an exclusive claim for the Mosquito Indians to the ownership and sovereign jurisdiction of the n.outh and lower part of the river San Juan de Nicaragua; that the United States had no disposition to intermeddle in any pragmatical spirit, or with views in the slightest degree unfriendly to Great Britain, with that question, but they were necessarily parties to it in their own right; that citizens of the United States had entered into a contract with the State of Nicaragua to open, on certain conditions, a communication between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by the River San Juan and the Nicaragua Lake; that the Government of the United States, after the most careful investigation of the subject, had come undoubtingly to the conclusion that upon both legal and historical grounds the State of Nicaragua was the true territorial sovereign of the River San Juan as well as of the Nicaragua Lake, and that it was, therefore, bound to give its countenance and support, by all proper and reasonable means, to rights lawfully derived by their citizens under a grant from that sovereign; that the United States, moreover, as one of the principal commercial powers of the world, and the one nearest to the scene of the proposed communication, and holding, besides, a large domain on the western coast of America, had a special and deep national interest in the free and unobstructed use, in common with other powers, of any channel of intercourse which might be opened from the one sea to the other, and that moved by a proper regard for that interest, it had probably already concluded, or would soon do so, a treaty with Nicaragua for securing a transit for its commerce and public stores by the route in question, on terms open alike to all other nations. I then proceeded to observe to Lord Palmerston that the Government of the United States was particularly desirous that there should be no misconception of its objects and motives in this matter by her Britannic Majesty's Government, and that it was of the highest importance that both governments should be made acquainted frankly with the views and intentions of each other; that it had sometimes happened in military operations that detachments of the same army had gotten engaged with each other, in the dark, in bloody strife, and so in civil and political affairs, nations, as well as individuals, in ignorance of each other's real views, and under the influence of a natural but unfounded distrust, were often committed in serious opposition to each other, when a frank and unreserved communication, in the first instance, of their respective objects would have brought them to co-operate heartily in the pursuit of a common end; that the United States sought no exclusive privilege or preferential right of any kind in regard to the proposed communication, and their sincere wish, if it should be found practicable, was to see it dedicated to the common use of all nations on the most liberal terms, and a footing of perfect equality for all, securing it beforehand, by proper stipulations, against unreasonable and oppressive exactions for the use of it, either from the States through whose territories it should pass, or the individuals or companies who might be authorized to construct it; that the United States would not, if they could, obtain any exclusive right or privilege in a great highway, which naturally belonged to all mankind, for they well knew that the possession of any such privilege would expose them to inevitable jealousies and probable controversies which would make it infinitely more costly than advantageous; that while they aimed at no exclusive privilege for themselves they could never consent to see so important a communication fall under the exclusive control of any other great commercial power; that we were far from imputing to Her Britannic Majesty's Government any views of that kind, but Mosquito possession at the mouth of the San Juan could be considered in no other light than British possession, and his lordship would readily comprehend that such a state of things, so long as it was continued, must necessarily give rise to dissatisfaction and distrust on the part of other commercial powers. Would it not, then, be wise, I said to Lord Palmerston, that Great Britain and the United States should come to a frank and manly understanding with each other and unite their influence for the accomplishment of an object of the highest importance to both of them as well as the rest of the world, instead of hazarding the final loss of so great an object by jarring and divided councils. If, however, the British Government shall reject these overtures on our part, and shall refuse to co-operate with us in the generous and philanthropic scheme of rendering the interoceanic communication by the way of the port and river San Juan, free to all nations upon the same terms, we shall deem ourselves justified in protecting our interests independently of her aid, and despite her opposition or hostility. With a view to this alternative, we have a treaty with the State of Nicaragua, a copy of which has been sent to you, and the stipulations of which you should unreservedly impart to Lord Palmerston. You will inform him, however, that this treaty was concluded without a power or instructions from this government; that the President had no knowledge of its existence or of the intention to form it until it was presented to him by Mr. Hise, our late chargé d'affaires to Guatemala, about the first of September last; and that consequently we are not bound to ratify it, and will take no step for that purpose if we can, by arrangements with the British Government, place our interests upon a just and satisfactory foundation. But if our efforts for this end should be abortive, the President will not hesitate to submit this or some other treaty which may be concluded by the present chargé d'affaires to Guatemala to the Senate of the United States for their advice and A consent, with a view to its ratification, and if that enlightened body should approve it, he also will give it his hearty sanction, and will exert all his constitutional power to execute its provisions in good faith, a determination in which he may confidently count upon the good will of the people of the United States. * I am, &c., * * * * JOHN M CLAYTON, The treaty with Nicaragua, negotiated by Mr. Hise and referred to in the above correspondence will be found in inclosure No. 6. The negotiation thus opened in London was superseded by the execu tion in Washington of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which will be found herewith [inclosure No. 7]. Immediately after the conclusion of this treaty, and for the purpose of securing promptly the execution of its provisions, Mr. Webster and Sir John Crampton agreed upon a draft of treaty to be executed by Nicaragua and Costa Rica with each other, by which all questions of limits between them should be adjusted, and such other provisions adopted as would allow the prompt application of the principles of the ClaytonBulwer treaty to the construction of the canal. That agreement you will find herewith [inclosure No. 8. No. 77.] Mr. Webster to Mr. Lawrence. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SIR: Your dispatches to No. 176, inclusive, have been received. On the 30th ultimo, as you may have been informed through another channel, Mr. Crampton and myself agreed upon and signed a proposition to Costa Rica and Nicaragua for the adjustment of their disputes upon the subject of boundary and also for the adjustment of the controversy between Great Britain and Nicaragua in regard to the territory claimed by the Mosquito Indians. If this proposition should be accepted by those republics, a quadripartite treaty will probably be entered into by them, Great Britain and the United States. A principal impediment to the commencement or successful progress of the ship canal through Nicaragua will then have been removed. Considering that the United States and Great Britain have jointly agreed to protect such a canal, and in consequence of their possessions on the coast of the Pacific and of other obvious causes, have a similar interest in its success, it seems desirable that the capital required for its construction should be advanced by the citizens and subjects of both countries. If, however, English capitalists should not be disposed to invest ther funds in the enterprise, the means for its construction can easily be obtained in this country, whenever our citizens shall be satisfied of its practicability and that it would yield a regular and fair profit. Convinced of the great importance of the work, the Government of the United States would always be disposed to aid in the prosecution thereof to the full extent of its constitutional power. It is not likely, however, that the canal company will need any such assistance from this government. * * * * * * I am, &c., &c., DANIEL WEBSTER. Mr. Kerr, at that time minister resident in Central America and Mr. Walsh were appointed by the United States, and Consul-General Wyke by Great Britain, as special commissioners to submit this treaty to the States of Costa Rica and Nicaragua for adoption. The negotiation failed, owing to the unwillingness of the latter power, and so much im. portance did this government attach to their joint action on this subject, that Mr. Everett as Secretary of State instructed Mr. Kerr, 30th December, 1852: You will also make known to the Nicaraguan minister that the President cannot consent to renew the discussions with his government on the subject of inter-oceanic cominmunication by the Nicaraguan route, without a satisfactory explanation of the grounds on which the Government of Nicaragua peremptorily rejected the propositions which in conjunction with Her Britannic Majesty's minister the Government of the United States agreed upon for the purpose of removing the obstacles which had existed. |