German Government denying that a German submarine had attacked the British hospital ship "Rewa," and declining, in the absence of proof, to discuss the protest which had been made to them by His Majesty's Government against the attacks also made on the hospital ships "Glenart Castle " and "Guildford Castle."

2. I transmit to you herewith statements, supported by sworn declarations, of the facts in regard to the attacks on these three vessels, which afford convincing proof of their having been delivered by hostile submarines. In view of the locality in which the attacks took place, and of the fact that the German Government alone have attempted, though on the flimsiest foundations, to justify such deeds, there can be no doubt that the submarines concerned belonged to the German forces.

3. I shall be glad if your Excellency will communicate copies of the enclosed paper to the Spanish Government, inviting their attention to the importance of its contents, and requesting them to transmit a copy to the German Government, together with a reiteration of the emphatic protest already made by His Majesty's Government against the action of the German submarines concerned. This action,

as already pointed out, was contrary not only to international law and the law of humanity, but also to the definite pledge given by the German Government to the Spanish Government that the German naval forces would not attack hospital ships except in certain waters, which do not include those in which these three vessels were assailed.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR.

Statements respecting Attacks on British Hospital Ships 'Rewa," Glenart Castle," Guildford Castle," and "Llandovery Castle."

"REWA."

ABOUT 11 P.M. on the 4th January, 1918, the hospital ship 'Rewa," homeward bound from Malta to Avonmouth, and showing navigation and hospital ship lights, was in the entrance to the Bristol Channel, about 17 miles to the southwest of Hartland Point. Her course was north 50° east (true) and her speed about 8 or 9 knots. She was carrying 279 patients, a medical staff of 79, and a crew of 207. A small white light was sighted about 11 P.M. on the port bow. The light was low on the water and appeared and disappeared at intervals. The vessel from which the light proceeded could not clearly be seen. Shortly afterwards a second and fainter white light appeared close to the first. It was low down and

was

came from the same craft as the other. The master, thinking it must be a small sailing boat, ported his helm 24 points, but the strange lights still maintained the same bearing on the port bow, showing that the unknown vessel manœuvring so as to keep the Rewa" in the same relative position. About three or four minutes after the helm was ported a violent explosion occurred amidships on the port side, approximately at 11.15 P.M., in latitude 50° 55' north, longitude 4° 59' west. The ship sank at about 2.15 A.M. on the 5th January.

The suggestion of the German Government that the "Rewa" was destroyed by a mine is negatived by the following considerations:

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1. An enemy submarine is known to have been in the vicinity at the time, because at 4.40 P.M. on the 4th January the schooner 'Pauline" was attacked by one, visible on the surface, in latitude 50° 23' north, longitude 5o 28' west, while at 10.10 A.M. on the 6th January the steamships "Spencer and Halberdier" were torpedoed and sunk in latitude 52° 23' north, longitude 5o 30' west.

2. The two white lights sighted shortly before the explosion evidently proceeded from a low-lying vessel, such as a submarine. Although it was a fine clear night, it was impossible to see her clearly, even with glasses.

3. It is clear that this vessel deliberately altered course so as to conform to the movements of the hospital ship, and after the explosion, although she was in close proximity to the sinking ship, she offered no assistance whatever. Friendly and neutral vessels have no reason to follow the movements of a hospital ship to the extent of keeping in a favourable position for a torpedo attack, and they are not slow in rendering assistance to ships in peril. This conduct of the strange vessel, even if it stood alone, affords very strong ground for believing she was an enemy, and therefore a German submarine.

4. The German Government are well aware that their vessels would not have laid mines many miles from land in a locality where their own submarines were habitually operating.

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5. No mines were found in the locality at any time before or after the destruction of the Rewa," although the area was thoroughly swept.

The German Government lay stress on the fact that a wireless message was intercepted at the time of the disaster to the effect that the "Rewa" had been mined, and they also comment on the interval of time which elapsed between the occurrence of the disaster on the 4th January and the

The answers to these criticisms are:-

1. That those on board the "Rewa," when sending out their call for assistance, had no time to form a considered opinion as to the cause of the explosion, and it is to their credit that they were willing, while the matter was still uncertain, to take the more charitable view that the ship had struck a mine.

2. The Board of Admiralty were naturally and properly reluctant to state that the ship had been torpedoed until the question had been placed beyond all reasonable doubt.

Sworn declarations* by the following witnesses are appended:

John E. Drake, master.

Benjamin T. Evans, third officer.
George A. Paterson, cadet.

Henry Taylor, fourth engineer.
William Moyse, quartermaster.

GLENART CASTLE."

About 4 A.M. on the 26th February, 1918, the hospital ship "Glenart Castle," while on passage from Newport to Brest, was destroyed in the entrance of the Bristol Channel. Her course was south 630 west, and speed about 10 knots.

She was carrying a crew of 122 officers and men and a medical staff of 64, including 8 women nurses, and was showing the usual navigation and hospital ship lights.

About an hour before the ship was attacked a bright light was seen on the starboard bow, very low on the water. The light changed its position from starboard bow to starboard quarter and back again, and so far as known was last seen about half an hour before the explosion occurred; it was then on the starboard quarter. About 3.57 A.M., the ship was struck on the starboard quarter and sank a few minutes later. The fact that out of the 186 persons on board only a small proportion were saved has made it a matter of some difficulty to ascertain the exact position in which the attack took place, but from the evidence of the quartermaster, who was in the best position to judge, it would appear that the most probable position was latitude 51° 5' north, longitude 5° 5' west.

Two of the survivors of the "Glenart Castle," while in the water, saw a submarine on the surface at distances not exceeding 100 yards. A number of men who were struggling in the water shouted to the crew of the submarine to take them aboard, but the submarine took no notice of their appeals and left them to drown.

No mines were found in the vicinity at any time before or • Not printed.

after the loss of the "Glenart Castle," although the area was thoroughly swept.

An enemy submarine is known to have been in the vicinity at the time, because at 9.15 P.M. on the 24th February the steamship Renfrew" was torpedoed in latitude 510 34' north, longitude 5° 16' west, and at 4.30 A.M. on the 26th February an enemy submarine was seen on the surface in latitude 51° 8' north, longitude 4° 57' west.

Sworn declarations* by the following witnesses are appended:

Jork J. Schiller, quartermaster.

C. Beveridge, private, R.A.M.C.

Alfred Bale, greaser.

"GUILDFORD CASTLE."

About 5.35 P.M. on the 10th March, 1918, the hospital ship Guildford Castle," on passing from Cape Town to Avonmouth, with 438 wounded on board, was attacked without success in the Bristol Channel in latitude 51° 11' north, longitude 5o 6' west.

The ship was showing the usual navigation and hospital ship lights. The weather was clear with a visibility of about 5 miles.

It appears that at 5.35 P.M. several witnesses saw a torpedo approaching the ship on the port side, the track of the torpedo being visible for several hundred yards; two of the witnesses also saw a periscope. The master put his helm hard-a-starboard and the torpedo passed some 30 or 40 yards behind the ship's stern. A minute or two later the ship received a severe blow on the port side, and an examination of the hull on arrival in port showed that the ship had been struck below the water-line by an object, probably a second torpedo, which failed to explode.

An enemy submarine is known to have been in the vicinity at the time, because about noon on the 10th March the French steamship "Germaine" and the Spanish steamship

Cristina were torpedoed and sunk by an enemy submarine in latitude 50° 37' north, longitude 4° 55' west, and latitude 50° 25' north, longitude 5° 13' west, respectively. Sworn declarations* by the following witnesses are appended:

Thomas Lang, master.

James D. Kerridge, chief officer.

Henry Hall, fourth officer.

Arnold Jackson, corporal, Army Service Corps.

Frank W. Gibson, sapper, Royal Engineers.

Sir,

(Enclosure 2.)-Mr. Balfour to Sir W. Townley.

Foreign Office, October 26, 1918. FOLLOWING On the attacks made by the enemy on the British hospital ships "Rewa," "Glenart Castle," and "Guildford Castle" in the Bristol Channel in the first three months of this year, the British hospital ship "Llandovery Castle" was torpedoed without warning and sunk by a German submarine in the Atlantic Ocean on the 27th June last. The vessel was showing all her navigation lights and. the special lights carried by hospital ships to make her character plain. She sank about ten minutes after being struck by the torpedo.

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2. The Llandovery Castle" was homeward bound from Canada, and therefore had no sick or wounded on board. Her crew consisted of 164 officers and men, and she carried 80 officers and men of the Canadian Army Medical Corps and 14 female nurses. Only one boat, containing 24 survivors out of this total of 258 persons, reached port. The search for further survivors proved fruitless.

3. The master of the hospital ship escaped in the boat which eventually reached land. This boat, while engaged immediately after the disaster in rescuing men in the water, was, in spite of explanations, prevented from continuing such work by the submarine, which peremptorily ordered her alongside and insisted on several men being left to drown.

4. The master was summoned on board the submarine, and was informed by the commander that the hospital ship had had on board eight American flight officers. This was quite untrue, as might have been ascertained by an exercise of the right of visit and search, provided for in Article 4 of The Hague Convention* for the adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention.

5. The remark shows that the attack on the ship was deliberate and premeditated. It appears also to indicate that the attack was made in consequence of orders given to the submarine by some superior German authority, who alleged the presence of the flight officers on board the hospital ship. The inference is that it is a settled plan of the German High Command to destroy hospital ships on any or no evidence, without exercising the right of visit and search.

6. A little later the second officer, who was in the same boat as the master of the hospital ship, was summoned on board the submarine, where the commander suggested to him that the noise made by the explosion of the boilers of the sinking vessel was caused by the explosion of ammunition. Vol. C, page 415.