v. Donald (a), that there would not be any difficulty in replying to this plea. In La Forest v. Langan (b), Tindal, C. J. expressed an opinion that it was improper to try a cause upon affidavit, where a distinct issue might be taken upon a plea. [Parke, B.-It is not simply a false plea, but it also casts upon the plaintiff the difficulty I have adverted to. Now the plaintiff in such a case ought not to be subjected to the inconvenience of having to consult his counsel as to the proper method of replying. In Bartley v. Godslake (c), it was held, that where a sham plea is such as to make it necessary for the plaintiff's attorney to consult counsel, and thereby to cause delay and expense, the plaintiff was entitled to sign judgment. That case is precisely in point. Pollock, C. B.-The judgment of Lord Lyndhurst, C. B., in the case of Milley v. Walls (d), is precisely to the same effect.]

Manisty, in support of the rule, was not heard.

PER CURIAM (e).-The rule must be absolute.

(a) 13 M. & W. 424.

(6) 4 Dowl. P. C. 642.

(c) 2 B. & Ald. 199.

Rule absolute.

(d) 2 L. J., Exch., 170.

(e) Pollock, C. B., Parke, B., Alderson, B., and Rolfe, B.

1849.

NUTT

V.

Rusu.

1849.

Νου. 22.

Under 6 & 7
Vict. c. 73,

s. 26, a solicitor

or attorney can

not recover for business done by him in that character, unless he have obtained a certifi

cate which was

in force for the

period the work

was done.

Where a soli

In re THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK, and the Sureties of CROWL and Another.

IN this case a rule had been obtained by the Duke of Brunswick to proceed against the sureties of Crowl under the statute, and that rule was discharged with costs in Easter Term last (a). Upon the case coming before the Queen's Remembrancer for the taxation of the costs, it was objected, that the solicitor who had acted for the defendants upon that occasion was not entitled to costs, on the ground that he had not a certificate during the time that the business had been done. A certificate was therecitor applied for upon produced by the solicitor, permitting him to practise as such during the interval between the 17th of October, 1848, and the 15th of November, 1849, (the time during which the business had been done); but it appeared that he and the officer, had applied at the Stamp-office, and had paid for, a certificate to practise for the period between the 17th of October, 1847, and the 15th of November, 1848, and that the officer had inserted the wrong dates by mistake. The Remembrancer, however, having taxed the costs,

and paid for a certificate for the period between October,

1847, and November, 1848,

by mistake,

dated it Octo

ber, 1848, and November,

1849-Held,

that the solici

tor was not en

tiled to recover for business done in 1849.

Henniker obtained a rule to set aside this taxation.

Knowles now shewed cause.-The alleged objection to the allowance of these costs is, that the solicitor was uncertificated at the time the business was performed; but he had in reality a certificate. [Parke, B.-He relies upon the certificate, which, when looked at by itself, is for the period when the work was done. But the 26th section of the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, enacts, that no person who as an attorney or solicitor shall sue, prosecute, defend, or carry on any action or suit, or any proceedings, &c., without having previously obtained a stamped certificate which shall then be in force, shall be capable of maintaining any action or (a) 3 Exch. 829.

suit at law or in equity for the recovery of any fee or reward, or disbursement, for or in respect of any business, matter, or thing done by him as an attorney or solicitor as aforesaid, whilst he shall have been without such certificate as aforesaid." Now, in point of fact and in truth the certificate was not in force during the time the solicitor was in practice. It appears otherwise, no doubt, upon the face of the certificate, but the matter is open to explanation. The certificate, therefore, does not afford the solicitor any protection. Pollock, C. B.-How could the officer have granted a certificate in 1849, for the year 1852?]

Henniker, in support of the rule, was not called upon.

POLLOCK, C. B. This rule ought to be made absolute. At the time the business was done the certificate was not "in force."

PARKE, B., ALDERSON, B., and ROLFE, B., concurred.

1849.

In re DUKE OF BRUNSWICK

V.

CROWL.

Rule absolute.

WALKER V. WALL.

BARSTOW had obtained a rule in this case, calling up

on the plaintiff to shew cause why a suggestion should not be entered upon the roll to deprive him of costs, under the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. At the trial of the action, before the Under-sheriff of Middlesex, the plaintiff had obtained a verdict to the amount of 91. 10s. 6d. It appeared that the action was brought for goods sold and delivered, some of which had been supplied in July, 1848. The affidavit of

the defendant was silent as to the time of the accruing of the cause of action, but stated that the residence of the defendant and dwelling-house of the plaintiff were within the jurisdiction of the County Court of Surrey, within

VOL. IV.

K K

EXCH.

1849.

WALKER

v.

WALL.

which the defendant resided at the time the action was brought; and that the cause of action arose wholly, or in some material point, within the jurisdiction.

Joyce now shewed cause.-There are several objections to this rule. It is no where stated in the affidavit when the action was commenced. It may therefore have been commenced before the Act in question was passed, and before the County Court had any jurisdiction: Parker v. Crouch (a). The affidavit, moreover, merely states the cause of action to have arisen within the jurisdiction of the County Court of Surrey. Now, by the 4th section of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, the ancient County Court is preserved; and a district County Court might not have been established. The affidavit therefore ought to have stated, that the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the district County Court. There is nothing equivalent to a statement that any district court for the county of Surrey has been established.

Barstow, in support of the rule. The affidavit is sufficient to entitle the defendant to enter a suggestion; it discloses a probable and reasonable ground for the defendant's application. It is not to be presumed, at this late period, that the new County Court for Surrey has not been established; the case would be different if this application were made at a time shortly after the passing of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. The particulars of demand shew that the action was commenced after the passing of the Act, and the plaintiff does not attempt to deny that fact by affidavit.

POLLOCK, C. B.-I think that this rule ought to be made absolute to enter the suggestion. This is an application made under the 129th section of the statute in question.

(a) 1 Exch. 699.

It has been objected to the defendant's affidavit, that it does not state that any district court for the county of Surrey has been established. The plaintiff does not deny that fact; and the defendant has made this application on the assumption of its existence. The question is, whether sufficient ground of a reasonable and probable nature is disclosed by the affidavit, to satisfy the Court that the suggestion ought to be entered. I am of opinion that the affidavit is sufficient, and therefore that this application ought to be granted.

PARKE, B.—The defendant has made out a primâ facie case, and has disclosed reasonable grounds for a suggestion. The plaintiff may, if he please, traverse it.

ALDERSON, B., and ROLFE, B., concurred.

Rule absolute.

1849.

WALKER

บ.

WALL.

HOWE v. PIKE and Another.

Nov. 24.

DEBT for work and materials, for goods sold and deli- The plaintiff,

gine in Dorset

the course of the

springs became necessary for

an engineer, vered, and on an account stated.-The defendants pleaded, was employed first, never indebted, upon which issue was joined; second- to repair an enly, except as to 127. 8s., payment; and thirdly, payment of shire, and, in that sum into court. These latter pleas were traversed, work, and issue was joined thereon. At the trial of the cause, springs before Parke, B., at the Middlesex Sittings in Trinity Term last, it appeared that the plaintiff was a working engineer, residing in London, and that the defendants were clay-merchants carrying on business at Wareham, in the county of Dorset, and the action was brought to recover the sum

of 321. 2s., for work and repairs done to a certain engine of the plaintiff's.

its completion; were purchased

these springs

in Middlesex,

and were sent from thence into

the country. The plaintiff having brought back the venue

from Dorsetshire into Middlesex

upon the usual

undertaking:-Held, that the purchase of the springs in Middlesex did not satisfy the undertaking to give material evidence in that county.