plication to a case of that description. In Huntley v. Luscombe (a), it was doubted by the Court of Common Pleas whether a commitment in execution for a penalty, on conviction before a magistrate for an offence against the Excise laws, was a crime within the meaning of the Act.] The 9th section (b) clearly points to the person aggrieved being in custody of an officer for some criminal or supposed criminal matter. The 56 Geo. 3, c. 100, also shews that the legislature considered the Habeas Corpus Act to apply only to cases of an indictable nature. The declaration is also bad, for not shewing that the defendant was an officer. There was no warrant in the present case. The same objection holds good with respect to the second count; and it does not allege that the plaintiff was committed. The defendant, therefore, at the most, is a mere trespasser. The plaintiff appeared in person in support of the replication, but was desired by the Court to confine his argu (a) 2 Bos. & P. 530. (4) That section enacts, that, "if any person or persons, subjects of this realm, shall be committed to any prison or in custody of any officer or officers whatsoever for any criminal or supposed criminal matter, the said person shall not be removed from the said prison and custody into the custody of any other officer or officers, unless it be by habeas corpus or some other legal writ; or where the prisoner is delivered to the constable or other inferior officer to carry such prisoner to some common gaol; or where any person is sent by order of any judge of assize or justice of the peace to any common workhouse or house of correction; or where the prisoner is removed from one prison or place to another within 1850. COBBETT V. SLOWMAN. 1850. COBBETT v. SLOWMAN. ments, in the first instance, to the sufficiency of the declaration; and he contended, that all commitments are in the nature of criminal or supposed criminal matters: In re Crawford (a). That the writ of rebellion may be executed on Sunday, and the outer door may be broken open, he cited Lewis v. Morland (b), and Miller v. Knox (c). He also contended that the second count was good, and that the removal from a custody to which he had not been legally committed, strengthened his case. Bramwell replied. POLLOCK, C. B.-I am of opinion that the defendant is entitled to the judgment of the Court, on the ground that the declaration is bad in substance, as not disclosing a good cause of action. The action is brought to recover certain penalties under the provisions of the Habeas Corpus Act. In order to bring the case within the terms of the 9th section of that statute, the party aggrieved must be in custody for "some criminal or supposed criminal matter." The words "supposed criminal matter," I appre hend, are intended to meet the case where a charge is instituted against a person, which may or may not turn out in the event to be a criminal charge; as, for example, where the facts adduced in support of the charge are insufficient to prove it, or where it may fail in point of law. But I take it, that the whole scope of this Act of Parliament has reference to criminal charges upon which the party may be brought to trial. If this matter were now brought to our attention for the first time, I think we should have no doubt that the subject-matter of this declaration is not within the meaning of that statute, inasmuch as a writ of rebellion is no more in the nature (a) 18 L. J., Q. B., 225. (b) 2 B. & Ald. 56. (c) 4 Bing. N. C. 574. of a criminal matter than an attachment for a contempt of Court. In the case of Rex v. Hobhouse, to which our attention has been called, the Court of King's Bench, after some consideration, expressed their opinion that the Habeas Corpus Act clearly did not apply to cases of that description, because, as the Court there said, "It is wholly confined to cases of commitment for crime, with the exception of treason or felony, or the suspicion thereof." In that case the claim of the grant of the writ was not made under that statute, but at common law; but the Court threw out a decided opinion on the point. As, therefore, a writ of rebellion is not a criminal or supposed criminal matter, within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act, the defendant, in so dealing with the person of Mr. Cobbett as he is charged to have dealt, is not liable to the penalties under that statute. PARKE, B.-I agree with what has been said by the Lord Chief Baron in this case. Both counts in the declaration are bad in substance. The foundation of the action is, that, the plaintiff being in custody for a criminal matter, the defendant has removed him without lawful authority; and the question is, whether a commission of rebellion is a criminal matter, within the true intent and meaning of the 9th section of the Habeas Corpus Act. No doubt, for some purposes, that commission is a criminal matter; for instance, the party may be arrested on Sunday, and all parties may be called upon to aid in its execution; but it is not a criminal matter within the meaning of the Act, which only relates to persons in custody for offences triable in the Court of Queen's Bench, or at the assizes or sessions, or in some other court where the offence is properly cognisable. In the case of Huntley v. Luscombe, it was doubtful whether a commitment upon an Excise conviction was within the Act; but I have no doubt that the Act does not apply to any case where the party is in 1850. COBBETT V. SLOWMAN. 1850. COBBETT บ. SLOWMAN. custody for an offence for which he is not by trial amenable to law. It was admitted, in Hobhouse's case, that a committal for contempt was not within the 9th section of the statute, for the motion there was for a writ at common law; and the Court there appear to have considered that the case did not fall within the Act. In the next place, I do not think that a commissioner under the writ of rebellion is an officer. The defendant is not liable for the penalty under the second count; if he be liable at all, it is as a mere trespasser. It is, therefore, clear that the declaration is bad; and the judgment of the Court must be for the defendant. ALDERSON, B.-I am of the same opinion. The language of the Habeas Corpus Act, in speaking of criminal or supposed criminal matters, applies to crimes in the ordinary sense of that word; and as felony and treason are excepted, it applies only to misdemeanors, which ought to be tried as such. By one of the sections of the Act, the prisoner is to enter into sureties, according to his quality and the nature of the offence; so that a trial of the offence is clearly contemplated by the Act, and that the trial should proceed with all due expedition. As the declaration is bad upon the preceding ground, I do not feel myself called upon to give any opinion upon the other two points; but it seems to me, as at present advised, that there is a time specially limited by the Habeas Corpus Act, within the meaning of the stat. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42; and that, supposing there had been no other objection to the bringing of the action, it would have been in time. PLATT, B.-I am also inclined to agree that the action would have been brought in time; but that is not the question upon which we are now called to give an opinion. The declaration is, I think, clearly bad. The language of the 9th section is, "any criminal or supposed criminal matter;" and that applies only to cases of misdemeanor in the legal meaning of the term; in which case the party may be discharged upon entering into recognisances. Then the 8th section confirms me in this view of the case, if that were necessary, for it provides that the Act shall not extend to discharge out of prison any person charged in debt or other action, or with process in any civil cause; by which latter words I understand any process that a subject may sue out to vindicate, in a civil cause, his civil rights; and I am of opinion that a writ of rebellion is such a process. The plaintiff's case, therefore, does not fall within the Habeas Corpus Act, and he cannot maintain this action for the penalties under that statute. Judgment for the defendant. 1850. COBBETT . SLOWMAN. NORMAN V. THOMPSON. ASSUMPSIT. The first count of the declaration was upon a bill of exchange for 48l. 10s. 54d., payable three months after date, drawn by the plaintiff upon and accepted by the defendant. The second count was a com mon count. The defendant pleaded, as to the first count, and as to 48. 108. 5 d., parcel &c., in that count mentioned; and as to the second count, and as to 487. 10s. 54d., other parcel &c., in that count mentioned (after identifying the two sums, and the consideration for which the bill was accepted), that, after the making of the promises, &c., he the defendant was in bad and embarrassed circumstances, and indebted to the plaintiff in respect of the previously stated that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff and divers other persons) "to pay to them respectively, and that the plaintiff and the said last mentioned other creditors agreed together to accept a certain composition for the payment of the defendant's debts,—is satisfied by proof of some of the creditors having entered into that agreement. |