rally that the verdict for the plaintiff was to stand, and that the damages were to be reduced to a certain sum: -Held, that the award was good, as the arbitrator had sufficiently disposed of all the issues. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 500 (2). Finality of-Argumentative In an action for the non-performance of an award, the declaration, after stating that, on the 16th of April, an action for goods sold, &c., and all matters in difference, had been referred, with liberty to the arbitrator to enlarge the time to the 1st of May, the costs of the cause to abide the event, contained an averment of mutual promises to perform the award. The declaration then alleged that the time had been enlarged by two Judges' orders to the 21st and 29th of May, and that, on the latter day, the award was made, whereby the arbitrator" ordered and determined that there was due from the defendant to the plaintiff, on balancing the accounts between them, and after giving credit for all sums of money paid by the defendant to the plaintiff, and every item of set-off, the sum of 2281. 88., the clear balance, and the whole thereof was recoverable in the said action;" and the arbitrator further ordered the payment of that sum and the costs of the reference and award. The defendant pleaded, first, that true it was that the award was made, and then certain facts were set out to shew that the award was not final. Verification. And he pleaded also, that the arbitrator did not make any award within the time for making it under the order of reference, but at a later period, to wit, on &c.-Verification:-Held, that these pleas were bad on special demurrer, as amounting to argumentative denials that the award stated in the declaration was ever made. Held, also, that the de claration was good; that the award sufficiently disposed of the issues in the cause, and that the promise was well laid to perform the award as made under the original submission and order; and that the order for the enlargement of the time did not affect the original promise. Armitage v. Coates, 641 (3). Finality. After action brought, the cause and subject-matter thereof, and the rights of the parties in relation thereto, as well at law as in equity, were referred to an arbitrator, with power to order what he should think fit to be done by either of the parties respecting the matters in dispute. The arbitrator awarded that the plaintiffs would be entitled to receive from the defendant two specified sums of money, so soon as they should have discharged the demands of certain local agents of a certain Company, which the plaintiffs had undertaken to satisfy, and upon production by the plaintiffs to the defendants of the vouchers of the local agents, and upon proof that the said demands had been discharged, the defendants were to pay the said sums to the plaintiffs: -Held, that the award was final; for that either the words upon proof might be rejected as surplusage, or that it was a part of the matter itself, which the parties had agreed should. be done, and therefore was correctly stated in the award Miller v. De Burgh, 809 (4). Power of Arbitrator or Umpire over his own Fees. An arbitrator or umpire has no power to fix his own fee in the award, and to make the taking up of the award conditional upon the payment of the fee, unless the submission specifically give him that power. Certain matters in difference between A. B. and C. D. having been referred to two arbitrators, with power to appoint an umpire, where, by the terms of the submission, the costs of the submission and award were to be in the discretion of the arbitrators or umpire, who, by their award, might direct by and to whom the same should be paid, with power also to make the submission a rule of Court, (which was done,) an umpire was appointed who made an award, and thereby found a certain sum to be due from A. B. to C. D.; and he awarded and directed all the costs (specifying the sum) of the submission and award, including therein the costs of taking up the award, to be paid by the party taking up the award, to be paid on a specified day by A. B. The fees of the arbitrators and umpire were included in the costs:-Semble, that the award was bad; and, C. D. having paid the amount to take up the award, that he might recover back the amount beyond what was reasonably due, in an action for money had and received. In re Coombs, BANK. 839 Payment into what amounts to. The plaintiff's broker, by his direction, was accustomed to pay his dividends into the defendants' bank, in London, to the plaintiff's credit in account with K. & Co., bankers at Abingdon, where the plaintiff resided. On the 14th October, 1847, the broker so paid into the defendants' bank 1277. 58. 9d. On the 15th, and before advice of the receipt thereof, K. and Co. stopped payment. The plaintiff having sued the defendants for the sum so paid into their bank:-Held, in the Exchequer Chamber, on exception to the ruling of the Judge at the trial, that the payment into the defendants' bank was a payment to K. and Co., and that the defendants were entitled to a verdict. Williams v. Deacon, 397 BANKING COPARTNERSHIP. BANKER'S RECEIPT. See JOINT-STOCK COMPANY, (1). BANKING COPARTNERSHIP. (1). Transfer of Share-Liability of Shareholder-Admissibility of Returns to Stamp Office. To a scire facias issued the 24th January, 1848, against a member for the time being of a banking copartnership, on a judgment obtained against their public officer, the defendant pleaded, that at the time of the issuing of the writ he was not a member, modo et formâ. At the trial it appeared, that in July, 1847, the defendant, who was an original shareholder, agreed through a broker to sell his shares to T. The broker, in order to carry this sale into effect, went to the Bank, and there delivered to one of the clerks a notice, dated the 21st August, 1847, of such the defendant's intention to sell his shares. On the same paper on which this notice was contained, three clauses from the Company's deed of settlement were printed. One of these clauses provided that no person should be registered as a shareholder without the consent of the board of directors, who might testify the same by a certificate signed by three directors, a form of which was given. Another of these clauses provided, that before such certificate should be given the price to be received for the shares proposed to be transferred should be sent in writing by the vendor to the board of directors. The other clause provided, that in case the board of directors should refuse their consent, they should, at the request of the holder, be obliged to purchase the shares. The broker, together with the notice, delivered to the clerk at the Bank the defendant's certificate of his shares, BANKING COPARTNERSHIP. and asked if the transfer would be allowed. The clerk went into an inner room, and came out, saying that the transfer would be accepted. On the 25th of August, T. paid the defendant the price of the shares, and on the next day received a certificate, signed by three directors, certifying that he was the proprietor of these shares, and that they stood in his name in "The Share Register Book." No consent to the transfer was ever given by a board of directors; but the certificate, which was not in the form prescribed by the above clause, was signed, first by the managing director, and afterwards by the two others, separately at their private residences. T., on receiving this certificate, signed a receipt, which was delivered to and and kept by the Bank, in which T. stated that he was the holder of these shares, and that, having executed the deed of settlement, he agreed to abide by the rules and regulations of the Company. Soon afterwards the managing directors caused the transfer to be entered in "The Share Register Book." On the 14th January, 1848, a board of directors was held, and by their direction an entry was made, declaring the transfer to T. null and void. For five or six years past all transfers of shares had been made in the same manner. Between August and January several circulars were sent by the board to shareholders, including T., but none to the defendant before the 7th January, 1848:-Held, that there was no such consent to the transfer by "a board of directors," as required by the deed of settlement, and that this irregular mode of transfer, though adopted for some years, was wholly ineffectual, and consequently the defendant remained liable as a shareholder. Quere, whether, if three directors had given a certificate in the prescribed form, the parties transferring and receiving the shares might not have treated that certificate as conclusive evidence of a consent by the board. Held, also, that the annual general return for March, 1848, to the Stamp Office, under the 7 Geo. 4, c. 46, was admissible in evidence in support of the issue, whether the defendant was a shareholder on the 24th of January, 1848. Bosanquet v. Shortridge, 699 (2). Executor of deceased Member— Liability of The deed of settlement of a jointstock banking copartnership, established under the 7 Geo. 4, c. 46, provided that the executor of a deceased shareholder should not be a member of the Company, in respect of such shares, but should be at liberty to sell the shares, or at his option to become a member on complying with certain provisions; and that, if he did not elect to become a member, he was not to be entitled to any dividend accruing due after the testator's death-Held, that the executor of a deceased shareholder who received a dividend which accrued due after the death of his testator, but had not complied with the provisions of the deed of settlement, was not a member for the purpose of execution against him by scire facias on a judgment against the public officer of the Company. Ness v. Armstrong, BANKRUPT. 21 (1). The defendant lent T. 5007., and received from him a document whereby he promised to pay the defendant or his order, on demand, 500l., with 71. per cent. interest, and also to give the defendant a life policy, and the lease of a house. The lease and policy were deposited within a few days, and some weeks afterwards T. executed an assignment of the lease to the defendant, as a security for repayment of the 500Z., and interest at 51. per cent. T. subsequently made several payments of interest at 77. per cent.:-Held, that the above document was not within the protection of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 98, s. 7, for it was not a promissory note, inasmuch as it contained a promise to pay money, and also to do another act; that the loan was not protected by the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 37, because it was accompanied by a real security; and that, the assignment being part of the same transaction, the whole was usurious and void under the 12 Anne, stat. 2, c. 16, and the assignees of T., who had become bankrupt, were entitled to recover both the lease and policy. Quare, whether, if the document had been a promissory note, the loan would have been protected by the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 98, s. 7, it being further secured by an interest in land. Follett v. Moore, 410 (2). Contingent Debt. Under the 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 56, a claim on a guarantee for a sum certain, when due, is proveable as a debt, and before it is due is proveable as a debt due on a contingency. A. & Co. bought certain wools of B. & Co., payable by the buyers' acceptance at eight months; but before the sale was completed, B. & Co. requiring some security in consideration of 17. per cent., obtained the following instrument from C., signed by him: "Gentlemen,-In consideration of 17. per cent. I hereby guarantee the due and correct payment of half the amount of 136 bales of wool, sold to Messrs. A. & Co. as per contract," &c. Before the bill given by A. & Co. fell due, a fiat in bankruptcy issued against C., and, shortly afterwards, against A. & Co., and no dividend was declared under either fiat. The bill was duly pre The defendant's wife, whilst sole, made, as surety with F., a joint and several promissory note payable to L.: F. having become embarrassed, delivered his effects to W. for the benefit of his creditors. The defendant applied to F. for money to take up the note, when F., voluntarily, and in contemplation of bankruptcy, gave him an order upon W. for the amount, which was paid to the defendant. L., in whose hands the note was, refused to receive the amount unless the whole of F.'s debt to him was paid, and the defendant retained it as an indemnity. A fiat in bankruptcy having issued against F.,-Held, that his assignees were entitled to recover from the defendant the sum so paid to him, as money received for their use. Groom v. Watts, into the post-office, in pursuance of the order given:-Held, that the delivery of the fiat by the Lord Chancellor to the secretary was not the true "date and issuing of the fiat" within the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 29, so as to protect an execution levied after such delivery. Freeman v. Whitaker, 834 BILL OF EXCHANGE. (1). Waiver of Acceptance-Indorsement after due-Argumentative Denial of Indorsement. Assumpsit on a bill of exchange, drawn by W. on and accepted by the defendant, payable to the order of W. six months after date, and indorsed by W. to the plaintiff. One of the defendants (H.) let judgment go by default: the other defendants pleaded, that after they accepted the bill, and before it became due, and before it was indorsed to the plaintiff as in the declaration mentioned, W. waived the acceptance of the bill, and exonerated and discharged the defendants from the same, and from the payment of the bill, and that no person ever gave or received any consideration for the said indorsement. Another plea differed from the above, only in stating, as the concluding averment, that the bill was indorsed to the plaintiff after it became due:-Held, on special demurrer, (by the Court of Exchequer Chamber, affirming the judgment of the Court of Exchequer,) that these pleas were bad, for not shewing that W. was the holder and payee of the bill at the time of the alleged waiver by him. Another plea stated, that, after the making and acceptance of the bill, and before it became due, it was delivered, so accepted by the defendants, to W., and that while W. was the holder and payee, and before it became due, W. indorsed it to the defendant H., and delivered it so indorsed to H., with the intention of divesting himself, and VOL. IV. whereby he did divest himself, of all right, title, and interest in and to the bill, and of the right of suing thereon, and of indorsing the same again; that the bill was so indorsed to H. for a valuable consideration, and that H. continued to be the holder of the bill from the time of the said indorsement thereof to him, W., until it was delivered to H. by the plaintiff; that the indorsement in the declaration mentioned consisted merely of the lastmentioned delivery by H. to the plaintiff of the bill so indosed by W., and that it was never indorsed by W.otherwise than in this plea mentioned; and that it was delivered so indorsed by H. to the plaintiff after it had become due and payable:-Held, by the Court of Exchequer Chamber, that this plea was a good answer to the action in substance; and also (reversing, as to this point, the judgment of the Court of Exchequer), that it was not bad in form, as being an argumentative traverse of the indorsement to the plaintiff. There were other pleas, which differed from this last only in stating, (instead of the allegation that the delivery of the bill by H. to the plaintiff was after it had become due), that at the time when it was so delivered to the plaintiff, he had notice and knowledge of all the matters in the plea mentioned; and that there was no consideration for the delivery of the bill to the plaintiff:-Held, that these pleas were bad, the facts alleged in them not preventing the operation of an indorsement of the bill by H., which might be before the bill became due. Harmer v. Steele, 1 (2). Presumption as to Bona Fide Holder. In an action of trover for a bill of exchange, it appeared that the defendants were bankers, and had discounted bills for A. B., who sent the |