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landing of the goods as aforesaid, upon lawful demand." The duties had always been paid by the importer:Held, that a person who gratuitously landed, entered, and warehoused goods for the owners, who resided in London, was an "owner" within the meaning of the said charter, and liable to the dues. The Master Pilots and Seamen of Newcastle-upon-Tyne v. Hammond, 285

PRACTICE.

(1). Pending Rule.

A rule for judgment as in case of a nonsuit was upon the last day of term made absolute on affidavit of service; but the Master having discovered a defect in the affidavit, after the expiration of the term, refused to draw up the rule. This defect having been rectified, the Court, in the sittings after term, made the rule absolute on motion, on the ground that the rule was then pending. Dow v. Bell, 259

(2). Particulars of Demand.

A Court of common law will not compel a plaintiff to give particulars of matters which he does not claim to recover in his declaration. Thus, in an action for the value of goods supplied to a third party on the false representation of the defendant, the Court would not compel the plaintiff to give a particular of goods supplied to, and bills of exchange, &c. given by such third party, such goods and bills not being claimed by the terms of the declaration. Luck v. Handley,

486

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A writ of prohibition, issued out of the Court of Chancery, is a "proceeding" within the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 109, s. 39, and the superior courts of common law have jurisdiction to set aside such writ when improperly issued.

It is no answer to such an application, that the attorney of the applicant has not entered his name and address in a book at the Petty Bag Office, as required by the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 109, s. 44.

Paving rates assessed under the 11 Geo. 3, c. xv, and 57 Geo. 3, c. xxix, are not incorporeal hereditaments, and may therefore be sued for in a county court. In re Baddeley v. Den508

ton,

932

PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE-MAN.

PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE

MAN.

Liability of-Minutes of Board atDirectors-Admissibility of.

In an action by A. and B. for work done for a Railway Company, as engineers, against C., it appeared that C. was a member of the provisional committee, and took part at a meeting on the 9th of September, 1845, at which the plaintiff A. and one D. were appointed joint engineers, and S. was appointed secretary to the Company. D. never acted as such engineer, but there was no proof that his appointment had ever been revoked. All the work had been done by the plaintiffs. At a meeting of the board (the date of which did not appear) the defendant C. proposed that the engineers should be paid through the solicitors out of the money which was to come from the shareholders, but the names of the engineers were not then mentioned. On a subsequent occasion, one of the plaintiffs, A., was paid a sum of money by one of the solicitors of the Company. In order to prove that the plaintiff B. had been appointed one of the joint engineers to the Company, a letter from the secretary, signed by him, and headed "Minute of the Board, Sept. 13, 1845," which letter stated that it was "resolved that B. be requested to accept the office of joint engineer to the line," was offered in evidence; and also an entry in the minute book, also written by the secretary (it being his business to enter in the book all minutes of the proceedings of the board). This entry was "Minute of the Board, Sept. 13, 1845: Resolved, that B. be requested to accept the office of joint engineer to this line." This entry did not contain the names of any persons present at the meeting, nor had it the signature of any person as chairman, although that word stood at the bottom

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RAILWAY COMPANY. See JOINT-STOCK COMPANY. Liability of Contractor's Workmen. See MASTER AND SERVANT. (1). Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, (8 & 9 Vict. c. 20).

The 86th section of the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, (8 & 9 Vict. c. 20,) is permissive only, and a Railway Company who under it elects to carry goods, is subject to no greater liability than attaches to carriers at common law. Therefore, such a Company is not bound to carry every description of goods, and between all places on their line, but only such goods, and to and from such places, as they have publicly professed to do, and have convenience

for that purpose. Johnson v. The Midland Railway Company,

(2). Action for Calls.

367

In an action for railway calls, the declaration stated, that the defendants were and still are the holders of shares, and being such holders were, at the commencement of the suit, and still are indebted to the Company in the amount of the calls. The defendants pleaded nunquam indebitatus only:-Held, no admission that the defendants were shareholders.

Shares were allotted to B. & T.,

and another, as trustees, and their names were entered on the alphabetical list of shareholders, pursuant to the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 16, s. 9, but the sealed register described the holders of the shares to be "B. and others." The secretary notified to B. the allotment of the shares, and B. wrote in reply accepting them:-Held, that the sealed register only is, by the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 16, s. 28, made primâ facie evidence of a party being a shareholder; that here it was no evidence against T., who was not individually named in it; and that there was no proof that T. agreed to accept the shares allotted to him and his co-trustees. The Birkenhead, Lancashire, and Cheshire Junction Railway Company v. Brownrigg, 426

(3). Calls-Reduction of Shares— Power of Directors to make CallsInterval between.

The Act under which a Railway Company was formed provided, that, for the purpose of voting, each sum of 251. of the capital of the Company should be considered as representing one share; and that no person should be entitled to vote in respect of any less proportion of the capital than that sum.

Under the 22nd section of the 8 Vict. c. 16, the Company were empowered to make calls; and, by the 90th section, the directors were authorised to exercise all the powers of the Company, except as to matters directed by that and the special Act, to be transacted by a general meeting of the Company; but by neither of these Acts was it directed that calls should be made at a general meeting of the Company. The special Act directed that an interval of three months should elapse between the making of successive calls. Calls were made by the Company at first on shares of the amount of 251. each,

which shares were afterwards reduced by them to 20%. each. The directors, on the 11th of January, passed a resolution for a call to be paid on the 15th of the February following; and they passed a second resolution on the 8th of May, for a call payable on the 19th of June.

In an action against a shareholder by the Company for these two calls— Held, first, that the shares were valid, although they were less than 251. each, and had been altered to 207. Secondly, that the directors were empowered to make the calls; and, thirdly, that a proper interval had elapsed between the making of the two calls. The Ambergate, Nottingham, and Boston and Eastern Junction Railway Company v. Mitchell, 540

(4). Allottee-Railway Scrip-Letter of Allotment-Stamp.

In an action for money had and received, by an allottee of railway scrip, for the recovery of his deposit on the abandonment of the scheme, the letter of allotment was offered in evidence by the plaintiff, who called upon the defendant to produce the letter of application, which he refused to do:-Held, in error on a bill of exceptions, that, under such circumstances, the letter of allotment was receivable in evidence without a stamp, as there was no presumption that the two letters were ad idem, and that the contract depended upon them alone.

The deposit was paid into one of the Banks mentioned in the prospectus of the Company, on account of the Company and to their credit, the defendant being a member of the managing and also of the provisional committee; and upon application by the plaintiff for a return of his deposit, he received from the attorney of the Company an answer, to the effect that arrangements for that pur

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(5). Infancy of Shareholder-Appearance by Attorney.

To an action for calls on railway shares, the defendant pleaded (by attorney), that, at the time of the making of the calls, he was an infant; and also, that at the time he became the holder of the shares, he was an infant:-Held, that the pleas were bad, it not appearing that he became a shareholder by contract, and avoided it; also, that the Court could not infer, from his appearance by attorney, that he was of full age. The Leeds and Thirsk Railway Company v. Fearnley, 26

RECEIPT. See STAMP, (6).

RECOGNISANCE.

Discharge from Custody.

On the removal by certiorari into the Court of Queen's Bench of an indictment for disobedience of an order of sessions, the defendant and two sureties entered into the usual recognisance under the 5 & 6 Will. & M. c. 11, s. 2, but which made no mention of costs. The defendant was convicted and attached for non-payment of the costs, and the recognisance was estreated into the Exchequer. On the petition of the defendant and his sureties, the Court discharged the

former out of custody, on account of his poverty, but refused to stay proceedings on the recognisance. In re Thornton, 820

REGISTER-SEALED.

See RAILWAY COMPANY.

REPUDIATION OF EXECUTORY CONTRACT.

See CONTRACT.

RULE-PENDING. See PRACTICE, (1).

SCIRE FACIAS. See PLEADING, I., (1).

SEAMAN.

Deceased Seaman's Wages-Proceeding by Arbitrator-Notice.

Under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 112, s. 15, a justice of the peace is not authorised to act upon the personal application of the administrator of a seaman, but only upon the application of the seaman himself.

In an action of trespass against a magistrate, for breaking and entering the plaintiff's rooms, &c., and seizing his goods, the notice of action stated, "I, J. H. (the plaintiff), do hereby, according to the form of the statute &c., give you notice, that I shall, by my attornies Messrs. E. and S., of &c., at or soon after the expiration of one calendar month &c., cause a writ of summons to be sued out &c., for that you, on &c., with force and arms &c., caused a distress to be levied at my office of business, at &c., on certain goods &c. belonging to me, being in and upon the said premises, by virtue of a warrant under your hand and seal, bearing date &c., without any

:

reasonable or probable cause &c; whereby &c. I was then greatly hurt &c." This notice was endorsed "Messrs. E. & S., of &c., attornies for the within-named J. H." After this notice had been served, Messrs. E. & S. dissolved partnership, and the action was brought by S. alone :Held, that the notice of action was sufficient, although the action was for a trespass, and the notice stated it to be for causing a distress to be levied; and also that the endorsement was sufficient, the change of attorney being immaterial. Hollingworth v. Palmer, 267

SECRETARY OF STATE.

When liable in Trespass.

See TRESPASS, (3).

SECURITY FOR COSTS.
See ATTORNEY, (3).

SEQUESTRATION.

Bishop's Return-Reference to Master.

A return having been made to a writ of fi. fa. de bonis ecclesiaticis, annexing accounts of monies levied under that and a prior writ issued by another sequestrator, the Court referred the account to the Master to examine the deductions made from the sum levied, and say whether they were proper to be allowed, notwithstanding the same accounts had been filed in the Ecclesiastical Court. Morris v. Phelps, 895 SET-OFF.

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SEXTON.

Appointment.

The appointment to the office of sexton, primâ facie is not vested in the inhabitants of the parish at large. Where the duties of that office consist in the care of the sacred vestments and vessels, in the care of the church, by keeping it clean, in ringing the bells, and in opening and closing the doors for Divine service, the presumption is, that the churchwardens have the right of appointment; and where the duties are confined to the churchyard, in digging graves, &c., the presumption is, that the appointment is in the incumbent; and where the office embraces both the above-mentioned duties, the presumption is, that his appointment is vested in the churchwardens and incumbent jointly. Cansfield v. Blenkinsop,

SHARE.

In Mine.

See STAMP, (5).

SHAREHOLDER.

234

In Insurance Company-Liability of.
See INSURANCE.

Evidence to constitute Member.
See RAILWAY COMPANY, (2).

SHERIFF. Execution by. See TROVER.

(1). Wrongful Seizure of Goods bySpecial Damage.

If a sheriff wrongfully seizes goods which are afterwards taken from him by another wrong-doer, the owner of the goods may, in an action against the sheriff, recover as special damage the amount necessarily paid to the

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