A declaration for penalties under the Jury Act, 6 Geo. 4, c. 50, s. 46, described the defendant as "acting under-sheriff," and it was proved that he was the person who in the county performed the duties of under-sheriff; but that T., in London, was nominated under-sheriff, pursuant to the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 90, s. 5. On the occasion of receiving official documents from the late under-sheriff, the defendant, at the request of the latter, appended the word "under-sheriff" to his signature, at the same time saying, that he was not under-sheriff, but T. was. The defendant had described himself in an affidavit as "acting under-sheriff: "Held, that the defendant was not liable to the penalties as under-sheriff, and that the plaintiff was properly nonsuited. 479 Williams v. Thomas, (3). Return to Fi. Fa.-Power of Attorney to order him to quit Possession. To a testatum fi. fa. the sheriff returned that he seized the defendant's goods, and kept possession until he received from "the attorney of the plaintiff" an order to withdraw from possession:-Held, that the return was good, for the attorney of the plaintiff meant "the attorney in the action," and that he had power to order the sheriff to quit possession. Levi v. Abbott, SHIPOWNER. Liability of, for Necessaries. 588 In an action against a shipowner for goods supplied and money lent to the master at a foreign port, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove that the goods and money supplied were necessaries. Mackintosh v. Mitcheson, 175 SLANDER OF TITLE. In an action for slander of title, by saying at the sale of a lease and assignment of premises, whereof the defendant was the original lessor, the false and malicious words, viz. that "the whole of the covenants of this lease are broken, and I have served notice of ejectment; the premises will cost 707. to put them in repair;" by reason of which false and malicious words the property fetched less than it otherwise would have done: the true question for the jury is, whether the words are false and malicious, and whether the special damage arose therefrom. Brook v. Rawl, 521 SOLICITOR. Certificate-Mistake in Date. Under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 26, a solicitor or attorney cannot recover for business done by him in that character, unless he have obtained a certificate which was in force for the period the work was done. Where a solicitor applied for and paid for a certificate for the period between October, 1847, and November, 1848, and the officer, by mistake, dated it October, 1848, and November, 1849: -Held, that the solicitor was not entitled to recover for business done in 1849. In re The Duke of Brunswick, 492 STAMP. See JOINT-STOCK COMPANY, (1). Letter of Allotment. See RAILWAY COMPANY, (4). (1). Agreement. In 1842, W. & S., type-founders, were indebted to G., the plaintiff's testator, in 60007., for money lent. The defendant, who was a member of the firm of E. & S., printers, had been accustomed to purchase of W. & S. large quantities of type, for which quarterly accounts used to be sent, and it was expected that those dealings would be continued. W. & S. being applied to by G. for payment, delivered to him the following order, signed by them, and directed to the defendant:-"We hereby authorise you to pay on our account, to the order of G., 60007., at the following periods, deducting the amount from the quarterly accounts for type furnished to you, and to Messrs. E. & S., viz. 11th November, 1843, 10007.; 11th November, 1844, 10007.; 11th November, 1845, 10007.; 11th November, 1846, 15007.; 11th November, 1847, 1500l." The defendant, on receiving this order, wrote underneath "Having received the foregoing authority from Messrs. W. & S., I undertake to make you the payments as above stated." The instalments were paid up to 11th November, 1844, but no other part of the 60007. was paid. W. & S. continued to furnish the defendant with type, the quarter's account of which, up to the 31st December, 1845, amounted to 6517.08. 9d. On the 18th December, 1845, the defendant wrote to W. & S., stating, that he considered himself bound to see all the amounts due from him to them applied in payment of the debt due to G. Held, first, that the above documents did not require to be stamped either as a promissory note or a bill of exchange, but only as an agreement. Secondly, that the documents amounted to an agreement, that, if any of the specified portions of debt mentioned therein were at any time unpaid by W. & S. to G., and if, after that event had occurred, and come to the knowledge of the defendant, any quarterly accounts for type should become due from defendant to W. & S., the defendant would, so far as those accounts would extend, pay the debt VOL. IV. due from W. & S. to G., and that such agreement, when assented to by all parties, was irrevocable, and consequently the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the 6511. Os. 9d. Hamilton v. Spottiswoode, 200 (2). Agreement, when not a LeaseEntry by Tenant-Evidence of. A. & B. entered into the following agreement with C.:-"We hereby agree to hire your cottages and premises known as, &c. from the 27th of September next, at the rent of 407. per annum, payable quarterly, free from all deductions, and agree to pay 10%. on the 30th of October. And in case any one quarter's rent shall be in arrear and unpaid for the space of fourteen days, we hereby engage to quit possession of the same, upon a notice to that effect, giving us seven days' further time, being left upon the premises aforesaid; and in the event of our noncompliance with such notice, we hereby authorise you, or your agent, to clear the premises as if you were the occupier thereof, and to resume the possession accordingly without the aid of legal authority, this right to be without prejudice to any remedy for enforcing payment of the rent that may be in arrear; and further, we engage to preserve the mills, cottages, and premises from damage, and to deliver them up in good condition, together with all fixtures belonging to you when our tenancy expires, reasonable wear and tear being allowed us." In an action for use and occupation, it appeared that A. entered and occupied the premises on the 27th of September, but there was not any evidence that B. had done so, who suffered judgment by default in the action :-Held, that the jury were justified in finding that both the defendants, A. & B. were liable in the action. Held, also, that the above agreement did not require a lease stamp. Glen v. Dungey, 61 (3). Agreement under 201. The plaintiff agreed in writing with the defendant to do the brickwork of a certain building for the sum of 17. 148. per rod, the defendant to find all materials:-Held, that the agreement did not require a stamp, it not appearing at the time of making it that its value amounted to 20%., though the work done ultimately exceeded that amount. Liddiard v. Gale, 816 (4). Deed. An indenture, whereby several persons jointly convey their separate interests in certain shares in an incorporated Company, does not require several stamps, but one ad valorem stamp is sufficient. Wills v. Bridge, 193 (5). Transfer Stamp. In an action against the defendant as a shareholder in a mining adventure, for articles supplied to the mine, it appeared that the persons whose names were entered in a book, were alone entitled to be shareholders, and that the defendant had been registered by the purser of the mine, in consequence of a document sent to him by the defendant, which was to the effect that one L., for the consideration expressed in a certain deed of transfer, did certify that he had assigned, sold, and transferred to the defendant certain shares in the said mine, with the like parts of and shares in all engines, tools, &c., together with the dividends to be paid in respect of the said shares of the said L., subject to the rules, &c.; to this there was added a statement, that the defendant did thereby agree to accept the same:-Held, that this document did not require a transfer stamp under the 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, Sched. Part 1. Toll v. Lee, 230 (6). Receipt. In an action by the indorsee of a bill of exchange for 91. 58. against the drawer, the defendant pleaded payment by the acceptor, and in support of that plea, offered in evidence the following document, without a receipt stamp, signed by the plaintiff:-"Myself v. Marks. Mr. Marks has this day left with me 107., on account of the debt, interest, and costs in this action :". Held, that it was admissible in evidence without a receipt stamp. Levy v. Alexander, 485 (7). Stamp Acts-Lease-Consideration-Settlement of Accounts-Set-off. The plaintiff granted a lease to the defendant, in consideration of a premium of 40%., and, being indebted to the defendant in that amount for work done, a settlement of accounts took place between them, when the defendant was allowed the 40%. in account, but no monies in fact passed. The plaintiff having afterwards sued the defendant for 371. 48., for rent, and goods sold, the defendant claimed to set off the 40%. as money received for his use, on the ground that it was not expressed in the lease, and therefore he was entitled, under the 48 Geo. 3, c. 149, s. 24, and 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, to recover it:-Held, first, that the effect of those statutes is to put leases for a premium on the same footing as conveyances upon a sale, so that in all cases where the consideration is not expressed in the lease, the amount paid may be recovered back; secondly, that the settlement of accounts amounted to payment; and, thirdly, that, as the defendant might recover back the premium as money received for his use, he was entitled to set it off as a debt. Gingell v. Purkins, 720 (8). Policy of Insurance-Penalty. A policy of insurance on the lives of cattle is an insurance on lives within the 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, and is liable to duty. But such an instrument is only liable to a 57. penalty for want of a stamp, under the 10 Anne, c. 26, and not to the penalty of 500l. under 35 Geo. 3, c. 63, s. 17, which applies to marine insurances only. The Attorney-General v. Cleobury, 65 (9). Document not requiring Stamp. The following document was held not to require an agreement stamp: "I, N. F., do hereby request S. B., bailiff to my landlord, who, on the 4th of November, 1848, having distrained my goods on the premises which I now hold, situate at &c., for the sum of 100l. as rent due to S. B.; and I request him to forbear the sale thereof until the 2nd of February, 1849, to enable me to discharge the said rent; and I do hereby request, agree, and consent that the goods so distrained shall remain at my proper cost in his possession upon the premises until the 2nd of February, 1849; and I undertake to give up the same goods, and not to replevy the same, and that this distress shall remain in full force during that time; and I do hereby undertake to give up peaceable possession of the premises and effects distrained on the 2nd of February, 1849, and pay all costs and charges attending this distress." Fishwick v. Milnes, 825 STATUTE OF FRAUDS. See GUARANTIE. (1). Acceptance under. The defendant verbally agreed to buy some sheep, which he selected from the plaintiff's flock, and directed them to be sent to a field of his, which was accordingly done. Two days afterwards he sent his man to remove the sheep from the field to his farm, which was some miles distant, and on their arrival he counted them over, and said, "It is all right:"-Held, that this was evidence for the jury of his accept ance of the sheep, so as to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, notwithstanding he afterwards repudiated the purchase, and sent the sheep back to the plaintiff. Quare, whether, under the statute, there can be an acceptance before delivery. Saunders v. Topp, 390 (2). To be performed within a Year. The plaintiff by indenture assigned letters patent to the defendants H. & N., who covenanted to pay the plaintiff a certain sum by instalments, extending over several years; provided, that if, at the expiration of twelve months from the date of the indenture, the defendants should not approve of the patent, and should give notice of their disapprobation, and of their intention to sell the patent, then the payment of the first instalment should be suspended; and if, having given such notice, the defendants should within six months sell the patent, the covenant should cease. The deed was executed by N., but there was no signature of H., but only a seal for him in the usual way. H. & N. attempted to work the patent, but, being dissatisfied with it, sent the plaintiff a notice, signed by both, referring to the deed, and in the terms of the proviso: -Held, that the contract having been performed on one side within a year, the case was not within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, inasmuch as that enactment applies only to contracts not to be performed on either side within the year. Semble, that an agreement by deed is not within that statute. Semble, also, that, if the case were within the statute, the notice was a sufficient note or memorandum to satisfy its provisions. (3). Agreement to answer for Debt of 940 STATUTE OF FRAUDS. was a shipbroker, and that he was employed by the owners of a ship to procure for them a charter of that ship, upon the terms that he should be entitled to receive the freight, and so thereout to satisfy himself his commission; and that he did accordingly procure a charter-party on certain terms; that the ship sailed and performed her voyage, and returned to England; that a change of ownership in some of the shares of the ship had accrued before her return; that, after her return, the plaintiff was about to collect, and would have collected, the freight, so as thereout to satisfy himself his commission; that the defendants were the brokers for the new owners, and it became desirable for them to obtain immediate possession of the ship, and they were therefore anxious that plaintiff should abandon his right of receiving the freight; that, in consideration of the premises, and that the plaintiff would relinquish his right to collect the freight, the defendants promised him his commission; that plaintiff did relinquish his said right, but that defendants would not pay him his said commission:-Held, that this was an agreement by the defendants to pay, in consideration of the plaintiff abandoning his rights, arising from several matters stated by way of inducement, the inducement, as stated, being material; and that the declaration was not supported by proof of an agreement, in consideration of the plaintiff not asserting any lien on the freight, without its appearing whether or not he was entitled to such lien. Held, also, that, in such case, no amendment was allowable at Nisi Prius to cure the variance. A written agreement, signed by the defendants, the plaintiff, and the charterers, after reciting that the ship had arrived in port, and a stop had been put on the freight by the owners, and that a difficulty had arisen as to the settlement of the charterers' accounts, stated that the stop was to C. & T., merchants at Liverpool, sent orders to I., a merchant at New York, to purchase for them certain goods; which were accordingly shipped by I. in five vessels bound to Liverpool, and consigned to C. & T., who, after the receipt of the goods by one of the vessels, stopped payment on the 7th of April, 1846. I. had drawn bills for the goods, partly on C. & T., and partly on R. & Co., with whom C. & T. had dealings. B. & Co., who were merchants at Liverpool, and who also had a house of business at New York, purchased there several of the bills, which were drawn at sixty days' sight, and were dated, some on the 28th of March, and the rest on the 30th. On the 8th of May a fiat in bankruptcy issued against C. & T. The four other vessels arrived at Liverpool respectively on the 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 9th of May; and immediately on the arrival of each, and whilst the transitus of the goods on board co |