tinued, B. & Co., on behalf of I., gave notice to the master and consignees of each ship, claiming to stop the goods in transitu. B. & Co. were not the general agents of I., nor had they received from him any authority to make this stoppage. On the 11th of May, the assignees of C. & T. made a formal demand of the goods from the master and consignees of each of the four ships, at the same time tendering the freight; but they refused to deliver them, and on the same day delivered the whole to B. & Co. On the next day, the assignees made a formal demand of the goods from B. and Co., but they refused to deliver them up, claiming title under the stoppage in transitu. On the 28th of April, I. heard at New York that C. & T. had stopped payment; and on the next day, he executed a power of attorney to H. of Liverpool, authorising him to stop the goods in transitu. This was received by H. on the 13th of May, and he on that day adopted and confirmed the previous stoppage by B. & Co. I. afterwards adopted and ratified all that had been done both by H. and B. & Co. In trover by the assignees of C. & T. against B. & Co.Held, first, that there could be no valid stoppage in transitu after the formal demand of the goods by the assignees on the 11th of May, and the subsequent delivery of them to the defendants; secondly, that the ratification of the stoppages by I., after the conversion by the defendants, had not the effect of altering retrospectively the ownership of the goods, which had already vested in the plaintiffs. Bird v. Brown, 786

SUGGESTION.

(1). Under the County Courts Act.

Under the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, if the defendant makes out a primâ facie case, bringing the matter within the

(4). Under 43 Geo. c. 46, s. 3.

A defendant having obtained a rule nisi on a motion to deprive the plaintiff of his costs, under the stat. 43 Geo. 3, c. 46, s. 3, the Court intimated their opinion to be in favour of the plaintiff, and delivered judgment to the effect that the rule ought to be discharged; but, at the same time, directed a suggestion to be entered on the record, to enable the parties to raise the question for a Court of error: -Held, that so much of the rule as related to the entry of the suggestion was incorrect, as being inconsistent with the expressed opinion and judgment of the Court, which was in the plaintiff's favour; and the Court amended the rule by striking out the objectionable part. Ricketts v. Noble, 260

SURVEY. See CUSTOM.

942 "TRADE OR NAVIGATION."

TAXES.

Covenant to Pay. See COVENANT, (3).

TENANT. Entry by-Evidence of See STAMP, (2).

TITHE COMMUTATION ACT. Rent-charge-Distress-Judge's Order.

Under the Tithe Commutation Act, 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 71, s. 82, where the half-yearly payment of rent-charge on land shall be in arrear and unpaid for the space of forty days, and there shall be no sufficient distress upon the premises liable to the payment thereof, it shall be lawful for any Judge of her Majesty's courts of record at Westminster, upon an affidavit of the facts, to order a writ to issue to the sheriff, requiring him to summon a jury to assess the arrears of the rent-charge remaining unpaid, and to return the inquisition thereupon taken to some one of the superior courts, &c. :-Held, (per Pollock, C. B., Alderson, B., and Platt, B., dissentiente Parke, B.), that such order could be made on an ex parte application to the Judge. Hammersmith Rent-charge,

TITLE.

Slander of.

See SLANDER OF TITLE.

TOLL TRAVERSE. See CUSTOM.

In re

"TRADE OR NAVIGATION." Relating thereto.

See MERCHANT SEAMEN'S ACT.

87

TRESPASS.

TRESPASS.

(1). When it does not lie against Master.

A master is not liable in trespass for an injury done without his knowledge by his servant, though in the course of his employ. Therefore, where the defendant, a contractor for certain works, employed a sub-contractor, whose men, in the performance of the works, but without the authority of the contractor, used the plaintiff's crane, and broke it :—Held, that the defendant was not liable for this injury in an action of trespass. Gordon v. Rolt, 365

(2). When not against Railway Com

pany.

The plaintiff's sheep got upon the defendants' railway, through defect of fences, and were run over by a locomotive engine driven by a servant who had directions from the Railway Company to drive at a certain rate per hour:-Held, that trespass would not lie against the Company, and that, if the cattle had a right to be on the railway, the plaintiff's remedy was by action on the case for causing the engine to bedriven in such a way as to injure thatright. I the cattle were altogether wrong-doers, there was no neglect or miscondu for which the Company were responsible. If the cattle escaped through defect of fences which the Company should have kept up, their damage was consequent on that wrong, and recoverable in action on the case against the Company, for letting their fences be incomplete or out of repair. Sharrod v. The London and North Western Railway Company, 580 (3). Secretary of State-Refusal of Insolvent to file Schedule-Evidence of Trespass-Attachment-Committal -Plea in bar of Matter arising after Action commenced-Judge's Certificate.

The removal of a person from one

Semble, that, under the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 22, prisoners in the Queen's Bench Prison, who had refused to file their schedules pursuant to an order of the Insolvent Debtors Court, were rightly placed in Class 1; but, assuming such removal to be illegal, the stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 7, s. 3, affords protection against an action brought for the improper removal.

In an action of trespass against two defendants, the plaintiff, in proof of the alleged acts of trespass, gave in evidence a return by one defendant to a writ of habeas corpus, in which that defendant stated, that he had committed the acts in question in obedience to certain orders made by his codefendant. The defendants thereupon called in aid the evidence contained in that document in support of certain pleas of justification:-Held, that the return was evidence for the defendants in support of their pleas, and also against them in proof of the trespass.

An attachment issued by the Court of Chancery against a person, for a contempt for non-payment of costs, is evidence in support of an averment in a plea that he was committed by reason of a contempt of the Court of Chancery.

A plea in bar, justifying under a statute which affords a defence arising subsequently to the commencement of the action, is good after verdict.

A Judge before whom the cause was tried may grant a certificate, under the 4 Ann. c. 16, s. 5, that the defendant had reasonable ground for pleading certain pleas, although the order be made

ex parte, and after the taxation of costs has commenced. Cobbet v. Sir George Grey, 729

TROVER.

Right of Possession to Chattel.

The plaintiffs, brewers in Dublin, supplied a customer in Wales with porter in casks, on the terms that the empty casks were to be returned to Dublin at his expense and risk, within six months from the date of the contract, or paid for at invoice price, at the option of the shippers :-Held, that as soon as the casks were empty, the vendee of the porter was a mere bailee of the casks during pleasure, and that the vendors had such an immediate right of possession as entitled them to maintain trover against a sheriff who wrongfully took them in execution. Manders v. Sir James Williams 339

USURY.

Under 12 Anne, Stat. 2. c. 16. See BANKRUPT, (1).

VENUE.

The plaintiff, an engineer, was employed to repair an engine in Dorsetshire, and, in the course of the work, some springs became necessary for its completion; these springs were purchased in Middlesex, and were sent from thence into the country. The plaintiff having brought back the venue from Dorsetshire into Middlesex upon the usual undertaking:Held, that the purchase of the springs in Middlesex did not satisfy the undertaking to give material evidence in that county. Howe v. Pike, 495

WARRANT OF EXECUTION.
Date.

A warrant of execution issued out of the Palace Court is not "an action or suit" within the meaning of the

WINDING-UP ACT.

Contributory.

An action having been brought against the defendant, a provisional committee-man of a certain Railway Company provisionally registered, for work done for and on behalf of the Company, and judgment having been recovered against him, and a writ of ca. sa. issued thereon, an order absolute was made for winding up the affairs of the Company under the Winding-up Act, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 45, and an official manager was appointed. The Court stayed the proceedings until after proof by the plaintiff of his debt before the Master appointed by the said Act. Macgregor v. Keily,

801