Mr. President, inasmuch as the allotted time has expired, I yield the floor.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, article V of the Neutrality Treaty provides-and it is very brief-in the following sentence:

After the termination of the Panama Canal Treaty, only the Republic of Panama shall operate the canal and maintain military forces defense sites and military installations within its national territory.

Under the 1903 treaty, Mr. President, this protection is not provided. Any foreign power can, at this point or after the year 2000, station a military garrison in Panama and the United States would have no legal right to complain as long as that garrison were located outside the Panama Canal Zone.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair must rule that, pursuant to the previous order, the debate on the Panama Canal treaties will now terminate, the hour of 6:30 having arrived.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I congratulate Members of the Senate, who have carried on a very instructional debate. I commend them, both those who have presented views in support of and those who have presented views in opposition to the treaties.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I was pleased and proud to note that the January 4-7 issue of the Christian Century contained one of the best discussions I have yet seen on the Panama Canal treaties. The article was written by the president of Dakota Wesleyan University, Dr. Donald Messer, of Mitchell, S. Dak.

Dr. Messer was among a number of Americans who spent a day in Washington in November receiving briefings on the treaties from President Carter and other administration officials. In my view he has performed a real service to the country by collecting the most pertinent facts from those sessions, combining them with imaginative arguments of his own, and setting them forth for a wider audience in a highly readable form.

He addresses with particular cogency the question whether these treaties represent a retreat by the United States. Dr. Messer writes:

Actually, the opposite can be argued; it is evidence of a nation's greatness when it can live in peace and partnership with its neighbors. Gunboat-diplomacy days are long gone; the U.S. promotes the self-determination and development of nations, unlike the communists in eastern Europe who continue to practice a form of colonialism.

Mr. President, because I believe it will be of interest and help to my colleagues as we approach the debates on the Panama Canal treaties, I ask unanimous consent that the article I have described, entitled "Panama Canal Treaties: Answering Questions on MainStreet America," be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

PANAMA CANAL TREATIES: ANSWERING QUESTIONS ON MAIN STREET AMERICA

(By Donald E. Messer)

Almost unnoticed in the wake of the world drama of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's journey to Jerusalem was a mobilization meeting on Friday November 18 of grass-roots American citizens concerned with peace in the western hemisphere.

Summoned to meet President Jimmy Carter at the White House, over 1,000 leaders, Democrats and Republicans from every part of the United States, spent a day being briefed on the Panama Canal treaties. Almost unprecedented, at least in recent times, is the degree of presidential prestige and persuasion being applied in the interests of treaty ratification.

Prompting Carter's effort in the realization that the treaties are in jeopardy: the majority of Americans are opposed to them, and treaty opponents have launched a well-financed campaign to exploit this sentiment. Republicans particularly are being subjected to a political litmus test of true conservatism. While Ronald Reagan is the best-known spokesman for this perspective, members of the American Conservative Union have for some months been carrying on a highly organized crusade, sponsoring petitions, speaking on radio/TV talk shows, producing mass mailings, and generating antitreaty letters and petitions to Congress.

The White House Conference was directed by a bipartisan group called the Committee of Americans for the Canal Treaties (ČOACT), headed by Averill Harriman and former Senate minority leader Hugh Scott. Speakers defending the treaties included Vice-President Walter Mondale; former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; Sol M. Linowitz, U.S. treaty negotiator (with Ellsworth Bunker); Secretary of the Navy W. Graham Claytor, Jr.; and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. In welcoming his White House guests, Carter asked for help, noting that supporters "will not be received with gratitude" when they defend the treaties, for they are "not yet popular." What an understatement from a man noted for hyperbole! In South Dakota one high school poll showed 90 percent of students opposed, with the other 10 percent saying it was OK to "give [the canal] away." A recent New York Times/CBS nationwide poll revealed that 29 per cent approved, 49 per cent disapproved, and 22 per cent had no opinion.

NEEDED: A CLIMATE OF PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING

Evidence suggests, however, that the American people could be persuaded to change their minds, if they were to receive accurate information regarding the treaties. Many conscientious citizens on main-street America, though initially op posed to the treaties, are open to hearing new information. People are confused, victims of a jingoistic third-grade educational past, an emotional antitreaty campaign, and the failure of political, civic, church and educational leaders to address their doubts and concerns. When the Times/CBS poll put the question differently, asking respondents if they would support ratification if it were certain "that the United States could always send in troops to keep the canal open to ships of all nations," then 63 per cent approved, 24 per cent disapproved, and 13 per cent had no opinion. Ironically, the treaties do give America precisely that right of military intervention, but the American people don't know it.

Mere passage of the Panama treaties is insufficient. A climate of public understanding is critically needed. Indications are that two-thirds of the Senate can be persuaded but that many need "home" support. Pushing through to passage with only minority public support could have negative consequences in the long run. The political alienation fostered by the Vietnam war, Watergate and Koreagate would deepen. More critical would be the undermining of President Carter's ability to conduct the foreign affairs of this nation with authority and confidence. The public needs to understand and approve the Panama Canal treaties: otherwise, efforts toward a new SALT pact or negotiations in South Africa or the Mideast could be severely weakened.

Now, for the first time since the 1960s civil rights movement, church people have an opportunity to join with the administration in a bipartisan political and educational effort to influence a policy decision for peace and goodwill in the western hemisphere. The Senate vote is expected by the end of March 1978. In the next few weeks, grass-roots Americans must speak out.

AMERICA'S INVOLVEMENT IN PANAMA

Even the simplest recitation of the history of America's involvement in Panama will provide more information than most Americans remember. Few have given the matter consistent, thoughtful attention, yet now most feel emotionally involved. Capturing this mood was a recent cartoon of two men, one saying: "I don't know what is the matter with me. For 30 years I never thought about the Panama Canal and now I can't live without it." These widespread feelings are what opponents are accenting, believing that this is "one of those few issues that come along every ten or fifteen years in which a politician can make or break himself with one vote" (Richard A. Viguerie, quoted in "The New Activists," Newsweek, November 7, 1977,

p. 41).

Most Americans are surprised to learn the circumstances and details of the original Panama Canal treaty. The facts of our involvement stand in sharp contrast to our historic ideals and our commitment to international justice, fair play and the self-determination of peoples.

It was the French who first attempted to build a canal, across the Isthmus of Panama to give ships a more direct route between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The French company went bankrupt, and Philippe-Bunau-Varilla, a French stockholder, approached the United States government in 1903. Recognizing the commercial and military value of a shortcut linking the Atlantic and the Pacific, the United States approached the government of Colombia and offered a treaty that would give the U.S. 100-year use of a six-mile swath of land through the province of Panama in exchange for $10 million and $250,000 annual rent. The Colombian legislature refused, arguing that the proposal was unreasonable.

The province was ripe for revolution. With American foreknowledge, if not assistance from military ships offshore, the Panamanians declared their independence and new nationhood. Three days later the United States recognized the new government and 12 days later signed a treaty for building a canal and creating a special zone. No Panamanians were even present; the treaty was signed by the Frenchman, Bunau-Varilla, who benefited significantly when the U.S. purchased his assets. From the beginning the fairness of the treaty has been questionable. The offer rejected by the Colombians was far better than the agreement the Panamanians accepted. Rather than for a term of 100 years, the U.S. would hold the strip of land in "perpetuity"; not six miles but ten miles would be carved out of the center of their country. And "all the rights, power, and authority" were given to the U.S. as "if it were the sovereign of the territory." A new nation, which owed its independence to America's military might, and had no bargaining power; it had to sign. Secretary of State John Hay, who signed for the United States, later wrote a U.S. Senator that it was "vastly advantageous to the United States, and we must confess, with what face we can muster, not so advantageous to Panama. .@.@. You and I know too well how many points there are in this treaty to which a Panamanian patriot could object" (quoted in Panama Canal: The New Treaties [Department of State, 1977], publication 8924, p. 5).

The construction of the canal fired America's imagination. From 1904 to 1914 America's spirit and technological know-how were pitted against enormous problems of topography, jungle disease and other hardships. It was "our moonshot of the early 1900s," according to Sol Linowitz. Built and run not for a profit but as a public service to the world, the canal has benefited ships of every nation.

Over the years minor treaty adjustments have been made, including an increase in the yearly payment to Panama to $2.3 million. Especially irritating to Panamanians, however, was the Canal Zone-the "little America"-in the heart of their country.

Actually it surprises many main-street Americans to learn of this colonial strip of land, ten miles wide and 51 miles long. Just ask how they would like for their state to be divided in two, with 10,000 foreign troops and eight military bases occupying a strip down the middle. This simple exercise in "walking in another's moccasins" helps one imaginatively to see the issue as the Panamanian people see it (cf. "Bought and Paid For"? A Historical Look at the Panama Canal Issue," by Raymond K. DeHainaut, Christian Century, July 7-14, 1976, pp. 629-631).

This anticolonial resentment exploded in 1964, resulting in the deaths of 24 people (20 Panamanians and four Americans). President Lyndon Johnson, after consultation with Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, began negotiations for a new treaty which finally reached fruition in 1977. Though Carter signed for the United States, the document really represents the bipartisan diplomacy of the past seven presidents. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger says, "If only two more states had voted differently, it would have been the Ford-Kissinger treaty."

PROVISIONS OF THE TWO NEW TREATIES

Technically there are two treaties: one called the "Panama Canal Treaty" and the other the "Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal." Interrelated, both need ratification by a two-thirds vote of the United States Senate.

The "Panama Canal Treaty" terminates and supersedes previous treaties and defines how the canal is to be operated and defended until the year 2000. Briefly, six provisions can be outlined: First, it is agreed that the United States will have prime responsibility for defense and canal operations until 2000, with increasing Panamanian participation during this time. Right now, 70 per cent of the canal work force is Panamanian, so transition should not be difficult. Second, in three years the

Canal Zone will cease to exist and Panama will assume general jurisdiction. The U.S. retains its military bases until 2000.

Third, the canal will be operated by an American governmental agency, the Panama Canal Commission, made up of five Americans and four Panamanians, until the end of the century. The U.S. thus sets the rate of tolls for the next 22 years. Fourth, there are extensive provisions protecting the security and rights of current U.S. employees.

Fifth, Panama and the U.S. agree to study the desirability and feasibility of putting a new canal through Panama. A new sea-level canal (in contrast to the current one utilizing a complicated lock system) would be easier to defend militarily and would permit passage of larger ships. The U.S. will not attempt to build a canal in another Latin nation, and Panama has agreed not to construct a canal with the help of another country.

Sixth, Panama will immediately begin to receive more money from its most important economic asset, the canal. It will receive 30 cents per Panama Canal ton. Depending on traffic, this figure could total $40 to $50 million yearly. Additionally, an annuity of $10 million is guaranteed, and up to another $10 million is possible if revenues permit. All of this money comes from canal operating revenues, not from congressional appropriations.

The "Neutrality Treaty" is what its name suggest; it ensures that the canal "shall be permanently neutral"-open to commercial and naval vessels, without discrimination as to conditions or tolls. In time of national need, the "vessels of war and auxiliary vessels" of both the U.S. and Panama are "entitled to transit the Canal expeditiously."

Contrary to popular main-street American understanding, the treaty does provide that the United States has a right to intervene militarily after the year 2000 to ensure the canal's neutrality and the passage of America's warships. Controversy over whether Panama and the U.S. concurred in this interpretation resulted in a return visit to Washington this fall on the part of Panama's president, General Omar Torrijos. Since Carter and Torrijos issued a joint communique, affirming America's right to intervene militarily and "in case of need or emergency to go to the head of the line," this controversy has subsided somewhat.

Outlining a brief history and explicating the basic provisions of the treaties will resolve numerous queries. Yet most Americans are seeking an agenda of answers to their own questions and those raised by the vocal and active opponents of ratification. What follows are answers to typical questions being posed by main-street Americans today. No listing can be complete, but basically there are four types of concerns-those relating to sovereignty, costs, security and the American spirit. 1. "Why should we give away what is ours?" There are many variations on this "bought and paid for" or "giving back Alaska and the Louisiana Territory" argument. Some congressmen have even joined in a lawsuit against the president, contending that the treaties are "an unconstitutional giveaway of U.S. territory.' Columnist Peter Reich of the Chicago Tribune suggests that next we will have to "show the Russians our good faith by turning Alaska back to them."

Sovereignty is the critical question-the U.S. has never owned or held title to the Panamanian land. The original treaty gave America "rights, power, and authority" as "if it were the sovereign of the territory." We bought Alaska in 1867 and the Louisiana Territory in 1803; in those cases there is no doubt as to our sovereignty. Even John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's secretary of state, acknowledged in the United Nations that Panama never relinquished sovereignty over its land. A child born to non-American parents in the Zone has never been granted American citizenship. These slogans for sovereignty are not based in historical legal fact or practices.

Gradually turning over the operation of the Zone and the canal to Panama certainly falls within the best traditions and ideals of America. As an enemy of colonialism and champion of freedom, the U.S. voluntarily gave freedom to the Philippines in 1946 and refused to occupy its defeated enemies Japan and Germany. The rights of longtime friend Panama must likewise be respected.

THE BOTTOM LINE

2. "Shouldn't Panama give us money, instead of America paying Panama?" Related are rumors of secret money deals and fears of another "rip-off" of American taxpayers.

To the various questions of cost, at least five responses can be given. First, America can be proud that it has never operated the canal to make money. Our interests has been to ensure that it remain open for us, not that it be a source of

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profit. America's initial investment has already been repaid many times over as our economy and our nation have grown.

Second, payments for Panama will come from the tolls charged, not from the American taxpayer. No new congressional appropriations are required. From 1914 to 1977 the tolls have increased only from $1.20 to $1.29 per Panama Canal ton. A 20 to 25 per cent increase in tolls is obviously inevitable and justifiable.

Third, increased tolls will have little if any effect on the American economy. The canal itself is obsolete for our larger vessels. Only about 4 to 7 per cent of our trade goes through the canal. The mechanism of the market is the best protection against future unreasonable rates; Panama wants to attract canal traffic, not discourage it. As someone has noted, if the canal were to close for any reason-sabotage, mismanagement, disaster or whatever-America's economy would hardly feel a tremor while Panama's would experience "an earthquake of a proportion no Richter scale could measure."

Fourth, Panama will receive increased loans from the United States, all to be repaid with interest. Apart from the treaties, America has agreed to stimulate further the national development of Panama by providing assistance via four international programs already existing and requiring no new funding. In the next five years Panama will get approximately $295 million, all in loans to be repaid with interest. Along with making available military credits totaling $50 million over a ten-year period, the purpose is to help Panama be more self-sufficient.

Fifth, it should be noted that it is Panama that could justify crying "rip-off" over all these years. The $2.3 million received annually by Panama's 1.5 million people from the tolls for the use of the canal and Zone amounts to about $6 per acrehardly a fair price, especially when we remember that America pays rent to its allies around the world for the use of land for military purposes. Spain is getting $685 million during a five-year period; Greece, $700 million for four years. Turkey and the Philippines have been talking in terms of $1 billion for four years. What Panama will receive under the new treaties seems small indeed, when compared with other arrangements, the value of the canal, and the fact that the U.S. will continue to operate at least eight military bases there.

THE BEST DEFENSE

3. "Isn't America's national security endangered by these treaties?" Critics say that the "communists" may take over the canal; during war our enemies will use it, the Panamanians will sabotage it; Torrijos is pro-Marxist and can't be trusted. The primary way to address these concerns is to point out that America's top military leaders unanimously support the new treaties. Prior approval was received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense before any provisions were inserted in the treaties. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General George S. Brown, asserts: "Our capability to defend the Panama Canal will be enhanced through cooperation with the government of Panama. I have personally worked very diligently for four years to achieve these treaties. We have worked hard for these treaties because we feel they are right.” Apparently nothing angers the chiefs more than the claims of opponents that they really don't favor the treaties but must follow Carter's line. (Don't forget that these men advocated the B-1 bomber, though Carter opposed it.) For conservative senators to impugn the integrity of generals is really a switch!

Knowledgeable Panamanian observers report that communism has no popular base of support in that country and that Torrijos is no Marxist. Ratification would take away the most compelling communist argument: that America will not peacefully turn over the canal and Zone. Further, Panama could not invite Cuba or Russia to operate the canal or to establish military bases, since the Panama Canal Treaty provides that the U.S. can be the only foreign power with military bases in Panama until year 2000. After that date, the Neutrality Treaty specifies that only Panama can operate the canal and maintain military bases within its border. If neutrality is threatened, America can intervene militarily.

Fears that enemy warships would benefit from these "neutrality" provisions are not shared by America's military leaders. During World War II, Germany and Japan technically could have used the canal. According to Navy Secretary W Graham Claytor, Jr., if an enemy ship tried using the canal during war, it would be destroyed before it got within three miles of the entrance. If somehow it got to the canal, the U.S. would carefully ensure its passage—then blow it up three miles out

to sea!

What alarms American military leaders is not external threat but internal sabotage. Probably the canal is defensible, but General Brown predicts that it would take 100,000 troops to fight in a jungle environment worse than Vietnam. Even if