tect the interests of the United States in the next 75 years. I am ready to vote in favor of ratification of these two treaties. They represent the collective negotiating effort of four administrations and reflect a wise and just accommodation of the interests of the United States and Panama. President Carter and his associates deserve admiration for the skill and perseverance they have shown in reducing long-agreed general principles to the treaty texts we are considering today.

The distinguished majority leader and the distinguished minority leader have earned the thanks and respect of their colleagues for the way they have promoted consensus on this significant, but contentious, issue. I have joined with them, as well as the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Sparkman, the distinguished ranking minority member, Senator Case, and many others in sponsoring amendments to articles IV and VI of the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal. These amendments incorporate language from the Carter-Torrijos statement of last October regarding the right of the United States to defend the neutrality of the Panama Canal after the year 2000 and the right of the U.S. vessels to expeditious passage through the canal, including going to the head of the line in emergencies. These amendments are sound ones, making explicit in the text of the treaty what I believe was already implicit.

Of the two treaties we are considering, the Panama Canal Treaty governs the operation of the canal until the year 2000. The other treaty, the Neutrality Treaty, insures the permanent neutrality of the canal after that date. The treaties grant the United States the primary right to protect and defend the canal until 2000, insure access by the United States and other nations, and guarantee its neutrality indefinitely after 2000.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has completed extensive hearings on the treaties in which the whole range of opinion, pro and con, was thoroughly explored. In its current debate the Senate is examining in the most minute detail the text of these treaties and their implications for the economy and defense of the United States.

Our chief concern should be the protection of long-term American interests in the canal-specifically its continued efficient operation and our access to it on a nondiscriminatory basis. The problem facing the United States is to insure our continuing military and commercial interests by putting relations with Panama on a realistic footing instead of trying to defend an indefensible status quo. Even most critics of the present treaties accept the fact that continuation of the status quo does not represent a practical alternative.

This subject has inflamed feelings and produced misunderstanding, although I have noticed from my mail that there is an increasing awareness of the long-term benefits these treaties will bring to the United States. We should keep in mind that, while protecting our own basic interests, we have to take into account the legitimate interest of the Panamanians in regaining control over their own land. Failure to reach a reasonable agreement with the Panamanians on this issue would diminish American influence, especial

ly in Latin America, and could result in serious threats to the secure operation of the canal itself.

Far from forfeiting all control over the canal, the purpose of the Carter administration, like that of the Ford, Nixon, and Johnson administrations before it, has been to preserve the essential U.S. interests in the use and protection of the canal, to assure our right of access, and, finally, to assure the canal's neutrality indefinitely. The questions that have been raised about the right of the United States to take military action, if necessary, to preserve the neutrality of the canal, and to enjoy expeditious passage of its warships through the canal have been dealt with satisfactorily by the assurances and clarifications provided by the administration and the Government of Panama. These assurances and clarifications are now incorporated in the amendments to the Neutrality Treaty I spoke of earlier.

Another matter of potential importance to the United States is the possibility of building a sea-level canal in Central America. The provision of the Panama Canal Treaty which prevents the United States from building an interoceanic canal in any other country in the region without Panamanian approval initially raised a question in my mind. I found, however, after investigating this that our studies indicate that the best route for another and more adequate canal is in Panama. The overall effect of this provision is to protect an important potential interest of the United States by preventing Panama from negotiating with another country for a new canal without our consent.

We are all dedicated to finding a workable and honorable arrangement that meets our needs and the valid aspirations of the Panamanians, one that looks ahead rather than is transfixed by a romantic vision of a noble but distant past. These treaties do that; I support them for that reason.

PANAMA CANAL TREATIES-EX. N, 95-1

AMENDMENT NO. 28

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. Scott submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to Ex. N, 95-1, the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal.

AMENDMENT NO. 29

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. Scott submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to Ex. N, 95-1, the Panama Canal Treaty.

AMENDMENT NO. 30

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. Stevens submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to amendment No. 21 intended to be proposed to Ex. N, 95-1, the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal.

(The remarks of Mr. Stevens when he submitted the amendment appear earlier in today's proceedings.)

AMENDMENT NO. 31

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. DeConcini (for himself and Mr. Ford) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by them jointly to Ex. N, 95–1, the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal.

Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, a good deal of the discussion involving the Panama Canal treaties has centered upon threats to the canal which might come from third parties-more specifically-Communist countries. While this concern is certainly justified, I have been equally bothered by the possibility that internal Panamanian activities might also be a threat to the waterway, should we give it up. Labor unrest and strikes; the actions of an unfriendly government; political riots or upheavals-each of these alone or in combination might cause a closure of the canal. In February 1975, for example, there was a "sickout" which disrupted the efficient operation of the canal. Yet as I read the treaties, there does not appear to be any specific guarantee that a disruption of the canal arising out of internal Panamanian activities can be swiftly and adequately dealt with.

Although General Torrijos has brought a welcome degree of stability to Panama in recent years, it can be argued that the history of Panama is one of substantial political instability and turmoil. Under normal circumstances, the United States would not or should not contemplate intervening in the internal affairs of another nation. However, there are extremely unique and special circumstances surrounding the relationship between the United States and Panama. Since the beginning of this century, the United States has exercised de facto sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone, and has been responsible for the defense and operation of the canal. We have maintained this control over the canal for one very simple reason: the Panama Canal is vital to the security, economic and military, of the United States. This fact must be recognized in any treaty which contemplates a fundamental change in the American-Panamanian relationship.

The amendment being offered by Senator Ford and myself is designed to clarify and expand the language of the neutrality treaty even beyond the amendments offered by the leadership. It is still unclear from the treaty language or the clarifying amendments whether the United States possessed the right to intervene to maintain the operation of the canal in circumstances when the closure of the canal is the result of an action other than external aggression. Our amendment makes it perfectly clear that the United States has the right to insure that the canal continues to operate regardless of the cause of its closure.

We neither believe nor expect that this language gives to the United States an indiscriminate right to meddle in the affairs of Panama. It does, however, take the view that the continued operation of the canal for the benefit of all nations is of paramount importance. Thus, the language of our amendment states thatIf the Canal is closed, or its operations are interfered with, the United States of America shall have the right to take such steps as it deems necessary to reopen the Canal or restore the operations of the Canal, as the case may be.

We contemplate that if the Senate chooses to adopt this amendment that the American Government will act with restraint and with discretion. Without this amendment, however, the United States is essentially powerless under the terms of the treaty to insure free passage through this vital waterway.

I commend the amendment to our colleagues, and I hope they will regard it with favor during the deliberations of the next few weeks. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the amendment be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the amendment was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

AMENDMENT NO. 31

At the end of article V add the following: "Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding sentence, if the Canal is closed, or its operations are interfered with, the United States of America shall have the right to take such steps as it deems necessary to reopen the Canal or restore the operations of the Canal, as the case may be.".

AMENDMENT NO. 32

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. DeConcini (for himself and Mr. Ford) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by them jointly to Ex. N, 95-1, the Panama Canal Treaty.

Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, on numerous occasions I have stated that there are a number of questions raised by the Panama Canal treaties which have not been satisfactorily answered. National security concerns which have rightly been given the most attention are now being addressed through the amendment process. Some of the flaws so apparent in the ambiguous language of the Neutrality Treaty are now the object of remedial action, although these corrective measures may still be insufficient.

But there are other issues that have emerged from the debate. Some of those involve the ultimate cost of the Panama Canal treaties to the American taxpayer. Testimony last week before the Armed Services Committee was particularly troublesome for it suggested that contrary to the repeated assertions of the administration, American citizens might be saddled with heretofore unsuspected and unjustifiable costs over the next 22 years, and beyond. Let us consider for a moment the value of the asset we are giving to the Republic of Panama. A very conservative valuation for interest purposes places the value at $319 million. The total replacement value, however, is $8.5 billion. Panama will also receive anywhere from $50 to $70 million per year from a combination of increased tolls and annuity payments. Finally-although it is not a formal part of the treaty-Panama will receive loan guarantees and credit of up to $295 million. This is above and beyond the $331.5 million in economic foreign aid Panama has already received from the United States.

The information presented at the Armed Services hearings, particularly from Governor Parfitt, suggests that there may be some hidden costs about which we have not been informed. More importantly, he pointed out that the United States may be unwittingly accepting substantial further financial obligations.

I was particularly disturbed to discover that some Panamanian officials believe that the $10 million optional payment to Panama provided for in article XIII of the Panama Canal Treaty which is supposed to come from surplus revenues, will actually accumulate so that on the date we are supposed to leave their country, we shall owe them a $220 million lump sum payment. I find this incredible. The administration assures us that this interpretation is incorrect. If so, surely they can support the clarifying amendment which I now offer. Simply put, the amendment adds language to article XIII to the effect that the United States is not committed to any lump sum payment to Panama at the expiration of the Panama Canal Treaty. I do not believe that the American people are in a mood to pay more millions of their tax dollars for the privilege of giving up the canal. I hope my colleagues agree that we need to guard against this eventuality.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, to have the text of the amendment printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the amendment was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

AMENDMENT NO. 32

At the end of paragraph 4(c) of article XIII, add the following: "Nothing in this subparagraph may be construed to commit the United States of America to make any payment to the Republic of Panama after the date of the termination of this Treaty.".