In addition to these direct loans to the Government of Panama or institutes of the overnment, the Marine is engaged in normal short-term lending operations hrough the banks and the private sector in that country.

Intermarine owns two Panamanian special-purpose shipping companies, Internaional Ship Finance (Panama) Inc., and Avon Shipping, Inc. These companies each wn a Panamanian flag vessel on behalf of Japanese owners, which vessels are inanced by Intermarine. These corporations are financing vehicles, and they are only notionally involved with Panama.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I will be glad to read that. The point that disturbs his Senator, however, is that the President chose this irregular method of appointing a negotiator in such an important situation. I, of course, had hoped that we would have treaties before us that I could consider were in the national interest, and that I could support. But I find so much that is wrong with them, so many ambiguities, so many things that in my humble opinion do not serve the interests of this country, that I must raise the point that chey very well could have been negotiated in a hasty, last minute situation, and that disturbs me very much.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Charles J. Conneely of the staff of the Armed Services Committee be afforded the privileges of the floor during the consideration of this meas

ure.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, having listened to the colloquy between the two distinguished Senators, I am going to make my statement in its entirety, without yielding the floor, and then I will be glad to respond to any questions that any Senator might have. I might say at the outset that I have been advised that our statements are no longer being carried on the radio since it is after the hour of 5 o'clock. Perhaps we can relax a little more at this time.

[Mr. Zorinsky assumed the chair.]

Mr. Scort. Mr. President, many thoughts have been expressed by various Senators since we started considering whether to advise and consent to the canal treaties. One suggestion was that we pay some attention to the views of the people of the country. My own mail is becoming heavier, although there is little, if any, change in the ratio of those for and against the treaties. Needless to say the overwhelming majority of the mail is in opposition to ratification. This in spite of every effort by the administration to educate the people to its point of view.

In fact, our chief negotiator, Ellsworth Bunker, stated in a talk in Los Angeles on December 2, 1975, that—

Our presence in the canal has a constituency among the American people-but our negotiations to solve our problem there do not. So, if we are to gain support, we must find it through candid and reasonable discussion.

These discussions, however, have not been productive insofar as changing the public view on giving the Canal Zone to Panama. While the State Department has been attempting to educate the American people to their point of view, we should remember that throughout our history the ultimate decisions in the United States have been made by the American people. Alexander Hamilton

recognized this during the debates on the Constitution in 1788 when he said:

Here, sir, the people govern.

If our votes in the Senate are to reflect the views of the American people, these treaties will be defeated.

My opposition, in a broad sense, is that the treaties are written in a way to meet the demands of Panama and further the best interests of Panama rather than the best interests of the United States. At the present time the United States has possession and control of the canal. From the viewpoint of our own national interest there is no need to negotiate a new treaty. In my judg ment, we do not obtain any benefits from these treaties but we lose substantially all of the interests we now have in the Canal Zone. It would appear that our negotiators have been willing to give Panama anything it wanted and that Panama has wanted everything it could get. This has resulted in a one-sided treaty. A treaty that, in my opinion, is not in the interest of the United States or in the interest of the free world.

Perhaps it would be well to initially consider what we have in the Canal Zone that will be lost by the ratification of these treaties. First, of course, is the canal itself, together with the installations, material, and equipment used in its operation. The canal is an important artery of commerce of great value from an economic and military point of view. Ownership will immediately be transferred to Panama, as more gradually will complete control. At the present we have roughly 3,300 American citizens residing in the Canal Zone who are civilian employees of the canal government and approximately 6,200 dependents of these employees. The American military forces consist of roughly 8,500 members with somewhat over 11,000 dependents, plus an additional 1,200 civilian employees assisting our military forces for a total of 30,186 Americans presently residing in the Canal Zone, according to testimony by General McAuliffe, the head of our southern military command. Of course, there are quarters, both military and civilian; 17 military bases; the Panama Railroad; the Thatcher Ferry Bridge crossing the canal on the Pacific side; highways of various kinds, including one crossing the entire isthmus; schools, hospitals, stores, and recreational facilities; the Military School of the Americas where officers from the various Latin American countries receive training and the jungle warfare school where our own troops are trained for jungle fighting. We have several pipelines of various sizes across the isthmus; pier complexes to handle cargo and storage, warehouses for material awaiting transshipment. It should also be recalled that all of the improvements within the Canal Zone were constructed by the United States, or purchased from the French company; that yellow fever and malaria were conquered, sanitary water and sewage systems established; that many American lives were lost in the establishment of this project which has been called the "moonshot" of its day. These facilities are said to have a replacement value of approximately $10 billion.

I believe the exact figure is $9.8 billion.

It is said that fewer than 1 percent of the original work force that built the canal were Panamanians.

I do not know, Mr. President, the nature of all of our military facilities within the Canal Zone but there have been newspaper accounts of foreign agents operating within the zone and it would appear that in closed session each Senator should be informed fully regarding additional military use, if any, being made of the Canal Zone. It would appear that this is the southern most base of operation for our military forces in the Western Hemisphere and military aid programs for all of South America are directed from our bases located within the zone.

In addition to the tangible assets that would be lost, the world community might well lose the right to cross the Isthmus of Panama to avoid the much longer route of going around the entire South American Continent to get from the Atlantic to the Pacific ocean at prices shippers can afford to pay. The United States has always permitted transits of the canal at cost and, in fact, in recent years I understand that there has been a deficit in the operation of the canal even though tolls have been raised. But immediately after ratification, Panama will receive 30 cents per ton on all material passing through the canal, plus an annuity of $10 million per year, an additional annuity of another $10 million annually if toll revenues permit, and $10 million for providing fire, police, and sanitary services. There is no doubt that Panama will charge all that the traffic will bear when it is able to fix the rates. Last year I visited five South American countries, Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Even the leaders of these countries who support transfer of the canal to Panama wanted some provision against increases to tolls. Concern was also expressed about Communist influence and ultimate Communist control of the canal.

We cannot afford to ignore the Russian buildup of its military and naval forces; of its support for revolutionary movments throughout the world; Soviet pilots flying MIG aircraft in Cuba; or Russia supplying weapons and material for Cuba to intervene in the internal affairs of others nation; of Egypt, Ghana, and Somalia finding it necessary to expel the Russians; of Canada expelling more than a dozen Russian diplomats for attempting to bribe Canadian citizens to obtain intelligence information.

Russia using other nations to achieve its subversive goals in Africa is illustrated in a concise statement on page 29 of the February 20 issue of Time magazine entitled, "Moscow's Helping Hands." It points out that a number of Warsaw Pact nations, including East Germany, are aiding Cubans in Ethiopia, Angola, and other places. I ask unanimous consent that this statement be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows.

Moscow's HELPING HANDS

"Doing the Kremlin's dirty work" is the way one Western intelligence official refers to them. Another labels them "Moscow's cat's-paws." These derisive descriptions refer to Communist countries that are busily reinforcing Soviet support for Ethiopia with sorely needed arms as well as military and political expertise.

Cuba has been the most prominent of Moscow's proxies, with 3,000 troops in Ethiopia, 19,000 in Angola and about 4,000 in nine other states. In recent years other Communist-ruled nations-most notably in Eastern Europe-have dispatched elite units to black Africa to serve Soviet foreign policy interests. Presumably, this

strategy has been designed to help Moscow maintain a low profile and thus escape being branded a neoimperialist.

The efficient and ideologically rigorous East Germans have apparently been se lected as the most trustworthy ally. First sent to Ethiopia last summer, East Germany's forces there now number an estimated 1,000. Senior East German officers assigned to the Ethiopian Defense Ministry helped to reorganize the country's armed forces, and no doubt have contributed to the planning of the current offensive. Other East Germans have been advising the Ethiopians on the military and ideological training of the police, militia, regular armed forces and youth groups. A hard-lining East Berlin Politburo member, Werner Lamberz headed a delegation that advised Addis Ababa about reconstructing the country's economy on orthodox Marxist lines.

The army and secret police of nearby South Yemen have been learning the latest security techniques from some 2,000 East Germans, assisted by about 4,000 Cubans, some of whom also seem to serve as a kind of Praetorian Guard for the country's repressive Premier Ali Nasser Mohamed. East Germany is also believed to be running three training camps in South Yemen for radical Palestinian commandos. East Berlin has dispatched "Brigades of Friendship," consisting of military, ideological, security and medical cadres, to Angola; in Mozambique, the East German "diplomatic" mission has become the largest in the country, exceeding even that of the Soviet Union. East Germany's increasingly complex African operations are now handled by a special secretariat in East Berlin, headed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Alex Schalk.

Hundreds of Czechs, Hungarians, Poles and Bulgarians are also aiding Ethiopia's forces. Technicians from Prague and Budapest have supervised the arrival of large quantities of weapons, such as AK-47 automatic rifles and machine guns, made by Warsaw Pact countries. Transporting arms and men from Eastern Europe to Ethiopia formerly presented only minor problems, since they were flown from their staging area in Libya over an unsuspecting Sudan. Until they were expelled in May, Russian advisers in Khartoum had tampered with the Sudanese radar network to create a blind spot in its coverage, in effect creating a "corridor" through which Soviet planes flew undetected.

Ominous though the Soviet presence in Ethiopia may be, Moscow may yet bungle this political opportunity as it has bungled others. Despite heavy political and military investments in Ghana, Egypt and Somalia, the Russians were ultimately tossed out of those countries. They and their cat's-paws may start to suffer if the war on the Horn begins to exact a toll. According to intelligence reports, Cuba's military presence abroad is now so unpopular that troopships must leave Havana at night.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, let me read just the first part of the statement.

All these happenings add credence to the warning of the former Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, in testimony on January 31 before our Senate Armed Services Committee. He said:

The defense and use of the Panama Canal is wrapped inextricably with the overall global strategy of the United States and the security of the free world. I submit that, if the United States opts to turn over full responsibility for the maintenance and operation of such an important waterway to a very small, resource poor and unstable country as Panama and then withdraws all U.S. presence, a vacuum will be created which will quickly be filled by proxy or directly by the Soviet Union as is their practice at every opportunity.

So, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, do not be surprised if this treaty is ratified in its present form, to see a Soviet and/or Cuban presence quickly established in Panama. In any event, any confrontation over the “neutrality" of the canal then becomes a confrontation with the Soviet Union rather than with Panamanian guerrillas or terrorists. With the Soviets already on the scene, as Senator Goldwater has pointed out, fighting our way in-with or without the help of the small 1,500 men Panamanian Army will not be without unnecessary loss of U.S. men and material, not to mention loss of the use of the canal.

I believe a permanent United States presence in the Panama Canal Zone to be the only feasible and safe posture for all of the nations of this hemisphere. In saying this I must also emphasize that the year 2000 is meaningless insofar as the requirements for the security of this hemisphere are concerned. The threat, the problems,

the global balance will not change as if by magic in the year 2000, so why should we pass this dilemma down to our children and grandchildren.

Let us remember that Admiral Moorer, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was our No. 1 military man from 1970 to 1974. Although presently retired I believe his opinions are entitled to great weight. Therefore, I asked his views on the testimony of a presently active military commander, Admiral Weisner, the commander in chief of the Pacific, who previously had testified before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Armed Services Committee: The question posed was, if the canal was not under the control of the United States, could he see possible adverse effects on his command in the Pacific?

Admiral Weisner answered:

I can see an adverse effect, Senator Scott. It takes considerable time to move items by sea from the east coast to the Pacific. Without the Panama Canal you are adding 3 weeks time in shipping critical items as ammunition from East Coast ports rather than from West Coast port.

Then I asked him, aside from the time elements, would he see any need for an increase in the naval strength of this country if we did not have control of the canal. He answered:

Yes, we would have to put these critical items shipped by sea over a greater area to accomplish the same purpose.

Would we need a larger navy? and he said:

That is right.

When I asked Admiral Moorer whether he agreed with Admiral Weisner, he responded:

I agree with him on every point.

In fairness, I believe the treaty supporters agree that the Panama Canal is very important to our national security. Treaty supporters constantly argue that it is "use rather than ownership that is important" and that the United States can better assure use of the canal by ratifying the present treaties. Secretary of Defense Brown in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, stated:

Use of the canal is more important than ownership.

He later noted:

I think the canal is more likely to remain open to us with friendly Panama and a friendly Latin America than in a situation where the people of those nations look at the canal as an American ownership of the canal, and it works as an insult to them, as a threat to them.

There seems to be a strange logic that the United States would be in a better position if it reduced its present military installations in the Canal Zone from 17 to 4 after the treaties are ratified and entirely withdraw our military presence from the canal in the year 2000. The argument goes that, with a friendly Panama, the canal would likely be more available for the use of U.S. commercial and military ships.

What is ignored here is to whom we are giving the canal-today to General Torrijos and tomorrow to who knows what government in Panama, given that country's political instability.

Let us discuss for a moment who General Torrijos is. He is the dictator of Panama who took over that country from a lawfully