Airborne Division reportedly volunteered for duty at the jungle training schools i Panama because of the lure of drugs. The Subcommittee has been told by US dru law enforcement officers that the Panamanians have complained about the use à marijuana by U.S. troops and have charged that our G.I.'s have corrupted Paname nian troops by introducing them to drug use during what they ironically describe a "joint" maneuvers.

Since a clamp-down on major Mexican airports, Panama has become the conde through which passes enormous quantities of dope—an estimated one twelfth of the heroin in a recent one year period-used by U.S. addicts. This means that at one point in time roughly 20,000 American drug addicts were getting their daily supply by this route. Large quantities of cocaine have also transited the Zone into the country.

With the increase in heroin and cocaine coming through the Canal Zone, the possibility of drug epidemics that have plagued our military bases and the depend ents of both military and civilian support personnel in most parts of the world is a constant threat. This happened for example, in the sprawling U.S. air base, Ching Chuan Kang (CCK), Taiwan, on Okinawa, in the Philippines, and, of course, on massive scale in Vietnam. Wherever this happens, our military strength is sapped our image before the people of the host countries is tarnished and our capabilities t operate defense positions and vital installations such as the Panama Canal ar diminished.

Given the sensitive nature of our current relations with Panama, we cannot afford to have the picture distorted by the use of drugs or the activities of merce nary American nationals, "soldier of fortune" pilots, and others who are making small fortunes by running thousands of pounds of the world's illicit dope through the Republic of Panama. There are, of course, many points surrounding the United States where criminals transship narcotics into the United States-but these ares do not have a canal vital to the defense and commerce of the Americas and the entire world.

As Chairman Garmatz of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee said in mandating the Subcommittee, we must keep abreast of all of those factors affecting the smooth and efficient operation of the Canal.

The narcotics traffic is a threat to our people there, to their children, to the American image in that country and to the relationships between our two countries. We must not let international dope peddlers and drug traffickers imperil the American position in Panama. It should be and must be stopped as quickly as possible and the Subcommittee intends to see that the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Panama Task Force does this as quickly and efficiently as they did in Okinawa where a special BNDD led task force arrested 71 traffickers in nine months-mostly American servicemen and dependents-and all but wiped out the traffic on that island which contains 50,000 U.S. troops and civilians.

The Subcommittee in no way wishes to cast all of the blame on Panama or its officials for the sudden emergence of Panama as a pipeline for heroin and other drugs into the United States. It is basically an American problem run, in part, by Americans and criminals in other countries. *

Another case which prompted the original BNDD assessment of Panamanian official involvement centered around Joaquin Him Gonzales, a notorious smuggler who was arrested in the Canal Zone by U.S. authorities on February 6, 1971. Within two weeks he was brought to Dallas, Texas, for his active participation in the drug market and tried for conspiracy.

Him Gonzalez was international transit chief at Panama's Tocumen Airport and he used his high position to protect shipments of drugs to the United States. He was accused on this occasion of sending to Dallas somewhat over a million dollars worth of heroin. Gonzalez was allegedly a Torrijos protege and this relationship was made clear when the Panamanian Government mobilized all its resources, something it had not done until that point, for the offender to be returned to Panama. Reports in the press cited the "angry outburst" and "outraged" protest of the Panamanian Government-led by Juan Tack-over the arrest of Gonzalez.

An indication of the duplicity of certain Panamanian officials is found in a comparison of their public statements and their private or official actions in this regard. For example, in October 1972, Colonel Manuel Moriega, the Intelligence Chief of the National Guard, proclaimed a desire for Panama to become the enforce ment center for fighting the drug traffic in Latin America. Yet that same month intelligence reports of the United States Government sustains the 1971 BNDD assessment and we still find that Panamanian officials and security agents are allegedly involved in narcotics trafficking. A similar "offer" was made on April 8,

1972, which received worldwide publicity. However, U.S. officials, when questioned by the Subcommittee, were unaware of any direct contact by the Panamanian Government which would have brought this about. The arrest of Manuel Rojas Sucre, the nephew of Panama's Vice President Arturo Sucre at Kennedy International Airport on December 3, 1972, with cocaine, liquid hashish, and a diplomatic passport (his mother is Panama's consul general in Montreal) is further indication of a need for continued efforts by the United States Government to impress upon the Panamanians the seriousness with which we view the drug problem.

THE POSITION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The State Department has had a history policy of ignoring or denying the involvement in the narcotics traffic into the United States of high-ranking officials of friendly foreign governments.

While the Department has taken a "soft" approach to the narcotics problem generally, in Panama it has reached an absurd extreme. For example, the Subcommittee was told by the director of the BNDD that as a result of the strong Panamanian objections to the arrest of Him Gonzalez it is highly doubtful that the State Department would ever again allow the arrest of a Panamanian national in the Canal Zone; BNDD agents claimed the Panamanians were only paying lip service to narcotic drug enforcement and that the big trafficking was going on full tilt with the knowledge, sanction and even involvement of certain Panamanian officials and Guardia members.

After a preliminary Subcommittee report was released in March of 1972, on the involvement of Panama's Foreign Minister and others in that government in the narcotics traffic, three BNDD agents assigned to work out of the U.S. Embassy in Panama City were declared persona non grata and given 12 hours to leave the country. This ultimatum was delivered on national television by Foreign Minister Juan Tack. This was done after Tack had arranged for the agents to sign letters written by the U.S. Ambassador in Panama denying they had discussed with the Chairman of this Subcommittee the relationship of government officials of Panama to narcotics smuggling into the United States. In subsequent testimony before this Subcommittee, one of the agents stated that he had, in fact, discussed with staffmembers of the Subcommittee such high-level involvement. There were public denials by various administration agency heads of the charges made in the Subcommittee report-the most heated coming from the Department of State. However, a recent government document supplied to the Subcommittee compiled from information and intelligence gathered by the several agencies with a responsibility for international narcotic law enforcement reached the following conclusion on the socalled "Latin connection":

"Generally speaking, the greatest detriment to effective enforcement in Latin America is corruption. The corruption goes all the way to the top of some Latin American governments. One of the more glaring examples of official corruption is the country of Panama,.

This Subcommittee is in accord with the proposal made by the authors of this report when they concluded:

.. Because of the known involvement of Panamanian government officials in the international narcotics traffic, the U.S. Government should take a firm stand in the current negotiation of a new treaty for the continued use of the Panama Canal Zone.

"The new treaty should continue to vest authority for the Canal Zone in the Canal Zone Police. The U.S. should not abrogate its authority to arrest fugitives from the U.S. who appear in the Zone, regardless of their nationality. The U.S. should not forego the right to remove such fugitives to the appropriate federal jurisdiction. By taking a strong stand, the U.S. will continue to provide adequate protection to the large number of U.S. citizens who reside in the Canal Zone. It will also prevent international traffickers from obtaining refuge in the Zone as they now do in Panama. More importantly, it will also demonstrate to the rest of the continent that the U.S. is completely serious about controlling the flow of narcotics into the country. It is recognized that by taking this stand, the Government of Panama will attempt to retaliate by creating incidents similar to those that occurred in 1964."

In summary, the Department of State has put a higher priority on placating an increasingly hostile and demanding regime in Panama than it has on taking a firm stand against government that is a major factor in allowing the international flow of heroin and cocaine presently inundating the United States. This is in spite of a wealth of evidence and intelligence that would dictate a firmer course of action.

The question that has apparently been left for the Congress to answer is: Is the United States negotiating a treaty that involves a 70 year-5 billion dollar US investment, not to mention the security of the United States and this hemisphen with a government that condones or is actually involved in a drug-running oper ation into the United States?

In view of the weak reaction of the Department of State to the narcotics traffic in Panama, it is the conclusion of this Subcommittee that it is incumbent on the Subcommittee to let the Congress-and in turn the Panamanians—know that the United States will not tolerate the use of diplomatic channels and the attendant immunity to be used to funnel drugs into this country.

AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED FOR PRINTING

PANAMA CANAL TREATIES-EX. N, 95-1

AMENDMENT NO. 33

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table)

Mr. ALLEN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to Executive N, 95-1, the treaty concerning the permanent neutrality and operation of the Panama Canal.

(The remarks of Mr. Allen when he submitted the amendment appear earlier in today's proceedings.)

AMENDMENTS NOS. 34 THROUGH 39

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. HATCH submitted six amendments intended to be proposed by him to Executive N. 95-1, the Panama Canal Treaty.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, as in executive session, I submit and send to the desk six amendments to the Panama Canal Treaty. I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the amendments were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

AMENDMENT No. 34

In paragraph 1 of article I, after "Upon its entry into force," insert "subject to the enactment of the implementing legislation referred to in paragraph 5,".

In the first sentence of paragraph 2 of article I, after "related agreements," insert "and subject to the enactment of the implementing legislation referred to in paragraph 5,".

At the end of article I, add the following:

"5. For all purposes of this Treaty, the two Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, the legislation necessary to implement the provisions of this treaty, including the legislation necessary to exercise the power of the Congress of the United States of America under article IV, section 3, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States of America, relating to the disposal of territory or other property belonging to the United States of America.".

AMENDMENT No. 35

In the first sentence of paragraph 1 of article III, after "as territorial sovereign," insert "but subject to the enactment of the implementing legislation referred to in Article I,".

In paragraph 10 of article III, after "Upon entry into force of this Treaty," insert "subject to the enactment of the implementing legislation referred to in Article I,".

AMENDMENT No. 36

In the first sentence of paragraph 1 of article XI, after "The Republic of Panama shall" insert a comma and the following: "subject to the enactment of the implementing legislation referred to in Article I,".

In the second sentence of paragraph 1 of article XI, after "upon the date this Treaty enters into force," insert "subject to the enactment of the implementing legislation referred to in Article I,".

AMENDMENT No. 37

In paragraph 1 of article XIII, after "Upon termination of this Treaty," insert "and subject to the enactment of the implementing legislation referred to in Article I‚”.

AMENDMENT No. 38

In paragraph 3 of article III, at the end of the text immediately above subparagraph (a), add the following: "The operating revenues of the Panama Canal Commission shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States of America.".

In the first sentence of paragraph 5 of article III, strike out "Panama Canal Commission shall reimburse" and insert in lieu thereof "United States of America shall reimburse, only after the amount of such reimbursement has been appropriated.".

AMENDMENT No. 39

In the text of paragraph 4 of article XIII immediately above subparagraph (a), strike out "Panama Canal Commission" and insert in lieu thereof "United States of America, only after such amount has been appropriated,".

In paragraph 4(a) of article XIII, strike out "Canal operating revenues" and insert in lieu thereof "the Treasury of the United States of America".

In paragraph 4(b) of article XIII, strike out "Canal operating revenues" and insert in lieu thereof "the Treasury of the United States of America".

In paragraph 4(b) of article XIII, strike out the last sentence.

In paragraph 4(c) of article XIII, strike out "Canal operating revenues to the extent that such revenues" and insert in lieu thereof "the Treasury of the United States of America, if its receipts from the Panama Canal Commission".

In the last sentence of paragraph 4(c) of article XIII, strike out "Canal operating revenues" and insert in lieu thereof "such receipts."

COMMUNIST CUBA TO BACK PANAMA

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, appearing in the Miami, Florida paper, the Diario Las Americas, was an article written in Spanish that has been of great concern to people who oppose the canal treaty. I have translated this and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record. I hope that my colleagues in the Senate will read it and I hope they will pay a little more attention to the proximity of Cuba to the Panama Canal and the proximity of other countries not exactly friendly to the United States who while they want the canal to continue to operate, would probably take up the defense of what the Panamanians would call an intervention by the United States if and when it becomes necessary for us to defend the canal. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

COMMUNIST CUBA TO BACK PANAMA

MEXICO CITY, D.F., January 28.-Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Maimierca stated that Cuba would back Panama militarily if the people of that country were to request assistance to defend themselves against a U.S. aggression.

"We will aid any government that requests it in order to fight for its indeperdence and social justice," added Malmierca who is here to share in the work of a Cuba-Mexico Joint Commission.

Within this ideological framework, the Cuban Foreign Minister stated that his country's troops would remain in Angola until that country's security had been assured "against the racist armies of South Africa and Zaire."

Malmierca also stated that Latin American integration "is a permanent aspira tion of the Cuban revolution" but much progress yet remains to be made. Finally, Malmierca stated his "dismay" at the presence of U.S. troops in Guants namo and the possible intervention of the U.S. Navy in the Panama Canal.

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES CLOSED SESSION
DEBATE

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, at 10 o'clock, the Senate will go into closed session to discuss and hear discussed and perhaps hear the record on certain allegations involving General Torrijos' alleged drug trafficking.

Mr. President, as one who is very concerned about this, I would hope that following the closed session, whether it ends today, to morrow, or whenever, the Senate would, in its wisdom, vote to make that information available to the public. There might be some exceptions, if there is any possibility that someone's life might be endangered or someone might be exposed to physical harm.

But having traveled around the country a great deal in the past 10 days, there is a great interest in the Panama Canal debate across the country. Some are for the treaties; some are opposed to the treaties; and some have not made up their minds.

It seems to the Senator from Kansas that one way to discourage the American people is to somehow keep secret information that should be made available.

The Senator from Kansas said on a number of occasions that there is not any direct bearing or direct connection between the alleged drug trafficking and the treaties themselves. The Senator from Kansas never made that charge. But I can say as far as the American people are concerned there is a direct bearing because, as I sense the mood of the American people, they do not want us voting for the treaties if, in fact, there is some connection between drug trafficking and General Torrijos.

So it would seem to me, as we prepare to go into closed session, there are a number of questions that must be addressed.

We must determine whether General Torrijos has ever been "the subject"-as distinguished from "the target" of an investigation by either the U.S. Justice Department, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, or a U.S. grand jury, with respect to illegal Panamanian drug operations. If so, we should know the results of that investigation and if not why not, considering the several allegations contained within DEA files.

We should also address the question whether or not General Torrijos if not a direct participant is in any way aiding, abetting, protecting, or tolerating illegal drug traffic passing through Panama.

If there is a sealed indictment, as there now appears to be, involving the brother of General Torrijos, Moises Torrijos, as a coconspirator in illegal drug operations, is there additional evi