4. Panama has a sincere interest in keeping the Canal open and would not do anything to jeopardize the efficient operation of the Canal.

5. The Canal Zone is an anachronism; it is a source of irritation. Once the U.S. citizens are scattered throughout Panama City and Colon, they will no longer be identified as "Zonians", thus easing tensions and frictions between the U.S. and Panama.

6. The economic growth of Panama depends on acquiring the lands in the Canal Zone so that Panama City and Colon can expand their business interests.

7. The denial of basic human rights within the Republic of Panama is not a matter that needs to be brought into the treaty negotiations. After all, Panama is one of the "developing countries of the world," and such behavior is quite normal for such countries.

8. The State Department would not negotiate a treaty which the U.S. Congress would not ratify.

The above concepts might be plausible to someone who has not lived here, to someone who has little or no dealings with the Panamanian government and its officials. They make the negotiation of a new treaty with Panama under the Kissinger-Tack conceptual principles as the most logical course to follow. Permit us to provide some responses to these concepts we have listed.

1. When the Canal Zone U.S.-based legal system ceases to exist, many U.S. employees will leave, creating a problem for Canal administrators in finding qualified replacements for the short-term, at least.

2. The countries of Latin America say one thing in public and another privately. In the newspapers they pledge full support for Panama's claims to the Canal. In private, to people such as former Under Secretary of State William Rogers that they are satisfied with the course that the U.S. is following in the Canal treaty negotiations. From observation of the political behavior and egocentrism of Latin American governments, one can safely say that Omar Torrijos could not depend on his Latin American neighbors for monetary or military support in an open conflict with the United States. Those other countries wish to preserve their own ties to the United States in foreign aid allotments and commercial ventures. They would not sacrifice their own interests for the sake of Torrijos' "just aspirations" concerning the Panama Canal. Rhetorical support is about all that General Torrijos can expect from Central and South America.

3. Turning over the Canal is NOT in the best interests of the United States because:

a. Construction of enough warships to provide a "two-ocean navy" would be necessary in case Panama became whimsical in permitting us access to the Canal for military vessels.

b. The Moscow-Havana axis has been casting lustful eyes for a long time toward our Canal as well as at other straits and waterways of the world. Panama does not have the military strength to withstand an assault from ANY country that would choose to invade and occupy it. The Panamanian people are not "fighters" by tradition; they have never fought a war of liberation. The average campesino reasons in this way: "Why should I get myself killed for the sake of a dictator? What will it gain me or my family? Absolutely nothing. Therefore I will simply adjust to whoever is in power. One ruler is as bad as another."

c. The flow of Alaskan oil through the Panama Canal en route to eastern ports in the United States will be in serious jeopardy when Panama has control over access to the Canal and over the setting of tools.

d. Our first line of defense in the western hemisphere would suddenly become Harlingen or McAllen, Texas (or perhaps Key West, Florida.)

4. The Panamanian government is not noted for rational, logical behavior, nor for extensive attention toward preventive maintenance of government equipment. At this point, the government, which is nearly bankrupt, needs money desperately. This government has already indicated an interest in increasing the tolls 13-fold when they gain control of the Canal. This would seriously jeopardize the economic health of the Canal, and the government's lackadaisical attitude toward repairs and maintenance would contribute to the mechanical breakdown of the Canal (unless the United States agreed to continue supplying parts and maintenance indefinitely.) 5. The "gringo" as he is often called here in Panama will continue to receive harassment, whether he lives in Panama or the present Canal Zone. The United States has been a rather convenient whipping-boy for the Republic of Panama for years and years. Criticism of the U.S. has always been used to distract the Panamanian public's attention from the incompetence, graft, corruption, and poor judgment of the Panamanian government. Besides, the average Panamanian, (when he permits himself to talk freely), does NOT want a treaty signed under the regime of

Omar Torrijos. Such a treaty would reinforce the already crushing power of the Torrijos government on the Panamanian people.

6. The economic growth of Panama will need more than a Canal to restore it to health. The repressive atmosphere has inhibited consumers from visiting stores and businesses; it has inhibited investors from putting their money to work in Panamanian enterprises. The acquisition of Canal Zone lands for use by Panamanian commercial interests still requires the intelligent use and exploitation of those lands by competent businessmen. Such people are not the ones in control in the Panamanian government today. The ones in power are military men without adequate training in economics and business management.

7. The denial of basic human rights within the Republic of Panama IS a matter that should be considered in the treaty negotiations. President Carter has expressed repeated interest in the matter of human rights. If our country is to participate in a metaphorical "marriage" by means of a treaty with another country, we should know just who that "spouse" is. Denial of human rights is bound to make further problems for Canal employees later on, no matter WHAT nationality they are. Rather than taking an amoral stance, our country should apply its influence on the Panamanian government, to the extent that U.S. citizens (who do come under the legitimate concern of our federal government) will not be permitted to live under such repression. We cannot rightfully interfere in the domestic policies of another nation, but we can let them know that they will not receive what they want so desperately from us until they make some changes in those policies.

8. The State Department is negotiating a treaty which it is willing to ratify. They make the assumption that they know what is "in the best interest of the United States" and that all other opinions are to be considered ill-informed, unenlightened, and out of step with modern times. It is our sincere hope that the U.S. Congress will give long and hard consideration to all the factors of a new treaty with the Republic of Panama. The very unstable condition of the Torrijos regime condemns this proposed "marriage" to eventual separation or divorce in a very short time.

For ourselves as U.S. citizens living and working thousands of miles from our homeland, we can say, "Pack up tomorrow. We're ready to go." But for the sake of U.S. commerce and of U.S. national interests in general in the hemisphere, we urge you to examine the proposed treaty (whenever it is announced) thoroughly. We urge you to visit here for more than three days, to observe the situation with your own eyes and not to depend solely on briefings by U.S. or Panamanian government officials. The new treaty with Panama will have long-range repercussions that coming generations will have to live with; we urge you not to ratify a new treaty solely because the State Department says that it is the cure-all to problems with Panama. Russia and Cuba are waiting to see which way the treaty issue goes. A hasty decision on the part of our Congressmen without giving deep and thoughtful study to the question would please them very much.

Mr. ALLEN. I am now delighted to yield to the distinguished Senator.

Mr. GARN. Just for a brief comment. Earlier today when Senator Gravel was discussing human rights and saying there was nothing really going on, people were not being arrested on the streets down there, he is correct right now. Senator Baker and I met with five members of the Panmesta Party, some of them part of the Arias' government that was overthrown just after it was legally elected in 1969. I asked them why do they dare to meet with us. They said, "Oh, because we are on a holiday. Since the treaties were signed, Torrijos is being very nice and we enjoy it. So discuss those treaties for a long, long time. He is trying to impress you Senators."

Each one of them had been imprisoned at various times, one of them as many as seven times in solitary confinement with no charges made ever, just picked up off the street, and political parties were outlawed by Torrijos. They do not exist legally at all. But it was rather interesting. They were enjoying the whole process. "The first time we had freedom from being picked up on the streets and arrested, held incommunicado, and not charged, since September 7." What they said is that "We are afraid whether you

• sign the treaties or not, or ratify them, that as soon as it is decided then we are going to be in trouble again.”

So they described it very accurately as "We are enjoying a holiday from human rights violations right now.'

Mr. ALLEN. I thank the Senator for this most interesting information.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana (Mr. Johnston).

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I rise today to express my opposition to both Panama Canal Treaties. I commend the distinguished majority leader for offering two clarifying amendments concerning our right to intervene unilaterally to defend the canal and our right to priority passage for our vessels during emergencies, but I do not believe these rights will be unequivocally secure without a continued American military presence in Panama and they will not change my vote. Second, I do not believe that the treaties assure that the canal will remain open, secure, and well run during the proposed transitional period. Finally, I believe the financial aspects of the treaties are unacceptable and I simply cannot justify voting for huge expenditures, which could amount to as much as $10 billion by December 31, 1999, according to the State Department, without having all the implications clearly spelled

out.

Militarily, I do not believe that we can be assured, under the current treaties or clarifying amendments, that we can defend the canal at a reasonable price, keep the canal in operation, and protect our strategic interests. Numerous military officials have testified that a continuing American presence in Panama, after the year 2000, is both necessary and desirable. For example, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, USN, retired, stated before the Armed Services Committee:

I believe a permanent U.S. presence in the Panama Canal Zone to be the only feasible and safe posture for all of the nations of this hemisphere.

Maj. Gen. George L. Mabry Jr., USA, retired, stated that the United States "should retain the right to operate some bases and remain in the canal under a status of forces type agreement" and that these bases "would enhance our ability to operate and defend the canal on a unilateral basis if the United States deems such action as necessary." He also pointed out that a continued American military presence would give the United States leverage over Panama during a major dispute and would enable our Government to "apply levels of pressure against Panama to encourage better cooperation.'

Even some of those officials who support the treaties admit, by implication, that a continued American presence would make it easier and less costly-in terms of lives as well as dollars-for the United States to defend the canal after the year 2000.

Should the treaties be ratified, there remains the possibility of internal civil strife in Panama that would disrupt the operation of the canal. As Lt. Gen. Gordon Sumner, Jr., commented, many of our OAS allies see the possibility of Communist subversion as real and all members of the Inter-American Defense Board have "expressed reservation about the fact that the United States will no

longer be in Panama. *

Once we do not have the bases there, then the entire area becomes destabilized."

The treaty is also inadequate over the transitional period. With the disappearance of Canal Zone institutions like the police and the courts, it should come as no surprise that many polls indicate many skilled American workers in the zone will leave. While actual operators may well remain, it is likely that many—if not a majority-of company administrators will depart. I believe that Panama, boasting a commendable 80-percent literacy rate, can find skilled operators, who can successfully maintain the canal's daily technical operations. But I do have serious doubts about the Panamanian Government's commitment to managing the canal professionally and efficiently, to replace the current administrators without so politicizing these jobs that the efficiency of the canal is jeopardized.

Let me state that this is a very serious concern, and not simply a justification of my position. General Torrijos already has more than 3 dozen relatives on the government payroll and the Government of Panama has a bleak record in managing other public enterprises-to wit, the phone and power companies, the new airport, the new convention center, the Bayamo hydroelectric project. The overriding reason for these failures is bad, dishonest, corrupt management-not lack of skilled or trained technicians. This track record certainly does not give one much hope for responsible management of the canal. And, since the canal's economic situation is fragile, as we saw in the deficits incurred from 1973 to 1976, there is little margin for covering poor judgment or graft. The upshot, as I see it, is an unacceptably high risk of inefficient management and permanent U.S. subsidies to keep the canal open, not a guarantee for continued access to an open, free and secure canal.

Financially, I believe that those costs which we can estimate are too high, based on information we have at hand. Gov. Harold R. Parfitt outlined the various kinds of cost impacts the treaties could have. The figures he noted are as follows:

Early retirements-$165 million.

Defense construction costs-$43 million.

Payments to Panama out of Commission revenues-$2 billion. Current value of the Panama Canal Company and Canal Zone assets-$4.6 billion.

Value of all assets, at current prices-$10 billion.

Furthermore, there are other costs we cannot estimate-partly because of the lack of implementing legislation and partly because of ambiguities in the treaty. These costs would push the bill for the American taxpayer up even higher. This is unacceptable to me and the majority of the citizens I represent. A number of my colleagues have already raised this issue and I do not wish to belabor the point. Nonetheless, I am constrained to join these voices and state that it is absolutely vital that we know—and that those people whom we represent know-precisely what we are voting on.

Elmer Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, made this point clear in his testimony before the Armed Services Committee, stating that there will be other treaty related costs we cannot estimate that will be born by U.S. Government agencies,

but we do not know what these will be since "only sketchy details are available at this time." Mr. Staats stated further:

That the treaty implementing legislation is the key determinant of the financial viability of the proposed Panama Canal Commission.

And

We did make an effort to obtain that implementing legislation, even in draft form, because we thought it would be helpful to us, but we were unable to obtain it. He further noted:

If I were a Senator, I would want to see the legislation before I voted.

Well, I am a Senator, and I do want to see that before I vote. That is only fair to the American taxpayer and we should not ramrod down the taxpayer's throat future obligations which we cannot put a price tag on.

One example of our uncertainty is the disposition of possible surpluses over actual costs of services during the first 3 years of the treaty-which could theoretically be as much as $15 million. Will this be applied to reducing the annual $10 million payment during the following 3-year period, will it be returned to the commission, or will it become a hidden subsidy to the Panamanian Government? Another question concerns the annual interest payment to the U.S. Treasury from canal revenues on the U.S. investment in the canal. Amounting to some $20 million annually, the discontinuance of the interest payment would be a considerable revenue loss for our Government and I understand that the administration intends that this be stopped. This would mean a loss of $450 million in revenues to our Treasury over the 23-year life of the treaty. There is also the large question of whether the United States-directly or indirectly-will be asked to make up deficits if there are inadequate revenues to cover debts incurred by the proposed canal commission when the canal is turned over to Panama in the year 2000. With the canal's track record of operating deficits from 1973 to 1976 and the projections for deficits after 1984, this is a legitimate and serious issue which should be brought out in the open.

Before we in the Senate are asked to vote, these matters need to be resolved. Given the strong possibility-or at least toleration-of corruption and graft in the current Panamanian regime which we all heard about during the closed sessions of the Senate, I do not believe such loose financial arrangements are in the interests of our Nation and our taxpayers. And given the statement issued by various Panamanian officials concerning the amount of money they expect to receive directly and indirectly as a result of the treaties, the economic question becomes of great importance to that Nation as well. For if these expectations are dashed, there is a greater likelihood of instability in that country, with a resultant potential for threats to the continued efficient operation of the canal through subversive activities.

I can only conclude that the treaties were hastily negotiated, poorly negotiated and should be rejected. We in the Senate are to give advice and consent to treaties on the basis of full knowledge. We do not have that and this alone is reason for rejecting these documents. But, based on what I have seen so far, I believe the treaties should be rejected, and I intend to so vote.