colleagues who negotiated the agreements, Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz. You have explored the security and military implications of the treaties with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As for the technical operations of the Canal itself, now and in the future, my colleagues at this sessionSecretary Alexander and Governor Parfitt-can provide more detailed information than I can.

What I would like to do is to look at this matter from the vantage point of the Isthmus of Panama. How did we get where we are? Where do we go from here? What course best serves our fundamental interests? How do Panamanians look at all this? What are the prospects for a reasonable working relationship between our countries? These are some of the questions I would like to address with you. I am sure the members of this Committee are familiar with the dubious history of the treaty of 1903 which the present agreements would replace. That treaty, written and signed in unseemly haste, is what Panamanians call "the treaty no Panamanian ever signed." As you know, it was developed and approved by a Frenchman who it is fair to say-had little interest in the future of Panama, but a great interest in salvaging what he could of the financial interests of the defunct French Canal Company. It gave the United States rights it would have "if it were sovereign of the territory"-and it gave us those rights "in perpetuity." We agreed to pay Panama $10 million and the munificent sum of $250,000 a year and in the debate in the Senate which followed, one member of this august body said: "We have never had such a concession so extraordinary in its character as this. In fact, it sounds very much as if we wrote it ourselves." Incidentally, the payment to the French Company was $40 million-four times what we paid Panama.

It was an arrangement, Mr. Chairman, greatly advantageous to the United States, and vastly profitable to the French Canal Company. But it was not much of a deal for Panama. It was an arrangement which-as the Secretary of State admitted at the time was "we must confess, with what face we can muster, not so advantageous to Panama.”

"You and I know too well," he wrote his senatorial friend, "how many points there are in this treaty to which a Panamanian patriot could object." And object they did. There is a notation widespread among our fellow Americans that Panamanian resistance to the 1903 treaty is something of recent origin, a development of the last few years. And some have portrayed opposition to the 1903 treaty as merely a product of "leftists" and "extremists." That, Mr. Chairman, is the wildest kind of distortion of history. If one takes the trouble to go back to the files of the Panamanian press of the period, you quickly find that resistance to the 1903 treaty began in 1903. And it has never ceased since.

This is an issue-probably the only issue-which brings Panamanians together in a kind of national unanimity that is rare in history. Some members of this Committee have been in Panama; I urge those who have not to make the trip. Talk with Panamanians. You will find that whether they are rich or poor, city men or campesinos, university graduates or day laborers, they are as one in their dream of a Panama that is unified and sovereign, a country that is no longer divided in half by a foreign enclave.

And this brings me, Mr. Chairman, to one of the central points I wish to make today. For us Americans, the key goal in this situation-it seems to me is to assure that the Panama Canal is open and efficient, available to us and to world commerce, and that it be properly protected against external attack. I believe the treaties before you give us that assurance. Opponents of those treaties would have you believe that Panama's key role is to take over the Canal. That, I submit, misses the whole point, the whole explanation of Panamanian attitudes. They want a canal that works well as much as we do. They have pride in it; they benefit from it. The issue, as seen through Panamanian eyes, is not the canal at all. Rather it is the presence in a friendly country of a zone governed by the United States. It is an area over which Panama-the country in which it is located-has absolutely no control of any kind. If a Panamanian is caught speeding or is involved in an accident, he gets a ticket from a foreign policeman. If the offense is serious enough, he is tried in a foreign court, under a foreign code of laws.

You and I can well imagine what the reaction would be of Americans faced with such a situation. Suppose, for example, that history had dictated that the Mississippi River and a strip of territory on each side were controlled by a foreign power. Suppose that in going from Illinois to Missouri, or from Louisiana to Texas you had to cross that strip. And imagine, if you will, that you broke the law in some fashion-by speeding or having a tail light out, or whatever-and you were arrested by a French gendarme or a Mexican policeman. It does not take great imagination

to know what our reactions would be. Yet that is the situation that our Panamanian friends have found themselves in for the past 70 years.

That is what they have for so long wished to see changed. That is what the treaty now before you will change. And I for one say that it is high time for such change. What is our central interest in Panama? I submit that it has not changed essentially since President Theodore Roosevelt's day. It is to maintain between the two great oceans a passageway that is open, efficient, safe and neutral. Our commercial interest in that waterway continues to be significant-though in a world of changing trade patterns and changing technology, it is less than it once was. Our military interest, too, continues-though, again, it is not what it once was. I think that all of us are agreed that the maintenance of the Canal in an efficient and open way is a great advantage-to us and to the other nations of the world.

How do we best achieve that end? Not, I think by being inflexible and bullheaded. Not by simplistic formulas like "it's ours and we're going to keep it." No waterway or road, no military base or business can long remain open and efficient if it is surrounded by a sea of public hostility and resentment. But, you may well ask, don't the Panamanians realize that the Canal is a major resource that produces great benefits for them? Of course they do. They want to have the Canal open and operating well just as much as we do, perhaps more. They know better than we do what it means to them and their country.

Their feelings-and I share it-is that the best guarantee of a canal that is working well and serving us all is one in which the American people and the Panamanian people are working as partners. And that is precisely the goal of the treaty that is before you. There can be no better security for the Panama Canal than to have the people who live around it, who work on it feel that it is part of them-and that any effort to attack it or disrupt its operation is an attack on them and on their best interests.

I am sometimes asked, Mr. Chairman, whether we can "do business" with Panama? My answer is Yes"-at least if in dealing with this small country we try to understand what it is really like and if we treat it as a powerful yet fair nation must treat a neighbor. I believe it is fair to say that Panama has deeper and closer ties with the United States than has any other country in Latin America. In large part that is because of the presence of the Canal and because of the many ties that have developed between us stemming from that fact of geography.

Thousands of Panamanians have attended our colleges and technical schools. They have come to know us well and to develop a respect for our way of life, for its freedom and its fairness. And if they feel some bitterness over the historical record, it is, in part, because they see such a gap between what we have sometimes done and what we have professed.

Despite some rhetorical outbursts and occasional incidents and demonstrations, there is remarkably little anti-Americanism in Panama. The vast majority of Panamanians harbor warm and friendly feelings toward our country and our citizens. They want us as friends, not enemies.

Nonetheless, I realize that some Americans living in the Canal Zone feel otherwise. They are nervous and concerned. I think we can all understand that. For they see in a new treaty an end to the very special and protected way of life they have enjoyed. They have gone through a very trying period in which they felt their future was being changed, and they were not at all sure in what direction. In the absence of hard information, many of them imagined the worst. They became vulnerable to every rumor and exaggerated prediction. And there has been no shortage of rumors and exaggerations!

Now, I think, the situation is changing drastically. With the publication of the text of the treaties, Americans in the Canal Zone realize they have not been sold down the river. They understand that their basic employment rights, job security and the like are preserved. Thanks to the efforts of Governor Parfitt and Secretary Alexander, there is a vastly better perspective as to what a new treaty means-and will not mean.

One thing that has greatly bothered many people in the Zone is the prospect of being subject to Panamanian laws and jurisdiction. To meet this concern, the treaty negotiators reached agreement on certain procedural guarantees-set forth in an annex to the treaty-that assure certain special protections to any American who, in the future, may face prosecution. Those protections include the right to a speedy trial, to a lawyer of choice, to full disclosure of charges, to have a representative of the U.S. Government present at any trial, etc., etc., down a very long list. I believe the Government of Panama has every intention of living up to these guarantees. I am sure they would not have agreed to these special features at all if they had no intention of abiding by them. Moreover, it is clear that the Panamanians want as

29-400 0 - 78 - 20

many Americans as possible to remain in their country for some time-to provide the skills needed to keep the Canal operative and to train Panamanians to do those jobs.

My clear impression is that, as these various features of the new treaty have become known, the outlook among Americans in the Zone has moderated. I believe that the vast majority—are ready to see how such a treaty works in practice, to give it a fair chance.

In this connection, I should point out to this Committee that there are some 3,000 American employees of the Canal Company who will be affected by a change in their life style and in the rules of the game. At the same time there are some 6,000 Americans living and working peacefully in Panama-in banks and businesses, selling and buying, teaching and preaching, in short doing all the things that Americans are doing in most other countries around the world, day in and day out-without special privileges or special rules. With time-and with good will on both sides-I think our citizens now in the Zone will find that it is not that difficult to live and work in another country.

I have been asked by friends here and in Panama how the various joint boards and committees provided for in the treaty will work out. As you know, there is provision for a consultative committee to act as a kind of policy advisory board to the Panama Canal Commission. There will also be a coordinating committee of both Americans and Panamanians to help see that the provisions of the treaty are carried out in an orderly and reasonable fashion. Similarly, on the military side, there will be a combined board of senior military representatives as well as a joint committee to help carry out the military provisions of the treaty. I cannot say, of course, how these various bodies will conduct their business. They will be breaking new ground and carrying out functions that have not previously existed.

What is clear, of course, is that the working of any body of men and women depends on the quality of people selected to do the job-and on the spirit in which they undertake their tasks. I have been assured by the highest levels of the Panamanian Government that they want these various groups to be efficient and to work in harmony. For that purpose, they have told me, they intend to pick the best possible and most highly qualified people available. Given that spirit, I see no reason why these joint groups should not work in harmony and in the best interest of both countries.

A related question is whether the Panamanians will ever be able to run the Canal. There is a kind of arrogance in the very question that I do not like. It reminds me of the way some people used to talk of the impossibility of Egyptians ever running Suez. In an earlier period, you will recall how unthinkable it was in London that a bunch of ragtag colonists could ever run their own affairs. The short answer, Mr. Chairman, is that of course Panama will be able to run the Canal. 70 percent of the work force now operating the Canal is Panamanian.

They could doubtless fill many of the administrative and technical jobs tomorrow. As for some of the more highly developed skills, there is no reason why Panamanians cannot acquire them in a reasonable time. And we can help greatly in providing the necessary technical training.

One final question that is frequently asked: In giving the Canal to Panama, wouldn't we be turning it over to a left-wing military dictatorship? My answer to that loaded question is, first, to note that under the treaty we are discussing, the United States retains the responsibility for operating and the primary responsibility for defending the Canal for the remainder of this century. The government that finally will take control of Canal operations will not be the present government. And we cannot know precisely what form of government that will be-any more than we know what our own condition will be in the year 2000.

But more than that, I would say that the American people have been given a quite distorted picture of the present Government of Panama. It is not a full-blown democracy as you and I understand that term. Frankly, there are things I would like to see changed in the system. But I am not a Panamanian and it is not for me to prescribe what is good or bad for others. That is a judgment only the Panamanian people can make as they will over time. We can perhaps explore these matters more fully if you like. One thing I do know, Mr. Chairman: if we wish to encourage change in what we regard as a positive and constructive direction-in Panama or in any other country-we can only do so in an atmosphere of friendship and trust, of cooperation and mutual advantage. We cannot hope to see our values flourish, we cannot expect to have our suggestions heeded, we cannot work effective ly with others toward the goals we cherish if we try to do so in an atmosphere of bitterness and frustration. It is to the goal of eliminating the bitterness of the past

and the frustrations of the present that the treaty now before you is so largely aimed. I hope it will receive your thoughtful and favorable consideration.

PANAMA CANAL ISSUE

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, we are in the process of posing questions to the Carter administration on its proposed Panama Canal Treaty. Whether or not we ratify this treaty will depend largely on how effective the President is in making his case to us and to the country. As a very useful contribution to the ongoing debate, I should like to insert in the Record an editorial by the Cleveland Press together with the very useful response written by one of my constituents, Reed I. Irvine of Silver Spring, Md. I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

PANAMA CANAL ISSUE

After bloody riots in the Canal Zone that left 25 dead in 1964 and after tortuous negotiations since then, the United States and Panama at last have agreed "in principle" on the future of the Panama Canal.

In a historic and sensible step toward decolonialism, the Carter administration wishes to yield control over the waterway and the 533 square mile Canal Zone to Panama in the year 2000.

The negotiators no doubt feel they have accomplished a difficult feat, but the hardest part lies ahead: to convince the required 67 U.S. senators that it is in the national interest to ratify a new canal treaty.

While we may change our mind after a word-by-word reading of the treaty-it has not yet been written-the outlined agreement seems fair to both sides and we hope the Senate approves it.

The Panamanians made major concessions: Letting the Americans run the canal for 23 more years; accepting a U.S. military presence until 2000; agreeing that U.S. forces could return after that date to defend the canal, and scaling down their annual rental demands to $50 million, which can be covered by canal tolls.

Unfortunately the canal issue is an emotional one in this country and a violent debate can be expected. Ronald Reagan and other conservatives are fond of declaiming, "We bought it, we paid for it, we built it and we ought to keep it."

In fact, "we built it" is about the only accurate part of the statement. We didn't buy it; Teddy Roosevelt used to admit proudly that he "took" the Canal Zone and all but blackmailed Panama into ratifying the one-sided 1903 treaty giving the United States rights there "in perpetuity."

However, it's pointless to argue about ancient history. What this country got away with in an era of imperialism is not what it should practice today. It makes more sense to argue about the canal's value, which is much exaggerated by its admirers.

Diplomatically it is a handicap. It is seen throughout Latin America as proof of "Yankee imperialism" and thus harms the nation's interests in the hemisphere. Strategically it is obsolete. Big aircraft carriers, large naval vessels and modern tankers cannot fit through it. That is why this country built a two-ocean Navy. Also, the canal is indefensible; in wartime one Soviet submarine could close it with one nuclear missile.

Economically the canal is overrated. It now carries only 2 percent of this country's coast-to-coast trade. And by the year 2000 its military and economic value will be less than today's.

Americans ought to try to look at the canal through Panamanian eyes. It was stolen from them. It is an open wound dividing their country, diminishing their nationhood. It is their main natural resource-held by foreigners.

There are only 1.7 million Panamanians but they are united in their determination to regain the Canal Zone. If the Senate succumbs to demagoguery and jingoism and defeats the treaty, one can expect guerrilla warfare and sabotage of the canal.

In their struggle the Panamanians will have the backing of all Latin America. Should this country risk a nasty little tropical Vietnam over a waterway that isn't worth much anymore?

SENATE, SEPTEMBER 3, 1977.

EDITOR,

The Cleveland Press,
Cleveland, Ohio

SIR: Your editorial on the Panama Canal on August 12 was flawed by several factually inaccurate statements.

1. You said that we "built" the Panama Canal but we didn't "buy" it. Of course, the United States paid both for the construction of the canal and for the territory through which it was built. We built the canal at a cost of $375 million, a figure which would amount to some $2.5 billion at today's prices. We paid Panama $10 million for the rights to the Canal Zone and we paid individual landowners nearly $5 million for title to their property in the zone. We subsequently paid $25 million to Colombia to compensate it for its claims on the zone. In addition we paid $40 million to the private French company that had tried and failed to build the canal for its rights and equipment. The Canal Zone has been called our most expensive territorial acquisition.

2. You state that the Panama Canal is obsolete strategically, arguing that "large naval vessels and modern tankers cannot fit through it." Two former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and two former chiefs of Naval Operations have sent a joint letter to the President in which they say: "As long as most of the world's combatant and commercial tonnage can transit through the Canal, it offers inestimable strate gic advantages to the United States... Under the control of a potenial adversary, the Panama Canal would become an immediate crucial problem and prove a serious weakness in the overall U.S. defense capability, with enormous potential consequences for evil." These experts note that all naval vessels except the largest (13) carriers can transit the Canal. Modern tankers carrying Alaskan oil are now transiting the Canal. Only huge supertankers cannot make the passage, and the U.S. does not have ports that can accommodate supertankers.

3. You say that the Canal is overrated economically. The New York Times says that it saves $1.5 billion on the prices of American imports and exports. Higher prices for our exports caused by higher transportation costs could drive our already excessive trade deficit even higher, as our ability to compete with other countries weakened. The Canal is of even greater economic importance to several Latin American countries, who use the Canal for the majority of their shipping.

4. You say the Canal "was stolen" from the Panamanians. Rubbish! How could we have stolen the Canal when it was we who built it? As noted above, we paid a high price for the land, and Panama was delighted that we built the canal there and not in Nicaragua. They have reaped enormous benefits from it, including the attainment of a per capita GNP of over $1,000 a year.

REED IRVINE.