capable of operating this canal, even more efficiently than the United States can, and that this canal will be defended even more efficiently than they can defend it, because in the final analysis the defense of the canal consists of two fundamental factors-one, the capability of the specialized force, and two, the love and faith of the Panamanian people who know that this is their canal and that consequently every Panamanian has to become a defender of this international waterway, which is a part of the country's natural resources. [Applause.]

This is why, in considering a treaty of this nature-and I am not going to talk about the neutrality aspect, which will be discussed by the head of the negotiations team, Dr. Escobar Bethancourt-I will only say that the military ties will end on 31 December 1999.

At this moment I recall a statement I recently read in an international report published in Panama, a statement which was very sad and painful to me. Two Panamanians by birth-according to the Panamanian constitution a person cannot lose his nationality-made a statement that they are not interested in the canal, that they are concerned only about the Torrijos dictatorship and that if the treaty is signed, it would be between the United States and Torrijos, but not between the United States and the Panamanian people. With a problem as large as this one, so large that people set aside their political attitudes, it is not a matter of what you or I think or what political leanings, crusade or ideology one advocates but of whether or not one loves one's country. At such a time, when a problem arises that is above domestic disputes, when Panamanian nationality and the state and the elimination of a state within a state are at stake, these Panamanians made this statement. It was a sad and depressing comment that could cause pessimism among those who are not politically aware.

The truth is that when I gained political awareness at an early age, I began to understand that in the political dictionary of all countries, including ours, there is one clear and precise word to describe this type of action and position. That word is treason. This is so because, in any effort to inflict temporary wounds of a political nature, such people do not hesitate to grab a poisoned knife and thrust it into the loving heart of the fatherland! Thank you.

EDUCATION MINISTER ROYO

Mr. President, Mr. General, Mr. President of the Assembly, Mr. Vice President, second commander in chief, fellow government officials, members of the staff, honorable representatives:

The subject of the duration of the treaty is related to the subject of abrogation. The 1977 treaty points out that this treaty supersedes all the other agreements that Panama has signed with the United States.

This means that the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, the 1936 and the 1955 treaties and all the annexes, exchanges of notes and any other documents in conflict with the present treaty are abrogated. This treaty will have an approximate duration of 23 years. It will expire on 31 December 1999 at 1200 o'clock [as heard]. This treaty clearly establishes the principle of nonintervention. Neither U.S. civilians nor U.S. military forces will have the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of Panama or to participate in Panamanian political affairs.

Regarding the operation of the canal, there will no longer be a governorship in the Canal Zone. There will no longer be a governor of what? [Applause.] There will no longer be a Panama Canal Company in the form it has been operating up to now. There will be other organizations which will be explained immediately. The United States has primary responsibility for the administration of the canal until 31 December 1999. Panama will have a continuously increasing participation in the administration of the canal while U.S. participation will decrease, as will be explained later together with the employment policy aspect.

However, they will have primary responsibility [until 31 December 1999] in line with the Tack-Kissinger agreement.

This does not mean-and we want to use this opportunity to make this clearthat foreigners working in the canal will be persecuted or dismissed. There will be no Belgian Congo here. There will not be an Algerian case here to expel the French. Those persons who have been working in the Canal Zone for years will be able to remain at their jobs. However, they have an obligation. In the first 5 years after the treaty goes into effect, they are under the obligation of reducing the foreign labor force by 20 percent.

Lies have been reported, lies to the effect that all those who have been working in the present Canal Zone will be dismissed. We can tell them-making use of this opportunity to rest assured and to sleep well, because although we had a 9 Janu

ary of 1964 here, and despite all the interventions we have suffered, this is not a vindictive country.

Finally, we would like to refer to a point which is perhaps more important from an emotional, rather than a practical, point of view. This is the problem of the flags.

It is said that the flag problem is what caused the events of 1964, but this is not true. What caused it was the symbolic problem. The flag problem was a real one. It involved the recovery of our sovereignty in the Canal Zone.

Regarding the flags, here has also been an important recovery: Throughout all the territory that now constitutes the Canal Zone, excluding the office of the Canal Commission-with only this exception-only the Panamanian flag will fly on the flagpoles. [Applause.]

NEGOTIATOR FABREGA ON LAND RECOVERY

Half of Fort Amador will revert to Panama with all the corresponding installations on the 1st day of the treaty, as well as the islands of Naos, Perico and Flamenco. [Applause.] From the Bridge of the Americas you see all the installations of the fuel tanks, of the Port of Balboa, and which extend to Diablo Heights, including the northern part of Diablo Heights, where there is an antenna field. All this land will revert to Panama immediately and it will be known as the Balboa Port complex, including areas for expansion. Albrook Field will revert to Panama on the first day of the treaty. Curundu Heights will revert to Panama 3 years later, as well as the antenna field across from Panama University. Ancon Hill will revert to Panama on the first day of the treaty, [applause] with two exceptions, namely Gorgas Hospital, to be used for military use by the U.S. Armed Forces and U.S. civilian personnel, and the area where the Quarry Heights offices are now located, which will serve as headquarters of the combined military board which will be in charge of planning and carrying out everything concerned with the defense of the canal-a combined defense. This board will be evenly divided, that is, it will have the same number of representatives from Panama and the United States. The rest of Ancon Hill will revert to Panama on the first day of the treaty.

The railroad with all its installations will also revert to Panama on the first day of the treaty, as well as a coastal strip, from beneath the Bridge of the Americas at the entrance of Farfan Beach to Veracruz so that the residents of Veracruz will not have to transit a defense site. The strip has the best beaches closest to Panama City and every Panamanian may, as of that date, have access to those beaches, which are the best close to Panama City.

On the Atlantic side, in the city of Colon, the port of Cristobal with all its installations will revert to Panama on the first day of the treaty, [applause] as well as Rainbow City and the towns of Paraiso and Pedro Miguel.

To conclude, we want to point out that the agreement in principle does not grant lands and waters and installations, but the right to use them, according to the agreement, so that the United States may operate, maintain and defend the canal as a primary right, until 31 December 1999 at noon.

We see, then, a Panama fully liberated from a condition that limited its political, economic and social geography. According to the new treaty, we shall have a truly free nation. Thank you. [Applause.]

SECOND ESCOBAR BETHANCOURT ADDRESS

Mr. President, General Torrijos, distinguished representatives and general public: We will now report on two very controversial points in the negotiations-one is the neutrality pact between Panama and the United States and the other is the problem of the option to build a new sea-level canal. We feel that the best way to explain this is by pointing out the details of how this negotiation was conducted and what things Panama accepted or rejected, because that will allow you to see the real scope of the neutrality pact.

One of the conditions originally established by the United States before beginning negotiations with Panama called for a neutrality pact and a military pact between the two countries. The military pact had to be concluded before the end of this century so that it could go into effect after 2000. This created a deadlock in the negotiations for some time because Panama opposed the signing of a military pact. And it opposed such a pact because the military pact entailed two things: First, the U.S. military presence in Panama after the expiration of the new treaty. Second, as a great power, the United States is often involved in wars in other parts of the world and we did not want a situation in which, on the basis of a military pact, our country's future generations would be required to fight in U.S. waters under the pretext that they were fighting because the war was being waged to defend the Panama Canal. That was a position Panama maintained until the United States

stopped insisting on the military pact, and discussions began only regarding the neutrality pact.

One of the problems that arose had to do with granting preferential transit through the canal to U.S. warships. They said they had two problems: First, they had to please their Pentagon and had to present them in this matter of the treaty. Second, they said that since they are leaving after the expiration of the treaty they should at least have that [preferential treatment] because they had constructed the canal.

We told them that we admitted that they had in effect constructed the canal, but that to put down in the neutrality pact that U.S. warships were entitled to preferential transit in relation with other ships violated the neutrality pact itself, contradicting the very idea of the pact we were negotiating. This was another subject of long debates and thorough analysis. They kept looking into their books, we into ours; they kept quoting their treaty writers, we kept quoting ours, for this is the way in which these debates are conducted.

So this is the framework of the neutrality pact. The criticism being made against it-some of which you may have heard or read by a number of people who like to nitpick is that we are giving the United States the right to intervene in our country after the year 2000. Those people believe that the right to intervene is granted, but nobody grants the big powers the right to intervene. They intervene wherever they damn well please with or without a pact. [Applause.]

When they landed in Santo Domingo they did not have any military pact with Santo Domingo, nor did they have any right to intervene in Santo Domingo. But just the same they landed there. But there are people here who believe that it is the articles in a code which tell a country whether or not it has the right to intervene. They do not know that is the bayonets and cannons and the atomic bombs which give a country the right to intervene. A country like the United States can land its troops in Panama whenever it pleases after 2000 with or without a neutrality pact. But it cannot land its troops in Russia, even if Russia told them to do so. This is reality. In other words, with the neutrality pact we are not giving the United States the right to intervene. What we are giving them is an assurance that the canal will remain permanently neutral, that we are not going to close the canal to their ships or those of any other country.

Why this neutrality pact? Because they think that maybe in the year 2000 this country will become socialist and will turn into their enemy and they feel it is better to make sure right now that even if our country becomes socialist, it cannot prevent them from using the canal. To be even more frank, they do not need that neutrality pact to tell them whether or not they may intervene. They need it to show to their Congress; in order to be able to tell their Congress: Look, we are turning the Canal over to the Panamanians, but we still have the right to watch over them so they behave. That is the truth. It is a question of their internal policy. They are solving an internal problem regarding a Congress that is largely opposed to these negotiations and which even has members who have not been elected of their own free will, turned into members of the U.S. Congress. They are Panamanians who live here and in Miami. [As heard.] [Applause.]

The other problem we discussed was that of the option for the construction of a sea-level canal. In all these years the problem of a sea-level canal was hardly discussed at all at the negotiating table. There were about two talks on this. We discussed this, nothing came out of these discussions and then came the Bogota conference with the presidents. That is where the option problem really reached a crisis. It reached a crisis because a very direct and continuous communication was established among all the presidents meeting there and President Carter through negotiators Bunker and Linowitz as well as with us through Dr. Giogenes de la Rosa, who was there at the time, and our Ambassador Gabriel Lewis Galindo. But they made a proposal to us on that option and that is why the issue reached a crisis. They proposed that Panama grant them an option to build a sea-level canal without setting any date. Second, they wanted Panama to promise that no other country would construct a sea-level canal. We rejected that proposal in Bogota. We read it to the presidents. That was the proposal brought the previous evening by several of our negotiators and we read it to them. The negotiations between the two countries was practically broken in Bogota. So much so that I remember that at one point General Torrijos told the presidents: Well, we called this conference several days ago for a celebration of a new treaty and it turns out that we have come for the wake. The struggle between the two countries began in Bogota. And I say the two countries because the rest of the presidents got as involved as if they had been Panamanians. We must really be very grateful to the presidents that met with the general in Bogota. Regarding this problem they acted just like any of us; they even

wanted to walk out mad. The Mexican president wanted to get on his plane and leave; he was very furious. They all became Panamanians regarding the option problem.

When the United States finally realized that there was no way in which an agreement could be reached regarding this option in the terms they were proposing and that the issue had reached an impasse, they asked for a recess. During that recess we continued our discussions with the presidents meeting in Bogota.

The Panamanian delegation then prepared a draft which all presidents liked. They said it was correct and fair. We then called the United States, they examined it for a while and finally accepted it. I think that it would be a good idea to read the text of this draft to you so that you will see how the option problem came out. It reads:

Article 3. Possibility of building a third set of locks or a sea-level canal.

First, the Republic of Panama and the United States of America acknowledge that a sea-level canal can be important for future international navigation. As a result of this, after approving the treaty of the existing canal and for the duration of this treaty, both countries promise to study joinly the viability of such a canal. In the event that the need for such a canal is viewed favorably, they will negotiate its construction in the terms agreed on by both countries. This is how the option issue came out. [Applause.]

As you can see, it is not even a option to build a sea-level canal. It is an option to promise to study the viability of it. That is the true option. The true commitment is to sit down with the United States to study whether or not it is viable to build a sea-level canal. If the two countries feel it is viable, then they will sit down to negotiate the terms agreed on by the two countries.

This is the panorama we have before us. This is the famous neutrality that is being criticized in these negotiations. The real problem, or rather the two real problems that those who oppose these negotiations will have to face, will be to prove to us that the 1903 treaty, the Buneau-Varilla Treaty, is better than this one. That will be their first problem-to prove that the perpetuity clause we now have and the present Canal Zone is better than this. That is something they will have to prove to us and our people. They will have to prove that the $2 million we now get is economically better for all the coming years than what has been presented by our planning and economic policy minister. That is something they will have to prove. We do not mind being criticized by those who say they do not want the treaty because, as Ahumada said, they do not like General Torrijos because he is a dictator and they do not want the treaty to be signed under a dictator. That is nonsense. At the bottom of this problem, those who oppose this treaty will have to prove to us that perpetuity, the Canal Zone's existence, the existence of a foreign jurisdiction here and the anarchic existence of military bases is better than what we are proposing. And those who do not attack us on that side, but on the contrary, say that we are not revolutionary enough, will have to prove it to us by getting their knapsacks and their grenades and entering the zone to get the gringos out of there. That is how they will have to prove it to us. Not with little speeches or documents.

SPEECH BY GENERAL TORRIJOS

Esteemed fellow members of the government, honorable representatives: You have heard a compact account of what has been 70 years of struggle for the Panamanian people.

I say that it has been 70 years of struggle for the Panamanian people because America and the world know that many of the cemeteries of rebels in this country are full of the crosses of youths who sacrificed themselves to see their sovereignty and their dignity respected.

This triumph, which I come to present to you here, is a triumph which results from the greatest conviction that we have triumphed [as heard]. It is a triumph which comes from the conviction that the country will take another path and a triumph which comes from the conviction that, had we not organized the country politically and given this people authentic representation in the administration of their destiny, no government or leader, no matter how great or how good a pathfinder, could have presented to the nation a treaty which has as its most important feature the fact that it sets the date for the eradication of each of the colonialist stakes [surrounding the zone] which exist at present. [Applause.]

I can tell you that this is a triumph which fills me with pride because to change the term perpetuity to 23 years is a triumph of this generation. I tell you that I am proud of the negotiating team, because they set a deadline on perpetuity, which in other words meant eternity plus one. And I tell you that I am proud because I am convinced that the great objectives of sovereignty can only be achieved through this

struggle which the country has waged, which I call the aplinism [alpinismo] of generations. I call it alpinism of generations because we would be very selfish if we failed to admit that all the past generations, within their own circumstances, fought with all their effort, valor and determination to eradicate the colonial enclave which divides the fatherland. [Applause.]

Never before have I felt more respect for those who participated in this effort. I had not felt such respect because I was unaware of the pressure to which they had been subjected. Sirs: If one were not a leader with a good mental attitude, if one were not a leader who is inspired daily by love for our youth, if one were not a leader overly prepared to withstand pressure, today one would be in a mental asylum. One is subjected, in this type of negotiation-when one chooses the route of negotiation to liberate the country, one chooses a somewhat shorter, but which would entail the sacrifice and immolation of no less than 50,000 Panamanian youths who, being overly devoted to the cause of their fatherland, would have demonstrated that they are the aristocracy of the country's patriots. We would have left future generations headless, completely without future leaders, because the best-the aristocracy of patriotism, the aristocracy of talent and the aristocracy of couragewould have been sacrificed in the 1,142 square kilometers of the Canal Zone. What will happen? I know that there is question in the minds of all the peoplewill we recover this piece of land in order to change its owners? To exchange white masters for brown masters? This is the great question and the great doubt which I wish to clarify right now. We are not going to exchange that great piece of land which we are now incorporating under our sovereignty for new masters. We are going to make the most collective use possible of those recovered installations and of those square kilometers. [Applause.] When I say the most collective use, I refer to the use by which the greatest portion of the Panamanian people may enjoy the fruits of their labor.

I visualize, with the idealism of a leader, I visualize Fort Amador, when I pass overhead in a helicopter, as the home of 20,000 Panamanian children playing on those fields, playing on those lawns, sheltered in those installations, without the fear that someone will say that their presence is illegal and that they are intruders on the soil which belongs to them. [Applause.]

I visualize the children of the [national] institute-and when I say the children of the institute I refer not only to those who are registered there but all those who have the philosophy of the institute, since the philosophy of the institute has been the greatest quarry of rebelliousness that has nourished the patriotism of the fatherland. [Applause.]

I visualize the children of the institute climbing Ancon Hill as they please and from there, looking down at the canal, the city, and wherever they wish without a foreign policeman arresting them and accusing them of the usual charge--disturbing the peaceful existence of 50,000 Zonians. Thank God that not everything in this country was badly designed, because he who had enough vision to install the national institute near the Canal Zone was doing so with the clear understanding that he was establishing there an outpost of national dignity so as to prevent those who had arrogantly usurped our territory from sleeping in peace for 70 years. [Applause.]

And now we are in the stage of drafting, of the academic polishing of the treaty. After the Panamanian Government accepts it, accepts this draft as what has been agreed upon, the U.S. Government will have to do likewise. This will take 3 or 4 weeks. Then two alternatives will remain. President Carter is not averse to the idea of coming to the country to sign this document in a setting which was a source of shame for them for 60 years, and in the presence of all the leaders of Latin America. He is not averse to the idea, but on the other hand he is also too busy [empenado], too busy trying to get the treaty through the Senate, and this might possibly prevent his being present. If this is so, then we will have to fly to the United States to sign the treaty and immediately begin disseminating information in order to saturate the public with information on what is being approved or disapproved.

We must stipulate that the government does not consider criticism of the treaty as criticism against the government and that all the government wants is for these opinions on the agreements to be expressed in a responsible manner. We must stipulate that the treaty will be submitted to a plebiscite and that every Panamanian who goes to the ballot box should be aware that what he is depositing in the box is a message from his own conscience. [Applause.]

It was possible to obtain this treaty due to the fact that a long time ago, following the moral scandal of Watergate in the United States, there a team of men began to be formed in the top political leadership of that country who gave a deep, funda