the extremely poor human rights record in Panama as identified by "Freedom House" and by Panamanian exile groups.

Why have we ignored the human rights issue altogether in Panama, while the Administration lambastes other Latin American nations on this point? I don't know the answer. But in the interest of moral principle, as well as consistent foreign policy, it's important that we address the subject of human rights observance within Panama. My amendment and my reservation will do this for the benefit of both U.S. citizens in Panama and for Panamanian citizens.

TRANSFER CANAL ZONE PROPERTY

Finally, my second reservation reaffirms the constitutional responsibility of the House of Representatives to participate in transfer of ownership of the Canal Zone territory. Without reviewing all of the historical precedents and court decisions which support this argument, I will simply say that disposal of Canal Zone "territory and property" clearly falls within the realm of Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 1 of the United States Constitution. As such, not only two-thirds of the U.S. Senate but a majority of the U.S. House of Representatives must approve the proposed Treaties.

My reservation clearly states that, before the Canal Treaty enters into force, "The Congress" must adopt appropriate legislation to transfer the Canal Zone to the Republic of Panama. This would protect the right and the responsibility of the House of Representatives to participate in this significant decision.

NO APOLOGIES

Mr. Chairman, I want to say that the people of the United States owe Panama no apologies for our involvement with the canal. The generosity of our government in building the canal, in operating and maintaining it for 65 years, and in thereby enhancing the standard of living for Panamanians, requires no remorse on our part. Free of any sense of guilt, we should proceed to analyze these Treaties in an objective and responsible manner.

But the Panamanian government must know that we will never relinquish our presence in the Canal Zone because of veiled threats or direct pressures. They must know that we expect priority passage for our ships during periods of crisis. They must be told that we expect to see substantial progress in the area of human rights, and that we expect to share a reasonable, but not exorbitant amount of the canal tolls with them.

I have outlined the reasons why I cannot support the Panama Canal Treaties in their present form. I have offered reasonable proposals for amending the Treaties to protect our vital national interests.

You gentlemen will have an influential voice in determining the final form of these Treaties that is voted on by the Senate. It's my opinion that the Treaties will not be approved unless modified. It's my own opinion that they should not be approved unless modified in a way that is truly effective—that is, by direct amendment or reservation.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR WILLIAM L. SCOTT

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the foreign relations committee and to express my personal views on the important matter now under consideration. I am aware that the administration in urging ratification has stressed the long period of negotiations under four Presidents, emphasized the support of Latin American countries and the need to yield to world opinion to relinquish the Canal Zone to Panama. However, in this country sovereignty resides in the people and not the President or the officials who negotiated the proposed treaties. Therefore, it would seem that the will of the people should be reflected in our decision. There is little doubt that the American people are opposed to the ratification of the treaties, and I have great faith in the collective will of the majority. My own mail is roughly 5% in favor of the treaties and 95% in opposition, and I expect each Senator's mail is quite heavy. So perhaps in the final analysis rather than the White House educating the American people, the President and the Department of State may receive an education in American Government. I would certainly hope that this will prove to be the case.

My views are based not only on mail from constituents, but upon two recent trips to Panama and South American countries. A thorough reading and rereading of the treaties and background information, independent investigations, listening to testimony before the subcommittee on separation of powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee and studies made by the Library of Congress.

There appear to be many objectionable provisions in the canal treaty which should be eliminated or clarified, such as the prohibition against the United States constructing a new canal anywhere within the isthmus without the consent of Panama, and the doubtful interpretation of "expeditious passage”.

However, the beginning of article I of the Panama Canal treaty, to my mind, is by far the most objectionable feature because it provides for the abrogation of all prior treaties with the phrase, "this treaty terminates and supersedes" the treaties of 1903, 1936, 1955 and "all other treaties, conventions, agreements and exchanges of notes between the United States of America and the Republic of Panama concerning the Panama Canal ⚫

Under the 1903 treaty we guaranteed the independence of the new country of Panama, paid $10 million and agreed to an annual payment of $250,000 and obtained both title to the Canal Zone and sovereignty over it. Other actions taken by our government to perfect our title included the purchase of the French canal properties for $40 million; what was tantamount to a quitclaim and recognition of our title from Colombia for the sum of $25 million; and the purchase of private rights from owners and squatters expressly excluded from the 1930 treaty. All this, however, would be vitiated by the first sentence of article I of the present canal treaties.

It is true that under numbered paragraph 2 of article I, the Republic of Panama grants to the United States for the remainder of this century "the rights necessary to regulate the transit of ships through the Panama Canal and to manage, operate, maintain, improve, protect and defend the canal." But we would be managing, operating, maintaining, improving, protecting and defending property belonging to the Republic of Panama rather than American property as the situation is today. Mr. Chairman, as you know, a valid contract must contain consideration. We speak of something of value flowing from one party to the other, mutuality, but in my judgment these treaties are for the benefit of Panama alone. I find no new benefits for the United States.

It does not appear, Mr. Chairman, that there is serious concern within the executive branch of government to the role of the Congress under article IV of the Constitution. As you know, the second paragraph of section 3 of the article provides: "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States:

To determine the proper role of the House under article IV, I requested a study be made by the Congressional Research Service which responded with an excellent and objective legal memorandum dated August 4, 1977, concluding that precedent indicates Congress has exclusive power to dispose of property in the Canal Zone. I ask, Mr. Chairman, to include a copy of this memorandum in the record.

Attorney General Bonaparte, in an opinion dated September 7, 1907 (26 Att'y Gen. 376), stated that sovereignty over the canal zone was not an open or doubtful question and applied what he stated was the first rule of construction, "that plain and sensible words should be taken to mean what they say." The Attorney General added: "The omission to use words expressly passing sovereignty was dictated by reasons of public policy, I assume; but whatever the reason the treaty gives the substance of sovereignty, and instead of containing a mere declaration transferring the sovereignty, descends to the particulars 'All the rights, power, and authority' that belong to sovereignty, and negatives any such 'sovereign rights, power, or authority' in the former sovereign."

Now, Mr. Chairman, I realize that some of our people in the executive branch are attempting to convey the impression that we do not possess either title or sovereignty but this is contrary to the opinion of Secretary of State Hay in 1904 who stated, "that the grant accomplished by the treaty was a grant of land and sovereign right thereover, and not a mere concession or privilege, is shown by the granting clauses and also by the references to the grant in subsequent clauses of the treaty; Later he said: "It cannot escape observation that the legislative branch of the Government of the Republic of Panama by legislative enactment declared the zone to be 'ceded to the United States,' and dealt with accordingly." And still later he stated: "The United States at all times since the treaty was concluded has acted upon the theory that it had secured in and to the Canal Zone the exclusive jurisdiction to exercise sovereign rights, power and authority." Mr. Chairman, I ask that this entire letter of Secretary Hay be inserted in the Record.

The Supreme Court in the case of Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907), stated that we hold a valid title to the Canal Zone and compared our title with the then territory of Alaska. The court added: "It is hypercritical to contend that the title of the United States is imperfect and that the territory described does not belong to

this Nation because of the omission of some of the technical terms used in ordinary conveyances of real estate."

Mr. Chairman, I ask that a copy of this unanimous opinion by the Supreme Court also be included in the record.

In 1971, The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Husband R. (Roach) 453 F. 2d 1054, cert. den. 406 U.S. 935 (1972), stated: "The Canal Zone is an unincorporated territory of the United States." So, Mr. Chairman, the first article of the canal treaty is an attempt to transfer United States property and sovereignty over the Canal Zone.

These are opinions of both cabinet officers and our highest court made near the time we acquired the zone and the exhaustive study of authorities made by the Library of Congress in its paper dated August 4, 1977. The only rationale I know for persons presently holding positions within the executive branch of government to deny that we hold title or sovereign rights in the Canal Zone is to close ranks in support of a treaty signed by the President.

I wonder if each Senator early in his school experience didn't learn that the United States acquired the Canal Zone, rid the area of disease, constructed the canal and has operated it under the American flag since the beginning of this century. At a time when world domination is being sought by a form of government entirely different from our own, it appears untenable to give away this vital artery of commerce, to pay Panama for taking it and to commit ourselves to defend it. This view is shared by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1970 to 1974, who testified before the Senate subcommittee on separation of powers. Toward the end of his testimony on July 22 of this year, Admiral Moorer made these statements: “Surrender of U.S. sovereignty over the Canal would inevitably lead to the transformation of the entire friendly character on the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. Everything would depend on the attitude of those who held sovereignty and ownership I might say that in military affairs there is no substitute for ownership of the territory and the ability to control or to deny the waters and the airspace."

Of course, Mr. Chairman, Admiral Moorer, retired as our number one military officer and is in a position to candidly express his opinion at this time and I believe we can well understand the hesitancy of some active members of our military forces publicly disagreeing with their Commander-in-Chief. We need only to reflect on General Singlaub being called back from Korea and being reassigned because of a candid statement made by him and the rebuke of General Starry by the Secretary of the Army to realize that active duty officers and even civilian government officials are not entirely free to express opinions contrary to the administration's position.

Before these rebukes, however, on March 11, 1977, during a closed session of the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Committee on Armed Services, Admiral Maurice Weisner, presently Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, or in other words, the Commander of all of our Armed Forces for one half of the globe, with headquarters in Hawaii, responding to specific questions regarding the importance of the canal to the United States. This testimony is reported at page 2378 of the hearings on military procurement for the fiscal year 1978 and I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, to include the page in the Record. He was asked for his views as to the importance of the Panama Canal; whether there would be any adverse effect on his command if the Panama Canal were not under the control of the United States. Let me quote his response: "I can see adverse effects, Senator Scott. It takes considerable time to move items by sea from the East Coast to the Pacific. Without the Panama Canal, you are adding 3 weeks' time in shipping critical items such as ammunition from an East Coast port rather than from a West Coast port."

Then I asked the Admiral if he would see a need for an increase in our naval strength if we did not control the Panama Canal. Admiral Weisner responded: "Yes, we would have to put these critical items being shipped by sea over a greater area. This, of course, is a response of an active duty military commander before the Singlaub affair.

Returning briefly now, Mr. Chairman, to the conclusion of the testimony by Admiral Moorer before the Judiciary Committee, he states, and I quote: "Anyone in this country who thinks that Soviet Russia is not staring down the throat of the Panama Canal is very naive, and I think it says something to note that the Soviets understand the importance of the Panama Canal apparently far more than many in our own country."

On September 8th of this year, retired Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. also testified before our Subcommittee on Separation of powers and I am quoting this 4-star

Admiral: "From my combined military experience which includes Europe, Asia, the Pacific, the Caribbean and the United Nations, it is my conviction that U.S. interests are best served by keeping the canal, by retaining undiluted sovereignty over the U.S. Canal Zone." He added and again I quote: "Finally, I would like to reemphasize the importance of the June 8, 1977 letter of the four greatly distinguished chiefs of naval operations to the President that was quoted in the testimony of Admiral Moorer. Their conclusions reflect a vast background, including combat experience, and are more pertinent today than ever. Retired military officers are completely free to voice their inner-most convictions. Active duty officers have an obligation to support the policies of their commander-in-chief."

I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that this committee will call more retired military officers in whom you have confidence and who are free of constraints from their commander-in-chief and ask their candid, personal opinions on the dangers of our Government parting with title to the Canal and the gradual turnover of full control to the Republic of Panama.

Mr. Chairman, we sometimes hear that Latin America favors the transfer of title Cand control of the Canal Zone from the United States to Panama but I have taken two trips to Latin America this year and have had the opportunity to talk with chief executives and other principal officials of a number of Latin American countries, with embassy personnel, with intelligence officers, with American citizens, as well as foreign nationals within the countries visited.

In Colombia I learned that because of kinship with an adjoining Latin country, Colombian officials do favor the transfer of the canal but are very much concerned about the contemplated increase in tolls, stating that the only practical way to transfer material from one part of their country to another is through the canal. Brazilian officials didn't seem to have any real concern regarding the proposed transfer, referring to it as a matter between the United States and Panama. Perhaps this is because Brazil fronts on the Eastern coast of the South American continent and is not among the prime users of the canal.

In Argentina, officials indicated that they did not make extensive use of the canal but expressed fear that it might come under communist control.

Chilean officials were even more concerned of the possibility of Communist influence or control of the canal indicating that 95 percent of their commerce used the canal and that they could not afford an increase in tolls or to have this vital artery subject to direct or indirect control by Communists. Chilean officials indicated that our contemplated action in giving up the canal appeared to be contrary to the best interest of the world community and they would much prefer that we retain complete control of the canal.

In Peru, we again heard that Panama was a neighboring country and because of this they favored the transfer to Panama. However, officials indicated their country would suffer greatly if the tolls were raised as appears to be inevitable if the treaties now under consideration are ratified. Contrary to some suggestions, officials of every South American country visited indicated that there would be no repercussions from their country if the Senate failed to ratify the treaties.

Within the Canal Zone itself, we heard the strongest opposition and the greatest fear of communism. American citizens complained of violation of human rights, they spoke of lack of expertise and management ability, of the differences between salaries within the zone and the Republic of Panama. Many indicated that they would not continue to work within the Canal Zone if it came under the control of Panama.

I inserted a detailed statement of the Panamanian trip in the August 4, 1977 Congressional Record and included a statement by the heads of various civic groups within the Canal Zone. Should any Senator have any doubt about the feeling of American citizens living in the Canal Zone, he might want to refer to this statement. It concludes, and I quote: "for ourselves as U.S. citizens living and working thousands of miles from our homeland, we can say, 'pack us up tomorrow. We're ready to go.' But for the sake of U.S. commerce and the U.S. national interests in general in the western hemisphere we urge you to examine the proposed treaty in minute detail.

We urge you to visit here for more than three days, to observe the situation with your own eyes and not to depend solely on briefings by U.S. or Panamanian Government officials. The new treaty with Panama will have long-range repercussions that coming generations will have to live with; we urge you not to ratify a new treaty solely because the State Department says that a treaty is the cure-all to problems with Panama. The Russia-Cuba axis and the American electorate are waiting to see which way the treaty goes. A hasty decision on the part of our

Congressmen without giving deep and thoughtful study to the question would please the former and infuriate the latter."

Now, Mr. Chairman, on this question of Communist influence, Mr. Charles Conneely, a member of the professional staff of the Armed Services Committee, and myself talked privately in a number of Latin American countries with Embassy officials, with military intelligence officers, with CIA officials, with both American citizens and foreign nationals about the possibility of Communist influence. We first visited in Panama and were somewhat skeptical, or thought perhaps the Americans living_within the zone might tend to exaggerate the question of Communist influence. Yet, the statements they made were verified in private conversations with the American intelligence community in various Latin American countries. In acting upon this treaty we may well be considering not only future control of the Canal Zone but future control of the Caribbean.

Therefore, it would seem important enough to the defense of our own country and that of the free world to have military and civilian intelligence officials, both active and retired, to testify under oath in closed sessions regarding Communist influence, within Panama and other nations of Latin America. Time after time we heard the names of leading political figures in Panama identified as Communists and were told that there were strong Communist influences throughout the Panamanian Government. I call these statements to the attention of the committee because of their repetition by so many people during our South American visit and suggest that the committee endeavor to ascertain the truthfulness of falsity of their allegations.

I believe the committee and the Senate will want to consider these factors in determining whether to advise and consent to the treaties.

My own opinion, Mr. Chairman, is that these treaties should be defeated. But I would hope that the administration could then be encouraged to negotiate an arrangement for joint control by the United States, Panama and a limited number of Latin American countries but with ownership of the Canal Zone remaining in the United States.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JESSE HELMS

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee: I come before you today not to give you some pre-set opinions of my own, but to raise some questions which I have not yet seen fully answered by the distinguished witnesses who have appeared before you. I would not be candid if I did not admit that the texts of the treaties have done little to convince me that the basic principles of the KissingerTack agreement of 1974, upon which the treaties are based, are themselves adequate to support the national interest. But no one can prudently adopt an attitude of a closed mind. Indeed, should the treaties pass-and I hope they do not-it will still be best that all aspects of the treaties and their implications be fully aired, and fully understood by all concerned. I therefore raise these questions today in the hope of creating an intelligent dialogue.

QUESTION NO. 1: THE REAL ISSUE

Let us take the slogan, frequently heard, "our true national interest is in the continued use of the Canal, not in ownership." Is not the real question rather whether the continued use of the Canal will be better protected by the present treaties or by the proposed new treaties? Will we be better able to keep the Canal open, safe, and efficient under the present system where we exercise exclusive command and control over a clearly demarcated area, or will it be easier to keep it open, safe, and efficient under the mixed administrative system with a combined defense and interlocking, overlapping areas of responsibility?

QUESTION NO. 2: U.S. SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CANAL ZONE

Let us now take the question of what kind of control we actually have there. Is it really true that the United States does not exercise the full rights of a sovereign in the Canal Zone? I am distinguishing the rights of a sovereign from the rights of a property-owner. Sovereignty is not some abstract concept like title. It means power. The 1903 Treaty is quite explicit. We exercise absolute power in perpetuity; Panama specifically quits claim to any exercise of power in perpetuity. I would like to ask the distinguished Committee if it has found any statement by the United States Congress, by any U.S. President, or by any U.S. Secretary of State or any international agreement with Panama, previous to the Kissinger-Tack Agreement of 1974which specifically abrogates our rights to the exercise of sovereignty as found in the 1903 Treaty. Is there a single statement of this kind?