the potential danger for giving this U.S. advantage to a man who might allow or might be persuaded that it was in his best interest to permit Soviet power and influence to prevail by proxy over the Canal, in much the same manner as happened in Cuba. I was convinced as Chairman of the JCS—and I remain convinced today that if the Soviet Union ever gained even proxy sovereignty and control over the U.S. Canal Zone and Canal through Cuba, U.S. security as well as U.S. prosperity would be placed in serious jeopardy.

The United States would be placed in jeopardy because interocean mobility would be threatened. The mobility of allied commercial shipping and naval forces would face the same threat. The economic lifelines of the entire Western Hemisphere would be needlessly jeopardized, and the point is: there is no point in surrendering this vital interest. Also, by relinquishing control of the Canal Zone and the Canal, we would force all those nations who depend on our power and leadership to accommodate to the adverse implications of such action on our part. Recent history clearly indicates that the Canal Zone could quickly become the satellite base of an adversary. The advocates of this proposed treaty do not appear to take this factor into account.

The Panama Canal is one of the four maritime gateways of the world, together with the Malacca Straits, the Suez Canal, and the Gibraltar Straits. Anyone who reads Soviet literature concerning maritime affairs soon learns that the Soviets fully understand the strategic importance of the Panama Canal, even if some here in Washington do not. In my view, the prime reason for the burdensome support of Cuba by the Soviet Union is related directly to the interest in the Canal as they greatly expanded their maritime capabilities, both warships and merchant ships. We have in fact a Torrijos-Castro-Moscow axis. Castro has sent thousands of troops to Africa aboard Soviet ships. He has been to Moscow where he was greeted with open arms. Torrijos has been to Havana where he has been decorated by Castro while both extolled the success of their respective revolutions. He has also been to Libya to visit Qaddafi who, next to Castro, is the most active international_revolutionary. When Torrijos overflew Havana on his return from Washington to Panama after the ceremonies last month, he sent the following message to Castro: "On my return trip to my country and flying above the sky of Cuba, I salute you with friendship always. I wish that the Cuban people under your skillful leadership continue its ascendant march toward progress. In Latin America your name is associated with feelings about dignity that have been channeled toward the ending of a shameful period of colonialism.'

In addition, a large Russian commission has recently visited Panama seeking concessions and offering economic assistance.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, do not be surprised, if this treaty is ratified in its present form, to see a Soviet and/or Cuban presence quickly established in the country of Panama. Such a presence will seriously complicate the exercise of the claimed "right" of the United States to intervene. (I can find no such specific right contained in the treaty.) In any event, any confrontation then becomes one with the Soviets rather than with the Panamanian guerrillas or terrorists. With the Soviets already on the scene fighting our way in will not be simple. A permanent U.S. presence on the other hand is the only feasible posture.

In view of the above, Mr. Chairman, I have yet to hear any convincing justification advanced as to why the United States should willingly sacrifice the strategic and economic advantages afforded the United States and, for that matter, all the nations in the Western Hemisphere by our exercise of full control of the Panama Canal as provided for in the current treaty. In fact, stripped to the essence I have heard only three reasons put forward in support of the proposed treaty: (1) by signing the new treaty we will divest ourselves of the stigma of colonialism harped on by Mr. Torrijos and thereafter everyone will love us; (2) if we do not surrender the Čanal some unknown individuals in the Isthmus of Panama will blow it up; (3) the Canal is not of much use anyway. Traffic between oceans is a convenience but is not vital. Further, the big ships of the Navy cannot use the Canal and only about 10 percent of the merchant ships passing through the Canal are U.S. flagships-so why the concern?

Let me briefly discuss each of these reasons in turn.

(1) The United States does not have to apologize to anyone for its generous outpourings of blood and treasure in an effort to assist the underprivileged and make life more peaceful and more livable for everyone. This Committee has participated in and masterminded our aid program for years. However, from observing the attacks on the United States in the United Nations and other places, it is apparent that a great nation such as ours cannot buy affection. One more move in this direction in my view will have little or no effect. What we should strive for is not

affection but respect. I am seriously concerned about the trends in recent years where in we have withdrawn from Vietnam, are planning to withdraw from South Korea, have lost considerable influence following the Angola affair, and overall are suffering a gradual change in the perception by the nations of the world of the will and determination of the most powerful democracy in the world.

(2) Even since the negotiations were initiated with Panama in 1964 the rationale has been advanced that if the United States did not divest itself of the Canal the Panamanians would sabotage it. To respond to this concept to me would be a retraction under threat. If this is to be our course of action in the future we might as well throw in the international towel. One should note from a practical point of view that the Panamanians enjoy the highest per capita income of any of the contemporary Latin American countries because of the presence of the Canal. The activities surrounding the presence of the Canal contribute about one third of the employment and one third of the gross national product to Panama. If they were to attempt to damage or sabotage the Canal they would be doing nothing more than cutting off their nose to spite their fiscal face. Furthermore, they would be the ones who would be committing violence, not the United States. To me a pulling back under threat will simply lay our country open to additional threats and we will lose the respect of which I spoke. Under such a condition one could expect many of the nations of the world to tilt toward those who they know are willing to take a firm stand in their national interest.

(3) So far as the question of a two-ocean navy and the passage of aircraft carriers through the Canal is concerned, let me say first that we do not have a two-ocean navy. In recent years the Navy has been rapidly reduced from over 900 ships to less than 500, while the Soviets are engaged in a rapid expansion of their fleets of warships as well as merchant ships. A large majority of our war plans and contingency plans are infeasible unless one assumes that full use of the Canal will be available. With respect to the large carriers, the Navy has only 13 of these ships. The vast majority-well in excess of 90 percent-of the ships of the Navy can transit the Canal and will be required to transit the Canal. I should note that the other alternative, namely going around Cape Horn, will add 8,000 miles, 25 to 30 days and a considerable increase in the cost of fuel to naval operations. In wartime the 30 days could well be vital.

As far as the big merchant ships are concerned, it is true that only about 10 percent of the ships flying the U.S. flag transit the Canal. But that is not the point. It is well known that the United States has a very small merchant marine and that the shipping interests in our country, for various legal and fiscal reasons, resort to what is known as a "flag of convenience." What really counts is the tonnage which transits the Canal enroute to and from ports in the United States. It so happens that out of about 14,000 ships that transit the Canal, 8,000 are either enroute from or bound for U.S. ports.

So much for these three reasons. Finally, Mr. Chairman, there are several questions somewhat outside my purview but troublesome nevertheless, and I will simply list them for you.

(1) Do the negotiators for Panama and the United States have the same perception as to the real meaning of the language in the treaty? Public statements by both sides subsequent to the negotiations seem to indicate otherwise. Certainly this matter should be cleared up without delay. Let me give you examples of conflicting statements which to me are matters of grave concern:

The proponents of the treaties state that Article 4 of the treaty concerning the permanent neutrality and operation of the Panama Canal guarantees our continuing freedom of action for unilateral action to maintain the Canal's neutrality. I can find nothing in Article 4 which guarantees to the United States the right to unilaterally intervene for any purpose.

Article 5 states that only Panamanian forces will be based in Panama. In a radio broadcast on 24 August Mr. Escobar Bethancourt said and I quote: "The Pact does not establish that the United States has the right to intervene in Panama. The word was discussed and eliminated the Neutrality Pact does not provide who will

say when neutrality has been violated."

Again, on September 15, General Omar Torrijos at the opening of the 10th Congress of the Panamanian Students Federation at the Augusto Samuel Boyd National Agriculture Institute in Divisa, Herrera Province, said: "I am not afraid, nor am I denying, that we signed a clause which if misinterpreted by future U.S. generations could give rise to intervention. But I am not afraid, I know the youth that we are producing. And in order for there to be intervention there must be a people willing to accept intervention, and these people have no intention of accepting it." This statement was followed by rousing applause.

Again, on the subject of guaranteeing U.S. flagships priority passage, Article 6 only guarantees U.S. ships "expeditious" not priority passage. Mr. Escobar Bethancourt also disagrees with this interpretation testified by our negotiators. Quoting him once more: "Expeditious passage does not mean privileged passage. As a matter of fact the concept of privileged passage was rejected if after examining the provision the Gringos say 'I want to go through first,' then that is their problem with the other ships waiting there. We cannot go that far."

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, in view of the above statements I do not think that anyone can contradict the fact that there is a wide divergence in the interpretation of the meaning of the treaty concerning neutrality between the two sides. This is cause for grave concern. If not cleared up in advance, this treaty does not eliminate problems-it makes them, and big ones at that.

I would note that representatives of the Defense Department who claim primary credit for the treaty concerning the permanent neutrality and operation of the Panama Canal, as well as members of this Committee frequently make the point that the important objective is passage and not ownership. Mr. Chairman, I submit that ownership and control on one hand and priority passage on the other are synonymous. In view of the statements by senior Panamanian officials, it is clear to me at least, that the only way for the United States to guarantee priority passage is to maintain control and ownership. Mr. Torrijos and Mr. Bethancourt have obviously taken a similar position.

(2) What will Panama do with a 2,000 percent increase over the 2.3 million dollars she received last year as income from the Canal? To me that appears to be a fantastic amount for a country with a population not much larger than Detroit. Where will the money really go?

(3) If the O.A.S. nations so strongly support the treaty, how do we account for the absence of the presidents of the two largest and most influential countries at the signing ceremonies in Washington a few weeks ago?

(4) In the event that the tolls are raised 30 percent resulting in serious impact on the economies of the other Latin American countries-particularly those on the west coast of South America-will these countries continue their strong support of the proposed treaty or will in the final analysis the U.S. taxpayer be asked to foot the bill in order to make certain that everyone loves us?

There are other questions which concern me, Mr. Chairman, but I think I will simply close by saying that regarding the question of control and ownership of the U.S. Čanal Zone and the Canal I am satisfied with the Supreme Court's decision in the famous Wilson vs. Shaw case to the effect that the United States does in fact have legal control and ownership as if she has sovereignty for the purposes enumerated in the Treaty of 1903. This ruling was reaffirmed as recently as 1972. Also, our Constitution states in Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, that only Congress has the authority to dispose of U.S. territory and other property of the United States. The language in the Supreme Court's decision of 1907 is quite precise. It is not ambiguous. So is the language in our Constitution. Since the Supreme Court's decision of 1907 still stands-it has never been overruled-and since the Constitution in my opinion is still the soundest governing document in existence, I can only conclude that we would be well advised to abide by such documents in our negotiations with other countries.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF GEN. MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, USA (RET.) BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES, MONDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1977

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I am very glad to appear before this committee to express my support for the Panama Canal Treaties as they bear upon issues of national security. The latter is deeply involved since these documents contain much which affects the armed forces, the national economy and our dealings not merely with Panama but with all Latin America and many countries of the third world. Relations with the latter are involved in the canal issue because of the growing dependence of our economy upon imports of oil and essential minerals from third world markets, the continuity of which depends upon friendly relations with producer countries. Viewed in this light, the Panama Canal issue is seen to be an important aspect of our global foreign policy which impinges on international relationships far removed from the locale of the canal itself.

It is my opinion that both from a national and hemispheric point of view, the treaties under consideration contain provisions of definite advantage. To begin with, they will provide improved protection against the threats most dangerous to the

peaceful operation of the canal-those arising from sabotage, terrorism and popular disturbances occurring within Panama itself. We have had sufficient past experience with these forms of violence to recognize their potency and the probability of their increasing prevalence in the turbulent world ahead.

By its nature, the canal will always be highly vulnerable to acts of sabotage directed at its locks, operating machinery, power sources and the dams controlling the water level in the system. There are many forms of terrorism which may disrupt its operation-for example, the harassment, kidnaping or assassination of key personnel of the government or canal, explosives covertly placed aboard ships or attached externally by divers in port or in transit. Light commercial aircraft are capable of dropping mines into the channel where even an abortive attempt would frighten ships away and stalemate traffic. Intermittent sniper fire from the banks could produce similar effects.

Lesser dangers can also arise to interfer with canal operations-political demonstrations, labor strikes or slow-downs, mob violence against canal facilities and American or Government property. Finally there is always the possibility of an uprising against the regime in power and the installation of a new government, perhaps one under avowed communist or pro-Castro leadership.

Who might be the perpetrators of such actions? They might be local dissidents or revolutionaries, foreign agents, commando groups infiltrated from neighboring States or hired trouble makers controlled by Havana or Moscow.

Panama has often attracted such types in the past and will continue to do so because of the growing importance of the region to the U.S. The Soviet Union in intriguing for leadership in the have-not world has taken as a primary objective the undermining of our Latin American relations-particularly those with our trade partners. It will always assure to Panama a large allocation of troublemakers to complicate our problems. Turbulence there is always good news to Moscow-so also are American blunders. In this connection, let us hope that we do not give the Kremlin chiefs the occasion to rejoice which our rejection of these treaties would undoubtedly afford.

Why do I believe that the acceptance of these treaties will moderate these internal threats and forestall troublemaking in the Canal area? First, under the terms of these treaties, the U.S. and Panama would be bound in a partnership based on reciprocal self-interest, jointly committed to an efficient and unimpeded operation of the Canal. The local government would have an equal interest with us to restrain outbreaks of violence and lawlessness. A peaceful settlement of past differences should moderate the present anti-American bias which has often made the country a recruiting base for perpetrators of violence and a sympathetic environment in which they may find shelter. The economic gains which Panama derives from the treaties if properly used should tend to eliminate many of the causes of popular discontent and thereby contribute to greater political stability.

Also, the treaties facilitate the use of American military forces to reinforce the Panamanian constabulary in case the latter proves inadequate in a crisis involving the Canal. Whereas the operation of our forces are presently confined to the zone itself, after the effective date of the treaties and until the year 2000, we can move our forces anywhere in Panama as necessary to protect the Canal.

Even after 2000 and the departure of our forces from Panama, we shall have a parallel and independent responsibility with Panama to maintain a “regime of neutrality" which, to paraphrase the treaty, will assure a secure, peaceful and an expeditious transit for our vessels in peace and war, and an efficient operation of the canal under just, reasonable and equitable rules, regulations and tolls. As I understand these provisions, we shall have the right to make our own unilateral judgment on matters of compliance with these criteria of neutrality and may act independently if necessary to enforce them.

It is to be expected that members of the Organization of American States and other foreign nations will adhere to the objectives of the neutrality treaty and will agree to respect its provisions. Thereafter conflicts over the canal should cease to be a confrontation between an overbearing Uncle Sam, the Goliath of the affluent industrial world and tiny Panama, the David representing Latin America and the world have-not community. All of this is clearly in our national interest.

It may seem strange that in stressing the internal dangers to the canal, I have indicated no concern for a foreign attack as an overt act of war. Such an attack could hardly occur in isolation but rather as an episode in widespread hostilities. It would probably be made by bomber aircraft or by missiles launched from planes, ships or land bases. In such a case, the local defenses of the canal, whether as at present or as they might become under the treaties, would be of little value.

Effective protection could be obtained only from offensive action by our Armed Forces against the sources of the attack far from Panama itself.

In supporting these treaties, I am aware of certain risks which their adoption may entail, some of which I have mentioned and others have been raised by opponents. After weighing the pros and cons I am convinced that the advantages of approval definitely outweigh the disadvantages. In taking this position, I am unmoved by the argument that we owe anything to Panama by way of reparations in compensation for past injustices. These treaties should be measured purely by their present and future impact on the interests of the United States and Panama as best we can evaluate that impact today. Fortunately, it appears to me that they are favorable to the interests of both countries—and of the western hemisphere as well.

TESTIMONY OF CANAL ZONE CITIZEN REPRESENTATIVES TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, OCTOBER 10, 1977

We want to thank you for the opportunity to present testimony to your committee today in what we believe is a history-making process. Our panel consists of three people elected by the community to represent them on various townsite Civic Councils and of one officer of the Central Labor Union-Metal Trades Council of the Canal Zone. Mrs. Charlotte Kennedy is president of the Cristobal-Margarita-Brazos Heights Civic Council and Mrs. Patricia Fulton is president of the Pacific Civic Council. Mr. Harold Green is president of the Gamboa Civic Council, and Mr. Louis Fattorosi is vice president of the Canal Zone Federation of Teachers, American Federation of Teachers, Local 29, AFL-CIO, and is a delegate and trustee of the Central Labor Union-Metal Trades Council.

People in the Canal Zone and in the Republic of Panama have been listening to these hearings on Armed Forces Radio with a great deal of interest. Both groups of people have heard innumerable statements made about them by witnesses before this committee, some of whom have never been to the Canal Zone and some of whom have only spent one to three days in the Canal Zone. Ambassador Jorden made some assertions about how the people in the Canal Zone feel. We are convinced that the Honorable Ambassador has no expertise in representing accurately what we feel as a people in the Canal Zone because his contacts are confined to the highest level of Canal Zone officialdom. Therefore, in our testimony today we would like to set the record straight on a number of issues. Our preparation for this presentation has been extensive, involving reading daily newspapers in Spanish and English, watching panel discussions of the treaty on Panamanian television, keeping in constant contact with Panamanian friends on the political climate in Panama, and in some cases supplying some Congressional committees with information which they did not receive through official channels. We have had formal and informal discussions with visiting Senators and Representatives. But we must make one observation: Presidents Carter and Ford, Henry Kissinger, and Sol Linowitz have never been to the Canal Zone, at least to our knowledge. Senator Hollings, who spoke very vehemently about what we are like in the Canal Zone, was only here for a very brief visit. He was entertained in Mrs. Fulton's home for approximately one hour where he spoke with a number of Canal Zone residents, before continuing on a very busy schedule of appointments. This, to our knowledge, was the extent of his contact with the average citizen in the Canal Zone. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker met twice, once in 1973 and once in 1975, with Canal Zone civic and labor representatives. On both occasions he was equally close-mouthed and uninformative. He did promise to keep our best interests in mind and to keep us informed. We believe that he fulfilled neither promise.

We live with the Panama Canal 365 days a year. Our people know more about its operation and more about the characteristics of Panama and the Canal Zone than do President Carter, Cyrus Vance and the Joint Chiefs of Staff just by virtue of our work and family residence. We welcome the suggestion made by the Honorable Senator Percy that your committee should visit the Canal Zone. But bear in mind that you will still not learn all you need to know in three days of frantic briefings, an airplane ride over the Canal, and a couple of official dinners. You will learn during your visit that the Canal Zone is not surrounded by a fence and that Panamanian citizens have free access into the Zone simply by crossing a street. You will also notice there are no checkpoints or customs guards to interfere with these crossings into the Canal Zone.

At this point we would like to respond to some statements made about the Panama Canal treaty issue in earlier testimony before this committee. It has been repeated many times that Panamanians as a people want this treaty, that they are unified behind General Torrijos, that they are exercising a desire for self-determina