[From the Foreign Information Broadcast Service]

PANAMA: TORRIJOS RETURNS, SAYS NOTHING SIGNED IN WASHINGTON

Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera arrived back home at 1700 today, when all the world's newspapers are reporting and commenting on his interview this morning with President Jimmy Carter. He returned in a special jet which landed at the Rio Hato Air Base. He was accompanied by Agricultural Development Minister Col. Ruben Dario Paredes, Presidency Minister Fernando Manfredo and Romulo Escobar Bethancourt, chief of the Panamanian negotiating team. He was also accompanied by special guard Sergent Jose de Jesus Martinez and his private secretary, Celia De Gaswell.

General Torrijos was received by the Rio Hato garrison chiefs and by the guards which are stationed at his farallon home. Our reporters filmed General Torrijos arrival and recorded his brief statements concerning his long and positive trip. Torrijos said that he was tired from the trip and wanted to rest before making extensive statements. He said that he considered the tour very beneficial for Panama and that we could rest assured that everything negotiated and everything discussed was in his people's favor. He added that he understands that the people are very defensive concerning their sovereignty and that during his meeting with President Carter he had not signed even one autograph. Questioned about the comments which arose after his meeting with Carter, Torrijos repeated that he had signed nothing at all and had done nothing to change the new treaties signed on 7 September. He said that the small groups which are opposed to the treaties also have their rights, but that this is nothing to worry about, that on the contrary, this provides stimulation for positive accomplishments.

Torrijos' wife, children and other relatives arrived on a special flight in Rio Hato a few minutes after Torrijos arrived. Bidding farewell to our reporter Santa Maria Llamas, Torrijos said that he will soon hold a news conference.

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 16, 1977]

GEN. OMAR TORRIJOS DENIES SIGNING NEW CANAL PACT

PANAMA CITY, October 15.-Gen. Omar Torrijos, fresh from a meeting with President Carter on the Panama Canal treaties, has denied reports here that he signed a pact giving the United States the right to military intervention in the canal. "I haven't even signed an autograph," Torrijos said yesterday when his flight from Washington landed at the Rio Hato air force base, near his beach house. He said he was too tired to make further comments.

Torrijos said Carter had been very affable and that they had talked about the process of ratifying Panama Canal treaties by the U.S. Senate and the people of Panama.

[After Torrijos and Carter met Friday, the United States and Panama issued a joint communique clarifying Washington's treaty right to intervene to maintain neutrality of the canal even after it reverts to Panamanian control in the year 2000. Neither leader signed the communique.]

[From the Congressional Record-Senate, Oct. 19, 1977]

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES-NO. 17

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, over the past weekend the news media covered extensively the visit to the White House made by Panamanian Dictator Omar Torrijos. The dictator apparently had been called in for a conference with the President to discuss the right of priority passage for the U.S. Navy and the right of the United States to intervene to guarantee canal neutrality-two of the many ambiguous provisions found throughout the proposed Panama Canal Treaty and the proposed Neutrality Treaty. Other matters, possibly involving the indictment of Moises Torrijos, the dictator's brother, may also have been under discussion; however, press accounts did not allude to that possibility.

In any event, at the conclusion of the conference, amid much fanfare and jubilation, yet another Panama Canal agreement was announced allegedly clearing up the two problems under discussion. At first, many thought that the agreement was at least a signed document. But we soon learned that the purported agreement was, in fact, an unsigned document wholly devoid of any binding legal effect.

But, Mr. President, even assuming that this document had been signed and even assuming that this document could, therefore, be treated as an executive agreement, or a reservation to treaty-I assume that is what it is going to be called if it is ever agreed to by our negotiators and sent up to be added to the treaty-does this document clear up ambiguities or does it simply create more? Clearly, Mr. President, we are in worse shape now than we were before the dictator's visit. For example, on the question of the right to intervene to guarantee the neutrality of the canal, the document reads:

The correct interpretation of this principle is that each of the two countries shall, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, defend the canal against any threat to the regime of neutrality, and consequently shall have the right to act against any aggression or threat directed against the canal or against the peaceful transit of vessels through the canal.

Now, that does not sound too bad, but look at this, Mr. President, that provision is followed by this language:

This does not mean, nor shall it be interpreted as a right of intervention of the United States in the internal affairs of Panama. Any United States action will be directed at insuring that the canal will remain open, secure and accessible, and it shall never be directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of Panama.

So, the dictator is seeking here to protect and preserve his dictatorship.

So, Mr. President, here we are back at square 1-more confused than ever. Does this language mean that the United States has the right to intervene within Panama to protect the canal against all aggressors, including Panama.

That is a possible aggressor. Panama, in entering into these treaties, does not guarantee that there will not be insurrection, sabotage, violence, demonstrations. So one of the aggressors may well be Panama.

Or does it mean that the United States may take action only outside Panama against third countries violating canal neutrality? Perhaps, on the other hand, it may mean that the United States can act within Panama to defend the canal's neutrality, but only against third nations. One guess is as good as another.

Mr. President, why can we not have a document which is clear and unambiguous on its face? Do they not have any lawyers down at the Department of State who are capable of drafting a simple contract?

That is what this really is: a high level contract between nations. Mr. President, they need to hire some lawyers down there who know that a binding contract to be performed over a period of years ought at least to be a signed document.

We do not have that at this time.

These proposed treaties are at least signed, but they themselves are obviously of no value in understanding our rights, since all these extraneous documents keep having to be drafted by platoons of lawyers at the behest of ill-advised negotiators. Certainly, this latest document does nothing but add to the confusion.

Yet, Mr. President, here is former Ambassador Linowitz telling the press at the time the document was announced, and I quote from his remarks:

There has never been any misunderstanding between President Carter and General Torrijos as to the exact meaning of the treaties. The statement is intended to put to rest any misunderstanding as to what is intended under the treaties.

There must have been some ambiguity if they had to issue a statement to clear up the ambiguity.

It would be difficult to see how there was no misunderstanding and now find the issuance of a statement to clear up ambiguity. You know, Mr. President, I am glad former Ambassador Linowitz thinks that President Carter and Dictator Torrijos have had no misunderstanding over the exact meaning of the treaties because that at least guarantees that two people on the face of the Earth can read these treaties and make some sense out of them. But what about the rest of us? What about future Presidents? What about future dictators-or, hopefully, what about future elected Panamanian presidents-which they do not have now, of course? What are they going to have to go on? If ratified, these treaties could stay in effect for many years and would be the best and only evidence of what was actually agreed. But it is indeed comforting, Mr. President, to know that at least the President and the dictator, according to former Ambassador Linowitz anyway, do mutually understand the exact meaning of these quote baffling provisions. Many of us do wish they would let us in on the secret.

So, Mr. President, former Ambassador Linowitz says there is a meeting of minds; let us hear what Dictator Torrijos had to say no sooner than he left the room where this so-called agreement was promulgated. Dictator Torrijos summarized the meaning of this new document this way:

If a great power attacks the canal or puts the canal in danger, it is the right of the United States to go and defend the canal. But it does not have the right to intervene or interfere in the internal affairs of Panama.

So, Mr. President, already the Panamanians have got their own version of the meaning of the so-called agreement, and I am sure the Department of State will soon too have its own interpretation.

I might say Mr. Torrijos boasted when he got back to Panama that he had not signed a document, he had not even signed an autograph when he was in Washington, conferring with the President; so he is boasting of the fact that he has not signed anything. Looking at the language of the document, I must say that Dictator Torrijos may well be correct in his assessment of this unsigned paper. As I read the document, it seems to be saying that the United States can take action away from Panama to defend the regime of neutrality which would be established under the neutrality treaty. But, of course, that right would be close to useless if the United States did not also have the right to defend in place the canal itself. In other words, if Panama—if Panama decided the canal would no longer be neutral because of an alliance formed with another nation, presumably with Cuba or with the Soviet Union, or if Panama decided that it would be convenient to impose discriminatory tolls, or if Panama decided to make difficult the passage of ships of particular nations, Dictator Torrijos or his dictator successor would be in a position to assert that, all neutrality aside, the United States had no right-no right whatsoever-to intervene within Panama or to interfere with the internal policies and affairs of Panama. Here we are, Mr. President, back at square

one.

What have we actually gained, Mr. President, by this latest diplomatic triumph-and I might add, Mr. President, I do not believe the country can take too many more diplomatic coups in our dealing with Panama. What have we gained? True, we all read the headlines boldly proclaiming that the President and the dictator had agreed on canal defense rights, but once again, as the truth leaks out, we learn that the document is not even signed, that the document itself is ambiguous, that the document creates problems, Mr. President, and does not solve problems.

This latter point is particularly clear when a thorough examination is given to the language purporting to clarify the rights of American warships to rapid transit of the Isthumus. This language reads as follows:

In case of need or emergency, warships may go to the head of the line of vessels in order to transit the canal rapidly.

What this unsigned document does not say, however, is who gets to decide what is a case of need or what is a case of emergency. Panama might have one idea about what constitutes an emergency situation and we might have another idea.

Why not say it, Mr. President, in simple terms? I suggest the following, which may well be offered as an amendment to the treaty when it comes up here, in the Senate:

United States warships have the right of priority passage at any time and may at all times proceed ahead of waiting merchantmen.

No, Mr. President, I guess that is too simple so we have elected instead in this unsigned, meaningless, nonbinding, and confusing document to foment still further potential disagreement by apparently leaving to the Panamanians the right to determine what

emergency or which case of need is sufficient to justify priority passage by American war vessels. I think I shall change this word that I have suggested, "waiting merchantmen" to say merely "waiting vessels" rather than merchantmen; that U.S. warships have the right of priority passage at any time and may at all times proceed ahead of waiting vessels.

But listen, Mr. President, what former Ambassador Linowitz is reported to have said on this subject:

We are hoping it will lay to rest the questions that have been raised so that we can go forward with the approval of the treaties. I don't think, personally, that any further action will be required.

Former Ambassador Linowitz does not seem to be paying too much attention to what is going on over here on the Senate floor, Mr. President, because if he did, he would know that this unsigned, ambiguous document clarifies nothing and does nothing whatsoever to address the many, many other serious-indeed, fataldefects found throughout the proposed treaties.

I would suggest, Mr. President, that the Department of State pay closer attention to what is being said over here in the Senate because sooner or later, the Department of State has to face up to the simple fact that these treaties are so poorly drafted throughout that the Senate could not properly consent to their ratification. Even proponents of a canal giveaway recognize that fact. Even proponents recognize that both treaties must be rewritten in their entirety.

In my judgment, Mr. President, the Senate should undertake this onerous task. The Senate should, by amendment, rewrite these disastrous proposals now under study in the Committee on Foreign Relations. The Senate should, acting as the Committee of the Whole, sit down to the hard work of undoing the damage and unraveling the mystery of why the Department of State was incapable of reaching an agreement with the Panamanian negotiators which could, at a minimum, protect the vital national security interests of our country.

Unsigned documents clarifying nothing, understandings of no binding legal effect, reservations of rights not agreed to by the other party, are not going to be sufficient. Fanfare and hoopla in the press is not going to be sufficient. The only course of action is extensive and thorough page-by-page, paragraph-by-paragraph, sentence-by-sentence, word-by-word consideration and amendment of each and every provision of both treaties. Both treaties, Mr. President. This process will be long and tedious, very long and very tedious, but if these treaties are not soon withdrawn, it is a duty, Mr. President, we must soon undertake inasmuch as others have not. We must unfortunately also go ahead with the painful process of resolving all of the questions surrounding the peculiar manner in which the treaties were negotiated.

Mr. President, I feel that, as time goes on, we shall see other statements to clear up other ambiguities. I feel that, in the final analysis, we are going to have to amend these treaties here, on the floor of the Senate, and send this amended treaty back to the negotiators to serve as a guideline for further negotiation.