setbacks in the treaty negotiations. There have been charges and countercharges, but all have received scant attention and no comment from the State Department. The charges may all be unsubstantiated. But that has not yet been thoroughly resolved.

There have been as well, allegations involving the bugging of Panamanian quarters. Though the charges seem to have been dealt with, I wonder if they have completely resolved. I am concerned that the Attorney General sought to intervene when the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers subpoenaed those records which may have clarified the situation. While I realize there may be some question of committee jurisdiction involved, I would hope the Senate Intelligence Committee has been completely satisfied in its investigation of the matter. It would be unfortunate if the incident did in fact have any influence on the negotiations, one way or another.

I am concerned about the way the Administration chose to publicize the signing of the treaties.

The U.S. Constitution guarantees to the Senate equal participation in the adoption of treaties with foreign nations. This is an essential element in assuring that the American people have an input in the contracts made with other nations. Far from presenting a treaty to the United States Senate on which we would advise and consent, President Carter has attempted to present the Senate with a "fait accompli."

I have since been very pleased with the extent to which this Committee has gone in receiving testimony of all those interested in this vital issue.

Ratification remains the sole prerogative of the United States Senate. There is some serious question as to whether the House of Representatives will in fact have an opportunity to exercise its Constitutional right to decide on the disposition of U.S. property within the Canal Zone. The Attorney General has taken it upon himself to assert that House approval is not needed. I cannot agree. I would hope the Administration does not insist on maintaining that position.

Members of the Armed Services, both active duty and retired status, are very divided over the Canal issue. Heavy support for the treaties is coming from senior officers currently serving, while those senior officers no longer serving are opposed to the terms of both treaties. I have long been one of the most ardent supporters of our defense establishment and have always believed in the exceptionally high caliber and integrity of our commanding officers. However, I cannot completely ignore that unfortunate situation recently when a commanding officer was immediately and publicly relieved of his duty when he expressed his doubts concerning the wisdom of one aspect of the Administration's foreign policy. While we must rely on members of our armed forces on matters involving our national defense I believe it is important that in light of recent events we keep in mind conflicting pressures under which such officers function.

Testimony from within the Administration has also differed with regard to the defensibility of the canal. The State Department has contended that the Canal is indefensible, as if that were some kind of logical argument to give up a fight before it begins. In advocating this position, the State Department has carried its propaganda to the American people in a most regrettable manner.

While the State Department has espoused the indefensibility of the Panama Canal, the Defense Department has confirmed what our common sense had already told us, that the Canal is indeed defensible. Obviously, it has occurred to the Administration recently that if we are entering into a treaty which gives us the right to defend the canal, it cannot be maintained that the canal is indefensible. Whether or not the canal is defensible is a matter which the State Department and the Defense Department ought to settle between themselves before the debate goes much further.

All the reasons put forth in support of the treaties have not convinced me. Representative Robert Dornan of California, in responding to those testifying in favor of ratification, said, "If a rejection of this treaty comes, it will not be an ungenerous act but a statement that we (the United States) have very little to apologize for. So far you've only given us two reasons for this treaty; that the Latin American people will love us more if we do it and to prevent the bloodshed of thousands of Panamanians if we don't do it." He is correct in his assessment of the arguments being used in favor of these treaties. They are weak, indeed.

ALTERNATIVES

It is extremely unfortunate the Administration is determined by means of this treaty to relinquish all practical control and rights of defense in the Panama Canal Zone.

Despite a widely publicized show of support, there are also serious reservations among the Latin American countries with regard to the terms of the treaties. At the gathering of the Organization of American States in Granada this year, that organization voted 19-0 for a resolution stating that canal tolls should reflect only the actual operating costs of the waterway. Panama did not vote and the United States abstained. I do not believe all of Latin America wants the United States out of the Canal Zone and again, I cite the State Department for perpetuating this false impression as a means to gain support for its policies. The countries of Latin America have as much to lose as the United States should the tolls be raised or access to the Canal limited.

The entire negotiation process was based on the threat of violence and deteriorating relations with the Latin American community, resulting in a treaty full of ambiguities and under which U.S. rights are not adequately protected.

Therefore, I have cosponsored six amendments and two reservations which Senator Dole has had the foresight to introduce. These reservations, and the amendments especially, would correct what I regard as the most serious weakness in the treaties.

The first amendment I have cosponsored with Senator Dole would reinstate the right of the United States to negotiate with any other State for the right to construct an interoceanic canal through that State. Any treaty which provides for less will be inadequate.

Article XII of the Panama Canal Treaty contains a provision which would allow the United States to build a second canal, if we should ever wish to do so, only in the country of Panama. At the same time, the treaty contains no commitment on the part of Panama to agree to permit us to construct that canal, should we decide to do so. Yet we are prevented from constructing one elsewhere. This provision is totally unacceptable. Why we would agree to build a second canal only in the country which has demanded possession of our first canal, is totally incomprehensible. I cannot believe our negotiators accepted such a provision, knowing full well the implications.

Article XIII of the Panama Canal Treaty deals with what has aptly been described as "ransom" or "conscience money." Currently, Panama receives a $2.3 million annual annuity. Under the terms of this treaty, the annual annuity would increase to between $70 and $80 million. A clause in this Article also binds our Government to negotiate an economic loan package amounting to almost $345 million.

The second Dole amendment which I have cosponsored reduces Panama's share of the canal's annual operating revenues from 30 cents per net ton to 15 cents per net ton for each vessel transiting the canal. It would further eliminate the biennial adjustment of this rate according to changes in the U.S. wholesale price index. Finally, the amendment would eliminate that provision which would supply Panama with up to $10 million per year depending upon revenues. The amendment also provides that during any period in which the canal is inoperable, the fixed annuity shall cease, regardless of why the canal is closed.

Article XI of the Panama Canal Treaty provides for the 'orderly transition' of jurisdiction over the Canal Zone. The Administration is emphasizing a 23-year period in which this will occur. In actual fact, as soon as the treaty enters into force, the Republic of Panama shall gain full jurisdiction over the Canal Zone. A complete transfer of U.S. judicial, administrative and regulatory authority will be accomplished within 30 months.

In my opinion, this does not constitute an orderly transition. I believe there are very few American citizens who will remain in the Canal Zone, knowing they will be under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Panama. Large numbers may return to the United States, leaving a void in the manpower support of the operations of the Canal.

The third amendment which I cosponsored would allow the Panama Canal consultative committee to study the situation after the treaty takes effect and make a recommendation as to when the period of transition should actually end. However, January 1, 1990, will be the earliest time at which that would take place. Any treaty which subjects our U.S. citizens to Panamanian law and civil and criminal justice within 30 months after the treaty enters into force is totally impractical. Transfer of the administration of the Panama Canal Commission from United States to Panamanian leadership takes place on January 1, 1990, and it is only logical the two dates be coordinated.

I have cosponsored a fourth amendment to add a new Article XV to the Panama Canal Treaty which stresses the importance of maintaining and properly observing internationally recognized human rights, including civil and political rights in the

Canal Zone. As I noted earlier, there remains a great deal of unresolved questions involving charges of civil and political human rights violations. The Administration and the State Department cannot operate under a double standard on the human rights issues, in the name of expediency when it comes to concluding a treaty with the government of Panama.

Article IV of the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, I believe, is the weakest article of the treaty. There is nothing in Article IV which assures that the United States can unilaterally intervene in the defense of the canal whenever necessary, regardless of how the Administration has sought to explain the section. And, as has been so recently illustrated, the Panamanians have explained this article to their people in opposite terms. Panamanian negotiator Escobar Bethancourt stated in August, "The neutrality pact does not provide that the United States will say when that neutrality is violated." As has been already noted, Panamanian interpretation is at least 50 per cent of the definition. Reinforcing the misunderstanding, Senator Dole recently released a cable in which Lopez Guevara, one of the Panamanian treaty negotiators, stated "Intervention is simply forbidden by international law. Panama cannot agree to the right of the United States to intervene." If this is in fact the definition, the treaty is unacceptable. I would hope the Administration settles the matter as expeditiously as possible.

The fifth amendment which I have cosponsored with Senator Dole adds a provision specifically guaranteeing U.S. authority to intervene militarily on behalf of the canal when we determine its neutrality to be threatened, whether from the outside, or the inside, which could very well be the case.

Article VI of the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal includes a provision which grants the United States "expeditious" passage through the canal in times of crisis. This provision alone is an admission which negates that argument espoused by proponents of the Treaty who would deny the strategic importance of the Canal during a time of crisis. However, the word "expeditious" is inadequate and open to subjective interpretation, as it has already been, by the Panamanian government. In August, Escobar Bethancourt said in a public broadcast to the people of Panama, "Expeditious passage does not mean privileged passage. As a matter of fact, the concept of privileged passage was rejected." Lopez Guevara reiterated those sentiments in the cable released recently saying expeditious passage does not mean the United States ships may "go to the head of the line." If this is in fact the case, we have been grossly misled by the Administration.

I have cosponsored a sixth amendment which would specifically stipulate that during a period of crisis, American war vessels and auxiliary vessels will be entitled to privileged passage through the canal. Without this amendment, the treaty is unacceptable.

In addition to these six amendments which I have cosponsored with Senator Dole which would improve upon the treaties considerably, I have cosponsored with him, two reservations to the resolutions of ratification.

The first reservation would require that Panama demonstrate, during the duration of the treaty, significant progress toward observing the internationally recognized human rights of its citizens.

The second reservation would reaffirm the Constitutional responsibility of the House of Representatives to participate in transfer of ownership of the Canal Zone territory. As I stated above, I am disappointed in the Attorney General's statement that House consideration of the treaties is not necessary, and I applaud the efforts of those Congressmen who filed suit recently in U.S. District Court seeking a reaffirmation of their Constitutional right.

In addition, I wholeheartedly support those Senators and State law officers who filed suit this week asking the United States Supreme Court to uphold the exclusive right of Congress to dispose of federal property under Article IV of the Constitution. Mr. Chairman, I commend Senator Dole for having taken the initiative on these important issues, and I am pleased to be a cosponsor of these amendments.

In my opinion, this entire matter of negotiating the treaties has been mishandled from the start. I would hope the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in its usual thoroughness and attention to detail, will refrain from reporting out these treaties before all the remaining questions are answered.

SENATOR THURMOND'S LEADERSHIP IN THE PANAMA CANAL ISSUE

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, the newly proposed treaties with Panama have stirred up a considerable amount of discussion here in the Senate. I am pleased that so many Senators are finally taking a keen interest in this subject. Debate is long overdue. For many years, our distinguished colleague from South Carolina (Mr. Thurmond) has endeavored to direct the Senate's attention to the crisis that our State Department was creating in Panama. It was Senator Thurmond, for instance, who, in anticipation of these treaties, took the lead in 1975 by introducing Senate Resolution 97, with 38 cosponsors. This legislation, which the State Department chose to ignore, put the State Department on notice that there was widespread opposition in the Senate, and among the American people, to the surrender of the Panama Canal. Many of the difficulties that we now face in Panama could have been avoided, in my judgment, had the State Department heeded the advice of Senator Thurmond.

It was also Senator Thurmond who, in 1974, offered S. 2330, a bill to modernize the operations of the Panama Canal. This creative legislation is based on the unassailable assumption that modernization would not only benefit the Panamanians and all nations which rely on this important waterway, but is, indeed, the best solution to our problems in Panama from an engineering, navigational, political, and military standpoint.

Major modernization of the existing canal, as Senator Thurmond has explained, can and should be done under the existing treaty of 1903. Developed within the Panama Canal organization after World War II, the Terminal Lake-third locks plan would provide a third lane of larger locks for larger vessels, the physical removal of the bottleneck locks at Pedro Miguel, the consolidation of all Pacific locks south of Miraflores, and the creation of a Pacific terminal lake to correspond with the eminently superior layout of the Atlantic end at Gatun. This work would enable uninterrupted summit level navigation from the Atlantic locks to the Pacific locks, and greatly simplify marine operations. Approximately $171 million has already been spent on this project.

In addition to aiding normal commercial shipping and enabling the transit of larger ships and tankers, the completion of the Terminal Lake-third locks plan would also benefit both the United States and Panama with increased employment. It is the least expensive and the most practical alternative to the proposed surrender of the canal and the construction of a new sea-level canal. What is more, it is highly doubtful that this modernization will ever take place if the canal is transferred to the Panamanians. Reiterating the need for completion of the Terminal Lake-third locks project, Senator Thurmond recently delivered an important address on the Panama Canal Treaties before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce International Policy Committee in Washington, D.C.

Mr. President, I would like to share this address with my colleagues, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

REMARKS BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

It is a distinct honor to be here this morning to present to the Chamber my reasons for opposing the treaties with Panama. I am pleased you recognize the need to participate in this national debate, as oftentimes lack of participation by a group of your stature is misread as a position of acquiescence.

My interest in the Panama Canal is long-standing. Over the years I have introduced several bills to modernize the Panama Canal. In the 94th Congress, I offered a resolution signed by 38 other Senators opposing the surrender of this waterway to Panama. Last August, I visited the Canal Zone for briefings and study to ascertain any changes since my previous visit several years before.

While I recognize the need for some adjustments with Panama concerning the Panama Canal, I see the retention of U.S. control as basic to the protection of our interest.

My 1976 resolution was more than sufficient warning to both the Ford and Carter Administrations relative to the Senate's concern in this matter. The treaties have been signed with great fanfare in an atmosphere of threats and violence by Panama. Panamanian chief negotiator Escobar Bethancourt went so far as to say This country (Panama) will take a course of violence" if the treaties are not ratified.

At no time in my memory have such threats and pressure been exerted on the Senate as is the case with these treaties. In making our decision, however, we must rationally decide what is in the best interest of our Nation, irrespective of the pressures and threats directed toward us.

Recently, treaty proponents have made a number of arguments to attempt to justify ratification. I would like to comment on some of these points:

USE VS. CONTROL

The central argument made, as enunciated by Defense Secretary Harold Brown, is that "use of the Canal is more important than ownership."

My position is that only through ownership can we be assured of control over this vital waterway. Once ratification takes place, sovereignty is surrendered. At that time the rights of Panama in Canal affairs will become dominant, as ownership by them means eventual control, which in turn governs use. I do not feel a small nation of 1.7 million people, with a history of 59 government changes since 1903, has the stability or economic strength to manage and finance a waterway of the Panama Canal's complexity.

U.S. RIGHTS OF PASSAGE

Treaty proponents also argue expeditious passage rights for our ships in time of emergencies adequately protects our interests.

Why then did our negotiators and the Defense Department seek "priority passage" during the negotiations? Despite our position as the world power most affected by the use of the Canal, the Panama officials say our ships are not guaranteed a place at the head of the line in emergencies. On this point, Admiral Thomas Moorer, former Joint Chiefs Chairman, declared Monday, "I submit that ownership and control, on one hand, and priority passage and defense, on the other, are synonymous."

INTERVENTION RIGHTS

Treaty proponents argue further that our rights to use the Canal are guaranteed under the Neutrality Treaty because the Treaty itself does not rule out U.S. intervention to assure its availability.

Even Treaty advocates, such as General Maxwell Taylor and Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, described the Treaty provisions on this subject as "ambiguous" and "fuzzy."

Admiral Zumwalt went so far as to suggest we attach a separate Resolution to the Treaty to nail down U.S. rights to step in if Canal movement was impaired.

PANAMA'S GOVERNMENT

Treaty proponents also argue that the Panamanian dictator Torrijos has the support of his people.

Why then have there been no free elections during Torrijos' 9-year reign, which has pushed the national debt from $167 million to over $1.5 billion, and brought