The Panama Constitution provides that any Canal Treaty must be "submitted" to a national plebiscite. However there is a confusion. The plebiscite does not have any binding effect because the power to approve a treaty belongs to the Assembly of District Representatives (Article 141 of the Constitution). The plebiscite is an expedient to give the treaty the appearance of a popular approval. However, what kind of a plebiscite can be held without a free press, without freedom of assembly, and without freedom of thought and expression? What is the value of a plebiscite under the constant manipulation of information by the government-controlled press, radio, and television?

With questions like that being asked, Mr. President, this plebiscite then is not going to be a very solid foundation for a new treaty, at least not in the eyes of some subsequent, freely constituted, legal Panamanian Government.

Dr. Robles also points out that it does not really matter whether the plebiscite was conducted freely or not because, and I quote his remarks:

The plebiscite is a simple problem for the Panamanian government. It does not matter how many vote aye or nay. What matters is who is going to count the votes.

So the results of this plebiscite could very easily have been tailored, Mr. President, to achieve the best public impact. And public impact is pretty important to our Department of State. You know, Mr. President, the U.S. Embassy in Panama had a study prepared by a Mr. John L. Jackley, on the subject, "The Impact of the New Canal Treaty." In addition to much other advice, Mr. Jackley suggested to our diplomats the following:

A lot of good press would be essential for success: In this situation we could make good use of the controlled press situation of the isthmus. If it doesn't work, no propaganda would sell it. But it can be given at least an initial breath of promise through skillful manipulation of the available media.

So it has been recommended, Mr. President, to the Department of State that the controlled press down there in Panama be utilized to full advantage to rig the results of this plebiscite. And you know, Mr. President, for the best psychological impact here in the United States, they would not want a 100-percent vote-that would be too obvious; they would want a vote showing some significant opposition but overall strong approval-and that is about what we have gotten out of these results reported from Panama.

Mr. President, with the Department of State being advised "to make good use of the controlled press," certainly we ought to be able to understand the feelings of the Panamanians who wish to see their country free, and certainly we ought to be able to understand their feeling that any deal negotiated with Dictator Torrijos is not binding and is in itself a threat to the prospect that Panama will ever regain freedom.

Dr. Robles summarizes the situation in this fashion:

Panamanians do not want to replace a bad treaty with one that is going to be imposed with Torrijos playing the same role that Bunau-Varilla played in 1903. The new treaty does not solve "the causes of conflict" between the two countries. On the contrary, it adds a few new ones, as, I am sure, many members of Congress are aware. However in this ever-changing world, permanent does not mean eternal. Sooner or later the dictator will fall. Then the treaty is going to be rejected by Panamanians and their governments and all the resentment against the dictatorship will be reflected in the future relations between Panama and the United States.

And that is the bottom line, Mr. President. Sooner or later the dictator will fall, and sooner or later any treaties negotiated with

the dictator would be by the Panamanian people completely and properly repudiated, and the United States will be blamed correctly for perpetuating a dictator whose time is already past.

PANAMA CAN'T OPERATE THE CANAL

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, one of a number of questions which the Senate should consider in the Panama Canal debate is whether the Panamanian Government will remain friendly to the United States if control is transferred to that country.

Additionally, does that Government_have_the political strength or will to resist outside interference? Does Panama have the economic vitality to maintain and protect this vital waterway?

Ron Hendren, writing in the October 18 edition of the Greenville News, examines the lack of technological sophistication which makes a transfer of control to Panama highly questionable.

This lack of technology raises other questions. If the Panamanians are unable to cope with the complex operation of the canal, to whom will they turn? If to us, it will mean great outlays of cash. The only other great power to whom they could turn would be the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, the Ron Hendren column entitled "Panama Can't Operate Canal," which appeared in the October 18 edition of the Greenville News, is excellent reading in light of these concerns. In order to share this column with my colleagues, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

PANAMA CAN'T OPERATE CANAL

WASHINGTON.-In all the prolonged, impassioned debate over the Panama Canal, the one question that ought, over all others, to be answered has yet to be asked: Can the Panamanians run it?

The answer is no.

Not only could the Panamanians not run it today, there is serious question whether an intensive training campaign begun tomorrow would ready them for the task in time. For in all their years of living next door to the canal, and despite their sustained enthusiasm for reclaiming what they view with some justification to be rightfully theirs, our unhappy neighbors have demonstrated virtually no inclination or capacity to master the technology to operate the thing.

I said technology; perhaps art is a better word: It takes a dozen years to learn how to pilot a ship through the locks, a feat that has been compared to nursing a hot dog through a series of eyedroppers. Only a handful of men have mastered it, none of them Panamanians. And piloting is only one of more than a score of canal jobs requiring special skills obtainable only through a lifetime of dedicated apprenticeship.

For me, the history and politics of the canal pale in comparison to the importance of that present-day reality. Whether the trench is rightfully ours in perpetuity, whether we are there illegally, or whether, as Sen. S. I. Hayakawa (R-Calif.) put it, we stole it fair and square-all those are important considerations. We also need to know beyond doubt whether, if we leave, we will retain the right of unilateral military intervention, and whether our warships will receive preferential passage. These are important questions that ought not even be asked until the Panamanians demonstrate as much enthusiasm for learning how to run the canal as they have for winning control of it.

To say no to that doesn't reflect politics, conservative or liberal. It's just plain common sense. Before those treaties are ratified-if they are ratified-there ought to be a clear, written understanding that we will not leave, nor be expected to do so, until we are satisfied that the Panamanians can operate the canal.

[From the Congressional Record-Senate, Oct. 27, 1977]

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES: QUESTIONS AND

ANSWERS

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, Time magazine associate editor, Edwin Warner, recently contributed an excellent piece concerning the Panama Canal treaties in the October 31, 1977, issue of Time.

In plain language, Mr. Warner poses the major questions about the Panama Canal treaties and what effect approval of the treaties would have! His responses to those questions are reasonable and succinct.

I believe this information will be of interest to my colleagues and ask unanimous consent that the questions-and-answers section of this Time essay be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THAT TROUBLESOME PANAMA CANAL TREATY

(By Edwin Warner)

Amid all the rhetorical smoke surrounding the canal treaty, people are understandably confused about the hard facts-and realities. Some key questions about the pact and what its approval would mean:

Q. How important is the Panama Canal for the U.S.?

A. Of course, it is still important, but not nearly so vital as it used to be. About 8 percent of U.S. international maritime trade passes through the waterway, much of it in non-American vessels. Some 4 percent of American coast-to-coast trade transits the canal, compared with 9 percent in 1964 and 50 percent in 1940. Few U.S. warships make the trip; the supercarriers are too big, and the nuclear submarines are vulnerable to detection and attack because they must be on the surface to make the crossing. Besides, the U.S. has maintained two virtually separate navies in the Atlantic and the Pacific since World War II. Strategic materials are increasingly transported across the country by rail and truck. While disruption of the canal would be troublesome for the U.S., it would be far from fatal.

Q. What claim does Panama have to the canal?

A. Historically, at least, not much of one. The U.S. will be ceding the canal to Panama but not "returning" it, since Panama never really possessed it. If anything, Colombia was the aggrieved party. With American connivance, Colombian rebels "liberated" the isthmus from the Bogota government in 1903 and turned the rights to build the canal over to the U.S. Panama and its canal came to life together; without the canal, Panama could scarcely exist as a viable nation. Canal revenues account for some 25 percent of Panama's gross national product, 20 percent of its employment and almost 40 percent of its foreign exchange earnings. Thanks to the canal, Panamanians have one of the highest per capita incomes of any nation in Latin America: a still very modest $1,060. In one sense, Panamanians can be grateful that America decided to build the canal.

Yet the present anomaly remains a small but proud nation cut in half by a huge waterway under the control of a foreign power. The arrangement may once have been economically justified, even a historical necessity, but it is a current indignity for Panamanians. As Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez Rodriguez told Carter: "The Panamanians feel exactly about the Canal Zone as North Americans would feel if the British owned the Mississippi River.” In fact, Americans had much the same attitude as contemporary Panamanians when the Spanish and French (not the British) controlled the Mississippi at the turn of the 19th century. In 1956 America supported Egyptian sovereignty and condemned the British and French attempt to recover the Suez Canal. The U.S. has had too much experience with double standards in dealing with the Communist world to indulge in the same practice.

Q. Can Panama run the canal as well as the U.S.?

A. The American record is hard to beat. There have been remarkably few accidents or sinkings considering the amount of traffic. Yet there is no reason to assume that Panamanians cannot do as well; the Egyptians have learned to run the Suez Canal, which admittedly lacks the complex system of locks of the Panama

Canal. Says a senior State Department official: "Nowhere is it written that you have to have a Georgia Tech degree to run the canal. The canal is damned important economically to the Panamanians. It is their only natural resource, and they will take care of it." Writes Vermont Royster, former editor of the Wall Street Journal: "For us, the canal is at most one adjunct to commerce and defense. For Panama, the canal is vital, the closing of the canal would be a disaster."

At the moment, Panama does not have the skilled manpower to take over the canal. But it has 23 years to train pilots, technicians and mechanics-a sufficient amount of time, one would think, since it takes a mere twelve years to train a brain surgeon. Panama has also said it would hire other nationals if there are not enough native citizens to do the job.

Q. Can the U.S. intervene militarily to protect the canal once Panama is in control?

A. No question has aroused more anxiety or opposition to the pact. Until 2000, the U.S. will control the canal and its military bases. After that the treaty states that the U.S. and Panama shall maintain the "neutrality" of the canal, a clause that seemed alarmingly vague to many people. When it became apparent that this concern was about to sink the treaty, Panama's head of state, General Omar Torrijos Herrera, went to Washington, and he and Carter issued a joint "statement of understanding." The "correct interpretation," they said, is that each country shall defend the canal against any aggressive act or other threat to its neutrality and shall make sure that it remains "open, secure and accessible." But the U.S. has no "right of intervention in the internal affairs of Panama." This seems to lead to a certain ambiguity. How can the U.S. defend the canal without somehow intruding in Panama's internal affairs? Treaty proponents admit the distinction is a fine one but think that it can be observed. The U.S. asks nothing more of Panama than a functioning canal.

The Carter-Torrijos understanding seemed to answer the question of intervention to almost everyone's satisfaction. Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd, who has not said how he stands on the treaty, described the understanding as "a very important diplomatic achievement and a big plus for the President and the treaty." Republican Senator Robert Dole, one of the pact's chief critics, called the joint statement a "step in the right direction," his most favorable remark to date.

The Carter-Torrijos understanding also cleared up another controversial point. The treaty gives both nations the right to send its warships through the canal "expeditiously." But how expeditiously? Panamanian officials, under fire from the left, insisted that U.S. vessels would be granted no special treatment. A number of U.S. Senators found that position unacceptable. The new statement specifies that warships of either country would be entitled to "expedited treatment" and, during emergencies, could go to "the head of the line of vessels."

Q. What if the U.S. fails to ratify the treaty?

A. The reaction in Latin America would be dramatic. Countries on the coast of Latin America that depend heavily on the canal-Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela-have privately advised the U.S. that they have some misgivings about eventual Panamanian control. But publicly they would doubtless join the rest of the continent in denouncing the U.S. for a breach of faith. Certainly the rejection would sour American relations with Latin America and intensify distrust and hostility.

Failure to ratify would also be a gift to America's worst enemies. Latin America's left wing opposes the pact because it ensures a U.S.-Panamanian partnership for the foreseeable future and, perhaps more important, because it eliminates a major source of antagonism between the U.S. and its southern neighbors. Notes the Buenos Aires Herald: “The Latin American left is clearly dismayed at the emergence of an agreement which may prove satisfactory to most Latin American opinion, ranging from the center left to the center right." If the Senate were to reject the pact, the Latin left would be able to say, "We told you so," and would probably gain adherents among disillusioned moderates. No right-winger in the U.S. is more fervent in his desire to see the treaty fail than is the Latin American left. Q. If the U.S. does not ratify the treaty, can it protect the canal from violence? A. Not very easily, say the people who should know: the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They believe it is in the national interest to cede control of the waterway. Acting alone, surrounded by a hostile population not only in Panama but in the rest of Latin America, the U.S. would need an estimated 100,000 troops to put down a determined guerrilla effort. And even that sizable a force could not seal off the waterway's lock mechanisms, dams and power plants from some kind of sabotage. A band of skilled terrorists, for example, could approach the Gatun Dam through the dense jungle with relative ease. Properly placed explosives could blow up the dam, drain the water that is required to operate the locks and put the whole canal out of

commission for as long as two years. General George Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Time Correspondent Jerry Hannifin: "If I were a guerrilla backed by Fidel Castro or somebody, I would just love those Panamanian jungles. They are better than even the jungles of Viet Nam. An organized guerrilla effort would cost us heavily. That is why we want the Panamanians on our side from scratch under the new treaties. We need them to help us." If the U.S. were forced to take some kind of military action to protect the canal in, say, the year 2027, it would be in a far stronger moral position if it had approved the treaty. Then it would be fighting on behalf of Panama, not against it.

The Panama Canal treaty is no historical accident, no caprice of idle statesmen. It has been twelve long, arduous, ruminative years in the making; it is an idea whose time has come and whose time may be running out, given the objection to the treaty among many Latin Americans, especially in Panama. Strongman or not, Torrijos is faced with opposition, chiefly radicals who are considerably farther to the left than he is. If the treaty is not ratified, if trouble breaks out in Panama, it will be all the harder to draw up a subsequent pact in an atmosphere of mutual recriminations. Responsible citizens of both countries would look back on the present period as an opportunity that was tragically missed."

HOW CANAL TREATIES WOULD BENEFIT IOWA FARMERS

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, for the people of Iowa one of the most important questions concerning the proposed Panama Canal treaties is the impact those agreements would have on American agriculture, and in particular farm exports.

Recently the Des Moines Register published an analysis of this issue by one of Iowa's most respected commentators, Lauren Soth. Mr. Soth details the importance of the canal for agricultural exports and concludes that our agricultural interest calls for every reasonable. foreign policy to keep that route open. That goal, he argues, requires that these treaties be ratified.

Mr. Soth also declares:

The surest way to close the canal and to put our farm exports under handicap, particularly in the growing Asian markets, is to try to hold control of the canal by force.

In view of the importance and timeliness of these facts for the people of Iowa and other agricultural states, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Mr. Soth's article be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

HOW CANAL TREATIES WOULD BENEFIT IOWA FARMERS

(By Lauren Soth)

Public opinion polls show large majorities of Americans opposed to Senate ratification of the Panama Canal treaties which have been signed by President Carter and Panama's ruler, Gen. Omar Torrijos.

The popular opposition to the treaties appears to be based on chauvinistic feelings about not giving up "our territory." It cannot be the result of serious thought about economic consequences.

The principal stake (practically the only stake) of the United States in the canal is its value for commercial shipping, especially for exports of agricultural products. The canal is vulnerable to sabotage or guerrilla attack. No treaty and no military guard can assure complete protection.

But it is evident from recent uprisings that continuing the U.S.-imposed one-sided arrangement on the canal would risk interruptions of traffic and destruction of the lock system.

American farmers have been expanding their markets in Asia tremendously in the last two decades. Japan now is the largest single country market for U.S. farm products. Of the total of around $23 billion of agricultural exports this year, about