United States around the Horn of South America and on into the Atlantic and then the Caribbean where the Oregon played a vital role in the victory of the United States in the Spanish American War. There was no Panama Canal then, Mr. President, and every American was caught up in the excitement of the journey of this great warship as she progressed around the entire land mass of South America in an effort to reach the Caribbean in time to affect the outcome of battle in favor of our country. The cruise of the Oregon lasted 70 days, Mr. President, and while I am sure the Dreadnought is faster than the old Oregon and while I recognize that a different continent is involved, the principles are identical and the distances are equally overwhelming.

How long would it be, Mr. President, before the pro-Marxist dictatorship in Panama decided-should these proposed treaties be ratified-how long would it be before the Panamanian dictator decided that it would be convenient to interpret this executive agreement provision I have quoted so as to justify the prohibition of the passage of a U.S. nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed warship? The provision reads this way-and I quote it again because I believe this is an important point which cannot be overlooked, and I might say that I am going to make sure that it is not overlooked because it is a very important point-this provision reads as follows:

The United States shall emplace no type of nuclear armament on Panamanian territory.

How long would it be before the Panamanian dictatorship interprets the Spanish text of this provision as a prohibition on the passage of U.S. nuclear war vessels? How long would it be before this pro-Communist government in Panama decides that its adherence to the Latin American Denuclearization Treaty makes it imperative to divert all U.S. nuclear warships seeking to transmit the Isthmus of Panama? How long would it be, Mr. President, before this avowed ally of Communist Cuba determines, as have the Egyptians in the case of the British, that U.S. nuclear vessels may not pass through the canal until sufficient numbers of nations have signed some obscure international protocol on even more obscure alleged safety measures and so-called security guarantees respecting the passage of such ships?

On Saturday, Mr. President, I was honored to be the principal speaker at the launching of the nuclear submarine Birmingham (SSN 695). At that time, I expressed the hope that the Birmingham would be a symbol of our determination to resist tyranny and a symbol of the will and might of our good country. I addressed the distinguished guests, Mr. President, but I spoke to the workers in the shipyard when I said, "You have taken cold steel and made it live." I shared their pride in their great accomplishment, and I would share also their sorrow should they see the day when this magnificent vessel they constructed was turned away from her course by a petty gangster dictator who had obtained, through the ineptness and folly of our diplomats, a deathhold on our canal. This is my final speech in a series of 24 speeches in this session of the 95th Congress, and I thank Senators for the attention they have given my remarks.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a wire service report under date of October 31, relating to the Dreadnought be printed in the Record, together with an article published in the San Diego Evening Tribune entitled "Admiral Opposes Canal Treaties."

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

CAIRO, Oct. 31.-Suez Canal authorities have refused to allow the British nuclear submarine Dreadnought through the canal at the request of the Egyptian Atomic Energy Commission, the semi-official newspaper Al-Ahram said today.

The report followed a statement yesterday by Egyptian harbor authorities denying any knowledge of the incident.

Al-Ahram quoted a senior Suez canal official as saying transit permission for the 3,588-ton Dreadnought had been refused because maritime regulations required ample prior notice and the request came at short notice.

The newspaper said Foreign Minister Mohammed Riad would explain the Egyp tian position to the British ambassador in Cairo today.

It said Egypt had told all naval powers since 1974 that passage of all nuclear vessels through the canal would be barred until signing of an international agreement on safety measures and security guarantees for such ships.

The British defense ministry said yesterday that the Dreadnought has been at the northern end of the canal since Thursday when the rest of a royal navy task force en route to Iran for an official visit was allowed through the canal.

[From the San Diego Evening Tribune, October 1977]

ADMIRAL OPPOSES CANAL TREATIES

(By Adm. Horacio Rivero)

The central issue can be narrowed to two questions.

Is the Panama Canal important to the security of the United States?

Will the security requirements be satisfied if the U.S. cedes the canal and zone to Panama?

Some proponents of the new Panama Canal treaties have deemphasized the strategic and commercial importance of the canal and its current value to our Navy. The President, for instance, stated to the press: "Any large ship, an aircraft carrier, for instance, can no longer pass through it" and "In the last 12 months only four or five Naval vessels" have transited the canal.

Ambassador Sol Linowitz, one of the treaty negotiators, in his speech before the American Legion convention August 19, 1977, stated: "It is no longer vital, clearly no longer as useful as it once was for the shifting of combat forces."

The President was obviously misinformed. For it is not "any large ship" but only the 12 attack aircraft carriers, out of a naval inventory of almost 500 ships, that cannot use the canal, and it is not its utilization in normal peacetime that is important to the Navy, but the availability of the canal for redeployment of naval vessels in time of war or in time of crisis or in anticipation of war, as the international situation may demand.

In time of need some of the attack carriers can be redeployed around South America at high speed, taking advantage of their high endurance; those powered by oil might be accompanied by a fast replenishment ship (AOE) to insure their arrival with a full fuel load, while the three nuclearpowered ones could proceed on their own at an even higher speed. It is for the other types of naval vessels-the cruisers, destroyers, submarines, frigates, amphibious and mine warfare ships and logistic support ships which constitute the bulk of the Navy and do not have the great endurance at high speeds possessed by the attack carriers that the canal provides the greatest benefits. Of course it would be desirable for the attack carriers to be able to use the canal also; this can be made possible in the future by enlarging the canal locks or constructing additional, wider locks alongside the present ones, a project of reasonable magnitude. A sea level canal is not only not required, but would represent a fabulously expensive solution which would result in a canal infinitely more vulnerable than the present one.

A Navy like ours, which has been reduced in size to the point that it cannot be described as a two-ocean Navy, must have one means for quick and timely transfer

of its ships from one ocean to the other, as demanded by strategic and operational needs. This is obviously important in wartime but equally important in periods of crisis or of international tension. The strategic mobility which is a characteristic of. naval vessels and the ability to utilize this quality that we currently obtain from possession of the Panama Canal balance to a degree the risks inherent in the naval force level deficiencies. Without unquestionable assurance that the canal will be available under all and any circumstances, these risks would loom much larger. The importance of the canal for "the shifting of combat forces" was well demonstrated in World War II and in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. It has also been shown in time of crisis.

For instance, during the Cuban missile crisis, when military operations to remove the missiles by force were at one point imminent, it was possible to reenforce rapidly the Atlantic Fleet with a brigade of Marines from the Pacific, with their armament, ammunition, and full equipment, providing a most valuable addition to the Atlantic Fleet forces. If the canal had been in the hands of a government under Cuban or Soviet influence, or sympathetic to those countries, could the safe and timely passage of the ships have been assured in those circumstances?

To the opinion of Ambassador Linowitz is opposed that of four former chiefs of naval operations, one of whom had previously commanded the Atlantic and the Pacific fleets and later became chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In their words: "Contrary to what we read about the declining strategic and economic value of the canal, the truth is that this interoceanic waterway is as important, if not more so, to the United States than ever." It is doubtful if any knowledgeable naval officer would dispute their view.

The commercial importance to the canal is also great but it is secondary to the military aspect. Ships with beam of slightly more than 100 feet cannot use the locks, but they constitute but a small fraction of the merchant vessels of the world. In any event, the passage of both merchant and war vessels in normal time of peace is a matter of convenience, in that it permits the saving of time and money. It is a different matter in time of war, or in preparation for war operations.

The question remains whether the security requirement can be equally well satised by a regime of control and occupation different from the existing one-that is if the canal is neutralized and placed under the control of another country and the U.S. military presence is removed, which are the stated objectives of the new treaties.

The proposed Panama Canal Treaty provides for assumption of sovereignty over the Canal Zone by Panama six months after final ratification, but until Dec. 31, 1999, the U.S. will have primary responsibility for the security and defense of the canal and is authorized to maintain forces in the Republic of Panama for this purpose. During that period the U.S. will be in a position to enforce its rights of passage, even if the current for a future Panamanian government should choose to interfere with them, although our ability to prevent or thwart violent action against our personnel and property and against the canal will be substantially reduced because of the absence of the protection of a U.S.-occupied and owned zone. Thereafter only Panamanian military forces would protect the Canal.

The Canal Neutrality Treaty would become effective concurrently with the Canal Treaty and provides that the canal shall be open, both in peace and war, to the war vessels of all nations without distinction, including those of nations at war with the U.S.

From that date the U.S. would not be able legally to deny passage to vessels that may pose a threat to the U.S. and after 1999 it would have neither the legal right nor the inplace military capacity to do so.

It is argued by the proponents of the treaties that their ratification, the elimination of the Canal Zone and the phasing out of the U.S. military presence would enhance the security of the canal and the assurance of its availability to all. In the words of Ambassador Linowitz before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries: "The greatest danger to our security interest in the canal would be an effort to maintain and continue the present status." The implication is that it is the U.S. presence which gives rise to the security threats to the canal and that these threats would be reduced if the U.S. military presence were removed, and the canal neutralized.

The argument rests on the fear of sabotage and plots which might result from anti-American feeling generated by our contimued presence in the Isthmus of Panama. Removal of our forces may reduce the causes of anti-American feeling, but will not necessarily remove the possibility of sabotage, either by disaffected Panamanians intent on changing their regime or by Soviet-inspired or other anti-American groups desiring to cause damage to the United States at a time of international

crisis or in time of war, or would it remove the external threat. Rather, it would increase the probability that any sabotage attempted or any external attack would be successful.

There is also in the argument the underlying assumption that the security interests of the U.S. would be served by permanent neutralization of the canal. It is clear that the security interests of the U.S. demand that the availability of the canal for its own ships be assured and that it be denied to its enemies.

This in turn demands differentiation between use by the U.S. and use by its enemies or potential enemies whenever, in the sole judgment of the U.S. government, the security of the U.S. requires it. Such differentiation is incompatible with the principle of neutrality, would be made illegal by the Neutrality Treaty and after 1999 would be impracticable for the U.S. to effect.

It is argued that in time of war, through rersort to "force majeure," the U.S. could denounce or ignore the provisions of the treaty and effectively deny passage to enemy vessels, with or without Panamanian acquiescence or concurrence. (No one has suggested that this might be done in time of tension or in advance of hostilities, to prevent redeployment of potentially hostile ships.) If Panamanian agreement is obtained and as long as U.S. military forces remain within Panamanian territory this would be readily possible. After 1999 it would be necessary to reintroduce military forces, not into U.S. territory where they now are, but into the territory of the Republic of Panama under Panamanian terms and after inevitable delays. A more likely scenario is one in which Panama would not agree to abrogation or violation of the treaty either in time of war or in periods of international tension which might or might not lead to war but which would demand the taking of prudent measures of increased security, including the denial of passage to potentially hostile ships. This scenario is assured if Panama should be under a Communist, Communist-oriented or neutralist government, and may occur even with a nominally friendly government in power which may wish to demonstrate its independence of dictation by the U.S.

In such circumstances the U.S. would be forced to take military measures against Panama in Panamanian territory in clear violation of that country's sovereignty, under conditions where our forces stationed there would be at a decided disadvantage.

After 1999 a full-scale invasion would be required which would undoubtedly succeed but might well result in the canal being rendered unusable for a protracted period, since Panama would be in position to damage or destroy key installations, including the locks and Gatun Dam, if it should choose to do so, before U.S. forces could be introduced to provide protection.

It has been maintained by proponents of the treaties that the U.S. will retain the right to intervene at any time to protect the canal. A careful reading of the treaties will disclose that they contain no provision whatsoever for intervention. Article IV of the Neutrality Treaty contains the following wording:

"The United States of America and the Republic of Panama agree to maintain the regime of neutrality established in this Treaty, which shall be maintained in order that the canal shall remain permanently neutral *

Even if this wording were to be stretched to imply a U.S. right to intervene, it could only be claimed to enforced neutrality-since Panama will be the sovereign, and in actual possession of the canal after a certain date, a request for intervention would have to originate with Panama.

[From the Congressional Record-Senate, Nov. 15, 1977]

PANAMA CANAL TESTIMONY

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, on October 28, 1977, the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers received the testimony of Mr. Karl Bendetsen on the subject of the Panama Canal Treaties. Mr. Bendetsen is well-known to many Senators, but I might mention that he was Under Secretary of the Army during the administration of President Truman and was for a period of many years Chairman of the Board of the Panama Canal Company. Mr. Bendetsen, after his service in Government, returned to private industry where he became chairman of the board and director of Champion International Corp., a company with facilities in many States and a company employing many thousands of American citizens. Mr. Bendetsen is both a lawyer and an engineer, and his life typifies the best in public service and private initiative.

Mr. Bendetsen's testimony before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers is, in my judgment, the best existing statement of all of the facts which ought to be considered in assessing the Panama Canal Treaties. The study he has given to this topic is truly remarkable, and the contribution he is making to the public discussion of this issue is invaluable.

Accordingly, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statement of Mr. Karl Bendetsen be printed in the Record so that it will be easily available to the Congress and to interested members of the public.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STATEMENT RE PROPOSED Canal ZONE TREATIES

(By Karl R. Bendetsen)

I. INTRODUCTION

By way of introduction, between 1948 and 1952, I served as Under Secretary of the Army. Among my many duties was that of Chairman of the Panama Canal Company. By delegation from The President of the United States to the Secretary of the Army and from him to me, I was made the responsible agent for supervising the reorganization of the Canal Zone and its activities pursuant to an Act of Congress, Public Law 841, 81st Congress, 2nd Session (64 Stat. 1038) approved September 26, 1950. This Act, adopted under the leadership of former Congressman Clark W. Thompson of Texas, constituted the first basic change in the permanent Canal operating organization from that originally established in 1914 pursuant to the Panama Canal Act of 1912.

Under the Act of 1912, in time of peace, the Canal was operated on an appropriations basis, under a single civilian agency as an interoceanic public utility headed by a governor. In war, that Act placed the Canal Zone and all of its functions under the supreme control of the Commanding General of the U.S. Army on the Isthmus. The concept of the Act of 1950 was significantly different from that of the Act of 1912. A new corporation was chartered by the Congress known as the Panama Canal Company. The Panama Railroad Company, a New York corporation, was merged into the Panama Canal Company. The new company was placed under the control of a Board of Directors under a Chairman. The President of the Company became the general manager of business operations on the Isthmus. The Governor of the Canal Zone serves ex-officio, as President of the Canal Company.

The Panama Canal Company was charged with the operation of all of the transit, tollmaking, navigational and commercial activities on a self-sustaining basis. It became the sole taxpayer and was required under the Act to fund all governmental