in modifying international treaties; and, second, it indicates that such modifications are not necessarily "fatal" to such treaties. That is, a proposal of amendments and reservations cannot be equated with efforts to "kill the treaties."

GROWING SUPPORT

Frankly, I am encouraged by the broader interest within the Senate in attaching revisions to the Panama Canal treaties. In recent days, the Senate leadership has publicly indicated its support for treaty modifications, particularly with respect to the defense and passage rights provisions. Those of us who endorsed treaty amendments and reservations last fall are gratified that our expressions of concern about treaty defects are being heeded.

Even Panamanian general Omar Torrijos refuses to be "intransigent" on the question of treaty revisions. During my conversation with the general in Panama City during late December, he indicated his willingness to "keep talking" at the negotiating table should the Senate amend the proposed accords.

At this point, it seems that only the Carter administration_remains adamently opposed to substantive treaty amendments. The President's refusal to consider Senate amendments or reservations is vaguely reminiscent of President Woodrow Wilson's intransigence toward Senate modifications to the Versailles Treaty in 1919. The result of that standoff was, of course, defeat of the treaty. I am hopeful, Mr. President, that the forthcoming Senate debate on the Panama Canal treaties will reflect not only a conscientious attitude on the part of all Members, but a spirit of cooperation on the part of the administration, and of course, the Panamanian Government.

AMENDMENTS NOS. 13 AND 14

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. President, this morning I announced my support for the Panama Canal treaties. I stated that I would vote in favor of the treaties if they are amended to include the October 14 statement of understanding issued, but never signed, by President Carter and General Torrijos.

When the Senate considers the canal treaties next month I shall offer two amendments designed to incorporate all relevant portions of the October 14 statement. The only changes I would make in the text are those necessary for accurate legal drafting. I recognize that similar amendments have been suggested, but note that they generally deviate in some respect from the text of the statement of understanding.

The importance of the points contained in the statement of understanding is self-evident. The communique clarified our right to take action to insure that the canal remains open, secure, and accessible; it provides appropriate assurances that, in time of need or emergency, our vessels will go to the head of the line.

The statement must be made an integral part of the treaty. There can be no ambiguity on the points it addresses.

The fact that this critically important document was left unsigned is a matter of grave concern, particularly in light of General

Torrijos' comments that he did not give any autographs during his October visit to Washington. We cannot accept a situation in which the validity and binding nature of the statement of understanding is open to challenge or interpretation.

The American people deserve clear and adequate assurances on the important issues of canal neutrality and priority passage. If my amendments are accepted, they shall have such assurances.

The people and Government of Panama cannot have it both ways. Either they accept the statement of understanding or they do not. If the October 14 communique is an accurate reflection of the Panamanian interpretation of the treaty provisions, then it should be no problem for Panama to accept a Senate amendment that adheres to the text of the communique. We are not adding anything new to the treaties; we are not asking Panama for concessions. We are simply incorporating important assurances already negotiated and agreed to by President Carter and General Torrijos. At the same time, I think the Senate should make an honest effort to avoid a situation in which we set out to amend the treaties along the lines of the statement of understanding, adding a little here, snipping off a little there, until we have destroyed the symmetry of the established text and rendered it unacceptable to Panama or forced a new plebiscite. The communique, as it stands, provides acceptable assurances on the questions of neutrality and priority passage and I strongly believe that we should adhere to the agreed text.

Regardless of what one may think about the personality and character of General Torrijos, there is a general concensus among those who have visited Panama that he has been forthcoming and sincere in his willingness to accommodate our objections and respond to our concerns.

During my stay in Panama I was assured by General Torrijos that a Senate amendment incorporating the language of the statement of understanding would not require a new plebiscite since the people of Panama were aware of the statement and its contents prior to voting on the treaties.

I credit these assurances, but would also emphasize that the important point is for the Senate of the United States to establish clearly and unequivocally, by amendment, the legitimacy of the statement of understanding and its central role in the treaty

Adoption by the Senate of the two amendments I shall offer will improve the treaties, will provide us with important, binding, mutually acceptable assurances, without doing violence to the 14 years of careful negotiation and compromise represented in the treaties. I sincerely hope that my colleagues will join me in support, and hopefully in sponsorship, of these amendments. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the amendments be printed in the Record. There being no objection, the amendments were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

AMENDMENT No. 13 (EXEC.) To Ex N, 95-1

At the end of article IV, add the following: "In order to carry out the responsibility to assure that the Panama Canal shall remain open and secure to ships of all nations, each of the two Parties to this Treaty shall, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, defend the Canal against any threat to such regime of neutrality and, consequently, shall have the right to act against any

aggression or threat_directed against the Canal or against the peaceful transit of vessels through the Canal. The preceding sentence shall not be construed as conferring a right of intervention on the United States of America in the internal affairs of the Republic of Panama. Any United States of America action shall be directed at insuring that the Canal shall remain open, secure, and accessible, and no such action may be directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of the Republic of Panama".

AMENDMENT No. 14 (EXEC.) TO EX, N, 95-1

At the end of paragraph 1 of article VI, add the following: "The preceding sentence is for the purpose of, and shall be construed as, assuring the transit of such vessels through the Canal as quickly as possible, without any impediment, with expadited treatment, and in case of need or emergency, assuring that such vessels go to the head of the line of vessels in order to transit the Canal rapidly."

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES AND SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd made an important announcement last Friday regarding his views on the Panama Canal treaties. After thoughtful deliberation, a firsthand view of the Panama Canal and discussions with a variety of people-both for and against the treaties-Senator Byrd announced that he would "vote for the present treaties and work for their ratification."

I completely agree with Senator Byrd when he said:

It is my view that these treaties are the best means of assuring continued access to and use of the Canal—and that is our primary concern.

For the benefit of my colleagues who may have missed Senator Byrd's remarks, I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

REMARKS BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

I have studied the past, assessed the present, and taken into account the future in reaching a decision on whether to support the Panama Canal treaties.

It has not been an easy decision, and in reaching it I have attempted to consider all the relevant information in an objective manner. As part of this process, I led a Senatorial delegation to Panama to gain as much first-hand knowledge as possible about the canal, the Americans living in the Canal Zone, the Panamanian people, and the Panamanian government.

Since first reviewing the treaties in September, I have taken the position that it would be necessary to clarify two important points: the rights of the United States in guaranteeing access to the Canal, and expeditious passage for United States military vessels. I felt that it was important for a clarification to be made prior to the Panamanian plebiscite of October 23, and I stressed the importance of this to President Carter. This clarification was made in the October 14 statement of understanding by President Carter and General Torrijos.

During our visit to Panama, we discussed this with General Torrijos, who clearly indicated his adherence to the statement of understanding. Further, it was clear that the Panamanian people had been informed about these points before the plebiscite.

I do not think there should be any question that we have the right to defend the Canal. However, in order that no doubt about that interpretation be left for future generations, I have on a number of occasions stated that the substance of the October 14 statement should be added to or incorporated in the treaties in some form. I plan to work with other Senators in seeing that such language is included.

Like most Americans, I take great pride in the Panama Canal. It represents a monumental achievement. Even in this space age it remains one of history's outstanding engineering feats. However, we should also understand the pride and aspirations of the Panamanian people.

During the period since the signing of the treaties, I have been impressed by the good faith exhibited by the Panamanians. Panama's interests are closely intertwined with our own and after visiting Panama, I am more hopeful and confident about that country's future political direction. In response to concerns expressed to General Torrijos by the Senatorial delegation of which I was a member, important steps have been taken to better human rights and civil liberties in Panama by abrogating certain repressive laws.

As I have said from the beginning, the basic question to be considered is whether these treaties are in the best interests of the United States, I believe that the weight of the evidence argues convincingly that they are.

It is my view that these treaties are the best means of assuring continued access to and use of the Canal-and that is our primary concern.

Panama would have a greater stake in the Canal and thus a strong interest in its efficient and unimpeded operation. However, the United States would retain a high degree of control over the Canal through the end of the century, as well as defense rights thereafter.

Ratification of the treaties would be consistent with our own role as a leader among nations. It is particularly important for our relations with Latin America and should open a new era of mutual trust and cooperation in inter-American relations. Given the history of the Canal and the principles of our country, the treaties are in our interest and ratification is the right step to take.

I am announcing today I will vote for the treaties and will work for their approval.

PANAMA CANAL: HISTORIC CONTRIBUTIONS BY EDWARD SCHILDHAUER IN ITS DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, my State of Wisconsin has produced many leaders of national stature including some whose contributions to the acquisition by the United States of the Canal Zone territory, 1903-04, and the construction of the Panama Canal, 1904-14, are historic.

Among such leaders were Senator John C. Spooner, author of the Spooner Act of 1902 under which the Canal Zone was acquired and the canal constructed, and Edward Schildhauer, a highly competent electrical engineer.

Recruited for canal service by chief engineer John F. Stevens of the Isthmian Canal Commission, a major builder of the Great Northern across the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific and the basic architect of the Panama Canal, Schildhauer measured up to the expectations of his famous superior by making notable contributions to the success of the enterprise. He designed the electrical and mechanical machinery for the locks and thus is largely responsible for the excellent safety record of the great interoceanic waterway in the lockage since 1914 of hundreds of thousands of vessels of various types of many nations during both peace and war.

A recent news story by the editor, Greg Hageman, of the New Holstein (Wis.) Reporter provides some little known history about Schildhauer's important services and, in view of current discussions about the Panama Canal, is a most timely contribution.

Mr. President, because the indicated article is highly informative and a noteworthy addition to the cumulating literature on the canal question, it should be of interest to all Members of the Congress as well as to students of the canal question in various

parts of the Nation. I ask unanimous consent for it to be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

NATIVE SON HAS LARGE STAKE IN PANama Canal PROJECT

Now, as in the early 1900's, the subject of the Panama Canal is a timely topic discussion, but while much of the conversation in this area now concerns a man from Plains, Georgia, back when the canal was first being built, much of the local conversation centered on a man from New Holstein.

The story of the canal is long and steeped in political maneuvering. The 1977 question of whether it is right or wrong to give the canal back to the Panamanian government is only the latest chapter in the political history of the Panama Canal. Spanish explorers as early as the 16th century sought a passage through the newly discovered land masses that became known as the North Central and South Americas, but none was ever discovered. As the explorers continued to look for what they were positive must exist, the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries dragged slowly by and still no such passage was found. The explorers left their ships and came ashore in hopes that at least gold and riches could be found and in hunting the riches of ancient Indian civilizations, it was noted that certain points in Central America were very narrow and might provide the proper position to construct a man-made passageway. Spain, England, France, Holland, and finally the United States all looked into the feasibility of constructing a canal across what became known as the

Isthmus.

Most of the European planning was just that, and never left the drawing tables of the men assigned to produce such plans, but with the great westward migration taking place in the United States in the mid-1800's, our governmental leaders began to take a great interest in any type of passage way that would save the time and danger experienced by ships having to round Cape Horn on sea voyages between east and west.

Still, even with the United States' great interest in the canal, much of the work being done on such a project, was largely political, treaties drawn up and about to be signed with the New Granada (what is now Colombia) government which had control of the isthmus, then not signed because of intervention by European powers, and the same type of goings on repeated again and again.

The first great expedition to actually construct a canal came into being in 1875 at the Congress of Geographical Sciences held in Paris. As a result of that gathering, a French company, the Societe Civile Internationale du Canal Interoceanique was formed and in 1876 a route was selected that would run from the Colombian cities of Colon on the west coast to Panama on the east coast.

Ferdinand de Lesseps, the French engineer who had constructed the Suez Canal, was put in charge of the project and he determined that the canal should be a sealevel ditch type canal that joined the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. He estimated that the cost of the canal from start to finish would run about $208,000,000 and after using his infectious optimism to gain financial support of many of his countrymen, gathered capital amounting to $60,000,000 and inaugurated the canal project in 1880.

Most of de Lesseps' plan was built on his great enthusiasm and reputation, however, and not on foresight, and by 1887 it was evident that his plan was not feasible. Diseases such as malaria and yellow fever took great tolls of life among the workers dispatched to the canal site, corruption among the administrators of the project ate up much of the canal funds and it became apparent that the ditch-type canal would never work. De Lesseps came up with an alternate plan of a lock-type canal, but in 1888 the French company was dissolved and a great scandal took place in France over the graft and corruption involved with the loss of funds on the project. Over $262,000,000 was spent with only about $100,000,000 actually spent on the canal. De Lesseps himself was sentenced to five years in prison, but never served the time, and other officials were likewise sentenced. Some fled the country and others took their own lives.

A new Panama Canal Company was formed by the French in 1894 and a new contract was arrived at with the Colombian government, but the United States government felt that with the past French failure behind them, they would also fail in this effort and so began to seek out their own canal route and plans.

In 1899, the U.S. Congress appointed a Canal Commission which after investigating the French route from Colon to Panama and a route through the country of Nicaragua, recommended the Nicaraguan route. The Nicaraguan route was actually