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heroin to replace it in the American market. Thus far, assistance to Thai and Burmese narcotics control efforts has been instrumental in preventing a sudden influx of Southeast Asian heroin from the estimated 400 tons of opium produced annually in that region. The amount of heroin entering the United States from Southeast Asia reof mained constant during 1977 and 1978 at approximately 2 metric tons yearly, which represents approximately one-third of the total. As Mexico's narcotics control efforts continue to reduce quantities of heroin available from that country, we expect further increases in the percentage and, possibly, the absolute amount of Southeast Asia heroin entering the United States.

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The Department's cooperative narcotics control programs with
Southeast Asian governments are aimed to curtail the heroin threat
from that region. These programs do this by addressing the illegal
drug problem in all its aspects; including eradication and interdiction
of illicit narcotics, development of alternate sources of income for pri-
mary poppy producing areas; and reducing demand for illicit drugs.
The fiscal year 1980 request of $7.83 million for our Southeast Asian
programs will maintain current levels of activity with Thailand and
Burma, and allow new, limited assistance to other Southeast Asian
countries as well as to regional organizations.

We propose to spend $4.6 million for assistance to Burma's inter-
diction and opium eradication efforts. This money will be used pri-
marily for maintaining fixed and rotary wing aircraft already
provided ($3.9 million), and training of aircraft pilot and mainte-
nance personnel ($610,000).

For Thailand we propose a funding level of $2.9 million to support a full range of programs. Of that total, $800.000 will provide advisory support, vehicles, communications, helicopter maintenance, and training to continue implementation of the 5-year narcotics enforcement expansion program. Thai Customs is projected to receive $500,000 in assistance for advisory support, vessel maintenance, and development of a narcotics information system. Two separate demand reduction efforts, covering drug abuse treatment, rehabilitation, and prevention will receive $700.000 in support. Another $500,000 will be used to continue development of alternative crop in the poppy growing Mae Chaem watershed. The remainder of the funds for Thailand will be for personnel and administrative costs in support of our programs. There are increasing indications that smuggling patterns in Southeast Asia are adjusting to enforcement pressures on traditional trafficking routes. To contain potential new routes bypassing Thailand, we initiated narcotic control programs with Malaysia and Indonesia during 1979, for which we have programed $135.000 in fiscal year 1980. Illicit narcotics move freely across international boundaries, making effective control in one nation dependent in part upon the success of neighboring governments. Recognizing that East Asia is no exception, in 1979 we began supporting an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) project for training professional educators in the area of preventive drug education. For 1980 we have set aside $150,000 to continue United States-ASEAN narcotics control cooperation. Another $150,000 is proposed to allow continuation of the Colombo plan drug advisory program and its support of regional narcotics control

activities.

Recent developments affecting the trans-Asia movement of heroin. into Europe are, however, placing increasing strain on our efforts in Southeast Asia. One factor contributing to our successes thus far has been the reliance of European heroin addicts on Southeast Asia as their primary source of supply, thereby absorbing significant quantities of those narcotics which might otherwise have been destined for the United States.

Statistics of drug seizures by European law enforcement agencies indicate, however, that Southeast Asian heroin is being increasingly replaced in the European market by Middle Eastern heroin. A comparison of relevant heroin seizure data illustrates this trend. The figures in the percent column indicate percent of total seizures.

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Progress against Southeast Asian heroin in Europe has been the result of both positive and negative factors. While effective narcotics control by source countries such as Burma and Thailand has reduced the quantity of heroin available for export, increased vigilance by both Asian and European law enforcement bodies has made the smuggling of Southeast Asian heroin more difficult.

Unfortunately, progress against Southeast Asian heroin has been accompanied by a tremendous increase in the production of illicit opium in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has estimated that the 1978-79 season opium cropfrom these two countries might range as high as 800 metric tons, making that area the world's largest source of illicit opium. Through intelligence and recent laboratory seizures, we know that this opium is being converted increasingly into heroin, both where it is grown as well as to some extent in neighboring countries.

Given the ready availability of narcotic materials, the Middle East is becoming an increasingly important supplier of heroin to Europe. As this trend increases, traffickers of Southeast Asian heroin can be expected to turn their energies increasingly to supplying addicts here in this country. In so doing they will pose a greater challenge to our own narcotics control mechanisms as well as to those of both source and transit countries in East Asia. To contain this threat will require not only more effective international narcotics control efforts in Southeast Asia but also in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other Middle Eastern nations.

Since the United States cannot shoulder the entire burden of the trans-Asian heroin problem we are pursuing a determined effort to enlist increasingly greater support on both a bilateral and multilateral basis from industrialized nations for the global international narcotics control effort.

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Since its establishment in 1971, the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) has been the major vehicle for multilateral narcotics control efforts. The task of enlisting full international support for the Fund's efforts has not been easy, and until recently, the United States provided the majority of contributions to the Fund. In 1977 this administration undertook an active campaign to increase support for UNFDAC from other developed countries, and results have been encouraging. Total contributions to the Fund during 1977 and 1978 increased 50 percent of the previous 2-year period, and the United States share of total contributions in 1978 dropped to 42 percent, from a high of 88 percent in 1973.

To encourage additional contributions from other governments, U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young convened a meeting of U.N. permanent representatives concerned with worldwide drug abuse problems in November 1978 at the United Nations in New York, Congressman Lester Wolff, chairman of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Control, and Congressman Benjamin Gilman of the select committee, effectively presented a case for giving greater priority and encouraging broader participation by U.N. member states in the international war on narcotics and drug abuse. Participants in the program expressed their willingness to bring this issue to the attention of their governments and considered this meeting a successful means of maintaining U.N. focus on the continuing problem of drug abuse control. Although it is too early to project total contributions to the Fund for 1979, they already total $4.9 million. Australia has pledged $1.25 million over the next 3 years, the Federal Republic of Germany has agreed to contribute $260,000 to the UNFDAC general fund in addition to providing $300,000-$400,000 for a feasibility study of the UNFDAC-sponsored Upper Helmand Valley in crop substitution/ agricultural development projects in Afghanistan.

For fiscal year 1980 we are requesting $3 million for UNFDAC, the same level of contributions as in the past 2 years. If the trend set so far this year continues, we believe that this sum will represent well under half of the total contributions.

In addition, the Department of State is continuing its effort to elicit Support from industrialized nations to use their bilateral foreign developmental assistance funds in support of eliminating narcotics cultivation in primary producing areas of less developed nations. In 1978 United States efforts helped obtain the endorsement of such assistance from the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Many members of ECOSOC, most notably the countries of Scandanavia, are showing an increasing willingness to use their foreign aid funds to support narcotics control. We also cosponsored a General Assembly resolution appealing to governments for increased and sustained contributions to UNFDAC.

Multilateral developmental assistance is perhaps the most promising source for the large sums required to finance economic development programs in the opium producing regions of Asia. The Department of State has undertaken active initiatives to encourage increased bilateral Western European and multilateral development aid for primary opium-producing areas in developing countries such as Paki

stan, Afghanistan, Burma, and Thailand. A similar effort is underway for multilateral aid to the coca-producing areas of South America.

Late last year I met with French and German officials to discuss means of coordinating bilateral assistance programs representing the United States at the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) in Geneva, I continued these discussions with European counterparts.

Secretary of State Vance also has discussed this issue with his counterparts in developed countries. In addition, he has instructed. U.S. Ambassadors in Western European capitals to keep the issue of economic assistance to poppy-producing regions before their host governments.

On a multilateral basis the Department of State is working closely with the Department of the Treasury to insure that multilateral developmental banks (MDB's) complement our international narcotics control objectives. Since most of the world's narcotic-producing areas are found in lesser developed countries, the primary recipients of developmental assistance from lending institutions such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Working with Treasury, we have briefed the U.S. executive directors of these institutions. Our American representatives have been instructed to work to insure that loans from their banks do not contribute to increased narcotics production, but instead provide poor populations with the economic alternatives to enable them to abandon narcotics production.

Closely related to the efforts of our executive directors, we are encouraging both multilateral and bilateral aid donors to consider the use of "poppy clauses" or similar provisions in their assistance agreements. Such clauses stipulate that as a condition for receiving assistance the recipient government undertakes not to permit narcotic production in the areas benefitting from such assistance. Last April the United States canceled an AID irrigation project in the Dau Jui area of Afghanistan because terms of an antiopium side letter to the project agreement were not being enforced. The World Bank is requiring recipients of its agricultural loans in Afghanistan to certify that they will not produce opium, and the ADB is considering use of a poppy clause in its joint project with UNFDAC in Afghanistan's Upper Helmand Valley project.

The trans-Asian heroin problem is immense, with great potential for harm to the United States as well as other regions of the world. It is therefore vital that we succeed in our efforts to marshal the resources of other industrialized countries to counter this threat.

In addition to the adverse health effects of drugs such as cocaine and marihuana, this administration has taken full cognizance of the destructive economic and social impact which their illicit trafficking can have on the United States and other countries, particularly our Latin American neighbors. We are especially concerned over the way in which the tremendous profits generated by this trade fuels criminal activities, distorts legitimate economies, and engenders political corruption. Thus, while maintaining our emphasis on heroin, we have over the past 2 years increased significantly efforts to control the international traffic in other drugs of abuse.

Interrupting the flow of cocaine and marihuana from Latin America into the United States is extremely complex and requires a multi

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faceted control strategy. Only within the past 2 years has this problem been addressed fully from the standpoint of controlling sources as well as interdicting the traffic on both the South American land mass and in the Caribbean region. However, the amounts of cocaine and marihuana being smuggled into the United States has kept pace with the steady rise in demand for them. As with heroin, exact statistics about the traffic and use of cocaine and marihuana are not possible to obtain. The Drug Enforcement Administration's best current estimates, however, indicate that in 1978, cocaine imports into the United States totaled between 19 and 25 metric tons. For marihuana, DEA believes the figure is close to 15,000 metric tons yearly. Interdicting this flow of drugs from entering our borders has been a high priority of our Government, and particularly of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard.

Although Peru and Bolivia are the source of coca for the manufacture of cocaine, the Drug Enforcement Administration estimates that as much as 70 percent of that cocaine coming into the United States transits Colombia. Moreover, DEA estimates that perhaps 70 percent of the marihuana entering this country comes from or through Colombia. As these illicit substances leave Colombia for this country, the problem becomes primarily one of interdiction. Because approximately three-quarters of that traffic moves through the Caribbean, that region has become a major focus of interdiction efforts by the U.S. narcotics control agencies.

Given the prevailing smuggling patterns, cooperation with the Government of Colombia is essential as we seek to interdict the traffic before it disperses over the entire Caribbean region. Within the past 2 years sustained high-level exchanges between our two governments have raised narcotics control to top priority in United States-Colombia bilateral relations. President Turbay and his administration have continued the drug control commitment of their predecessors and have made cooperation with us on that issue closer than ever before.

The most striking example of Colombia antinarcotics commitment has been the recent North Coast interdiction campaign focused on the Guajira Peninsula. This 6-month campaign designed to close down the Guajira as Colombia's major trafficking center achieved significant success. During the campaign Colombian authorities captured 27 aircraft and 59 vessels engaged in narcotics smuggling. Additionally, approximately 455 traffickers were arrested while authorities seized 1.034 tons of marihuana.

Perhaps the most significant elements of the Guajira effort has been the commitment of the Colombian military for the first time to sustained antinarcotics activity. Involvement of the military's greater material and personnel resources has created the potential for similar campaigns in other regions of the country, such as the Llanos, the Choco, and along the southern border, all of which are real or potential producing or transit areas.

The Colombian Government has taken measures to improve the efficiency of its own narcotics control and judicial apparatus. Creation of a central narcotics unit under the Attorney General has been a progressive step toward creating a professional drug enforcement agency. This centralization promises to improve coordination and reduce dupli

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