Since its establishment in 1971, the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) has been the major vehicle for multilateral narcotics control efforts. The task of enlisting full international support for the Fund's efforts has not been easy, and until recently, the United States provided the majority of contributions to the Fund. In 1977 this administration undertook an active campaign to increase support for UNFDAC from other developed countries, and results have been encouraging. Total contributions to the Fund during 1977 and 1978 increased 50 percent of the previous 2-year period, and the United States share of total contributions in 1978 dropped to 42 percent, from a high of 88 percent in 1973.

To encourage additional contributions from other governments, U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young convened a meeting of U.N. permanent representatives concerned with worldwide drug abuse problems in November 1978 at the United Nations in New York, Congressman Lester Wolff, chairman of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Control, and Congressman Benjamin Gilman of the select committee, effectively presented a case for giving greater priority and encouraging broader participation by U.N. member states in the international war on narcotics and drug abuse. Participants in the program expressed their willingness to bring this issue to the attention of their governments and considered this meeting a successful means of maintaining U.N. focus on the continuing problem of drug abuse control. Although it is too early to project total contributions to the Fund for 1979, they already total $4.9 million. Australia has pledged $1.25 million over the next 3 years, the Federal Republic of Germany has agreed to contribute $260,000 to the UNFDAC general fund in addition to providing $300,000-$400,000 for a feasibility study of the UNFDAC-sponsored Upper Helmand Valley in crop substitution/ agricultural development projects in Afghanistan.

For fiscal year 1980 we are requesting $3 million for UNFDAC, the same level of contributions as in the past 2 years. If the trend set so far this year continues, we believe that this sum will represent well under half of the total contributions.

In addition, the Department of State is continuing its effort to elicit Support from industrialized nations to use their bilateral foreign developmental assistance funds in support of eliminating narcotics cultivation in primary producing areas of less developed nations. In 1978 United States efforts helped obtain the endorsement of such assistance from the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Many members of ECOSOC, most notably the countries of Scandanavia, are showing an increasing willingness to use their foreign aid funds to support narcotics control. We also cosponsored a General Assembly resolution appealing to governments for increased and sustained contributions to UNFDAC.

Multilateral developmental assistance is perhaps the most promising source for the large sums required to finance economic development programs in the opium producing regions of Asia. The Department of State has undertaken active initiatives to encourage increased bilateral Western European and multilateral development aid for primary opium-producing areas in developing countries such as Paki

stan, Afghanistan, Burma, and Thailand. A similar effort is underway for multilateral aid to the coca-producing areas of South America.

Late last year I met with French and German officials to discuss means of coordinating bilateral assistance programs representing the United States at the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) in Geneva, I continued these discussions with European counterparts.

Secretary of State Vance also has discussed this issue with his counterparts in developed countries. In addition, he has instructed. U.S. Ambassadors in Western European capitals to keep the issue of economic assistance to poppy-producing regions before their host governments.

On a multilateral basis the Department of State is working closely with the Department of the Treasury to insure that multilateral developmental banks (MDB's) complement our international narcotics control objectives. Since most of the world's narcotic-producing areas are found in lesser developed countries, the primary recipients of developmental assistance from lending institutions such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Working with Treasury, we have briefed the U.S. executive directors of these institutions. Our American representatives have been instructed to work to insure that loans from their banks do not contribute to increased narcotics production, but instead provide poor populations with the economic alternatives to enable them to abandon narcotics production.

Closely related to the efforts of our executive directors, we are encouraging both multilateral and bilateral aid donors to consider the use of "poppy clauses" or similar provisions in their assistance agreements. Such clauses stipulate that as a condition for receiving assistance the recipient government undertakes not to permit narcotic production in the areas benefitting from such assistance. Last April the United States canceled an AID irrigation project in the Dau Jui area of Afghanistan because terms of an antiopium side letter to the project agreement were not being enforced. The World Bank is requiring recipients of its agricultural loans in Afghanistan to certify that they will not produce opium, and the ADB is considering use of a poppy clause in its joint project with UNFDAC in Afghanistan's Upper Helmand Valley project.

The trans-Asian heroin problem is immense, with great potential for harm to the United States as well as other regions of the world. It is therefore vital that we succeed in our efforts to marshal the resources of other industrialized countries to counter this threat.

In addition to the adverse health effects of drugs such as cocaine and marihuana, this administration has taken full cognizance of the destructive economic and social impact which their illicit trafficking can have on the United States and other countries, particularly our Latin American neighbors. We are especially concerned over the way in which the tremendous profits generated by this trade fuels criminal activities, distorts legitimate economies, and engenders political corruption. Thus, while maintaining our emphasis on heroin, we have over the past 2 years increased significantly efforts to control the international traffic in other drugs of abuse.

Interrupting the flow of cocaine and marihuana from Latin America into the United States is extremely complex and requires a multi

faceted control strategy. Only within the past 2 years has this problem been addressed fully from the standpoint of controlling sources as well as interdicting the traffic on both the South American land mass and in the Caribbean region. However, the amounts of cocaine and marihuana being smuggled into the United States has kept pace with the steady rise in demand for them. As with heroin, exact statistics about the traffic and use of cocaine and marihuana are not possible to obtain. The Drug Enforcement Administration's best current estimates, however, indicate that in 1978, cocaine imports into the United States totaled between 19 and 25 metric tons. For marihuana, DEA believes the figure is close to 15,000 metric tons yearly. Interdicting this flow of drugs from entering our borders has been a high priority of our Government, and particularly of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard.

Although Peru and Bolivia are the source of coca for the manufacture of cocaine, the Drug Enforcement Administration estimates that as much as 70 percent of that cocaine coming into the United States transits Colombia. Moreover, DEA estimates that perhaps 70 percent of the marihuana entering this country comes from or through Colombia. As these illicit substances leave Colombia for this country, the problem becomes primarily one of interdiction. Because approximately three-quarters of that traffic moves through the Caribbean, that region has become a major focus of interdiction efforts by the U.S. narcotics control agencies.

Given the prevailing smuggling patterns, cooperation with the Government of Colombia is essential as we seek to interdict the traffic before it disperses over the entire Caribbean region. Within the past 2 years sustained high-level exchanges between our two governments have raised narcotics control to top priority in United States-Colombia bilateral relations. President Turbay and his administration have continued the drug control commitment of their predecessors and have made cooperation with us on that issue closer than ever before.

The most striking example of Colombia antinarcotics commitment has been the recent North Coast interdiction campaign focused on the Guajira Peninsula. This 6-month campaign designed to close down the Guajira as Colombia's major trafficking center achieved significant success. During the campaign Colombian authorities captured 27 aircraft and 59 vessels engaged in narcotics smuggling. Additionally, approximately 455 traffickers were arrested while authorities seized 1.034 tons of marihuana.

Perhaps the most significant elements of the Guajira effort has been the commitment of the Colombian military for the first time to sustained antinarcotics activity. Involvement of the military's greater material and personnel resources has created the potential for similar campaigns in other regions of the country, such as the Llanos, the Choco, and along the southern border, all of which are real or potential producing or transit areas.

The Colombian Government has taken measures to improve the efficiency of its own narcotics control and judicial apparatus. Creation of a central narcotics unit under the Attorney General has been a progressive step toward creating a professional drug enforcement agency. This centralization promises to improve coordination and reduce dupli

cation of effort through combining the functions of five separate agencies. The Turbay administration has also undertaken a study of its judicial system in order to improve processing of narcotics related

cases.

At the diplomatic level, Colombia has demonstrated its willingness. to enter into international agreements relating to narcotics control. The Department of State, in cooperation with other Federal agencies, is working with the Colombian Government to negotiate procedures for or agreements covering extradition, maritime boarding and seizure, joint prosecution, banking, prisoner exchange, and return of aircraft. Colombia is also demonstrating its interest in cooperating closely with its South American neighbors on the narcotics issue. In December Colombia and Venezuela signed an anti-narcotics agreement setting up a joint commission to further cooperative action. Negotiations are now underway between Colombia and Peru on a similar agreement. For fiscal year 1980 the Department of State is requesting a total of $2,042,000 to support Colombian narcotics control organizations. Of this total, $1.3 million will be to provide support to the Attorney General's narcotics unit. Another $290,000 will defray the costs of two U.S. Customs advisers and limited equipment to enhance the narcotics interdiction capability of Colombia's Customs Service. The remainder of the request will provide administrative and program development support.

Of particular importance this past year have been the increasing emphasis on maritime narcotics interdiction, and the close, effective cooperation of U.S. law enforcement agencies with their counterparts from other governments in the region. Intelligence estimates indicate that approximately 70 percent of the marihuana and substantial quantities of cocaine entering the United States is moved by vessel through the Caribbean area.

Fortunately, our law enforcement agencies are becoming increasingly successful at intercepting smuggling vessels on the high seas. In 1978 the Coast Guard seized 1,700 tons of marihuana and 140 vessels engaged in marihuana smuggling. U.S. Customs seized an additional 222 vessels in our territorial waters, netting 1,000 tons of marihuana and 60.9 kilograms of cocaine.

The key to improved vessel interdiction is improved intelligence. Currently, approximately 20 percent of the smuggling vessels seizures are the result of previous intelligence, usually from the network of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents in the Caribbean area. Since last summer the U.S. Navy has been providing the Coast Guard additional intelligence by reporting sightings of suspect vessels. Additionally, during the Commandant of the Coast Guard's recent trip through the Caribbean and Latin America he proposed to his foreign counterparts a regional arrangement for reporting at sea sightings of possible smuggling vessels. The Latin American response was favorable and the Department of State is providing diplomatic and limited financial support as the Coast Guard moves to implement its plans.

By international law, the Coast Guard cannot board and seize suspected narcotics smuggling vessels on the high seas without first obtaining permission from the government under whose flag they sail. Such permission can usually be obtained through our embassies on an ad hoc basis. At times, however, unavoidable delays have enabled

smuggling vessels to jettison their illicit cargo or even escape capture. To address this problem the Department of State has opened negotiations with cooperating Caribbean area governments to institutionalize and expedite the granting of such permission.

We have responded to the growing threat of cocaine and marihuana smuggling in the Caribbean by developing small, carefully selected narcotics control assistance programs. În fiscal year 1980 we are requesting $270,000 to continue limited commodity support and training for the Bahamas ($100,000), Panama ($70,000), and Honduras ($100,000), important transit areas of narcotics destined for the United States. We are also reviewing the question of program assistance to Jamaica.

Over the long term, success in closing off existing transit routes is sure to be countered by opening new ones, although not without some disruption in the traffic and increased costs for the trafficking. The greatest promise for a lasting dimunition of drug trafficking lies in curtailing production of drugs at their source.

Controlling coca leaf production is a difficult challenge, but a course which is an essential ingredient of any long-term anticocaine strategy. The task is complicated, however, by the presence of extensive licit coca production alongside the illicit. Coca leaf is legally cultivated and consumed by large segments of Bolivian and Peruvian societies. Such consumption is traditional-usually chewed or brewed as a mild tea. Additionally, coca leaf is essential in the production of cocaine for legitimate medicinal purposes. Control is also made more difficult by the remoteness of areas where it is grown and by the economic and political problems endemic in Bolivia and Peru. Consequently, our cooperative efforts with those governments of necessity address the control of licit as well as illicit coca production and trafficking.

For Bolivia in fiscal year 1980 we are requesting $3.1 million to support efforts to continue development of alternative crops, marketing systems ($1.4 million), and projects to create institutions to insure that production is limited to legitimate needs and not diverted into illicit trafficking ($800,000). Most of these efforts are directed at eliminating coca production in the Chapare, primary source of Bolivia's illicit crop. The shift to coffee, tea, and other alternative crops will be encouraged by free distribution of Government-cleared land to those who give up coca.

The remainder of Bolivian coca is grown in the Yungas, an historical source for legitimate supplies. We are setting aside $410,000 to assist the National Directorate for Control of Dangerous Substances (DNSP) improve its control mechanisms designed to limit coca production to the Yungas, to reduce the level needed to meet licit demand, and to prevent displacement of coca production to other areas. Thus far, all coca farmers have been registered and licensed, and all new plantings have been prohibited. Registration of coca middlemen is now underway, and should be completed this year.

Last year we were able to reach cooperative assistance agreements with Peru, a country in which both licit and illicit coca production is believed to exceed that of neighboring Bolivia. The Peruvian Government has passed a strong anti-narcotics law. We are working closely with Peru to develop and implement workable narcotics control efforts that enforce the law against illicit production and we are studying