Hearings, Reports and Prints of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

The North Atlantic Assembly plays a unique and potentially constructive role in relations between the United States, Canada, and the West European allies. The Assembly is the only body that regularly brings together members of the United States Congress and members of the Canadian and European parliaments for the express purpose of discussing the Atlantic Alliance.

For a number of years, the Assembly sought to create a more formal link between the Assembly and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This effort has proved fruitless, for a number of reasons, and no important elements in the Assembly seem inclined to pursue this approach further.

The abandonment of a quest for an organic link to NATO, however, has left the Assembly with what resembles an identity crisis. The Assembly now faces a choice between remaining something of a "club" organized for the purpose of supporting NATO or of becoming a forum for the expression and interaction of all major political currents within the Alliance.

Transforming the Assembly into a more accurate reflection of the democratically-elected legislatures in the member countries would give the Assembly more political credibility and would enliven the debate and exchange of ideas at Assembly sessions. The main argument against such a transformation is that problems could result from the participation of some Communist parliamentarians from those countries where the Communist party has more than a minor representation particularly Italy, France, Portugal, and possibly Iceland. Participation of Communists could result in the Assembly-mainly the military committee-being denied some information that it currently is given by NATO and U.S. authorities. Very few sources, however, thought that this possibility would limit the Assembly's work in any substantial way.

Many European participants in the Assembly believe that sooner or later the Assembly will have little choice but to permit Communist participation or be open to damaging criticism. If this is so, the Assembly could make virtue out of necessity by declaring itself as welcoming delegations that are an accurate reflection of the composition of national parliaments before such a situation arises.

2. AMERICAN PARTICIPATION

Effective, representative, and consistent American participation in the North Atlantic Assembly is critical to the viability of the organization. The fact is that American participation has fallen far short of maximum effectiveness throughout much of the history of the Assembly.

Under ideal circumstances for the Assembly, the American delegation to the NAA would include at least a few of the chairmen (and/or the ranking minority members) of the committees or subcommittees that have the most direct responsibilities for United States-European relations. This would include the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and on Armed Services and the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services. The House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committees both have subcommittees specifically tasked with following European affairs and the House Armed Services Committee has established a subcommittee on NATO affairs; some of the leading members of these subcommittees, at least, should serve on the U.S. delegation.

Also, the U.S. delegation might beneficially have a number of members who serve for a period of years to provide continuity with new members regularly included to broaden the experience of individual members in United States-European relations.

Finally, there should be close cooperation between the Senate and House delegations, particularly between the secretaries of delegation. In fact, some observers believe that U.S. participation in interparliamentary groups such as the NAA should be handled by a small joint staff that would coordinate House and Senate participation, avoiding some of the organizational overlap and procedural difficulties that have been experienced in the past.

3. IMPROVING THE WORK OF THE ASSEMBLY

Just as it seems clear that the NAA has a place in United StatesEuropean relations and a potentially important role, some major changes need to be considered to enhance the effectiveness of the way the Assembly goes about its business.

The potential influence of the Assembly is not to be found in the recommendations that it now drafts and sends to the North Atlantic Council for response by the Secretary General. The Secretary General, for all the prestige of the position, is but a servant of the member countries of NATO. He exercises considerable influence but does not have the power to implement most proposals originating in the Assembly. The North Atlantic Council, for its part, is simply a mechanism employed by the Alliance members for consultation and consensusformation. Even though the Alliance countries are usually represented in the Council by well-respected and influential ambassadors, the Council has no power other than that created by the initiative and consensus of the member states.

If the Assembly wishes to have an impact on the affairs of the Alliance, its most effective option would be to improve its channels to national policymaking-through the links between the national delegations and the parent parliaments-and its channels to public opinion-through the press services in the member countries.

To implement such an approach, the Assembly could: (1) take specific steps to increase the effectiveness of feedback to the national parliaments; (2) improve the substance and the procedures of the committee and plenary meetings; and (3) enhance the substantive analytical work currently done by the Assembly by expanding the secretariat's capability for independent research.

Measures toward these ends could include:

Designing the decisionmaking process of the Assembly so that it focuses particularly on stimulating action in national parliaments;

Eliminating the practice of debating committee reports in plenary sessions and otherwise liberalizing the rules governing plenary debates;

Scheduling full Assembly sessions twice a year instead of once and holding one session per year in North America;

Opening Assembly committee meetings to the press and the public;

Creating a mini "think-tank" on Atlantic Alliance affairs within the Assembly Secretariat.

Specific changes in the Assembly's Rules of Procedure to implement these and other changes discussed in this report are included for considerations as appendix A.

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