Under ideal circumstances for the Assembly, the American delegation to the NAA would include at least a few of the chairmen (and/or the ranking minority members) of the committees or subcommittees that have the most direct responsibilities for United States-European relations. This would include the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and on Armed Services and the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services. The House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committees both have subcommittees specifically tasked with following European affairs and the House Armed Services Committee has established a subcommittee on NATO affairs; some of the leading members of these subcommittees, at least, should serve on the U.S. delegation. Also, the U.S. delegation might beneficially have a number of members who serve for a period of years to provide continuity with new members regularly included to broaden the experience of individual members in United States-European relations. Finally, there should be close cooperation between the Senate and House delegations, particularly between the secretaries of delegation. In fact, some observers believe that U.S. participation in interparliamentary groups such as the NAA should be handled by a small joint staff that would coordinate House and Senate participation, avoiding some of the organizational overlap and procedural difficulties that have been experienced in the past. 3. IMPROVING THE WORK OF THE ASSEMBLY Just as it seems clear that the NAA has a place in United StatesEuropean relations and a potentially important role, some major changes need to be considered to enhance the effectiveness of the way the Assembly goes about its business. The potential influence of the Assembly is not to be found in the recommendations that it now drafts and sends to the North Atlantic Council for response by the Secretary General. The Secretary General, for all the prestige of the position, is but a servant of the member countries of NATO. He exercises considerable influence but does not have the power to implement most proposals originating in the Assembly. The North Atlantic Council, for its part, is simply a mechanism employed by the Alliance members for consultation and consensusformation. Even though the Alliance countries are usually represented in the Council by well-respected and influential ambassadors, the Council has no power other than that created by the initiative and consensus of the member states. If the Assembly wishes to have an impact on the affairs of the Alliance, its most effective option would be to improve its channels to national policymaking-through the links between the national delegations and the parent parliaments-and its channels to public opinion-through the press services in the member countries. To implement such an approach, the Assembly could: (1) take specific steps to increase the effectiveness of feedback to the national parliaments; (2) improve the substance and the procedures of the committee and plenary meetings; and (3) enhance the substantive analytical work currently done by the Assembly by expanding the secretariat's capability for independent research. ly, the Amer of the chairme tees or sub nited State ommittees ca Committees an have subo ffairs and the committee bcommittees have a vide cont he expert ations. Teen the S taries of de ation in int ed by 8 S ticipation ifficulties t EMBLY in United role, some reness of be found he North ecretary C he member ut does not In the Asse mechan and conse ally repre mbassades a e initiative 3 Measures toward these ends could include: Designing the decisionmaking process of the Assembly so that it focuses particularly on stimulating action in national parliaments; Eliminating the practice of debating committee reports in plenary sessions and otherwise liberalizing the rules governing plenary debates; Scheduling full Assembly sessions twice a year instead of once and holding one session per year in North America; Opening Assembly committee meetings to the press and the public; Creating a mini "think-tank" on Atlantic Alliance affairs within the Assembly Secretariat. Specific changes in the Assembly's Rules of Procedure to implement these and other changes discussed in this report are included for con[siderations as appendix A. 2 Under ideal circumstances for the Assembly, the American dele gation to the NAA would include at least a few of the chairmen (and/o the ranking minority members) of the committees or subcommittees that have the most direct responsibilities for United States-European relations. This would include the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and on Armed Services and the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services. The House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committees both have subcommittees specifically tasked with following European affairs and the House Armed Services Committee has established a subcommittee on NATO affairs; some of the leading members of these subcommittees, at least, should serve on the U.S. delegation. Also, the U.S. delegation might beneficially have a number of members who serve for a period of years to provide continuity with new members regularly included to broaden the experience of individual members in United States-European relations. Finally, there should be close cooperation between the Senate and House delegations, particularly between the secretaries of delegation. In fact, some observers believe that U.S. participation in interparliamentary groups such as the NAA should be handled by a small joint staff that would coordinate House and Senate participation, avoiding some of the organizational overlap and procedural difficulties that have been experienced in the past. 3. IMPROVING THE WORK OF THE ASSEMBLY Just as it seems clear that the NAA has a place in United StatesEuropean relations and a potentially important role, some major changes need to be considered to enhance the effectiveness of the way the Assembly goes about its business. The potential influence of the Assembly is not to be found in the recommendations that it now drafts and sends to the North Atlantic Council for response by the Secretary General. The Secretary General, for all the prestige of the position, is but a servant of the member countries of NATO. He exercises considerable influence but does not have the power to implement most proposals originating in the Assembly. The North Atlantic Council, for its part, is simply a mechanism employed by the Alliance members for consultation and consensusformation. Even though the Alliance countries are usually represented in the Council by well-respected and influential ambassadors, the Council has no power other than that created by the initiative and consensus of the member states. If the Assembly wishes to have an impact on the affairs of the Alliance, its most effective option would be to improve its channels to national policymaking-through the links between the national delegations and the parent parliaments-and its channels to public opinion-through the press services in the member countries. To implement such an approach, the Assembly could: (1) take specific steps to increase the effectiveness of feedback to the national parliaments; (2) improve the substance and the procedures of the committee and plenary meetings; and (3) enhance the substantive analytical work currently done by the Assembly by expanding the secretariat's capability for independent research. Measures toward these ends could include: Designing the decisionmaking process of the Assembly so that it focuses particularly on stimulating action in national parliaments; Eliminating the practice of debating committee reports in plenary sessions and otherwise liberalizing the rules governing plenary debates; Scheduling full Assembly sessions twice a year instead of once and holding one session per year in North America; Opening Assembly committee meetings to the press and the public; Creating a mini "think-tank" on Atlantic Alliance affairs within the Assembly Secretariat. Specific changes in the Assembly's Rules of Procedure to implement these and other changes discussed in this report are included for considerations as appendix A. INTRODUCTION On July 18, 1955, the first NATO Parliamentarians' Conference convened at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris, France, with some 200 parliamentarians attending from the 15 NATO countries. In the words of one of the founders and now past President of the North Atlantic Assembly, Geoffrey de Freitas, the meeting in Paris "was only the final step in the long campaign of a few parliamentarians to get their governments interested in a forum for discussing problems of the Atlantic community." The Parliamentarians' Conference was established during the institution-building period of Atlantic and European affairs. Some of the founders hoped that the Conference would become in effect the consultative assembly for the Atlantic Alliance. Others took a more limited view of the possibilities for the organization, seeing it as a forum for the exchange of views among legislators and as a means for disseminating information about NATO. The latter view of the institution has dominated its development. The organization has gone through a number of changes, including a name-change to the North Atlantic Assembly in 1966, and moves of the Assembly headquarters from the initial site in London to Paris and then from Paris to Brussels (when NATO headquarters was forced to leave France following de Gaulle's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure). But the organization remains today essentially what it was when it began in 1955: a forum for discussions among parliamentarians from the signator countries of the North Atlantic Treaty about matters affecting the Atlantic Community nations. In pursuit of an Atlantic parliamentary dialogue, the Assembly meets in plenary session once a year. The committees of the Assembly, where most of the business is conducted, number six and meet at least twice a year. A Standing Committee is responsible for the general direction of Assembly activities. It is in the Standing Committee that the most important decisions regarding Assembly affairs are prepared. In addition to this locus of power, there are five committees which are specifically responsible for the substantive work of the Assembly. They are the Political Committee; the Military Committee; the Economic Committee; the Scientific and Technical Committee; and the Education, Cultural Affairs and Information Committee. In addition, the Assembly in recent years has appointed a number of subcommittees which, in fact, have done some of the more interesting substantive work of the Assembly.2 1 Cameron, Fraser. The North Atlantic Assembly 1964-1974. Introduction by Geoffrey de Freitas, Member of Parliament. The British Atlantic Committee. London (1974) p. 51. The Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation is credited by many observers as facilitating a more effective transatlantic dialog on issues of armaments cooperation. They point out that the meetings that this group has held with the Senate and House Armed Services Committees illustrate how the Assembly can be an effective vehicle for creating greater understanding between American and European legislators on issues of crucial importance to the Alliance. |