CHAPTER 8

THE UNITED STATES IN THE CROSSFIRE

During the past decades, the United States has often found itself in the crossfire between Greece and Turkey with each country anxious to have the United States support its positions. It is an impossible choice, but the maintenance of balance equidistant from the two has been impossible, too. Since it cannot be in the U.S. interest to withdraw or lose the friendship it extended in the Cold War, the policy question is one of finding means to make U.S. involvement productive instead of destructive. The question is made urgent by Turkey's internal turmoil and Greece's political timetable.

As the preceding chapters state, Greece and Turkey are of equal strategic importance to the United States and to NATO. They are also equally resistant to pressure from the United States to make what would be seen as concessions to one another. Indeed, that resistance has sent them both in search of national identities detached and perhaps independent from the United States.

That search, however, is unlikely to prove successful. Economically. their future is predominantly, if not exclusively within Europe. Politically, their democratic systems link them to Western ideas and institutions. Militarily, they would be equally at the mercy of the Soviet bloc if they were isolated from NATO and from one another. Yet their conflicts are pushing them further away from the West. Turks believe the United States has let them down. The harsh 1964 letter from President Johnson to then Prime Minister Inonu warning that Turkish intervention on Cyprus would isolate it from its allies is still cited by Turks as proof that America prefers Greece. The arms embargo imposed after the 1974 invasion of Cyprus is seen as conclusive evidence of that tilt. Since the lifting of the embargo, resentment has continued, not abated.

Ironically, Turkey's internal weaknesses have led it to expect and demand more from the United States. Without committing themselves to American interests or contingency plans for the Middle East and Persian Gulf areas, Turks have convinced themselves that their country has acquired added importance to the United States because of the crisis to their south and east. Accordingly, they have come to believe that they can exact more support from the West than before while paying less for it in military arrangements with the United States and in military-political accommodation with Greece. Greeks, for their part, believe the United States took them over, Convinced that the U.S. meddled deeply in Greek politics before the military coup in 1967, most Greeks also assume that the CIA backed

he colonels' action and held the junta in power. Senior Greek political eaders who know the situation to have been far more complicated han that do not seem to dare to explain the realities to their constituents. Thus, the impression persists and poisons U.S.-Greek elations.

Further, Greeks assume U.S. collusion, if not in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, at least in the continued Turkish Army presence on the island. The lifting of the arms embargo is interpreted by Greeks as a sign of U.S. unwillingness to support Greece in the disoute with Turkey. A similar conflict between the U.S. and Greece night arise about the terms of Greek reintegration into NATO's comnand structure.

From unrealistic bases, public opinion in both nations has erected inrealistic expectations for American diplomatic performance. For he United States, while there is no exit, there is also no easily deined middle course.

One broad U.S. policy option is to go on as before, proffering American good offices, but in general relying on the United Nations, NATO, or other international organizations to propose particular ormulas for resolution of Greco-Turkish differences. That approach, with degrees of shading, has marked the special Cyprus missions of Dean Acheson (1964), Cyrus Vance (1967), Clark Clifford (1977) nd State Department Counselor Matthew Nimetz (1978). It also haracterized the efforts, as SACEUR, of Generals Alexander Haig nd his successor, Bernard Rogers, to remove the Aegean command nd control obstacles to Greek military reintegration into NATO. At these levels American intercession has been sporadic and has so ar failed. The burden of responsibility, however, has grown as Greek nd Turkish political leaders have managed to shift their share of t onto American shoulders.

Another option discussed by Greek, Turkish and NATO officials as only a superficial attraction. It would involve bringing another utsider Germany, instead of the United States-into the role of rbitrator/peacemaker. Germany has substantial credibility with both ireece and Turkey. In recent years, moreover, Germany has led the conomic rescue efforts in the West on Turkey's behalf and contribted substantially to the modernization of the Turkish military stablishment. Germany, however, perceives its role in NATO and 1 Europe in terms of sharp limits on open political leadership. Sensiive to its neighbors' residual fears, Germany resists taking the politial spotlight. It would appear not just hard but probably impossible > tempt Bonn onto the shaky ground where Washington has beome mired.

A third course would have the United States' attempting to disince itself and eventually to withdraw from responsibility for reco-Turkish reconciliation. Such a policy would amount to an bdication of U.S. leadership within NATO. It could not be in the terests of the United States or of the Alliance to abandon the role ssumed in 1947, even though U.S. patience with the quarrels of reeks and Turks has often stretched to near breaking and U.S. inolvement in those disputes has damaged our relations with both arties.

A final possibility appears as risk-laden as it would be dramatic: the high-level assumption of responsibility for Greco-Turkish reconciliation. In a much riskier situation, with little apparent promise of a positive outcome, President Carter assumed such a role at Camp David. Instead of senior officials shuttling between the disputants or relying on international organizations, America's leader brought the Egyptian and Israeli leaders face-to-face and, in the extraordinary setting, prevailed over the fears and long-held positions of both to define the elements of compromise.

But the risks involved in summit negotiations may be too grea for the United States to bear. The Cyprus issue remains intractable and the United States may not be welcome as an arbitrator in the larger Aegean dispute. However, if General Rogers fails in his effort to achieve agreement on the terms of Greek reintegration into NATO. then a very high-level U.S. effort may be required to address tha: particular aspect of the Greco-Turkish dispute and, in the process to facilitate other negotiations.

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