I. BACKGROUND

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in NATO

American deployments of nuclear weapons in Europe began in the 1950's, serving both as an adjunct of the U.S. strategic capability and as a "substitute" for NATO conventional forces, since conventional parity with the Warsaw Pact was then judged politically and economically unattainable. Among the early U.S. nuclear deployments in Europe were intermediate-range strategic systems (bombers, IRBM's) targeted on the U.S.S.R., but these were later phased down as new technologies permitted the adoption of more distant and survivable basing strategies (U.S.-based bombers, ICBM's, and SLBM's) which allowed for an extra-European capability to strike the Soviet Union. Thus, over time, U.S. nuclear systems tended, tems able to strike the Soviet Union from submarines and from mispean-based "tactical" or battlefield systems and (b) "strategic" syssile sites and bomber bases in the United States. Falling between these two categories-and thus into a "gray area"-have been so-called forward-based systems (FBS), primarily in the form of U.S. aircraft capable of reaching Soviet territory from carriers at sea and from bases in the United Kingdom.

THE ROLE IN EVOLUTION

the United States enjoyed unquestioned strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. The doctrine of "massive retaliation" was strongly When American nuclear weapons were first deployed in Europe, enunciated, and the Soviets were seen as in a distinctly inferior position, able at most to use their conventional preponderance to hold Europe "hostage" against United States use of strategic forces but unable to threaten the United States itself. By the late 1950's, however, Soviet missile development had created the perception of a significant nuclear threat to the United States as well as to Europe, of America's deterrent. This situation served as a spur to the national provoking debates about European vulnerability and the credibility primarily in the United States, of possible NATO responses, evennuclear programs of Britain and France and stimulated discussion, tually engendering a proposal by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) for a NATO MRBM. In the early 1960's, in the face of French moves to establish a nuclear deterrent independent of NATO, the United States proposed creation of a Multilateral Force (MLF), which was intended to

finesse the SACEUR proposal for an MRBM and to head off further nuclear proliferation by allowing the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to participate directly in an Alliance deterrent. Designed as a limited size, mixed-manned, seaborne force, with U.S. weapons unambiguously targeted on the U.S.S.R., the MLF ultimately failed because of its doubtful military effectiveness and also, perhaps more significantly, because the United Kingdom and France alike perceived it as designed specifically for the West Germans and therefore as threatening to erase much of the distinction between them and the FRG.

Upon dropping the MLF proposal, the United States instead

(a) Advanced suggestions for improved consultation machinery, which ultimately evolved into NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), in which the FRG and Italy were given equal status with the United States and the United Kingdom;

(b) Rapidly expanded its deployments of theater nuclear forces (TNF), primarily in Germany, creating physical evidence of U.S. commitment which the FRG considered even more important than the proposed MLF arrangements; and

(c) Undertook efforts to spread nuclear participation and responsibility within NATO through bilateral Programs of Cooperation (POC's), which provide nuclear weapons (artillery, tactical missiles, naval nuclear bombs, and nuclear-capable aircraft) on a dual-key basis to seven Allies (including the FRG) and which came to involve, overall, nearly half the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe.

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This combination of political consultation arrangements and U.S. theater nuclear deployments for its own and Allied forces provided the framework for resolving the problem posed by the initial Soviet MRBM deployments.

Because U.S. nuclear strength was, from an early point, integral to NATO's posture, any apparent alteration in American nuclear doctrine or deployments has touched directly upon West European sensitivities. A pointed example came in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, when the withdrawal of Soviet-targeted U.S. missiles from Italy and Turkey was, despite U.S. denials, generally understood by Europeans to be a trade for Soviet withdrawals from Cuba. It was in part to provide clear assurance that the U.S. nuclear commitment remained firm that the United States subsequently undertook to maintain a certain number of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean, and later supplemented this with the allocation of a substantial number of Poseidon SLBM RV's to SACEUR for targeting purposes. Placing

Although the phrase "dual key" originated in the requirement that two officers are needed to activate a nuclear weapon, it is also now used to refer to the joint decisionmaking involved in the use of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Precise consultation procedures for the use of nuclear weapons during a NATO conflict were established in 1962 under the so-called Athens Guidelines. Subsequent elaborations of these Guidelines provide that special weight be accorded the views of those NATO countries on or from whose terri tory nuclear weapons would be employed, countries providing the warheads, and/or the countries providing or manning nuclear delivery systems. It is well understood, however, that agreed consultation procedures will be exercised only if time and circumstance permit and that the nuclear power or powers have the final responsibility for the decision to use nuclear weapons. Overall, the joint decision-making concept can be said to apply in two different senses. In the case of European-owned systems (with the exception of the independent systems of France and the United Kingdom), it refers to the need for the United States to authorize the release of warheads to the country in question. In the case of U.S.-owned and operated systems, it refers to the NATO consultation process.

such systems under SACEUR helped perceptually to tighten the cou=pling between "tactical" and "strategic" systems.2

At the same time, responding to the growing Soviet capability for nuclear retaliation, the United States became concerned with the escalatory implications of a doctrine which relied too heavily upon nuclear weapons and, in an effort to raise the nuclear threshold, began to place - greater emphasis on conventional defense. In 1967, Allied and U.S. interests were reconciled under the umbrella of a revised NATO doctrine (commonly referred to as MC-14/3) which embodied the concept of a balanced deterrent continuum. Theater nuclear forces (TNF) became the central leg of a "NATO Triad" which tied together NATO's conventional and strategic forces, while leaving deliberately vague the circumstances under which nuclear weapons, either theater or strategic, might be employed.

Throughout this evolution of circumstances and doctrine, the political implications of nuclear weapons varied widely among different. Allies:

-For the United States, nuclear weapons provided the essential evidence to support U.S. leadership in the Alliance and American commitment to the defense of Europe.

-For the United Kingdom, which developed its own nuclear capability in cooperation with the United States, nuclear weapons contributed to the "special relationship" and offered a limited. measure of independence and political influence.

-For France, nuclear weapons raised an issue of credibility ("Could the United States really be counted on to trade New York for Frankfurt or Paris?") and presented a means to assert national political independence by developing an autonomous nuclear capability and removing itself from integrated military participation in NATO. -For the Federal Republic of Germany, in contrast, nuclear weapons became a source of perpetual tension. Having been constrained from the development or possession of nuclear weaponry, first by the West European Union (WEU) Treaty of 1954 and again by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, the FRG has remained highly sensitive to its special status of full dependence on the U.S. nuclear guarantee. Accordingly, nuclear posture and doctrine have periodically surfaced as topics of concern within West German politics, as FRG officials have sought to reassure themselves and their public that the threat of strategic escalation is credible, that Soviet conventional forces can be deterred, and that nuclear war is not being considered a matter for German territory alone.

Among Europeans in general, the actual use of theater nuclear forces (TNF) in anything resembling classic military combat has naturally remained a horrifying notion. Thus, while consistently opposed to any Jessening of U.S. nuclear deployments in Europe, West Europeans. have remained concerned that NATO's TNF posture not have the perverse effect of "decoupling" America from Western Europe by per

Because no U.S. nuclear weapons, even those under SACEUR, may actually be used hont affirmative. Presidential decision, it may be fair to say that the assignment of S. weapons to SASEUR control changes appearance more than reality.

mitting the possibility of a devastating war on European soil without danger to, and hence strategic commitment by, the United States. To overcome this "decoupling" paradox-by which American commitments of TNF might actually enable the United States to limit its involvement in a European war-American and European officials have generally sought to emphasize the deterrent aspects of TNF deployments, stressing the escalatory linkage to U.S. strategic forces rather than the war-fighting capabilities of specific TNF systems. Nonetheless and almost inevitably-European confidence in the "coupling" of American and Western Europe for defensive purposes has fluctuated over time, under the influence of such factors as the internal European political climate, the state of East-West relations, recurrent debates on arms control and NATO strategy, the presence and visibility of U.S. TNF in Europe, and perceived trends in American and Soviet military strength. Perhaps an even more important factor-despite its seeming separation from the question of European defense has been the European perception of political uncertainty in the United States resulting from Vietnam, Watergate, and, most recently, from action or inaction affecting Angola, Taiwan and Iran and by the inadequate U.S. response to the energy crisis. On the other hand, however, European confidence in "coupling" has been fortified by several constants: the continuing presence in Europe of a substantial U.S. conventional force (at present, some 300,000 military and their associated dependents); a large number of American citizens permanently resident in Europe; U.S. business investments in Europe with a collective annual product surpassing the GNP's of all but a few nations in the world; and, of course, the pervasive understanding that U.S. interests would be severely damaged should Soviet influence be allowed to intrude into Western Europe.

Today, the key element in NATO doctrine is a theory of escalation and linkage: deterrence is seen to rest not on any one leg of the NATO Triad, but on the possibility that all, up to and including U.S. strategic forces, might be called upon to support the others. For the Europeans, a doctrine providing for the possibility of escalation to theater and strategic systems constitutes the essence of the U.S. nuclear guarantee. This is both reassuring-in that it means the Soviet Union cannot hope to fight Europe alone-and a source of constant anxiety since it underscores the extent to which European security is dependent on the United States. Conversely, for the United States, doctrinal linkage upward to strategic forces makes more credible the possible use of U.S. nuclear weapons in a European conflict, and thus strengthens deterrence while also underlining American leadership in the Alliance and the U.S. decision-making role in crisis or war.

Inherent in the escalation-linkage principle is the concept of flexibility in responding to any level of aggression. Flexible response requires a broad spectrum of planned options. A range of NATO nuclear options serves to (a) maximize Soviet uncertainty about the nature of NATO's response to attack, (b) minimize the political burdens on West European governments of a rigid employment plan which might imply an automatic recourse to nuclear weapons and which might seem to focus excessively on their territory, and (c) enable NATO to attempt to control escalation in the event of war. In the TNF posture, a range of options is provided by a spectrum of

geographically dispersed weapons with different yields in a variety of delivery systems: dual-capable tactical aircraft, tactical ballistic missiles, maritime nuclear weapons, artillery, and United States and United Kingdom SLBM's. With regard to the strategic forces, options are provided by the overall coupling of U.S. strategic forces to NATO and, specifically, by recent U.S. planning for Limited Nuclear Options (LNO's), under which U.S. strategic forces could be used selectively in direct support of Alliance objectives-for example, to hit supply, marshaling and communications operations in the Soviet Union.

While a broad range of options is generally thought to enhance deterrence by providing for measured-and therefore credible-responses, some observers have argued that LNO's are "decoupling," in that they could be seen as an effort by the United States to limit a conflict to the European theater. Others argue that including LNO's in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) of U.S. strategic forces makes their use more credible and thereby strengthens the coupling of U.S. strategic forces to NATO, a connection which is already emphasized by (a) the integration of SIOP and SACEUR target planning, and (b) the assignment of U.S. assets to SACEUR-both the highly visible U.S. TNF in Europe (e.g., dual-capable aircraft) and the less visible but highly capable U.S. strategic systems (SLBM's).

MODERNIZING THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

In his October 1977 speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt not only questioned the credibility of the coupling of American strategic forces to Europe-which he argued was undercut by strategic parity-but went on to press for parity in conventional and theater nuclear forces to preserve stability and deterrence in Europe. The implication of the Chancellor's argument was that in a condition of strategic parity-the "essential equivalence" to be codified in the SALT II Treaty—U.S. strategic forces could be neutralized; NATO TNF could be deterred because of Soviet superiority in long-range theater systems; and the Soviet conventional and theater nuclear preponderance could then be freely brought to bear against Western Europe-at least as a major source of political leverage.

This argument reflected German concern that a "gap" presently exists in the NATO Triad, and that the NATO escalation strategy might not actually be feasible because, beyond the level of battlefield and relatively short-range systems, NATO has few escalation options available to threaten the Soviet Union itself, short of calling on U.S. external strategic forces, which might not be readily brought into play. The source of such anxiety rests on the concern that the United States might not use any of its strategic forces, even in a limited nuclear strike, for fear that this would provoke a Soviet strategic response, with the risk of escalation to a full strategic exchange. Thus, so this argument goes, NATO needs an intermediate, European-based capability to threaten the Soviet homeland as a counter to the threat posed by the growing Soviet theater nuclear and conventional capability.

In response to this German argument, United States and other NATO officials pointed out that attempting to create a regional