EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report analyzes some foreign policy implications related to SALT II; it does not address the vital military factors which will weigh heavily in the Senate's consideration of the proposed accord. First, the report examines the foreign policy approaches that have characterized American policy toward the Soviet Union in the course of the strategic arms limitation talks. During the Presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, U.S. policy was devised principally by Henry Kissinger, in his capacity as National Security Advisor and then as Secretary of State. Kissinger developed what may be called a "positive linkage" approach to United States-Soviet relations which constituted an elaborate strategy designed to build a web of self-reinforcing relationships between Washington and Moscow. The SALT process was a central factor in this strategy. The "passive linkage" approach employed by the Carter Administration has not appeared as coherent as the Kissinger strategy, perhaps because neither Secretary of State Cyrus Vance nor National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski dominate the conduct of United States-Soviet relations as did Kissinger. This apparent lack of coherence probably also results from the fact that the passive linkage approach flowed from the Carter administration's desire to pursue an active human rights campaign vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in parallel with SALT. The policies of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations have come under attack by supporters of "high-pressure linkage." Advocates of this use of linkage premise their advocacy on the belief that only firm American actions that affect Russian interests directly can modify Soviet behavior. They tend to be skeptical of the SALT process as it has been conducted and of the SALT II agreement in particular. Moscow, for its part, argued strongly until recently for the compartmentalization of various aspects of United States-Soviet relations. Since the United States began moving toward direct relations with mainland China in 1978, however, Moscow has from time to time suggested that if U.S. policy became increasingly anti-Soviet, SALT and other aspects of United States-Soviet relations would inevitably be threatened. These approaches to linkage form a backdrop for the second section of this report which reviews the range of potential political consequences of acceptance or rejection of the SALT II accord-the links forward. Just as political factors have come into play in the debate over how the United States can best advance its own interests in dealing with the Soviet Union, there will be political consequences of the final outcome of the SALT II debate. The precise nature of these consequences will depend on a variety of factors, including the circumstances which surround the Senate's action, subsequent decisions by the Soviet and American Governments, the course of the leadership transition in the Soviet Union and the outcome of the 1980 Presidential elections in the United States. The range of possible consequences reviewed in this report suggests two final generalizations. First, Senate acceptance of the SALT II accord would symbolize and encourage continuity in the SALT process and in overall United States-Soviet relations. Second, rejection by the Senate would likely rupture, at least temporarily, the SALT process begun over 10 years ago. In so doing, it would bring a sharp turn in United States-Soviet relations. The longer term impacts of this action might depend on a number of factors, including how the leaders in Washington and Moscow chose to interpret and react to an unsuccessful outcome of the SALT II negotiations. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE The final vote in the U.S. Senate to accept or reject the SALT II accord undoubtedly will turn principally on whether or not Senators believe that the accord serves American security interests. These interests, however, are complex and multifaceted. Competing interpretations of the relative importance of various facets will form part of the debate over the accord. Some will argue that the crucial issues are the narrow security ones: Whether or not the provisions of the accord are balanced, militarily sound for the United States, and verifiable. Others will maintain that these issues, though central, have to be examined in the context of broader concerns: The longer term character of United States-Soviet relations, the process of arms control negotiations, the perceptions of major U.S. allies, and the nature of congressional-executive relations. This report is intended to examine some of these contextual issues and their relationship to SALT II. Judgments as to the importance of each issue as a factor in decisions on SALT II are individual ones and are not essayed here. The purpose of this study is to identify competing perspectives rather than to weigh their relative merits with regard to acceptance or rejection of the SALT II accord. Because the most central issues in this framework have to do with United States-Soviet relations, the initial section of this paper deals with the questions of whether, how, and in what respects decisions on SALT II should be shaped by other aspects of the United States-Soviet relationship. That section attempts to identify the main approaches to the use of "linkage" generally among various aspects of United StatesSoviet relations and specifically between the strategic arms limitation talks and other issues. The second section of the report is premised on the fact that the SALT II agreement cannot be isolated from other aspects of international politics, and that there are linkages both to previous history and to future developments which are part and parcel of the political environment of SALT II. It will attempt to suggest a possible range of political consequences of Senate acceptance or rejection of the SALT II accord-both in terms of United States-Soviet relations and otherwise. This study therefore discusses two general questions: (1) What are the main approaches to the use of linkage generally among various aspects of United States-Soviet relations and specifically between other issues and the strategic arms limitation talks? and, (2) outside of the issues relating directly to the strategic military balance, what is the range of possible foreign policy consequences of the Senate's acceptance or rejection of the SALT II accord? The first question calls for an analysis of the history of linkage politics that has led up to the current SALT II accord. The second question requires a survey of the potential links between the Senate's action on the treaty and the wider spectrum of U.S. foreign policy interests. 46-337-79-2 APPROACHES TO THE USE OF LINKAGE Helmut Sonnenfeldt, a practitioner in United States-Soviet relations during the Nixon and Ford administrations, has recently suggested that the term "linkage" has become overworked and potentially misleading. Sonnenfeldt suggests that, "Like many other words, indeed the word 'détente' itself, linkage' has come to denote many things to many people and has lost precise meaning, if it ever had any." Yet Sonnenfeldt recognizes that the term has become part of the vital currency of the debate over SALT II and United StatesSoviet relations, and concludes that "we are probably saddled with it." 1 If we are stuck with the term, it is important that we be very clear about how we intend to use it. There seems little doubt that there are linkages among and between the various aspects of United StatesSoviet relations. The question is not whether interrelationships exist; they clearly do. At issue has been when and how linkage should be used as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Some of the participants in the SALT debate have argued that the SALT II accord should be judged purely on its merits as the provisions of the agreement affect the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Most commentators on the SALT process, however, have demonstrated a preference for one or another approach to the use of linkage in United States-Soviet relations. The former approach is not examined here. This study defines three different approaches to the use of linkage in United States-Soviet relations. The three types may be described as positive, passive, and high pressure. In one way or another, they all have influenced American policy toward the Soviet Union during the 10-year history of SALT deliberations. "Positive linkage" describes, for the purposes of this report, the use of linkage that was practiced by Henry Kissinger during the administrations of Presidents Nixon and Ford. This approach seeks to create and use a web of interrelated and mutually reinforcing ties between the United States and the Soviet Union. It requires the collaboration of both superpowers for its successful implementation. The SALT process was a central factor in this approach. It was seen as potentially reinforcing the web of United States-Soviet interdependencies and possibly making the Soviet Union more responsive to U.S. interests on other matters. "Passive linkage" describes the approach that has generally characterized the policies of the Carter administration. This approach recognizes that various aspects of United States-Soviet relations are in fact interrelated, but avoids making formal, public, or active connections among the component parts. The administration has 1 Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, 'Linkage: A Strategy for Tempering Soviet Antagonism," NATO Review, No. 1, February 1979, p. 3. attempted to pursue an active human rights policy toward the Soviet Union while negotiating strategic arms limitations. This particular combination of confrontation (over human rights) and cooperation (in SALT) has required that the administration insist on separation among various aspects of United States-Soviet relations. "High-pressure linkage" is used in this report to describe the approach of those who believe that Soviet behavior can best be modified by forceful demonstrations of American power and national will; these advocates are often skeptical about the SALT process in general as well as about the proposed SALT II accord. They believe that the United States should attempt to redress grievances in one area of the relationship by taking forceful and punitive actions in other areas of United States-Soviet relations. For example, some advocates of high-pressure linkage have argued that Soviet activities in the Third World constitute one good reason for not ratifying the SALT II accord. The paragraphs below offer some illustrations of the advocacy and use of these three approaches to linkage, particularly as they have been deployed with regard to SALT. POSITIVE LINKAGE The orgins of the positive linkage approach can be traced to the Nixon administration, and particularly to President Nixon's foremost foreign policy strategist, Henry Kissinger. As Helmut Sonnefeldt has pointed out, positive linkage, used as a design for the conduct of United States-Soviet relations during the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years, was conceptualized originally as a general foreign policy orientation in President Nixon's first annual foreign policy report to the Congress. The administration asserted in this report that *** essential in successful negotiations is an appreciation of the context in which issues are addressed. The central fact here is the interrelationship of international events. We did not invent the interrelationship; it is a fact of life. This administration recognizes that international developments are entwined in many complex ways: Political issues relate to strategic questions, political events in one area of the world may have a far-reaching effect on political developments in other parts of the globe.2 The strategy, as used by Kissinger, assumed that there were direct interrelationships among various aspects of United States-Soviet relations. Kissinger attempted to use Soviet interest in cooperation in some areas-trade and strategic arms limitations, for example-to encourage cooperation in other areas, or at least to encourage Soviet behavior that was more in keeping with American interests. This approach depended in part on constantly reminding the Soviet Union that it could not expect to be able to challenge American interests in Africa while continuing to reap the fruits of cooperation. in other areas. But the approach stopped short of direct public threats of retaliation in the strategic arms limitation talks for Soviet activities in the Third World. Instead, when the Soviet Union and Cuba intervened in Nixon, Richard, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, A New Strategy for Peace," Feb. 18, 1970, pp. 135 |