B. OTHER RELATED MEASURES (1) Constraints on Non-ABM Systems or Components Article VI is designed to enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the basic limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty. To this end, each Party undertakes in this Article (a) not to give missiles, launchers or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory; (b) not to test such non-ABM missiles, launchers and radars "in an ABM mode" and (c) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward. The first of these undertakings would, for example, prohibit the modification of air-defense missiles (SAMs) to give them a capability against strategic ballistic missiles. The undertaking not to test non-ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars in an ABM mode subsequent to the date of signature of this Treaty would prohibit testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes, but would not affect ABM testing of ABM components, or prevent testing on non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes. With respect to the third of the undertakings in Article VI, it should be noted that the Treaty, while not intended to prohibit the further deployment of radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, requires their location along the periphery of each Party's national territory and oriented outward in order to minimize the possibility that they could contribute to an effective ABM defense of points in the interior. Article VI also has the effect of prohibiting the future deployment in third countries of radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack. Existing ballistic missile early-warning radars would not be affected. Article VI imposes no limitation on radars for national means of verification. In recognition of the fact that phased-array radars with more than a certain potential, though deployed for non-ABM missions such as air defense or air traffic control, would have an inherent capacity for ABM use, the Parties agreed not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential exceeding three million watt-square meters, except as provided in Articles III, IV and VI of the Treaty and except for the purpose of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification. Deployment of non-ABM radars currently planned by the United States would not be affected. (2) International Transfers Article IX provides that, to assure the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by the Treaty. The Parties understand that the first undertaking includes an obligation not to provide to other states technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty. In addition, the United States Delegation made clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provisions may be considered for a treaty on limiting strategic offensive arms, noting that the question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution. (3) Conflicting Obligations Article X contains an undertaking by the Parties not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with the Treaty. The obligations in this Treaty are not inconsistent with any obligation of the United States under any international agreement. (1) Verification C. VERIFICATION AND CONSULTATION Article XII relates to verification of compliance with the Treaty's provisions, which is to be accomplished by national technical means. Paragraph 1 states that each Party will use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law for purposes of providing assurance of compliance with provisions of the Treaty. It does not require changes from current operating practices and procedures with respect to systems which will be used as national technical means of verification. The second paragraph of this Article provides that each Party agrees not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other which are operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of the Article. This provision would, for example, prohibit interference with a satellite in orbit used for verification of the Treaty. Paragraph 3 contains an agreement not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means. This paragraph expressly permits continuation of current construction, assembly, conversion and overhaul practices. (2) Standing Consultative Commission Article XIII provides that the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission (hereafter referred to as the Commission) to promote the objectives and to facilitate the implementation of the ABM Treaty. The Parties have further agreed to use the Commission to promote the objectives and implementation of the Interim Agreement. (See Article VI of the Interim Agreement.) The Commission will provide a consulting framework within which the Parties may consider various matters relating to the Treaty and the Interim Agreement. The Parties may also consider these matters in other channels. A principal function of the Commission will be to consider questions of compliance with the obligations assumed under this Treaty and the Interim Agreement and also related situations which may be considered ambiguous. Each Party may voluntarily provide through the Commission information it considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance. Thus one Party might raise a question of compliance based on information gathered by national technical means of verification and the other Party could provide information to clarify the matter. Attention was called above to the provisions in Article XII prohibiting intentional interference with national technical means of veri fication operating in accordance with its provisions. The Commission is charged by Article XIII with the responsibility to consider any questions of interference with such means. The Commission may also consider questions of concealment impeding verification by national means. The Commission may consider changes in the general strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of the Treaty. Related to this is the Commission's authority to consider proposals to further increase the viability of the Treaty-such as agreed interpretations after the Treaty has entered into force-and to consider proposals for amendment of the Treaty. (Amendments to the Treaty would have to be ratified pursuant to Articles XIV and XVI.) The Commission may also consider other appropriate measures, not specifically enumerated in Article XIII, aimed at further limiting strategic arms. Finally, through the Commission the Parties are to agree on procedures and dates for the implementation of Article VIII concerning destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or ABM components. (For corresponding responsibilities of the Commission under the Interim Agreement, see section C of the discussion thereof.) The second paragraph of Article XIII provides for the establishment of regulations for the Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters. Such matters can be worked out early in the follow-on negotiations. Meanwhile, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the Delegations during such negotiations or, when they are not in session, through other diplomatic channels. The Commission is intended as a means to facilitate the implementation of the agreements and would not replace follow-on negotiations or use of other diplomatic channels. D. DURATION, WITHDRAWAL AND FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS Article XV provides that the Treaty shall be of unlimited duration, but contains a withdrawal clause of the type that has become standard in post-war arms control treaties. This clause provides that each Party in exercising its national sovereignty, shall have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Notice of such decision is to be given to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice is required to include a statement of the extraordinary events involved. In this connection, the United States has stressed the unique relationship between limitations on offensive and defensive strategic arms. This interrelationship lends extraordinary importance to the undertaking in Article XI "to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms." The special importance we attach to this relationship was reflected in the following formal statement relating to Article XI, which was made by the Head of the United States Delegation on May 9, 1972: The US Delegation has stressed the importance the US Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic E. OTHER PROVISIONS Article XIV deals with amendments and review. Paragraph 1 provides that the Parties may propose amendments to the Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification. The second paragraph of Article XIV provides for formal review of the Treaty by the Parties at five year intervals. Paragraph 2 does not preclude agreement on proposed amendments of the Treaty during the first five years, or between formal reviews thereafter; it simply reflects recognition of the possibility of changes in the strategic relationship and the development of new strategic systems. These anestions are also within the purview of the Standing Consultative Commission. Article XVI and the final paragraph of the Treaty contain standard provisions on entry into force, registration pursuant to the United Nations Charter, and equal authenticity of the English and Russian language texts. INTERIM AGREEMENT AND PROTOCOL The Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement), including a Protocol which is integral thereto, was signed on May 26, 1972. The Interim Agreement consists of a preamble and eight operative articles. In the course of the negotiations, agreement was reached on a number of interpretive matters related to the Interim Agreement. Enclosure 3 contains agreed interpretations and certain noteworthy unilateral statements. This Agreement provides for a restriction of five years on strategic offensive missile launcher deployments pending negotiation of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The main effects of the Interim Agreement will be that: the aggregate number of fixed, land-based ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers will be limited; starting construction of additional fixed, land-based ICBM launchers is prohibited. the number of launchers for modern heavy ICBMs, such as the Soviet SS-9, will be limited to that number currently operational and under construction; ceilings will be placed on the number of SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines operational on each side; and up to the agreed ceilings, deployment of additional SĹBM launchers above a specified number for each Party requires an offsetting reduction of ICBM launchers of older types or SLBM launchers on older ballistic missile submarines. In the first paragraph of the preamble of the Agreement the Parties express the conviction that the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiation on limiting strategic arms and will improve international relations. In the second paragraph the Parties acknowledge the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, and in the third they acknowledge their obligations under Article VI of the NonProliferation Treaty to pursue disarmament negotiations. A. ICBM LAUNCHERS Article I of the Interim Agreement prohibits starting construction of additional fixed land-based ICBM launchers. While the text of Article I prescribes July 1, 1972 as the freeze date, the United States and the Soviet Union understand that, pending ratification and acceptance of the agreements, neither will take any action that will be prohibited thereby, in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval. This construction freeze covers all fixed land-based ICBM launchers, both silo and soft-pad, but does not include test and training ICBM launchers or mobile land-based ICBM launchers. Test and training launchers are, however, subject to other constraints. The United States has made clear to the Soviets that we would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agreement to be inconsistent with the objectives of the Agreement. The Parties have agreed that the term ICBM includes any land-based strategic ballistic missile capable of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental United States and the northwestern border of the continental Soviet Union. Launchers for fractional orbital bombardment systems are considered to be ICBM launchers. On May 26, 1972, the United States had 1,054 operational, landbased ICBM launchers and none under construction; on that date, the Soviet Union had a total of land-based ICBM launchers operational and under active, construction estimated to be about 1,618. |