Sixth. Pending the completion of a permanent agreement on more complete measures of strategic offensive arms limitation, both Sides are prepared to reach agreements on separate measures to supplement the existing Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972. Seventh. Each Side will continue to take necessary organizational and technical measures for preventing accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under its control in accordance with the Agreement of September 30, 1971 between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Washington, June 21, 1973. For the United States of America: RICHARD NIXON, President of the United States of America. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: L. I. BREZHNEV, General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU. 20. PROTOCOL TO THE SALT I ABM TREATY (1974) Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missie Systems Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974 Senate advice and consent November 10, 1975 The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed on May 29, 1972, Desiring to further the objectives of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems signed on May 26, 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, Reaffirming their conviction that the adoption of further measures for the limitation of strategic arms would contribute to strengthening international peace and security, Proceeding from the premise that further limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems will create more favorable conditions for the completion of work on a permanent agreement on more complete measures for the limitation of strategic offensive arms, Have agreed as follows: Article I 1. Each Party shall be limited at any one time to a single area out of the two provided in Article III of the Treaty for deployment of antiballistic missile (ABM) systems or their components and accordingly shall not exercise its right to deploy an ABM system or its components in the second of the two ABM system deployment areas permitted by Article III of the Treaty, except as an exchange of one permitted area for the other in accordance with Article II of this Protocol. 2. Accordingly, except as permitted by Article II of this Protocol: the United States of America shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article III (a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union shall not deploy an ABM system or its components in the deployment area of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo launchers permitted by Article III(b) of the Treaty. Article II 1. Each Party shall have the right to dismantle or destroy its ABM system and the components thereof in the area where they are presently deployed and to deploy an ABM system or its components in the alter native area permitted by Article III of the Treaty, provided that prior to initiation of construction, notification is given in accord with the procedure agreed to by the Standing Consultative Commission, during the year beginning October 3, 1977, and ending October 2, 1978, or during any year which commences at five year intervals thereafter, those being the years for periodic review of the Treaty, as provided in Article XIV of the Treaty. This right may be exercised only once. 2. Accordingly, in the event of such notice, the United States would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the deployment area of ICBM silo launchers and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area centered on its capital, as permitted by Article III (a) of the Treaty, and the Soviet Union would have the right to dismantle or destroy the ABM system and its components in the area centered on its capital and to deploy an ABM system or its components in an area containing ICBM silo launchers, as permitted by Article III (b) of the Treaty. 3. Dismantling or destruction and deployment of ABM systems or their components and the notification thereof shall be carried out in accordance with Article VIII of the ABM Treaty and procedures agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission. Article III The rights and obligations established by the Treaty remain in force and shall be complied with by the Parties except to the extent modified by this Protocol. In particular, the deployment of an ABM system or its components within the area selected shall remain limited by the levels and other requirements established by the Treaty. Article IV This Protocol shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. It shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification and shall thereafter be considered an integral part of the Treaty. Done at Moscow on July 3, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the United States of America: RICHARD NIXON, President of the United States of America. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: L. I. BREZHNEV, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU 21. JOINT STATEMENT AT VLADIVOSTOK ON THE SALT II NEGOTIATIONS (1974) Joint Statement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, November 24, 1974 During their working meeting in the area of Vladivostok on November 23-24, 1974, the President of the USA Gerald R. Ford and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. I. Brezhnev discussed in detail the question of further limitations of strategic offensive arms. They reaffirmed the great significance that both the United States and the USSR attach to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. They are convinced that a long-term agreement on this question would be a significant contribution to improving relations between the US and the USSR, to reducing the danger of war and to enhancing world peace. Having noted the value of previous agreements on this question, including the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, they reaffirm the intention to conclude a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, to last through 1985. As a result of the exchange of views on the substance of such a new agreement the President of the United States of America and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU concluded that favorable prospects exist for completing the work on this agreement in 1975. Agreement was reached that further negotiations will be based on the following provisions. 1. The new agreement will incorporate relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, which will remain in force until October 1977. 2. The new agreement will cover the period from October 1977 through December 31, 1985. 3. Based on the principle of equality and equal security, the new agreement will include the following limitations: a. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles; b. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs). 4. The new agreement will include a provision for further negotiations beginning no later than 1980-1981 on the question of further limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms in the period after 1985. 5. Negotiations between the delegations of the US and USSR to work out the new agreement incorporating the foregoing points will resume in Geneva in January 1975. 22. SENATE RESOLUTION 406 ON UNITED STATESU.S.S.R. RELATIONS (1976) Senate Resolution 406 on the Importance of Sound Relations With the Soviet Union, May 5, 1976 Resolved, It is the sense of the Senate that: (a) United States relations with the Soviet Union are a central aspect of United States foreign policy, and thus it is critically important that we should sort out the difficulties that exist in the SovietAmerican relationship, and define the national interest in that relationship. (b) Without illusions about the fundamental differences which separate the United States and the Soviet Union, we believe that the survival of the values we cherish in our free society requires the most careful and judicious regulation of relations between these two great powers. We proceed, then, from a recognition of the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have, and are likely to have for some time, many competitive and conflicting interests. But we believe, nevertheless, that it is in the interest of both countries to regulate this competition and these conflicts so that they do not lead to war. (c) The basic premise of the United States approach to this relationship is that the United States must remain unchallengeably strong militarily, both to insure United States security and to contribute to the security of our friends and allies abroad. This military strength must include a strategic capability which is fully sufficient to deter any Soviet attack on the United States or its allies, and which leaves no room for misperception by the Soviet Union of our readiness and determination to defend our vital interests and allies. (d) Beyond this determination to do all that is necessary to defend and protect our Nation, we believe that an integral part of our national security policy should be to seek through negotiations to reduce, moderate, and stabilize the military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, in the belief that the lessening of international tensions must remain a continuing United States goal, we therefore support: (1) Efforts to conclude, as soon as practicable, negotiations on a timely basis to implement the principles of the November 1974 Vladivostok accords and, in addition, to continue to negotiate to reduce mutually the strategic military forces permitted each country under those accords. These agreements, to be submitted to the Senate as a treaty, should be based upon actions founded on clearly stated and verifiable stipulations. (2) Initiatives on the part of both the United States and the Soviet Union demonstrating a commitment to the achievement of peaceful solutions in present and potential areas of conflict, in |