25. JOINT STATEMENT ON THE SALT I ABM TREATY

(1977) Joint United States-U.S.S.R. Statement of September 24, 1977

In discussions between Secretary Vance and Minister Gromyko on the questions related to strategic arms, both sides—the Soviet Union and the United States of America-have reaffirmed their determination to conclude a new agreement limiting strategic offensive arms and have declared their intention to continue active negotiations with a view to completing within the near future the work on that agreement.

The United States and the Soviet Union agree that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed in Moscow in 1972 and amended in 1974, serves the security interests of both countries. They share the view that this treaty decreases the risk of nuclear war and facilitates progress in the further limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms. Both sides also agree that the ABM treaty has operated effectively, thus demonstrating the mutual commitment of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. to the goal of nuclear arms limitations and to the principle of equal security.

Accordingly, in connection with the 5-year review of the ABM treaty, the two sides reaffirm their commitment to the treaty. It is agreed that this review will be conducted in the Standing Consultative Committee [sic] after its regular fall meeting.

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26. SUMMARY OF MISCELLANEOUS AGREEMENTS RELATING TO THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, D.C., November 13, 1979. Hon. FRANK CHURCH, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your letter of September 17, 1979, there are enclosed the texts of those agreements reached between the United States and the Soviet Union either within or with respect to the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). Also enclosed are brief, unclassified statements which identify the substance of each document. Two of the documents are unclassified, seven are classified SECRET and have been provided to the Committee previously under an injunction of secrecy. SCC regulations (enclosure #2) specify that the proceedings may not be made public except with the consent of both sides. In the interest of preserving a constructive atmosphere in the SCC, it is important that this principle of confidentiality be observed.

If we can be of further assistance to the Committee on this matter,
please do not hesitate to let me know.
Sincerely,

J. BRIAN ATWOOD,
Assistant Secretary of State

for Congressional Relations. Enclosures : As stated.

Standing Consultative Commission Agreements 1. Memorandum of Understanding Establishing SCC · (December 21,

1972, Unclassified). This memorandum implements Article XIII of the ABM Treaty and Article VI of the Interim Agreement by establishing the Standing Consultative Commission. 2. Protocol Establishing Regulations for the Standing Consultative

Commission ? (May 30, 1973, Unclassified). This protocol formally adopts the regulations worked out for the SCC, pursuant to the Article XIII of the ABM Treaty and Article VI of the Interim Agreement. 3. Protocol on Procedures for Strategic Offensive Arms (July 3, 1974,

Secret). This protocol is an impiementation of the Interim Agreement and establishes procedures for the replacement and dismantling or destruction of strategic offensive arms limited by the agreement.

4. Protocol on Procedures for ABM Systems (July 3, 1974, Secret)

This protocol is an implementation of the ABM Treaty and establishlishes procedures for the replacement and dismantling or destruction of ABM systems. 5. Protocol on Immediate Notifications (September 30, 1976, Secret).

This protocol is an implementing agreement pursuant to Article 7 of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War. It establishes a system of pre-positioned messages designed to facilitate notification between the Parties in event of emergency situations which might lead to the outbreak of nuclear war. 6. Supplementary Protocol on ABM Procedures (October 28, 1976,

Secret). This supplementary protocol is in implementation of the ABM Treaty and establishes procedures for the replacement, dismantling, or destruction of operational ABM systems and for the exchange of ABM deployment areas. 7. Understanding Relating to the Use of Shelters Over ICBM Silo

Launchers (reflected in four documents dated April 25, May 19

and May 30, 1977, Secret) This understanding recorded the agreement of the Parties to the Interim Agreement that no shelters which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Agreement shall be used over ICBM silo launchers. 8. Agreed Statement Regarding the Potocol of September 30, 1976

(May 25, 1977, Secret) This statement supplements the procedures for immediate notification (item 5 above) pursuant to the Agreement on Measures to Reduce

5 the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War. 9. Agreed Statement on ABM Treaty Topics (November 1, 1978,

Secret) This Agreed Statement defines test ranges within the meaning of Article Iỹ of the ABM Treaty on the basis of the presence of ABM components for testing, identifies the current test ranges for each side. and sets forth procedures of notifying the other Party when a new test range is established. The Agreed Statement also specifies criteria for applying the term “tested in an ABM mode” as used in the ABM Treaty to missiles, launchers, and radars. Finally, the Agreed Statement specifies that the ABM Treaty permits air defense radars located at ABM test ranges to carry out air defense functions, but to avoid ambiguous situations or misunderstandings the sides will refrain from concurrent testing of air defense components and ABM system components co-located at the same test range, and air defense radars utilized as instrumentation equipment will not be used to make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles.