S. Eisenhower, Robert Storey, Kenneth Field, Raymond A. Hill, and the chairman, Robert B. Anderson. After some 5 years of study, they came to this conclusion:

Limiting the choice to Panama costs the United States nothing, and in return, we get the commitment that other powers cannot meddle in this matter. The theoretically feasible routes across Nicaragua and Costa Rica are 140 miles and 100 miles in length, in comparison with the Panamanian route.

It goes on to point out that what they proved after the expenditure of $22 million and 5 years of study, "is that we could not build a canal outside Panama."

I think the argument which has been made here that because, during the next 22 years, we sign an agreement not to build a sea level canal elsewhere in Central America other than Panama, means we have given away nothing. We have given away something we would not consider anyway. That is the possibility of a canal in Nicaragua or someplace else our experts' studies have ruled out as not being feasible. Mr. CHURCH. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes; I yield to the Senator from Idaho.

Mr. CHURCH. I think the Senator is unquestionably right. He has said that we yielded nothing. We did not want to preserve the option to build a canal outside of Panama when our studies have already shown us that only a canal within Panama would be economically feasible. So we gave up nothing.

The other side of the coin is that we got something from the Panamanians that was rather valuable.

This is why our negotiators sought to insert this provision in the treaty. It is not the Panamanians who urged it upon us, but it was the American negotiators who sought to insert the provision.

What we got back was a commitment on the part of Panama not to permit any other country during the life of the agreement to build a sea level canal in Panama, a matter of the greatest consequence to the United States and our future security interests.

So we have a provision which weighs heavily in favor of the United States, securing a commitment from Panama of enormous value to us in return for a commitment on our part of little value at all. It may be the most one-sided provision in our favor in the treaty before us. Mr. McGOVERN. I believe the point is well taken.

In addition to this argument that I regard as a specious argument about forfeiting the right to build a canal outside of Panama, a right that we are not about to exercise with or without this treaty, there has also been another argument expressed about the concern for human. rights, the implication being that the present government in Panama is of an authoritarian character.

It is interesting to me that some of the same people who would argue that it is perfectly proper for us to maintain forces in South Korea to back the regime of General Park, which, if anything, is an authoritarian regime, are so concerned about the authoritarianism of Panama. I wish that government was somewhat more democratic than it is, too, but I do not see how we could carry on diplomatic relations with the rest of the world if we are going to limit those relations only to countries which have a parliamentary democracy. That is going to eliminate a lot of allies and alleged friends of ours around the globe.

It has also been said that we could better defend the canal under the old treaty, that we could have more assurance that the canal would remain secure and operational if it is in American hands.

There was also some point that was to be drawn from the secret session. As I suggested before, I found it very hard to discover the relevance between the treaties and the disclosures we heard earlier this week. I suppose the implication was that if we turned the treaties down. it is going to somehow help solve the drug problem in Latin America. Upon closer examination these claims all tend to crumble.

Even setting aside the feasibility problem and the billions in cost, there is, for example, no reason at all to believe that we can negotiate a better deal with Nicaragua than with Panama. Nor is there reason to believe that the human rights of the Panamanians will improve in: the slightest should these treaties be scrapped. It is likely the opposite will happen, that all Panamanians will suffer both the injury of oppression and the continued insult of a foreign zone dividing their nation.

Similarly, the matter of defending the canal should have been long since settled, both by the explicit testimony of our top military commanders and by simple logic.

Most deeply of all we can set aside the notion that there is somehow a relation between these treaties and the international traffic in narcotics. Whether we support or oppose the treaties, I think most of us have come to the view that the secret session proved to be irrelevant and a waste of our time. It is quite safe to predict that rejecting the treaties will have no impact at all on the problem of narcotics.

So what we will really have if we reject these treaties, after weighing all the claims, is it seems to me we come down to only one indisputable result. It will be the right, if we reject these treaties, to throw out our chests and say that the Panama Canal is still ours. In the final analysis, that is what we are really talking about, the prize of claimed ownership. It is a sort of collective possessiveness over a thing to which we have, over the years, become strongly attached.

I must say, Mr. President, that the strength of that emotion is surprising. People who never thought about the canal are discovering now they cannot live without it.

36-614-79-12

C. Defense-Pro

(2) Senator Robert Byrd, February 27, 1978 (S 2363–64)

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, article I of the treaty concerning the permanent neutrality and operation of the Panama Canal guarantees that the canal, or any other waterway constructed in Panama, will be permanently neutral. It sets forth the basic principle which undergirds this treaty, that being that the canal shall remain an open, neutral waterway for the use of all nations.

The amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Alabama (Mr. Allen), as modified, would provide for a continued U.S. military presence, if the President of the United States deems it necessary, until December 31 in the year 2019.

Actually, other articles in the treaty, not article I, deal with the maintenance of the regime of permanent neutrality. Article IV states unequivocally that the United States and Panama will maintain that regime of neutrality.

Article IV would be reinforced and amplified by the proposed joint leadership amendment which states that the United States and Panama, and in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, shall defend the canal against any threat to its neutrality and shall have the right to defend against any aggression or threat directed against the canal or the peaceful transit of vehicles through the canal. Amendment 20, which is the joint leadership amendment, makes our defense rights after the year 1999 abundantly clear. There will be no question about our right to take action to assure the canal's security and neutrality and it will not be necessary for us to maintain troops stationed there permanently in Panama in order to do this.

So let us be clear about the impact of the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Alabama (Mr. Allen). It is unnecessary and it flies in the face of the entire agreement.

The Panamanians are willing to recognize our right to defend the canal, and we will have that long-term guarantee. They are not willing to make an agreement at this time for the continued presence of U.S. troops on Panamanian soil after 1999.

The treaty with the inclusion of the leadership amendments will insure our ability to maintain the canal's accessibility and neutrality after 1999 without a continued military presence.

Insistence on the presence of U.S. troops after 1999 would result in the kind of hostile atmosphere that we want to avoid. Cooperation and mutual respect, rather than an unwelcome show of military force. will engender the sort of environment that will enhance our security interests in the canal.

A realistic assessment of this matter was provided by one of our leading military officials, Adm. James L. Holloway III, Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral Holloway said that although be considered a U.S. military presence after 1999 desirable, he had concluded that Panama would not accept a treaty without the provision that the U.S. armored forces be withdrawn after a certain date, and he had decided there was a great need to gain achievement by having the treaties as they are than by having no treaties at all.

Admiral Holloway said, and I quote:

It is more important to have the Panamanians sharing in the defense of the canal, cooperating in the operation of the waterway and working to create a favorable environment for the defense of the canal, than not having any treaties, which almost certainly would have been the case had our side insisted on an indefinite military presence.

So, Mr. President, as Admiral Holloway said, we need to view things in the real world perspective, and he has offered this realistic analysis.

This is, as I say, the Chief of U.S. Naval Operations. He recognizes the value, indeed the advantage, of being partners rather than adversaries with Panama.

Should the canal in any way be threatened or our ability to defend it, Gen. Lewis H. Wilson, Commandant of the Marine Corps, has stated:

I do not believe that successful defense of the canal is dependent upon continued U.S. military presence in Panama.

That is the position held by all the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Wilson said:

With the capability of the Navy and Marine Corps to provide an amphibious task force to steam within a few miles of the end of the canal, a meaningful U.S. presence, for all practical purposes, is assured.

That, Mr. President, is the conclusion of our top military officials. A U.S. military presence in Panama after the year 1999 is not necessary. There is no justification as of this date, February 27, 1978, that such U.S. military presence in Panama, extending 19 years into the next century, is needed or necessitated.

Our defense rights in the treaty, reinforced and amplified, as offered by the amendment offered by the joint leadership, and coupled with our military ability, will insure we have the ability to maintain the security and neutrality of the canal.

Mr. President, the amendment offered by the Senator from Alabama, in my judgment, is not only unnecessary, but it is antithetical-antithetical-to the treaties and to the best interests of the United States.

The Senator from Alabama has stated his opposition to these treaties. I respect him for his opposition, I respect him for his belief that the amendment is necessary. But I say, Mr. President, that the amendment is a killer amendment. It would provide for a unilateral determination by the President of the United States that a continued military presence in the country of Panama should be maintained until the year 2019, and, ipso facto, that military presence would be retained if written into the treaties by virtue of this amendment; and the President would only need to so certify to the Panamanian Government.

Obviously, this amendment goes to the very heart of the treaties. There is no question that it would require renegotiation of the treaties, because it extends the date under which the military presence of the United States would be withdrawn. In the treaties as written, that date is December 31, 1999, after which the Neutrality Treaty, as amended by the joint leadership amendment, would take effect.

If the Allen amendment is adopted, it would thoroughly unravel-it would thoroughly and unmistakably, indubitably, unquestionably unravel the treaties, opening them to renegotiation, and certainly would not be in the best interests of the United States.