And interestingly enough, it was on August 10, 1977—exactly 6 months later, to the day-that negotiators for the two countries finally announced their agreement in principle on new treaties relating to the Panama Canal.

Mr. President, for these reasons and others which I shall not take the time to discuss here today, it is my reluctant but inescapable conclusion that these should not be approved by the Senate.

Any new treaty relationship built upon the ambiguities of the treaties now before us would be doomed to failure from the start. We cannot afford to approve them as they stand. To do so would be no favor either to the Panamanians or to the people of the United States.

It is argued by some that defects in the treaties can be remedied if the Senate will adopt a series of amendments. I cannot agree. Such an expedient, however attractive it may seem politically, would be inadequate and unwise. It would do both too little and too much.

If we must say "no" to these treaties-as I am now convinced we must-I believe, along with David McCullogh, that how we say "no" in this situation is very important in terms of our future relations with the people of Panama and the people of the Hemisphere.

I do not favor adoption on the Senate floor of a series of substantive amendments on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. That would be an affront to the Panamanian people. Furthermore, we would run the real risk that the Panamanian ruler temporarily in power would not submit such substantive charges to a plebiscite of the Panamanian people. If this happened we would end up with a treaty relationship only with the dictator in power, but not with the people of Panama.

Accordingly, Mr. President, I believe that the appropriate course for the Senate is to withhold its "consent" to ratification of the treaties now before us-and to "advise" the President to persist in negotiations until acceptable treaties can be fashioned.

A. General-Con

(2) Senator Robert Dole, February 8, 1978 (S 1550-53)

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, let me say at the outset that I think this is probably one of the most important foreign policy questions yet to come before the 95th Congress, and perhaps it is the most critical foreign policy issue of this decade.

The Senator from Kansas does not know how many votes there are for the treaties and how many votes are against. In my judgment, it is too close to call at this point.

Perhaps during this debate some will change their minds and some will change their positions. That is the way it should be.

It can be a very instructive and a very constructive debate. Certainly the Senator from Kansas wishes to be a part of that effort.

I would hope we do not fall into the trap of trying to bring up the treaties in reverse order, as is now being suggested by the Senate leadership, because it seems to this Senator we first must debate whether or not there is going to be a Panama Canal Treaty before we decide the second half of that agenda.

So I would suggest that the orderly procedure would be to take up treaties as they were sent to the Senate by the President, as the distinguished Senator from Alabama pointed out this morning.

There is no doubt in the mind of this Senator that there is a great deal of interest in both of these treaties.

TREATY DISCUSSIONS

Last Friday, the President asked me to step into his office, and we discussed the treaties. On Sunday, President Ford called me long distance and we discussed the treaties. On Monday Ambassador Strauss called me, and we discussed the treaties. On Tuesday, former Vice President Rockefeller called me, and we discussed the treaties. On Wednesday, today, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger called me, and we discussed the treaties.

I think it is common knowledge that they are all of one view, that they support the treaties. I had a very fine visit with each of these distinguished Americans and certainly I do not quarrel with their view.

I do not have the same feelings on sovereignty as some in the Senate. My concern is, are these the best treaties? Are they good treaties? Good for Panama, yes, but are they good for us, America?

I guess everyone here has had a very difficult time deciding just what to do, and how to posture himself, and how to vote, because there are political implications to the votes on these treaties.

Let me say that when the Senator from Kansas heard that our nègotiations had reached an agreement last August 10, I resolved, as I assume every other Member resolved, to try to come to grips with the real issues in a conscientious and impartial frame of mind.

I did not have any preconceived notions. I did not yet know all the details about the treaties.

I might add I had gone through the entire campaign as President Ford's running mate in 1976, and as far as I can recall was never asked about the Panama Canal treaties, even though they were the big issue between President Ford and Governor Reagan in securing the Republican Presidential nomination.

As far as I know, I was never asked by anyone from August 19 through the election what my views on the treaties would be. So I had no preconceived notions or any partisan commitments on the issue. Some of us were asked to support the treaties before they were ever made public; but until the treaties were made public and released on September 7, like most other Senators, this Senator withheld his judgment.

Once they became available for inspection, it was our obligation as Senators to study the treaties, to adopt what we thought might be the best course. I knew of the political significance, and so I discussed it with many people in my State of Kansas. Many I did not have to discuss it with; they sent letter after letter, by the hundreds and by the thousands.

In December, I went to Panama with the distinguished Senator from Nevada (Mr. Laxalt). We had a visit with Omar Torrijos, the leader of Panama. We discussed the canal, and aspects of the canal treaties, with Canal Zone employees and military officers. I have also discussed them with State and local public officials, and other concerned citizens throughout the Nation in the past several months. I state that. so that those who might be interesed will know that the process of reaching a decision is very difficult.

The objective approach of the Senator from Kansas toward this critical issue has been consistent. There were a number of unresolved points, as I read the proposed treaties. I recognize that the present 1903 Treaty is out of date in many respects. There is room for revision, but only in a responsible manner and to a practical degree.

So now we have the treaties before us, before the Senate of the United States, and it is our obligation as Senators to advise and consent, to give our best judgment, based not on partisan considerations but on what may be best for America and for Panama.

THESE TREATIES UNACCEPTABLE

I think all the arguments we will hear on this floor, whether they are for the treaties or against the treaties, would boil down to whether or not these are good treaties in the sense that they fully protect U.S. rights and interests. And are they the best treaties? Why not insist upon the best treaties that we can negotiate? Maybe they are the best. Maybe, after weeks and weeks of debate, the majority will determine that these are the best treaties.

I think in the end, the ultimate question will be this: Would American interests be best served by Senate ratification, by a series of amendments, or by outright rejection of the treaties?

There is no doubt about it, the majority of Americans are still opposed to the treaties. The latest Gallup poll indicated it was very

close, and that there may be a margin for these treaties if certain amendments were adopted.

However, I could not vote for the treaties as they were transmitted to the Senate. I do think a case can be made for updating the 1903 Panama Canal Treaty in a way that fully protects our rights as a nation, as well as the rights of Panama. I know that many opponents of these particular treaties, including Governor Reagan and others, have indicated they would be agreeable to some revisions in the traditional Panama Canal agreements. Like them, I do not reject out of hand the concept of a new bilateral treaty.

Frankly, though, I am disappointed with most of the decisions: rendered by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with regard to modification proposals set forth by this Senator and others. With the exception of the one amendment recommended by the committee, and =originally proposed by this Senator last October, the committee rejected all other treaty amendment proposals. The committee's action leaves most of the basic concerns about these treaties unresolved. I know that I cannot support the treaties in the form recommended by the majority of the committee members, and I will actively oppose final ratification of the treaties in that form. And those are the crucial words: "in that form."

Regrettably, many of my Senate colleagues, like administration spokesmen, seem more preoccupied with avoiding treaty negotiations. or a second Panamanian plebiscite than with correcting treaty defects. Treaty modifications, they suggest, spell disaster both for these treaties and for the foreign policy stature of this administration.

THE CASE FOR AMENDMENTS

I reject the suggestion that Senate amendments to these treaties would be equated with defeat of the treaties. Neither do I accept this view that treaty amendments would be a crushing blow to the President's ability to conduct our foreign policy in the months ahead. Instead, I think the enactment by this body of any other amendments ought to be viewed in its proper light: As a new stage in canal treaty negotiations. As the Senate performs its constitutionally designated advisory role to the President in this international treatymaking process, further talks with the Panamanians on critical points may be necessary and should be welcomed.

But let us not overdramatize the consequences. Amendment of the canal treaties will not spell disaster for this administration's foreign policy program, and it should not, for it is not accomplished in a narrow partisan sense, or as a vote of "no confidence for the President.. If we do our work as we should do our work, and as I think every Member of this body will do his work, it will be viewed by most thinking Americans as a conscientious effort by this body to preserve what we see as nonnegotiable interests.

I have listened to the arguments by treaty proponents that Panama will not accept changes in these treaties. But let me pose this question: Do my colleagues truthfully believe that Panama will reject out-ofhand a treaty that was 13 years in the making, simply because we suggest a few changes? Do my colleagues suggest that the Torrijos

government will turn its back on the one thing that promises to insure that regime's popularity and power for years to come?

From a practical standpoint, Panama's leaders are not likely to reject these treaties simply because we insist on a few alterations. No, I think they will find it in their interest to "keep talking" at the negotiating table, as General Torrijos himself indicated to me during my visit to Panama last December.

As I recall General Torrijos' statement, he said he did not want at year-around plebescite, that another plebescite would be fine but he did not want a year-around plebiscite.

So I suggest that whatever the action we take in the Senate, that Senate action will simply amount to a new stage in the treaty negotiations. And this Senator, for one, would be willing to see negotiations resume and continue for a few more months if it meant protecting America's vital defense and economic interests. Realistically, I think that is an arrangement that both governments can live with.

PRECEDENTS FOR TREATY MODIFICATION

All of us recognize, of course, that the U.S. Constitution gives the Senate the express responsibility to "advise and consent" on international treaty proposals, and there is ample precedent for our amending treaties such as this one. During the course of this Nation's history, more than 70 U.S. treaties with other nations have gone into force with Senate amendments attached. I believe it is our solemn duty and responsibility, as guarantors of the public trust, to modify treaties when necessary.

Least of all should we be deterred by the fear of renegotiation. I cannot, after all, accept the proposition that immediate ratification of these treaties is more important than guaranteeing the security of the canal and of our national interests. It would be far better that w spend a few more months at the negotiating table, than that we spend the rest of our lives regretting our handling of the treaty issue.

My general concern with the two proposed treaties is the careless and imprecise manner in which they were drafted. It is the ambiguities, the loopholes, and the concessions which disturb me the most, particularly as they relate to American rights of defense and use of the canal. It appears that much of this can be attributed to the undue haste in which they were concluded last year.

ADMINISTRATION CONCESSIONS DURING NEGOTIATIONS

Let us put one idea to rest right now: That is the misconception that these treaties have the weight of four presidential administrations in their favor. In fact, some of the major points of conflict which had been at issue for the past 12 years were suddenly "resolved" within the first 6 months of the Carter Administration. Previous administrations preferred no treaty at all to one which would involve unacceptable concessions. And that is to their credit. America has always taken a stand of principle over appeasement.

When one reviews the record of negotiations during the first 7 months of 1977, however, there is the unmistakable appearance of several important concessions made by the United States-A reflection