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IV. THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CONTROVERSY.
I. INTRODUCTION: PRIOR RELATIONS OF SERBIA, AUSTRIA, AND RUSSIA.
1. Previous history of Serbia: Its fleeting greatness under Stephen Dushan (died 1355); conquered by Turks, 1458; self-governing principality from 1830; independent of Turkey, 1878; territory greatly increased through war with Turkey, 1912-13. Revival in recent years of "Greater Serbia" movement, directed largely against Austria-Hungary, which held Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, lands which by nationality and speech were Serbian. Compare Piedmont's unification of Italy, against Austrian resistance. (See War Cyclopedia, under "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.")
1. Serbia's relations with Austria-Hungary.
(a) Political estrangement due to Austria's highhanded annexation of Bosnia in 1908, and the thwarting by Austria and Italy, in 1913, of Serbia's desire for an outlet to the Adriatic. Declaration exacted of Serbia in 1909 (March 31): "Serbia recognizes that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights. . . . In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary, and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter." (British Blue Book, No. 4; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 4.)
(b) Tariff disputes over importation of Serbian pigs into Austria-Hungary. A prohibitive tariff was imposed in 1906.
(c) Continued agitation of Serbian revolutionary societies (especially the Narodna Odbrana) against the dangerous, heartless, grasping, odious and greedy enemy in the north," who "robs millions of Serbian brothers of their liberty and rights, and holds them in bondage and chains." (Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 19; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 465.)
(d) German plans for Berlin-Bagdad railway required that Serbia should be controlled by Austria. (See above, ch. ii, IV 4.)
3. Russia's interest in Serbia-founded upon kinship in blood, language and religion, and on Russian aid in the past against Turkey (in 1806-12, 1829-30, 1877-8). This interest was well known, and Austria and Germany recognized that their policy toward Serbia might lead to war with Russia. (See War Cyclopedia, under Pan-Slavism.")
II. THE SERAJEVO ASSASSINATION (JUNE 28, 1914). 1. Assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand and his wife, while on an official visit to Serajevo, the capital of the Austrian province of Bosnia. Failure of first attempt at assassination by explosion of a bomb; success of second attempt, some hours later, by revolver shots. The assassins were Austrian subjects of Serbian nationality. (See War Cyclopedia, under "Serajevo.”)
2. Opportuneness of the crime for Austria. (See Ramsay Muir, Britain's Case Against Germany, p. 152.)
III. AUSTRIAN NOTE TO SERBIA (JULY 23, 1914.)
1. Preliminaries: Secret investigation of the crime by the Austrian court at Serajevo. (Reports of the alleged results in Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 490-4; Austrian Red Book, Appendix 8, and German White Book, Appendix; summary, pp. 416-7.) Quieting reports as to its intentions issued by Austrian Government, but preparations made in secret for rigorous measures against Serbia.
"A reckoning with Serbia, a war for the position of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a Great Power, even for its existence as such, cannot be permanently avoided." (Austrian Minister at Belgrade to Austrian Government, July 21, 1914. In Austrian Red Book, No. 6; Collected Diplomatic Documents, 452.)
2. Conference at Potsdam (July 5, 1914), at which the terms of the Note were practically settled. The holding of such a conference has been denied by German newspapers, but the denial is not convincing. (8. War Cyclopedia, under "Potsdam Conference; " New York Times, Current History, September, 1917, pp. 469-471.)
3. General character of the Note. In effect an ultimatum to which un onditional acceptance must be given within forty-eight hours. Humiliating character of its de mands. (See War Cyclopedia, under "Serbia, Austrian Ultimatum.")
"I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character." (Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in British Blue Book, No. 5; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 13.)
"The demands of that [the Austrian] Government are more brutal than any ever made upon any civilized State in the history of the world, and they can be regarded only as intended to provoke war." (German Socialist newspaper Vorwärts, July 25, 1914.)
4. Some specific demands. The numbers attached are those of the Note itself. (See British Blue Book, No. 4; Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 3-12.)
"2. To dissolve immediately the society called Narodna Odbrana [the chief society for Serbian propaganda], to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Serbia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal [Serbian] Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form."
"3. To eliminate without delay from public instruetion in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary."
"5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy.”
“6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of theAustro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto." 5. Denial by Germany that she was consulted by Austria before sending the Note.
"We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her preparations." (German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 406.)
This denial was, and is, generally disbelieved. (See Ramsay Muir, Britain's Case Against Germany, p. 8, and the evidence concerning the Potsdam Conference.) Germany's claim that she was ignorant of the Austrian Ultimatum was from the outset preposterous and against all reason. Intimately allied with Austria-Hungary and for a decade the dominating power in the diplomacy of the Central Powers in the Balkans and the Near East, is it possible to believe that she did not examine into and even give direction, in broad outline at least, to the policy of her ally at this critical stage in the development of her Pan-German program? The purpose of the denial, apparently, was to satisfy Italy (Austria's other ally), which certainly was not consulted.
6. Circumstances making a peaceful outcome more difficult: Absence of most of the foreign ambassadors from Vienna for their summer vacations; immediate withdrawal of Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to a remote mountain resort, etc., etc.
7. Widespread anxiety over the situation, as threatening the peace of Europe. Russia, England, and France make urgent endeavors:
(a) To induce Serbia to go as far as possible in meeting the demands of Austria.
(b) To obtain an extension of the time limit, in order (1) that the Powers might be enabled to study the documentary material promised by Austria embodying the findings of the court at Serajevo; and (2) to permit them to exercise moderating influence on Serbia. Sharp refusal of Austria to extend the time limit. (For later proposals see ch. v.)
IV. SERBIAN REPLY TO THE AUSTRIAN NOTE (JULY 25, 1914).
(See British Blue Book, No. 39; Collected Diplomatic Correspondence, pp. 31-37.)
1. To the gratification of Europe, Serbia
(a) Accepted eight of the ten Austrian demands.
As to No. 6, they returned a temperate refusal (founded, according to Austrian claim, upon a deliberate misunderstanding of the nature of the demand): "It goes without saying that the Royal [Serbian] Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or even
tually may be, implicated in the plot, . . . and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal [AustroHungarian] Government, the Royal [Serbian] Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as i would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the AustroHungarian agents."
(c) In conclusion, Serbia suggested reference to the Hague Tribunal or to the Great Powers, in case its reply was not considered satisfactory.
2. Austria (to Europe's amazement) found this reply dishonest and evasive. (See Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 34; Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 506514.)
In less than an hour after receiving it the Austrian Minister left Belgrade with all his staf. Grave apprehensions were felt that this break of diplomatic relations would be followed by European war.
The Austrian Foreign Minister declared to the Russian Ambassador (July 28) that his Government could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian Note." (British Blue Book, No. 93; Collected Diplomatic Documents, P. 70.)
AUSTRIA DECLARES WAR ON SERBIA (JULY 28, 1914). 1. In spite of the efforts at mediation of Great Britain, Russia, and France, Austria declared war on Serbia, July 28, 1914.
2. Demand of Germany that the war be "localized "-i. 0, that no other Power interfere with Austria's chastisement of Serbia.
3. Belgrade bombarded, July 29-30, and the war begun.
1. Austria and Germany wanted war with Serbia, and their chief fear was lest something might, against their wills, force them to a peaceful settlement; hence the haste and secrecy which attended their measures.
"The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian Note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Serbia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country [Austria-Hungary] has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment." (British Ambassador at Vienna, July 27, 1914. In British Blue Book, No. 41; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 38.)
"He [the German Secretary of State] admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Serbians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Serbian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands. . . . Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the Note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document.” (British Chargé at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, July
25, 1914. British Blue Book, No. 18; Collected July 31. Diplomatic Documents, p. 22.)
"In the Viennese note to Serbia, whose brazen arrogance has no precedent in history, each phrase bears witness that Austria-Hungary desired the war. ... Only a war, for which the best minds of the army were thirsting, . . . could cure the fundamental ills of the two halves of the Austrian Empire, and of the monarchy. Only the refusal and not the acceptance of the claims put forward in the note could have profited Vienna.
"The question has been asked: Where was the plan of campaign elaborated-in Vienna or Berlin! And some hasten to reply: In Vienna. Why do peopla tolerate the propagation of such dangerous fables? Why not say the thing that is (because it must be), namely, that a complete understanding in all matters existed between Berlin and Vienna.” (Maximilian Harden, in Die Zukunft for August 1, 1914; quoted in G. Alexinsky, Russia and the Great War, 129-130.)
8. Austria's object was to reduce Serbia to a state of vassalage, as a step to Austrian hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula. Her promises not to destroy Serbia's sovereignty, or to annex her territory, therefore, failed to satisfy Serbia's friends.
"Austria demanded conditions which would have placed Serbia under her permanent control." (Prof. Hans Delbrück, a noted professor and statesman of Germany, in Atlantic Monthly, for February, 1915, p. 234.)
1. Germany's objects were:
(a) To recover her prestige, lost in the Agadir affair
(c) To humiliate Russia and the Triple Entente, and
7. FAILURE OF DIPLOMACY TO AVERT WAR: GERMANY AND AUSTRIA AT WAR WITH RUSSIA AND FRANCE.
I. OUTLINE OF EVENTS, JULY 21 TO AUGUST 6, 1914. July 21. Secret orders preliminary to mobilization issued in Germany. These measures, including the movement of troops towards the French frontier, continued up to final mobilization. (See Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914, pp. 14-25; Nineteenth Century and After, issue for June, 1917.)
July 23. Austrian Note sent to Serbia.
July 25. Reply of Serbia. Austrian Minister quits Belgrade, severing diplomatic relations.
July 27. Sir Edward Grey proposed a conference at London on the Serbian question. France, Russia, and Italy accepted; Germany refused.
July 28. Austria declared war on Serbia.
July 29. Russian mobilization on the Austro-Hungarian frontier.
July 30. Bombardment of Belgrade. General mobilization in Russia begun.
"Threatening danger of war" proclaimed in Germany. German sent ultimatums to Russia and to France.
Aug. 1. Orders for general mobilization in France and in
Aug. 2. Occupation of Luxemburg by Germany. Demand
Aug. 3. Belgium refused the German demand. Germany declared war on France.
Aug. 4. Germany invaded Belgium. Great Britain declared war on Germany.
Aug. 6. Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia.
II. PROPOSALS FOR PRESERVING PEACE,
1. A conference at London proposed by Sir Edward Grey (July 27). To be composed of the German and Italian ambassadors to Great Britain, as friends of Austria, and the French ambassador and Grey himself, as friends of Russia. Its purpose, to discover “an issue which would prevent complications."
"If it is borne in mind how incomparably more difficult problems had been successfully solved by the conference of ambassadors at London during the Balkan crisis, it must be admitted that a settlement between the Austrian demands and the Serbian concessions in July, 1914, was child's play compared with the previous achievements of the London conference." (I Accuse, p. 155.)
The proposal was accepted by Russia, France, and Italy. It was declined by Germany (without consulting Austria) on the ground that she "could not call Austria in her dispute with Serbia before a European tribunal." (German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 409.) Grey explained that it "would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion; " nevertheless, Austria and Germany continued to decline.
2. Germany proposed (July 26) that France “exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg." The French Foreign Minister in reply "pointed out that Germany on her part might well act on similar lines at Vienna, especially in view of the conciliatory spirit displayed by Serbia. The [German] ambassador replied that such a course was not possible, owing to the decision not to intervene in the Austro-Serbian dispute." (Russian Orange Book, No. 28; Collected Diplomatie Documents, p. 276.)
3. Germany proposed direct negotiations between Russia and Austria over the Serbian question (July 27). Austria declined these direct negotiations, even though proposed by her ally. (Was this due to collusion between the two Governments?)
4. The Kaiser (who unexpectedly returned to Berlin on July 26 from a yachting cruise) attemped to act as "mediator" between Russia and Austria; but apparently he confined himself to the effort to persuade Russia "to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen." (Kaiser to Tsar, July 29, in German White Book, exhibit 22; Collected Diplomatie Documents, pp. 431-2.)
"Neither over the signature of the Kaiser nor over
that of his Foreign Minister does the record show a single communication addressed to Vienna in the interests of peace." (J. M. Beck, The Evidence in the Case, p. 112.)
6. The Tsar proposed, in a personal telegram to the Kaiser (July 29), "to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Tribunal." (Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 542.) This telegram is omitted from the German White Book! "The acceptance of the Tsar's proposal would doubtless have led to peace, and for this reason it was declined." (I Accuse, p. 187, note.) 6. Proposal by Grey (July 29) that Austria should express herself as satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighboring Serbian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands and should allow the other Powers time and opportunity to mediate between Austria and Russia.
King George of England, in a personal telegram (July 30) to the Kaiser's brother, said: "I rely on William applying his great influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe." (Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 539.)
Grey's expressed opinion (July 29) was that "mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would press the button' in the interests of peace." (British Blue Book, No. 84; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 64.)
7. Proposal of Russian Foreign Minister (July 30): "If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian question has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to stop her military preparations." (Russian Orange Book, No. 60; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 288.)
Reply of German Foreign Minister that "he considered it impossible for Austria to accept our proposal." (Russian Orange Book, No. 63; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 289.)
8. Second Proposal of Russian Foreign Minister (July 31): "If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian territory; and if, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude." (Russian Orange Book, No. 67; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 291.)
This proposal remained unanswered.
9. Austria declared (August 1) that she was then "ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Serbia with the other Powers." (Russian Orange Book, No. 73; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 293.)
Sir Edward Grey comments: "Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse." (British Blue Book, No. 131; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 97.) From July 30 onwards "the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight." (British Ambassador at Vienna, in
British Blue Book, No. 161; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 117.)
But it was then too late, as Germany had already resolved upon war, and was preparing her ultimatums which precipitated the conflict.
III. GERMAN ULTIMATUMS AND DECLARATIONS OF WAS AGAINST RUSSIA AND FRANCE.
1. A council of war, held at Potsdam on the evening of July 29, apparently decided definitely to make war OB France and Russia.
"Our innermost conviction is that it was on this evening that the decision of war was reached. The 5th of July, before his departure for a cruise on the coasts of Norway, the Kaiser had given his consent to the launching of the Serbian venture. The 29th of July he decided for war." (Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914, p. 38.)
"People who are in a position to know say that those occupying the leading military positions, supported by the Crown Prince and his retainers, threatened the Emperor with their resignation en bloo if war were not resolved on." (I Accuse, p. 189.) 2. General mobilization of Russian army (July 30-31). This was grounded not merely on the measures of Austria, but also on "the measures for mobilization [against Russia] taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for the last six days." (French Yellow Book, No. 118; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 223.)
The Tsar assured the Kaiser: "It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon." (German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 411.)
For evidence of German mobilization against France beginning as early as July 21, see Nineteenth Century and After, issue for June, 1917. Consult also I Accuse, pp. 194-201; War Cyclopedia, under "Mobilization Controversy.”
3. German ultimatum to Russia (July 31, midnight) demanding that the Government "suspend their military measures by midday on August 1" (twelve hours). Demand addressed to France (July 31, 7.00 p. m.) as to "What the attitude of France would be in case of war between Germany and Russia?" (French Yellow Book, No. 117; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 223.) The French Prime Minister answered (August 1, 1.05 p. m.) that "France would do that which her interests dictated." (German White Book, exhibit 27; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 434.)
4. Declaration of war against Russia at 7.10 p. m. on August 1, following Russia's failure to demobilize. (Russian Orange Book, No. 76; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 294.)
Orders for a general mobilization of the French army were signed at 3.40 p. m. the same day.
5. Declaration of war against France on August 3 (French Yellow Book, No. 147; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 240.)
This declaration contained charges that France had already violated German territory (e. g., by dropping bombs from aeroplanes on railway tracks near Nuremburg). These charges are now shown to be falsehoods. (Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914, pp. 130230; pamphlet entitled, German Truth and a Matter of Fact, London, 1917.) To avoid possible clashes
through hot-headedness of her troops and underofficers, France withdrew her troops 10 kilometers (about six miles) within her own frontiers. On the other hand, German bands repeatedly crossed the French frontier, and even killed a French soldier on French soil before the declaration of war. (French Yellow Book, No. 106.)
Similar falsehoods were inserted in the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, and in the German declaration of war on Russia. Falsehood and forgery were used with Machiavellian unscrupulousness by Germany in the conduct of her foreign affairs. (Compare Bismarck's changes in the "Ems dispatch" at beginning of Franco-German war and his diabolical pleasure that war with France thus became certain. Bismarck, Autobiography, II, p. 101. See War Cyclopedia, under "German Government, Moral Bankruptcy," etc.)
IV. GERMAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAB.
The testimony is overwhelming not only that Germany planned with Austria an aggressive stroke in 1914, but that in the end it was she who willed the war. (See War Cyclopedia, under "War, Responsibility for.")
The constant attitude of Germany who, since the beginning of the conflict, while ceaselessly protesting to each Power her peaceful intentions, has actually, by her dilatory or negative attitude, caused the failure of all attempts at agreement, and has not ceased to encourage through her Ambassador the uncompromising attitude of Vienna; the German military preparations begun since the 25th July and subsequently continued without cessation; the immediate opposition of Germany to the Russian formula [of July 29-31], declared at Berlin inacceptable for Austria before that Power had ever been consulted; in conclusion, all the impressions derived from Berlin bring conviction that Germany has sought to humiliate Russia, to disintegrate the Triple Entente, and if these results could not be obtained, to make war." (Viviani, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 31, in French Yellow Book, No. 114; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 221.)
"Never in the history of the world has a greater crime than this been committed. Never has a crime after its commission been denied with greater effrontery and hypocrisy." (I Accuse, pp. 208-9.)
"The German Government contrived the war jointly in concert with the Austrian Government, and so burdened itself with the greatest responsibility for the immediate outbreak of the war. The German Government brought on the war under cover of deception practised upon the common people and even upon the Reichstag (note the suppression of the ultimatum to Belgium, the promulgation of the German White Book, the elimination of the Tsar's despatch of July 29, 1914, etc.)." (Dr. Karl Liebknecht, German Socialist, in leaflet dated May 3, 1916. See War Cyclopedia, under “Liebknecht on German War Policy.")
"The object of this war [on the part of the opponents of Germany] is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible government which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices
and long-cherished principles of international action and honor; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier either of law or mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood-not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and now stands balked but not defeated, the enemy of fourfifths of the world. This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people. It is no business of ours how that great people came under its control or submitted with temporary zest to the domination of its purpose; but it is our business to see to it that the history of the rest of the world is no longer left to its handling." (President Wilson's reply to the Pope's peace proposals, August 27, 1917.)
For reading references on Chapter V, see page 39.
VI. VIOLATION OF BELGIUM'S NEUTRALITY BRINGS IN GREAT BRITAIN.
I. WHY GREAT BRITAIN WAS EXPECTED TO STAY OUT. 1. Embittered state of party relations growing out of the Budget struggle of 1909-11, the limitation of the veto of the House of Lords in 1911, violence of the suffragettes ("the wild women "), and the passage by the House of Commons of the Irish Home Rule bill (May 25, 1914).
2. Serious threat of rebellion in northern Ireland (Ulster) against putting in force Irish Home Rule act. Organization of armed forces under Sir Edward Carson; gun running" from Germany.
3. Widespread labor troubles, especially among the railway workers.
4. Unrest in India, following administrative division of the province of Bengal; boycott movement; revolutionary violence attending Nationalist (Hindu) agitations. 5. Unwarlike character of the British people; a "nation of shopkeepers" supposedly unready for the sacrifices of war. Progress of pacifist opinions ("Norman-Angellism").
6. Lack of an army adequate for use abroad. Composed of volunteers (" mercenaries") instead of being based on compulsory service, it was regarded (in the Kaiser's phrase) as "contemptible."
II. BRITISH DIPLOMACY AND THE WAB.
1. Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, labored unremittingly for peace. (See War Cyclopedia, under Grey and British Policy, 1914.")
"No man in the history of the world has ever labored more strenuously or more successfully than my right honorable friend, Sir Edward Grey, for that which is the supreme interest of the modern worlda general and abiding peace. We preserved by every expedient that diplomacy can suggest, straining to almost the breaking point our most cherished friendships and obligations, even to the last making effort upon effort and hoping against hope. Then, and only then, when we were at last compelled to realize that the choice lay between honor and dis