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honor, between treachery and good faith, and that we had at last reached the dividing line which makes or mars a nation worthy of the name, it was then, and only then, that we declared for war." (Prime Minister Asquith, at the Guildhall, London, September 4, 1914.)


Shoulder to shoulder with England we labored incessantly and supported every proposal," etc. (German White Book; in Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 410.) Similar admissions that Great Britain strove sincerely and energetically for peace are found in other passages in the German White Book. Later the German Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, declared: "The inner responsibility [for the war] lies on the Government of Great Britain. . . . England saw how things were moving, but did nothing to spoke the wheel." (Speech in Reichstag, December 2, 1914.) This statement, however, is palpably false. 2. British fleet kept together after the summer manœuvres (July 27). Importance of this step.


"I pointed out [to the Austrian ambassador] that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt [over the Serbian question].” (Sir Edward Grey, in British Blue Book, No. 48; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 43.)

8. Her liberty of action reserved; Great Britain was free from engagements (July 29).

"In the present case the dispute between Austria and Serbia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav-a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. . . . We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because we were taking

all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn [the German ambassador] not to count on our standing aside, but that it would not be fair that I should let [the French ambassador] be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise." (Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador, in British Blue Book, No. 87; Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 65-66.)

4. Germany's "Infamous Proposal" of July 29 (following the Potsdam council of that date, at which war apparently was resolved upon). In return for British neutrality in case of war between Germany and France, the German Chancellor promised: (a) Not to aim at "territorial acquisitions at the expense of France" in Europe; (b) a similar undertaking with respect to the French colonies was refused; (c) the neutrality of Holland would be observed as long as it was respected by Germany's adversaries; (d) in case Germany was obliged to violate Belgium's neutrality, "when the war

was over Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany."

"He [the German Chancellor] said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

"I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany." (British Ambassador at Berlin, in British Blue Book, No. 85; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 64.)

5. This proposal was emphatically rejected by Great Britain. "What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies." (Sir Edward Grey, in British Blue Book, No. 101; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 77. Compare Germany's attitude over Great Britain's proposal for a compact in 1912see ch. i, IV 6 c.)


The proposals of July 29 may be regarded as the first clear sign of a general conflict; for they presumed the probability of a war with France in which Belgium, and perhaps England, might be involved, while Holland would be left alone." (J. H. Rose, Development of the European Nations, 5th ed., II, p. 387.)

6. Grey holds out the prospect of a League of Peace (July 30). In his reply to the foregoing proposals, the British Foreign Secretary adds:

"If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between

the Powers than has been possible hitherto." (British Blue Book, No. 101; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 78.)

Germany made no reply to the above suggestion. 7. Would Great Britain keep out if Germany respected Belgium's neutrality? (August 1.)

"He [the German Ambassador] asked me [Sir Edward Grey] whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium's neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.

"I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

"The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

"I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free." (British Blue Book, No. 123; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 93.)

8. Great Britain not to come in if Russia and France rejected reasonable peace proposals; otherwise she would aid France (July 31).

"I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in." (Sir Edward Grey, in British Blue Book, No. 111; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 86.)

9. Great Britain gives Naval assurance to France (August 2), following the German declaration of war on Russia (August 1) and the invasion of Luxemburg.

"I am authorized [by the British Cabinet] to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power." (Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador, in British Blue Book, No. 148; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 105.)

This assurance was given as the result of an arrangement of several years' standing whereby the French fleet was concentrated in the Mediterranean and the British in the North Sea. "It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated." (Sir Edward Grey to the British Ambassador at Paris, in British Blue Book, No. 148; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 105.)


1. Luxemburg invaded by German troops (August 2). This was in violation of the Treaty of London (1867),

as well as of her rights as a neutral state in general. (See Hague Convention of 1907, Articles 2-5; War Cyclopedia, under “Luxemburg," "Neutral Duties," "Neutrality," "Neutralized State.")


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2. Special status of Belgium as a Neutralized State. Based upon the Treaty of London (1839), by which Belgium became "an independent and perpetually neutral state, ... bound to observe such neutrality towards all other states," and Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia became the guarantors of her neutrality. The German Empire was the successor to Prussia in this guarantee. Confirmation of Belgium's neutrality in 1870, by treaties between Great Britain and Prussia and Great Britain and France. (See War Cyclopedia, under "Belgium, Neutralization.")

Had Belgium been merely a small neutral nation, the crime [of her violation] would still have been one of the worst in the history of the modern world. The fact that Belgium was an internationalized State has made the invasion the master tragedy of the war. For Belgium represented what progress the world had made towards co-operation. If it could not survive, then no internationalism was possible. That is why, through these years of horror upon horror, the Belgian horror is the fiercest of all. The burning, the shooting, the starving, and the robbing of small and inoffensive nations is tragic enough. But the German crime in Belgium is greater than the sum of Belgium's misery. It is a crime against the basis of faith on which the world must build or perish." (Walter Lippman, in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July, 1917). 3. German reassurances to Belgium in 1911 and 1914.


Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international treaty." (German Minister of War, in the Reichstag, April 29, 1911. See Belgian Grey Book, No. 12; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 306.)

"The troops will not cross Belgian territory." (German Minister to Belgium, early on August 2, 1914, to Brussels journalists. In H. Davignon, Belgium and Germany, p. 7.)

"Up to the present he [the German Minister to Belgium, on August 2] had not been instructed to make us an official communication, but that we knew his personal opinion as to the feelings of security which we had the right to entertain towards our eastern neighbors." (Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in Belgian Grey Book, No. 19; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 309.)

4. France officially assured Great Britain and Belgium of her resolve to respect Belgium's neutrality (July 31 and August 1), in response to an inquiry addressed by Great Britain to both France and Germany. (British Blue Book, No. 115 and 125; Belgian Grey Book, No. 15; Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 87, 94, 307.) 5. Germany declined to give such an official assurance (July 31)-apparently on the ground that "any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing." (British Blue Book, No. 122; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 92.)

6. Germany demanded (August 2 at 7.00 p. m.) permission to pass through Belgium on the way to France, alleging (falsely) that France intended to march into Belgium, and offering to restore Belgium and to pay an indemnity at the end of the war. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, she would be considered as an enemy,"


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7. Belgium refused such permission (August 3). The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe." (Belgian Grey Book, No. 22; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 312.)

8. German armed forces entered Belgium on the morning of August 4. Belgium thereupon appealed to Great Britain, France, and Russia, as guaranteeing Powers, to come to her assistance in repelling the invasion.

. Germany's justification of her action.

(a) Plea of necessity. "Gentlemen, we are now in
a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law.
Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and per-
haps have already entered Belgian territory.
Gentlemen, this is a breach of international law.
... We know . . . that France stood ready for
an invasion [this statement was false]. France
could wait, we could not. . . . The wrong-I
speak openly-the wrong we thereby commit we
will try to make good as soon as our military
aims have been attained. He who is menaced as
we are and is fighting for his highest possession
can only consider how he is to hack his way
through." (Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg,
in the Reichstag, August 4, 1914. See War
Cyclopedia, under "Bethmann Hollweg," "Kriegs-
Raison," " Notwendigkeit."

(b) Charge that Belgium had violated her own neu-
trality by concluding military conventions with
England in 1905 and 1912 directed against Ger-
many. This claim is based on a willful mis-
interpretation of documents discovered by Ger-
many in Brussels after the taking of that city.
(Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 350-367.)
"That a wrong was done to Belgium was originally
openly confessed by the perpetrator. As an after-
thought, in order to appear whiter, Cain blackened
Abel. In my opinion it was a spiritual blunder to
rummage for documents in the pockets of the quiver-
ing victim. . . . To calumniate her in addition is
really too much." (Karl Spitteler, a Swiss, quoted
in I Accuse, p. 234.)

(c) Military expediency was the real reason. This
is shown, among other indications, by an inter-
view (August 3, 1914) between the German Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs and the Belgian Minister
to Germany.

German Minister: "It is a question of life or death for the Empire. If the German armies do not want to be caught between the hammer and the anvil they must strike a decisive blow at France, in order then to turn back against Russia."

Belgian Minister: "But the frontiers of France are sufficiently extended to make it possible to avoid passing through Belgium."

Foreign Minister: "They are too strongly fortiified." (H. Davignon, Belgium and Germany, p. 14.)


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of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." (Belgian Grey Book, No. 25; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 313.)

2. Great Britain's ultimatum to Germany (August 4) asking assurance by midnight that "the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany." (British Blue Book, No. 153, 159; Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 107-109.)

3. War declared by Great Britain (about midnight, August 4). The "scrap of paper utterance.

The account of the last interview (about 7.00 p. m., August 4) of the British Ambassador with the German Chancellor is instructive: "I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word -Neutrality, a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow [German Foreign Minister] wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of life and death' for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, 'But at what price will that compact have been kept? Has the British Government thought of that?' I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument." (British Blue Book, No. 160; Collected Diplomatio Documents, p. 111. See War Cyclopedia, under 'Scrap of Paper.")

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4. Great Britain's reasons for entering the war.

(a) Her obligations to Belgium under the treaty of 1839.

(b) Her relations to France growing out of the Entente Cordiale (1904). These ties were strengthened in subsequent years by consultations of British and French naval experts, but no promise of anything more than diplomatic support was given until August 2, 1914.

"We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in any contingency that has not yet arisen and may

never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to cooperate in war.

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'You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common." (Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador, November 22, 1912; see New York Times Current History, I, p. 283.)

"There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France [of August 2, 1914] that I have read to the House which prevents us doing that." (Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, August 3, 1914; New York Times Current History, I, p. 289.)

(c) Self-interest-the realization that Germany's hostility to her was implacable, and that if Great Britain was not to surrender her position as a Great Power in the world, and possibly a goodly portion of her colonial possessions, she must ultimately fight Germany; if so, better in alliance with France and Russia than alone at a later time.

5. Great Britain's declared war aims.

"We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed." (Prime Minister Asquith, November 9, 1914.)

"I say nothing of what the actual conditions of peace will be, because those are things which we must discuss with our allies and settle in common with them. But the great object to be attained. . . . is that there shall not again be this sort of militarism in Europe, which in time of peace causes the whole of the continent discomfort by its continual menace, and then, when it thinks the moment has come that suits itself, plunges the continent into war." (Sir Edward Grey, House of Commons, January 26, 1916.)

"What we and our allies are fighting for is a free Europe. We want a Europe free, not only from the domination of one nationality by another, but from hectoring diplomacy and the peril of war, free from the constant rattling of the sword in the scabbard, from perpetual talk of shining armor and war lords. In fact, we feel we are fighting for equal rights; for law, justice, peace; for civilization throughout the world as against brute force, which knows no restraint and no mercy.

"What Prussia proposes, as we understand her, is Prussian supremacy. She proposes a Europe mod

elled and ruled by Prussia. She is to dispose of the liberties of her neighbors and of us all. We say that life on these terms is intolerable. And this also is what France and Italy and Russia say. We are fighting the German idea of the wholesomeness, almost the desirability, of ever recurrent war. Germany's philosophy is that a settled peace spells degeneracy. Such a philosophy, if it is to survive as a practical force, means eternal apprehension and unrest. It means ever-increasing armaments. It means arresting the development of mankind along the lines of culture and humanity. . . .

"The Allies can tolerate no peace that leaves the wrongs of this war unredressed. Peace counsels that are purely abstract and make no attempt to discriminate between the rights and the wrongs of this war are ineffective if not irrelevant.

"... The Prussian authorities have apparently but one idea of peace, an iron peace imposed on other nations by German supremacy. They do not understand that free men and free nations will rather die than submit to that ambition, and that there can be no end to war till it is defeated and renounced." (Sir Edward Grey to correspondent of Chicago Daily News, in June, 1916.)

For reading references on Chapter VI, see page 40.

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1. Montenegro declares war (Aug. 7, 1914), as an ally of Serbia.

2. Japan declares war (Aug. 23), because of—

(a) Alliance with Great Britain (concluded in 1902; renewed in 1905 and 1911).

(b) Resentment at German ousting of Japan from Port Arthur in 1895, and German seizure of KiaoChau Bay (China) in 1897. Japanese ultimatum to Germany in 1914 modeled on that of Germany to Japan in 1895.

(c) Japan captures Tsingtau, on Kiao-Chau Bay (Nov. 17, 1914). Thenceforth her part in the military operations of the war was slight.

3. Unneutral acts of Turkey (sheltering of German warships, bombardment of Russian Black Sea ports, Oct. 29, etc.) lead to Allied declarations of war against her (Nov. 3-5, 1914). It is now proved that Turkey was in alliance with Germany from August 4, 1914. (See N. Y. Times Current History, Nov., 1917, p. 334-335.) 4. Italy declares war on Austria, (May 23, 1915; on Germany August 27, 1916.) Due in part to

(a) Italy's desire to complete her unification by acquiring from Austria the Italian-speaking Trentino and Trieste (Italia Irredenta).

(b) Conflicts of interests with Austria on the Eastern shore of the Adriatic.

(c) Austria-Hungary's violation of the Triple Alliance agreement by her aggressive policy in the Balkans.

5. Bulgaria, encouraged by Russian and British reverses, and assured by Germany of the much coveted shore on the Aegean, makes an alliance with Austria and Germany and attacks Serbia (Oct. 13, 1915). Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy thereupon declared war on Bulgaria (Oct. 16-19.) Refusal of King Constantine of Greece to fulfill his treaty with Serbia.

6. Portugal drawn into the war (March 9, 1916) through her long-standing alliance with Great Britain.

7. Roumania, encouraged by Allied successes early in 1916, and treacherously pressed thereto by Russia, attacks Austria-Hungary in order to gain Transylvania (Aug. 28, 1916.)

8. Further spread of the war: United States declares war on Germany, April 6, 1917 (see chapter ix).-Greece deposes King Constantine and joins the Entente Allies (June 12, 1917).-Siam, China and Brazil enter the war against the Teutonic Allies; Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador, etc., sever diplomatic relations with Germany. (See War Cyclopedia, under "War, Declarations of." II. WORLD-WIDE CHARACTER AND IMPORTANCE OF THE CONFLICT.

1. The most widespread and terrible war in history. A score of countries involved; compare the size of the belligerent areas and populations with those remaining neutral, of the States arrayed against Germany with those on her side.

"At least 38,000,000 men are bearing arms in the war -27,500,000 on the side of the world Allies and 10,600000 on the side of the Central Powers-according to latest War Department compilations from published reports in various countries. These figures do not include naval personnel strength, which would raise the total several millions. Against Germany's 7,000,000, Austria'a 3,000,000. Turkey's 300,000 and Bulgaria's 300,000, are arrayed the following armed forces: Russia, 9,000,000; France, 6,000,000; Great Britain, 5,000000; Italy, 3,000,000; Japan, 1,400,000; United States, more than 1,000,000; China, 541,000; Roumania, 320,000; Serbia, 300,000; Belgium, 300,000; Greece, 300,000; Portugal, 200,000; Montenegro, 40,000; Siam, 36,000; Cuba, 11,000, and Liberia, 400."-(Associated Press dispatch, Oct. 22, 1917.)

2. Universal disorganization of commerce and industry. Widespread suffering even in neutral countries. Problems of food-supply, coal, and other necessaries of life.

3. Importance of the issues involved: Government of the world by negotiation, arbitration, and international law, vs. reliance upon military force, and the principle that "might makes right."-Humanity vs. “frightfulness."-Democracy and freedom #8. autocracy and



1. New developments in trenches and trench fighting. Vast and complicated systems of deep and narrow trenches, inter-communicating; underground refuge chambers of timber and concrete; elaborate barbed wire entanglements; shell craters fortified with "pill boxes" of steel and concrete as gun emplacements. Defended by men with magazine rifles and machine guns; use of hand grenades, trench mortars, sapping and mining; steel helmets and gas masks. "Camouflage," the art of concealment. (See War Cyclopedia, under "Barbedwire Entanglements," "Camouflage," "Trench Warfare," etc.)

2. Great guns (German 42-centimeter mortars, etc.) used

to smash old fashioned steel and concrete fortifications and bombard towns twenty-two miles distant. Enormous quantities of high explosive shell, fired by thousands of guns, for days at a time, used to destroy wire entanglements and trenches. "Barrage" (barrier) shellfire used to cover attack; definition and use of "creeping barrage"; excellence of French "75's” (quickfire cannon with calibre of 75 millimeters-about three inches; British "tanks" (huge caterpillar motors, armored and armed with machine guns and rapid-fire cannon); poison gas and liquid fire; etc., etc. (See War Cyclopedia, under "Barrage," "Forbidden Methods of Warfare," "Gas Warfare," "Shells," "Tanks," etc.) 3. Great development of aeroplanes for scouting, directing artillery fire, etc. Use of captive balloons. Zeppelins used mainly for dropping bombs on undefended British and French towns; their failure to fulfill German expectations. Devices for combating aerial attacks. (See War Cyclopedia, under "Aviation," etc.)

4. Great development of the submarine and submarine warfare. Use of submarines against warships perfectly legitimate; employment against merchant shipping also entirely proper under certain limitations. Devices for combating submarines. (See War Cyclopedia under "Submarine," etc.)

5. New problems of transport and communication. Great use of motor trucks and automobiles for moving troops and supplies; increased difficulties of supply owing to great numbers of soldiers engaged, and enormous quantities of shells fired. Use of wireless telegraph and telephone. (See War Cyclopedia, under "Motor Transport.")

6. Mobilization of civilian population in all countries and national control of industry, food production and consumption. Increased participation of women in war work. In this conflict not merely armies but nations are engaged against one another; and the side with the greatest man-power, the best organized production and consumption, the largest financial resources, the staunchest courage and the closest co-operation between its allies will win. (See War Cyclopedia, under “Civilian Tasks," "Food Control," "Fuel Control," etc.)


1. War from the standpoint of International Law.

"From the standpoint of the international jurist, war is not merely a national struggle between public enemies, but a condition of juridical status under which such a conflict is carried on. It consists of certain legal rules and generally recognized customs, most of which have been codified and embodied in international treatiesthe so-called Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907— which nearly all the members of the international community, including Germany, have signed and ratified. Now, if we were to take up the Hague Regulations in detail, we should find that Germany has violated again and again practically all of them. A bare list or enumeration of the proved and well authenticated instances of violation of international law by Germany in this war would, in fact, fill many volumes. If these were accompanied by some description or commentary, I

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