Page images

sidered without a statement of facts.-Redo v.
State, 160 S. W. 71.

$1102 (Tex.Cr.App.) Document purporting to
be a statement of facts, not approved by the
trial judge, will be stricken out on motion.
Gerrade v. State, 160 S. W. 695.

$1102 (Tex.Cr.App.) That the county court
in a misdemeanor case allowed 30 days for fil-
ing statement of facts, and convinced defend-
ant's counsel that the law authorized him to
do so, is not, on motion to strike, an excuse
for not filing in 20 days.-Butler v. State, 160
S. W. 1191.

§ 1106 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where sentence was
pronounced on accused on the 25th day of Jan-
uary, the records in his appeal should be filed
on appeal not later than April 25th.-Meyer v.
State, 160 S. W. 1190.

§ 1110 (Tex.Cr.App.) The court could not
qualify bills of exception by stating facts dehors
the record; it being necessary that he testify
to such facts like any other witness.-Graham
v. State, 160 S. W. 714.

81114 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the only ground
assigned in the motion for a new trial is that
the verdict is contrary to the law and the evi-
dence, and there is neither a statement of facts
nor bills of exception, no question is presented
for review.-Fitzhugh v. State, 160 S. W. 710.
$1118 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where neither the mo-
tion for a continuance, which admittedly did not
conform to the statutory requirements, nor the
motion, for a new trial, stated what the defend-
ant expected to prove by the witnesses which he
might desire to use, and it did appear that
those witnesses knew nothing of the immediate
transaction, the action of the court in overruling
the motion will not be reviewed.-Valdez v. State,
160 S. W. 341.

$1119 (Tex. Cr. App.) A conviction will not
be reversed because accused was unrepresented
by counsel at the trial, where the record did
not show that he was prevented from securing
counsel by the court or by outside influences, or
show the character of his defense.-Cobb v.
State, 160 S. W. 78.

$1120 (Ark.) Error in refusing to admit in
evidence the record of a former acquittal of ac-
cused could not be reviewed, where the evidence
in support of the plea was not incorporated in
the bill of exceptions.-Hines v. State, 160 S.

W. 894.

§ 1120 (Tex.Cr.App.) A bill of exceptions to
the admission of evidence cannot be considered,
where it does not show what the evidence was.
-Coker v. State, 160 S. W. 366.

$1120 (Tex.Cr.App.) The incompetency of a
witness to testify could not be reviewed, where
no evidence as to his incompetency accompanied
the record.-Ramos v. State, 160 S. W. 380.

$1124 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the order denying
a motion for a new trial for misconduct of the
jury recited that the court heard the motion
and "the evidence adduced thereon," error in de-
nying the motion cannot be reviewed in the ab-
sence of a bill of exceptions containing the evi-
dence.-Sharp v. State, 160 S. W. 369.

Since a sworn motion for a new trial is merely
a pleading, if it is desired that exhibits attached
to the motion be considered as evidence, they
should be introduced, and the fact that no other
evidence was introduced should be shown by
the bill of exceptions in order to have error in
overruling the motion reviewed.-Id.

(E) Assignment of Errors and Briefs.
§ 1129 (Ark.) An assignment of error in deny-
ing a
new trial on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence cannot be considered, where the
only reference in the record to such evidence is
contained in the motion for new trial and
there are no bills of of exceptions referring to it.

(G) Review.

§ 1137 (Tex. Cr. App.) Accused cannot com-
plain of error in the admission of testimony
elicited by himself.-Coulter v. State, 160 S. W.

81137 (Tex.Cr.App.) Accused cannot complain
of an erroneous charge which he induced the
court to give by his own requests.-Meek v.
State, 160 S. W. 698.

§1148 (Tex.Cr.App.) On an application for
bail by a person charged with murder, the trial
judge has a reasonable discretion in determining
whether the death penalty probably will or
should be imposed, and on appeal the presump-
tion will be indulged that his judgment is cor-
rect.-Ex parte Stephenson, 160 S. W. 77.

discretionary ruling of the trial judge, unless
§ 1151 (Ark.) In matters of continuance the
an arbitrary abuse is affirmatively shown, will
not be disturbed.-Sullivan v. State, 160 S. W.

$1159 (Ark.) It is the province of the jury to
pass upon the credibility of witnesses, and the
weight to be given to their testimony, and their
verdict will be upheld if supported by any evi-
dence of a substantial character.-Hysell v.
City of Ft. Smith, 160 S. W. 383.

$1159 (Tex.Cr.App.) A verdict on conflicting
evidence will not be disturbed.-Stubbs v. State,
160 S. W. 87.

§ 1159 (Tex.Cr.App.) The testimony for the
state, if believed, being sufficient to sustain the
conviction, the verdict cannot be disturbed.-
Veherana v. State, 160 S. W. 711.

$1159 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for un-
lawfully carrying a pistol, where defendant
claimed he was taking it to be repaired, a con-
viction cannot be disturbed where the instruc-
tions asked by defendant presented that ques-
tion to the jury.-Decker v. State, 160 S. W.

§ 1166 (Tex.Cr.App.) Denying a continuance
to procure witnesses to show that prosecutrix's
reputation for chastity was bad before the al-
leged offense is not ground for reversal, where
the physical facts and the evidence conclusively
showed that prosecutrix did not consent.-Sharp
v. State, 160 S. W. 369.

§ 1166 (Tex.Cr.App.) The refusal of a contin-
uance for an absent witness was not ground for
reversal, where the evidence it was desired by
accused to contradict or explain was excluded
on appeal.-Creed v. State, 160 S. W. 468.
whom it was complained that they had formed
$11662 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the jurors of
an opinion in the case were peremptorily chal-
lenged by accused and did not serve, and no ob-
jectionable juror served error in not sustaining
a challenge on the ground that they had formed
an opinion was not reversible.-Reynolds v.
State, 160 S. W. 362.

§ 1169 (Ark.) Accused could not have been
prejudiced by the admission of a statement in
evidence which was identical with that testified
to by accused.-Coon v. State, 160 S. W. 226.

§ 1169 (Ky.) In a prosecution for burning a
tobacco warehouse, error in admission of cer-
tain evidence held harmless.-Wright v. Com-
monwealth, 160 S. W. 476.

gravated assault upon a woman, where accused
§ 1169 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for ag-
claimed that he acted with her consent, and
there was evidence tending to show that
fact, the improper admission of evidence of the

fact that he had been convicted of an assault
with intent to rape some 23 years previous is
prejudicial.-McGill v. State, 160 S. W. 353.

81169 (Tex.Cr.App.) It having been conclu-
sively proven that a certain woman was de-
fendant's wife, he was not prejudiced by evi-
dence that she "was supposed to be his wife."
-Key v. State, 160 S. W. 354, 356.

$1169 (Tex. Cr.App.) Where evidence was in-
troduced, upon a prosecution for carrying a pis-

$1170 (Tex.Cr.App.) The exclusion of a ques-
tion to a witness shows no error where it is
not shown what the answer would have been.
-Rasberry v. State, 160 S. W. 682.

$11702 (Tex.Cr.App.) The impeachment of
a material witness on an immaterial matter is
reversible error.-Ballard v. State, 160 S. W.

statement of

but the jury assessed the minimum penalty, the [tion for new trial raised no question which
evidence cannot be said to have inflamed the could be considered without a
minds of the jury.-Hickman v. State, 160 S. facts.-Castellano v. State, 160 S. W. 453.
W. 382.
$1184 (Tex.Cr.App.) Even if the judgment
and sentence be insufficient, as not showing de-
fendant had been convicted of any crime, the
court on appeal should, under the power given
by Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 938, to reform
the judgment, enter the proper judgment and
sentence.-Veherana v. State, 160 S. W. 711.
$1186 (Ark.) Error, in a prosecution for as-
sault with intent to kill in refusing instructions
submitting the lower grades or offense included
within the indictment when the evidence re-
quired the submission of such issues, will be
cured by entry of judgment convicting accused
of the lowest grade of offense of which she
could have been found guilty under the evidence,
ly on the state's refusal to consent to such judg-
and the appellate court may reverse conditional-
ment.-Roberson v. State, 160 S. W. 214.
§ 1186 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for
burglarizing a store, any error in an instruction
other, burglarized the store, the jury should
that if accused, either alone or acting with an-
find him guilty was not prejudicial to accused
so as to be reversible under Code Cr. Proc.
1911, art. 743, even if the evidence showed that
accused's accomplice kept watch and there was
no evidence that accused alone burglarized the
store.-Pinkerton v. State, 160 S. W. 87.

$11702 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where defendant, in
a prosecution for larceny from the person,' de-
nied that she was a prostitute, error, if any,
in permitting cross-examination as to her char-
was not reversible error.-Wilson V.
State, 160 S. W. 967.


$1171 (Ky.) Remarks of the commonwealth's
attorney in argument held not prejudicial to ac-
cused even if not wholly supported by the evi-
dence.-Wright v. Commonwealth, 160 S. W.



$1171 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for
a remark by the district attorney that
there should be speedy trials and prompt con-
victions or mob law would result, while improp-
er, held not to require a reversal of the con-
viction.-Valdez v. State, 160 S. W. 341.

§ 1172 (Ark.) In a prosecution for giving
away whisky to a minor, where there was a
sharp conflict in the testimony as to the time
of the offense, an instruction, erroneously re-
quiring the defendant to establish the defense
of limitations, was prejudicial.-James v. State,
160 S. W. 1090.

$1172 (Ky.) In a prosecution for burning a
tobacco warehouse, failure to instruct that cer-
tain testimony could be considered for impeach-
ment purposes only, held not prejudicial to ac-
cused. Wright v. Commonwealth, 160 S. W.


$1172 (Tex.Cr.App.) The use twice in in-
struction of the word "defendant" when "ac-
cused" was intended to be used was a mere
clerical error, and not reversible, where the
whole instruction showed that it was not mis-
leading.-Bonds v. State, 160 S. W. 100.

§ 1172 (Tex.Cr.App.) Accused cannot com-
plain of an instruction which is more favorable
to him than he is entitled.-Coker v. State, 160
S. W. 366.

Error, in a prosecution for robbery in charg-
ing that if accused retook the money under an
honest belief it was his property, the jury should
acquit, when accused had lost the money at
cards and voluntarily given it to the winner,
whom he afterwards robbed, was favorable to

the accused.-Id.

$1172 (Tex.Cr.App.) Since Pen. Code 1911,
art. 1349, punishes one who shall receive "or"
conceal property known to have been stolen, a
charge that accused must have "both received
and concealed" the stolen property erred in fa-
vor of accused so that he cannot complain there-
of.-Meek v. State, 160 S. W. 698.

$1172 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the court in de-
fining false imprisonment quoted another ar-
ticle of the statute in defining threats in connec-
tion with the offense, the error was harmless,
where the case was submitted solely on the false
imprisonment alleged and proved.-Matthews v.
State, 160 S. W. 1185.

§ 1173 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the court pre-
sented in its instructions every defensive theory,
the failure to charge on circumstantial evidence
held not reversible error.-Ballard v. State, 160
S. W. 92.

(H) Determination and Disposition of

$1182 (Tex.Cr.App.) A conviction will be af-
firmed where there is no bill of exceptions or
statement of facts in the record, and the mo

$1186 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under Code Cr. Proc.
1911, art. 743, it was not reversible error in a
prosecution for seduction under promise of mar-
riage, where there was evidence of the seduction
and of the promise, to define the offense strictly
in accordance with the statute without specifical-
ly defining it.-Blackburn v. State, 160 S. W.

§ 1186 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where accused was giv-
en the lowest penalty and there was no evi-
dence that he falsely testified by reason of in-
advertence or mistake, the failure of the trial
court to define willfully and deliberately in his
charge does not present reversible error in view
of Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 743.-Johnson v.
State, 160 S. W. 964.

§ 1189 (Ark.) A verdict of acquittal may be
reversed on appeal by the state, and the cause
remanded, where the punishment is not by im-
prisonment.-State v. Schnables, 160 S. W. 388.


§ 1210 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the court does
not order in its judgment that two or more sen-
tences in different prosecutions shall be cumula-
tive, as permitted by Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art.
862, the terms of imprisonment run concurrent-
ly.-Ex parte Davis, 160 S. W. 459.

Where accused was charged with theft and
burglary, and at his examining trial for bur-
glary on June 18th was bound and remanded in
default of giving bond, and on June 20th was
convicted of theft, and sentenced to four months
in jail, held, that the time from his conviction
for theft and commitment until he was tried
and sentenced to the penitentiary for burglary
should be considered as a part of the four
months imprisonment; Code Cr. Proc. 1911,
art. 862, permitting a cumulated sentence not

§ 1211 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under Code Cr. Proc.
1911, art. 862, providing that, where defendant
has been convicted in two or more cases, and
ordered confined in the penitentiary or county
jail, judgment shall be pronounced in each
case as if there had been but one conviction,
except that judgment on the second conviction
shall be that punishment shall begin when the
sentence in the preceding conviction has ceased
to operate, the second or subsequent sentence,
which is cumulative, may be a jail sentence for
a misdemeanor.-Ex parte Davis, 160 S. W.


§ 69 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the petition in an
action against a carrier for damage to goods

See Chattel Mortgages, § 144; Sales, 88 418, expressly seeks interest, it is recoverable from


See Witnesses, §§ 275-287, 337, 349, 350, 376,


See Railroads, §§ 312-351.


See Waters and Water Courses, §§ 178, 179.


See Criminal Law, § 1210.


See Insane Persons, § 41.


85 (Ky.) Prior to 1893, a surviving husband
was entitled to curtesy only where there was
issue of the marriage born alive.-Shepard v.
Browning, 160 S. W. 950.


See Carriers, § 318; Evidence, § 474; Factors;
Master and Servant, § 311.


See Appeal and Error, § 1068; Carriers, §§ 94,
135, 277, 408; Convicts; Eminent Domain,
8 205; Evidence, § 5432; Fraud, § 31; In-
junction, § 195; Master and Servant, $$ 41,
73; Municipal Corporations, § 671; Nuisance,
§ 50; Railroads, § 483; Sales, §§ 348, 418,
442; Telegraphs and Telephones, $$ 38, 67-
70; Torts; Trial, §§ 219, 234, 255; Waters
and Water Courses, §§ 76, 178.

(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or
Prospective Consequences or Losses.
§ 40 (Mo.App.) Profits which are a matter of
guess are too problematical as a measure of
damages, but they may be brought within the
limits of reasonable certainty and thus become
the basis of an action.-Kerns & Lorton v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 160 S. W. 556.
(B) Aggravation, Mitigation, and Reduc-
tion of Loss.

§ 62 (Ky.) Where plaintiff, by his own neg-
ligence after the injury, increases the damage,
defendant is only liable for that part of the
damage caused by his own acts and not for the
results of plaintiff's subsequent acts; the dam-
ages being separable.-Cumberland R. Co. v.
Baird, 160 S. W. 919.

§ 62 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff's wife,
while a passenger on defendant's road, was in
jured and took such means as an ordinarily
prudent person would have taken to avoid the
consequences of such injury, he was not to be
denied a recovery because the jury might be
lieve that if some other means had been taken
the consequences would not have been so seri-
ous.-Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v.
McCormick, 160 S. W. 429.

(C) Interest, Costs, and Expenses of Liti-

§ 67 (Tex.Civ.App.) A claim against the own-
er of one-third of a lot for contribution of that
part of the expense of filling the lot was not
a claim for damages not allowing the assess-
ment of interest as a part of the damages.-

the date of the damage to the time of the trial.
-Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Gray,
160 S. W. 434.



§ 80 (Tex.Civ.App.) Stipulation in a building
contract as to damages for delay held properly
treated as a penalty, and only actual damages
allowed, where the actual damages were easy
of ascertainment and amounted only to $1,491
for a delay for which $3,468 was claimed un-
der the stipulation.-First Nat. Bank v. Smith,
160 S. W. 311.

$80 (Tex.Civ.App.) In the absence of fraud,
accident, or mistake, a contract for liquidated
damages between parties capable of contracting
will be enforced, even though the amount stipu
lated exceeds the actual damages.-Geo, M.
Dilley & Son v. Wise & Hervey, 160 S. W. 985.

$85 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a contract for the
sale of gin machinery provided for a certain
amount as liquidated damages should the pur-
chaser breach the contract, the seller upon
breach, could recover the amount stipulated.-
Geo. M. Dilley & Son v. Wise & Hervey, 160
S. W. 985.


(B) Injuries to Property.

§ 113 (Ark.) The market value of goods, al-
leged to have been damaged by defendant's neg-
ligence, immediately before the injury is what
kets, plus the cost of shipping them to plain-
the goods would have cost in the usual mar-
tiff's place of business, and the market value
immediately after is what the goods could be
sold for at the place where they are held for
sale.-General Fire Extinguisher Co. v. Beal-
Doyle Dry Goods Co., 160 S. W. 889.

An instruction that the measure of damages
to dry goods is the difference between what the
damaged goods cost plaintiff and their market
value after the damage occurred was improper,
and properly refused.-Id.

The measure of damages to injured dry goods
is the difference between the market value of
the goods immediately before they were damag-
ed and their market value immediately there-

$113 (Tex.Civ.App.) The measure of damages
for injuries to secondhand household goods and
wearing apparel is the difference in their actual
value just prior to and just after the injury,
and not the difference in the market value of
similar goods at secondhand stores at or nearest
their destination.-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry.
Co. v. Wallraven, 160 S. W. 116.

Where secondhand household furniture and
wearing apparel is wholly destroyed, a proper
method of arriving at their value at the time of
the loss is to take into consideration the cost of
the articles, the extent of their use, whether
worn or out of date, their condition at the time,
etc., and from these and other pertinent facts to
determine the present value.-Id.

$116 (Tex.Civ.App.) A contractor having been
prevented by defendants from constructing a
building for plaintiff, a negro, and having, with-
out right, retained $100 of plaintiff's advance
payment, plaintiff could not recover such sum,
as a part of the damages, from defendants.-
Day v. Hunnicutt, 160 S. W. 134.


§ 131 (Ky.) A verdict of $200 awarded to a
child, 5 years of age, whose arm was broken
by a fall on the sidewalk, who was confined to
her bed and room 10 days, with the arm in
plaster of paris not fully knit until 30 days,
but not resulting in any permanent injury, was

mental suffering.-City of Newport v. Lewis, | troduced without objection to supplement ex-
160 S. W. 507.

§ 131 (Mo.App.) In a street car passenger's
action for personal injuries, held, that a verdict
for $2,000 for a temporary injury was excessive,
and will be reduced to $1,500.-Adams v. Metro-
politan St. Ry. Co., 160 S. W. 38.

§ 132 (Ark.) An award of $7,749 in favor of
a convicted felon, who was injured by the sud-
den jerking of the train, so that one leg had
to be amputated, his other foot being mashed
and his stomach seriously hurt, is not excessive,
even though he was sentenced to the peniten-
tiary for the next 11 years.-St. Louis, I. M.
& S. Ry. Co. v. Hydrick, 160 S. W. 196.

§ 132 (Ky.) A verdict for plaintiff for $6,500
was not excessive where his injured leg is use-
less and will cripple him for life, and his health
will be permanently impaired, and he also en-
dured mental and physical suffering.-New Bell
Jellico Coal Co. v. Oxendine, 160 S. W. 737.

§ 132 (Mo.App.) A verdict of $7,500 for a
prolapsed uterus is excessive and should be re-
duced to $4,000; earning capacity not being re-
duced.-Stokes v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 160
S. W. 46.

§ 132 (Mo.App.) A verdict of $4,250 for per-
sonal injuries to a woman, 30 years of age,
earning $21 per week, who had three ribs frac-
tured, suffered a concussion of the brain and
injury to her nervous system, resulting in loss
of memory, inability to sleep, etc., and who was
confined to her bed for four months, and ex-
pended $335 for medical treatment, held not ex-
cessive. Smith v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis,
160 S. W. 553.



(A) Pleading.

§ 157 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under a general allega-
tion of damage, evidence is admissible of all
damages which naturally and necessarily result
from the wrongful act, but if the damages sus-
tained do not necessarily result from the negli-
gent act, plaintiff must allege the particular
damage, unless the law infers such damage from
the facts alleged.-Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v.
Coffman, 160 S. W. 145.

8158 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under allegations of the
petition in a personal injury action that the
injury caused a concussion of plaintiff's spine
and of the nerves and muscles connected there-
with, and caused the loss of sensation and men-
tal and physical suffering, evidence of the na-
ture of traumatic hysteria, and that plaintiff
might be so affected, was admissible.-Pecos &
N. T. Ry. Co. v. Coffman, 160 S. W. 145.

(B) Evidence.

pert testimony that the goods were damaged 50
per cent., the evidence was sufficient to show
the amount of damage.-General Fire Extin-
guisher Co. v. Beal-Doyle Dry Goods Co., 160
S. W. 889.

(C) Proceedings for Assessment.
$210 (Mo.App.) In action for personal inju-
ries, an instruction allowing a recovery for
damages for future loss of earnings held within
the limitation of the prayer for damages.-
Smith v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 160 S.
W. 553.

§ 216 (Ky.) An instruction authorizing recov-
ery for mental suffering, for mental anguish, ad-
ditional damages for permanent impairment of
plaintiff's health and strength, and for diminu-
tion of his power to earn money, and yet other
damages if his injuries were permanent, was
erroneous. Lexington & E. Ry. Co. v. Craw-
ford, 160 S. W. 267.

Where the value of plaintiff's loss of time did
not exceed $285, the court should have charged
that, if the jury found for plaintiff, they should
allow him such sum as would compensate him
for physical and mental suffering, not exceed-
ing that amount, and for impairment of earn-
ing capacity, if any.-Id.

$217 (Mo.App.) The use of the term "rea-
sonable value" in instructions on the issue of
the market value of property destroyed by fire
was not reversible error.-Globe & Rutgers Fire
Ins. Co. v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 160 S. W. 907.


See Indictment and Information, § 161.


See Carriers, §§ 241, 331; Contribution; Exec-
utors and Administrators, § 438; Judgment,
8860; Limitation of Actions, § 127; Master
and Servant, §§ 86, 137, 227, 228, 258, 264,
265, 276, 278; Street Railroads, §§ 103–118;
Trial, § 219; Witnesses, § 397.

(A) Right of Action and Defenses.
87 (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1909, § 5425
(Laws 1905, p. 135), providing that every rail-
road company "shall forfeit and pay as a pen-
alty" for every person dying from negligent in-
juries "the sum of not less than $2,000 and not
exceeding $10,000" in the discretion of the
jury, plaintiff may sue for only $2,000; that
being the penal part of the statute.-Johnson v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 160 S. W. 5.

§ 9 (Mo.App.) In Rev. St. 1909, § 5425, provid-
ing that every railroad "shall forfeit and pay as
a penalty" for every person killed by its negli-
gence a certain sum, the word "forfeit" implies
a penalty.-Johnson v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
Ry. Co., 160 S. W. 5.

§ 174 (Mo.App.) In an action for injuries to
a 9-inch wall, testimony as to the cost of build-
ing a new wall is not inadmissible, because based
on an estimate for a 13-inch wall; it appearing
that the ordinances then in force required walls
of that thickness for buildings of the height of
plaintiff's and that the wider wall would not
(F) Trial, Judgment, and Review.
cost any more.-Jesel v. Benas, 160 S. W. 528.
§ 174 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for injuries 1909, § 5425, is penal up to $2.000, and com-
$104 (Mo.App.) Recovery, under Rev. St.
to secondhand personal property, evidence of the
original cost of the property in the market, the pensatory to the extent a plaintiff may recover
above that, so that refusal of instruction that
manner, time, and place of its use, its appear- the jury could not allow plaintiff "as a penal-
ance before and after the injury, and its rela- ty" any sum exceeding $2,000 held erroneous.
tive usefulness and physical condition is com-
petent.-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Wall-Lasater v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 160

raven, 160 S. W. 116.

§185 (Ky.) Evidence held not to show that
plaintiff sustained a miscarriage as a result of
the accident.-Cumberland R. Co. v. Baird, 160
S. W. 919.

§ 188 (Ark.) Where, in an action for injuries
to goods, defendant permitted evidence of the
market value of the goods, consisting of the
original price, plus freight and profit, to be in-

S. W. 818.


See Assignments for Benefit of Creditors; Bank-
ruptcy; Fraudulent Conveyances; Subroga-


See False Pretenses; Fraud.



See Criminal Law, §§ 412, 417; Evidence, §§ See Carriers, §§ 102, 213, 228; Judgment, § 456.
269, 271.



See Banks and Banking, § 47; Equity, § 429; See Warehousemen, § 15.
Judgment, § 217.


See Appeal and Error, §§ 1094, 1212; Cove-
nants; Estoppel, $ 22; Evidence, §§ 353, 383;
Husband and Wife, §§ 194, 271; Judicial
Sales; Limitation of Actions, § 96; Mort-
gages; Vendor and Purchaser, §§ 97, 231;
Waters and Water Courses, § 89; Witnesses,
$ 144.


See Principal and Surety, § 126.

See Criminal Law, § 404.


See Pleading, §§ 34, 193-216.


(B) Form and Contents of Instruments.
§ 34 (Ky.) Deed, reciting that the property See Pleading, § 248.
was the same as that conveyed to O. and that
the grantors were the only heirs at law of O.,
held to show sufficiently the source of the gran-
tors' title under Ky. St. § 495.-Gormley v.
Overstreet, 160 S. W. 483.

§ 38 (Tex.Civ.App.) A deed conveying a strip
"beginning at the northwest corner of that por-
tion which was conveyed to C. by M. by deed
day of
18-," was not ad-
missible in absence of proof showing the loca-
tion of the northwest corner of the C. tract.-
Sullivan v. Fant, 160 S. W. 612.

The description of the land conveyed held so
uncertain as to avoid the deed.-Id.




(A) General Rules of Construction.
§ 105 (Tex.Civ.App.) Deed held to
the property in controversy to H. & Bro. as a
firm.-Hollingsworth v. Wm. Cameron & Co.,
160 S. W. 644.

$110 (Tex.Civ.App.) The construction of
deeds is ordinarily a question for the court and
not for the jury.-Sullivan v. Fant, 160 S. W.

(B) Property Conveyed.

§ 114 (Ky.) A conveyance to plaintiff by his
father held, in view of the construction by the
parties, merely to pass the father's interest, re-
ceived from the grantee of the surviving hus-
band of the original owner, and not the interest
of plaintiff's mother, who took as heir of the
original owner.-Shepard v. Browning, 160 S.

W. 950.


See Appeal and Error, §§ 260, 1058; Witnesses,
§ 389.

$61 (Mo.App.) The deposition of a defendant
was admissible against a codefendant, though
it was not present when the deposition was
taken, if it had notice of the taking thereof.—
Irwin v. Kansas City, 160 S. W. 30.


§11 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where, in a suit to fore-
close a mechanics' lien, the purchaser at a
mortgage sale intervened and made a deposit
to secure the delivery of the property by the
receiver, it could not complain of the payment
of plaintiff's claim from such deposit.-Sweet-
water Cotton Oil Co. v. Birge-Forbes & Co.,
160 S. W. 1125.

See Curtesy; Executors and Administrators:
Wills; Witnesses, § 144.

(C) Debts of Intestate and Incumbrances

on Property.

of covenants of warranty made by his ancestor
§ 128 (Ark.) An heir is liable for the breach
only to the extent of his inheritance from that
ancestor, and the property claimed to have been
inherited from the ancestor must be properly
identified before it can be subjected to lien.-
Meyer v. McDill, 160 S. W. 1088.

heirs of a grantor for a breach of the latter's
§ 147 (Ark.) In a suit to recover against the
cient to show what property, if any, descended
covenants of warranty, evidence held insuffi-
Dill, 160 S. W. 1088.
to the heirs from their ancestor.-Meyer v. Me-

(C) Estates and Interests Created.
§ 125 (Ky.) Under deed conveying land to in-
fant but reserving control over the property for
the infant's benefit until she attained the age
of 21 years, and providing that if she died
without issue it should descend to the gran-
tor's son and his heirs, held, that grantor took
a defeasible title and upon reaching the age of
21 years she acquired a fee-simple title not sub-
jeet to be defeated by her subsequent death
without issue.-Gormley v. Overstreet, 160 S. See Boundaries, § 3.

W. 483.


(F) Loss or Relinquishment of Rights.
§ 183 (Ky.) Where a vendee being unable to
pay for the land, agreed to deed part of it back See Courts, § 92.
and prepared such deed and delivered it to the
county clerk, he cannot subsequently claim the
land, though the deed was not actually received
by his vendor.-Chenault v. Yates, 160 S. W.



See Libel and Slander.



See Continuance, §§ 26, 51; Criminal Law, §
598; Specific Performance, § 91.


See Trial.

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