sidered without a statement of facts.-Redo v. State, 160 S. W. 71.
$1102 (Tex.Cr.App.) Document purporting to be a statement of facts, not approved by the trial judge, will be stricken out on motion. Gerrade v. State, 160 S. W. 695.
$1102 (Tex.Cr.App.) That the county court in a misdemeanor case allowed 30 days for fil- ing statement of facts, and convinced defend- ant's counsel that the law authorized him to do so, is not, on motion to strike, an excuse for not filing in 20 days.-Butler v. State, 160 S. W. 1191.
§ 1106 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where sentence was pronounced on accused on the 25th day of Jan- uary, the records in his appeal should be filed on appeal not later than April 25th.-Meyer v. State, 160 S. W. 1190.
§ 1110 (Tex.Cr.App.) The court could not qualify bills of exception by stating facts dehors the record; it being necessary that he testify to such facts like any other witness.-Graham v. State, 160 S. W. 714.
81114 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the only ground assigned in the motion for a new trial is that the verdict is contrary to the law and the evi- dence, and there is neither a statement of facts nor bills of exception, no question is presented for review.-Fitzhugh v. State, 160 S. W. 710. $1118 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where neither the mo- tion for a continuance, which admittedly did not conform to the statutory requirements, nor the motion, for a new trial, stated what the defend- ant expected to prove by the witnesses which he might desire to use, and it did appear that those witnesses knew nothing of the immediate transaction, the action of the court in overruling the motion will not be reviewed.-Valdez v. State, 160 S. W. 341.
$1119 (Tex. Cr. App.) A conviction will not be reversed because accused was unrepresented by counsel at the trial, where the record did not show that he was prevented from securing counsel by the court or by outside influences, or show the character of his defense.-Cobb v. State, 160 S. W. 78.
$1120 (Ark.) Error in refusing to admit in evidence the record of a former acquittal of ac- cused could not be reviewed, where the evidence in support of the plea was not incorporated in the bill of exceptions.-Hines v. State, 160 S.
§ 1120 (Tex.Cr.App.) A bill of exceptions to the admission of evidence cannot be considered, where it does not show what the evidence was. -Coker v. State, 160 S. W. 366.
$1120 (Tex.Cr.App.) The incompetency of a witness to testify could not be reviewed, where no evidence as to his incompetency accompanied the record.-Ramos v. State, 160 S. W. 380.
$1124 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the order denying a motion for a new trial for misconduct of the jury recited that the court heard the motion and "the evidence adduced thereon," error in de- nying the motion cannot be reviewed in the ab- sence of a bill of exceptions containing the evi- dence.-Sharp v. State, 160 S. W. 369.
Since a sworn motion for a new trial is merely a pleading, if it is desired that exhibits attached to the motion be considered as evidence, they should be introduced, and the fact that no other evidence was introduced should be shown by the bill of exceptions in order to have error in overruling the motion reviewed.-Id.
(E) Assignment of Errors and Briefs. § 1129 (Ark.) An assignment of error in deny- ing a new trial on the ground of newly dis- covered evidence cannot be considered, where the only reference in the record to such evidence is contained in the motion for new trial and there are no bills of of exceptions referring to it.
§ 1137 (Tex. Cr. App.) Accused cannot com- plain of error in the admission of testimony elicited by himself.-Coulter v. State, 160 S. W. 80.
81137 (Tex.Cr.App.) Accused cannot complain of an erroneous charge which he induced the court to give by his own requests.-Meek v. State, 160 S. W. 698.
§1148 (Tex.Cr.App.) On an application for bail by a person charged with murder, the trial judge has a reasonable discretion in determining whether the death penalty probably will or should be imposed, and on appeal the presump- tion will be indulged that his judgment is cor- rect.-Ex parte Stephenson, 160 S. W. 77.
discretionary ruling of the trial judge, unless § 1151 (Ark.) In matters of continuance the an arbitrary abuse is affirmatively shown, will not be disturbed.-Sullivan v. State, 160 S. W. 239.
$1159 (Ark.) It is the province of the jury to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, and the weight to be given to their testimony, and their verdict will be upheld if supported by any evi- dence of a substantial character.-Hysell v. City of Ft. Smith, 160 S. W. 383.
$1159 (Tex.Cr.App.) A verdict on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed.-Stubbs v. State, 160 S. W. 87.
§ 1159 (Tex.Cr.App.) The testimony for the state, if believed, being sufficient to sustain the conviction, the verdict cannot be disturbed.- Veherana v. State, 160 S. W. 711.
$1159 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for un- lawfully carrying a pistol, where defendant claimed he was taking it to be repaired, a con- viction cannot be disturbed where the instruc- tions asked by defendant presented that ques- tion to the jury.-Decker v. State, 160 S. W. 1192.
§ 1166 (Tex.Cr.App.) Denying a continuance to procure witnesses to show that prosecutrix's reputation for chastity was bad before the al- leged offense is not ground for reversal, where the physical facts and the evidence conclusively showed that prosecutrix did not consent.-Sharp v. State, 160 S. W. 369.
§ 1166 (Tex.Cr.App.) The refusal of a contin- uance for an absent witness was not ground for reversal, where the evidence it was desired by accused to contradict or explain was excluded on appeal.-Creed v. State, 160 S. W. 468. whom it was complained that they had formed $11662 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the jurors of an opinion in the case were peremptorily chal- lenged by accused and did not serve, and no ob- jectionable juror served error in not sustaining a challenge on the ground that they had formed an opinion was not reversible.-Reynolds v. State, 160 S. W. 362.
§ 1169 (Ark.) Accused could not have been prejudiced by the admission of a statement in evidence which was identical with that testified to by accused.-Coon v. State, 160 S. W. 226.
§ 1169 (Ky.) In a prosecution for burning a tobacco warehouse, error in admission of cer- tain evidence held harmless.-Wright v. Com- monwealth, 160 S. W. 476.
gravated assault upon a woman, where accused § 1169 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for ag- claimed that he acted with her consent, and there was evidence tending to show that fact, the improper admission of evidence of the
fact that he had been convicted of an assault with intent to rape some 23 years previous is prejudicial.-McGill v. State, 160 S. W. 353.
81169 (Tex.Cr.App.) It having been conclu- sively proven that a certain woman was de- fendant's wife, he was not prejudiced by evi- dence that she "was supposed to be his wife." -Key v. State, 160 S. W. 354, 356.
$1169 (Tex. Cr.App.) Where evidence was in- troduced, upon a prosecution for carrying a pis-
$1170 (Tex.Cr.App.) The exclusion of a ques- tion to a witness shows no error where it is not shown what the answer would have been. -Rasberry v. State, 160 S. W. 682.
$11702 (Tex.Cr.App.) The impeachment of a material witness on an immaterial matter is reversible error.-Ballard v. State, 160 S. W. 716.
but the jury assessed the minimum penalty, the [tion for new trial raised no question which evidence cannot be said to have inflamed the could be considered without a minds of the jury.-Hickman v. State, 160 S. facts.-Castellano v. State, 160 S. W. 453. W. 382. $1184 (Tex.Cr.App.) Even if the judgment and sentence be insufficient, as not showing de- fendant had been convicted of any crime, the court on appeal should, under the power given by Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 938, to reform the judgment, enter the proper judgment and sentence.-Veherana v. State, 160 S. W. 711. $1186 (Ark.) Error, in a prosecution for as- sault with intent to kill in refusing instructions submitting the lower grades or offense included within the indictment when the evidence re- quired the submission of such issues, will be cured by entry of judgment convicting accused of the lowest grade of offense of which she could have been found guilty under the evidence, ly on the state's refusal to consent to such judg- and the appellate court may reverse conditional- ment.-Roberson v. State, 160 S. W. 214. § 1186 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for burglarizing a store, any error in an instruction other, burglarized the store, the jury should that if accused, either alone or acting with an- find him guilty was not prejudicial to accused so as to be reversible under Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 743, even if the evidence showed that accused's accomplice kept watch and there was no evidence that accused alone burglarized the store.-Pinkerton v. State, 160 S. W. 87.
$11702 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where defendant, in a prosecution for larceny from the person,' de- nied that she was a prostitute, error, if any, in permitting cross-examination as to her char- was not reversible error.-Wilson V. State, 160 S. W. 967.
$1171 (Ky.) Remarks of the commonwealth's attorney in argument held not prejudicial to ac- cused even if not wholly supported by the evi- dence.-Wright v. Commonwealth, 160 S. W.
$1171 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for a remark by the district attorney that there should be speedy trials and prompt con- victions or mob law would result, while improp- er, held not to require a reversal of the con- viction.-Valdez v. State, 160 S. W. 341.
§ 1172 (Ark.) In a prosecution for giving away whisky to a minor, where there was a sharp conflict in the testimony as to the time of the offense, an instruction, erroneously re- quiring the defendant to establish the defense of limitations, was prejudicial.-James v. State, 160 S. W. 1090.
$1172 (Ky.) In a prosecution for burning a tobacco warehouse, failure to instruct that cer- tain testimony could be considered for impeach- ment purposes only, held not prejudicial to ac- cused. Wright v. Commonwealth, 160 S. W.
$1172 (Tex.Cr.App.) The use twice in in- struction of the word "defendant" when "ac- cused" was intended to be used was a mere clerical error, and not reversible, where the whole instruction showed that it was not mis- leading.-Bonds v. State, 160 S. W. 100.
§ 1172 (Tex.Cr.App.) Accused cannot com- plain of an instruction which is more favorable to him than he is entitled.-Coker v. State, 160 S. W. 366.
Error, in a prosecution for robbery in charg- ing that if accused retook the money under an honest belief it was his property, the jury should acquit, when accused had lost the money at cards and voluntarily given it to the winner, whom he afterwards robbed, was favorable to
$1172 (Tex.Cr.App.) Since Pen. Code 1911, art. 1349, punishes one who shall receive "or" conceal property known to have been stolen, a charge that accused must have "both received and concealed" the stolen property erred in fa- vor of accused so that he cannot complain there- of.-Meek v. State, 160 S. W. 698.
$1172 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the court in de- fining false imprisonment quoted another ar- ticle of the statute in defining threats in connec- tion with the offense, the error was harmless, where the case was submitted solely on the false imprisonment alleged and proved.-Matthews v. State, 160 S. W. 1185.
§ 1173 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the court pre- sented in its instructions every defensive theory, the failure to charge on circumstantial evidence held not reversible error.-Ballard v. State, 160 S. W. 92.
(H) Determination and Disposition of Cause.
$1182 (Tex.Cr.App.) A conviction will be af- firmed where there is no bill of exceptions or statement of facts in the record, and the mo
$1186 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 743, it was not reversible error in a prosecution for seduction under promise of mar- riage, where there was evidence of the seduction and of the promise, to define the offense strictly in accordance with the statute without specifical- ly defining it.-Blackburn v. State, 160 S. W. 687.
§ 1186 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where accused was giv- en the lowest penalty and there was no evi- dence that he falsely testified by reason of in- advertence or mistake, the failure of the trial court to define willfully and deliberately in his charge does not present reversible error in view of Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 743.-Johnson v. State, 160 S. W. 964.
§ 1189 (Ark.) A verdict of acquittal may be reversed on appeal by the state, and the cause remanded, where the punishment is not by im- prisonment.-State v. Schnables, 160 S. W. 388.
XVII. PUNISHMENT AND PREVEN- TION OF CRIME.
§ 1210 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the court does not order in its judgment that two or more sen- tences in different prosecutions shall be cumula- tive, as permitted by Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 862, the terms of imprisonment run concurrent- ly.-Ex parte Davis, 160 S. W. 459.
Where accused was charged with theft and burglary, and at his examining trial for bur- glary on June 18th was bound and remanded in default of giving bond, and on June 20th was convicted of theft, and sentenced to four months in jail, held, that the time from his conviction for theft and commitment until he was tried and sentenced to the penitentiary for burglary should be considered as a part of the four months imprisonment; Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 862, permitting a cumulated sentence not applying.-Id.
§ 1211 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 862, providing that, where defendant has been convicted in two or more cases, and ordered confined in the penitentiary or county jail, judgment shall be pronounced in each case as if there had been but one conviction, except that judgment on the second conviction shall be that punishment shall begin when the sentence in the preceding conviction has ceased to operate, the second or subsequent sentence, which is cumulative, may be a jail sentence for a misdemeanor.-Ex parte Davis, 160 S. W. 159.
§ 69 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the petition in an action against a carrier for damage to goods
See Chattel Mortgages, § 144; Sales, 88 418, expressly seeks interest, it is recoverable from 442.
CROSS-EXAMINATION.
See Witnesses, §§ 275-287, 337, 349, 350, 376, 383.
CROSSINGS.
See Railroads, §§ 312-351.
CULVERTS.
See Waters and Water Courses, §§ 178, 179.
CUMULATIVE SENTENCE.
See Criminal Law, § 1210.
CURATORS.
See Insane Persons, § 41.
CURTESY.
85 (Ky.) Prior to 1893, a surviving husband was entitled to curtesy only where there was issue of the marriage born alive.-Shepard v. Browning, 160 S. W. 950.
CUSTOMS AND USAGES.
See Carriers, § 318; Evidence, § 474; Factors; Master and Servant, § 311.
See Appeal and Error, § 1068; Carriers, §§ 94, 135, 277, 408; Convicts; Eminent Domain, 8 205; Evidence, § 5432; Fraud, § 31; In- junction, § 195; Master and Servant, $$ 41, 73; Municipal Corporations, § 671; Nuisance, § 50; Railroads, § 483; Sales, §§ 348, 418, 442; Telegraphs and Telephones, $$ 38, 67- 70; Torts; Trial, §§ 219, 234, 255; Waters and Water Courses, §§ 76, 178.
III. GROUNDS AND SUBJECTS OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES. (A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or Prospective Consequences or Losses. § 40 (Mo.App.) Profits which are a matter of guess are too problematical as a measure of damages, but they may be brought within the limits of reasonable certainty and thus become the basis of an action.-Kerns & Lorton v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 160 S. W. 556. (B) Aggravation, Mitigation, and Reduc- tion of Loss.
§ 62 (Ky.) Where plaintiff, by his own neg- ligence after the injury, increases the damage, defendant is only liable for that part of the damage caused by his own acts and not for the results of plaintiff's subsequent acts; the dam- ages being separable.-Cumberland R. Co. v. Baird, 160 S. W. 919.
§ 62 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff's wife, while a passenger on defendant's road, was in jured and took such means as an ordinarily prudent person would have taken to avoid the consequences of such injury, he was not to be denied a recovery because the jury might be lieve that if some other means had been taken the consequences would not have been so seri- ous.-Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. McCormick, 160 S. W. 429.
(C) Interest, Costs, and Expenses of Liti- gation.
§ 67 (Tex.Civ.App.) A claim against the own- er of one-third of a lot for contribution of that part of the expense of filling the lot was not a claim for damages not allowing the assess- ment of interest as a part of the damages.-
the date of the damage to the time of the trial. -Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Gray, 160 S. W. 434.
IV. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AND
§ 80 (Tex.Civ.App.) Stipulation in a building contract as to damages for delay held properly treated as a penalty, and only actual damages allowed, where the actual damages were easy of ascertainment and amounted only to $1,491 for a delay for which $3,468 was claimed un- der the stipulation.-First Nat. Bank v. Smith, 160 S. W. 311.
$80 (Tex.Civ.App.) In the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, a contract for liquidated damages between parties capable of contracting will be enforced, even though the amount stipu lated exceeds the actual damages.-Geo, M. Dilley & Son v. Wise & Hervey, 160 S. W. 985.
$85 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a contract for the sale of gin machinery provided for a certain amount as liquidated damages should the pur- chaser breach the contract, the seller upon breach, could recover the amount stipulated.- Geo. M. Dilley & Son v. Wise & Hervey, 160 S. W. 985.
VI. MEASURE OF DAMAGES.
(B) Injuries to Property.
§ 113 (Ark.) The market value of goods, al- leged to have been damaged by defendant's neg- ligence, immediately before the injury is what kets, plus the cost of shipping them to plain- the goods would have cost in the usual mar- tiff's place of business, and the market value immediately after is what the goods could be sold for at the place where they are held for sale.-General Fire Extinguisher Co. v. Beal- Doyle Dry Goods Co., 160 S. W. 889.
An instruction that the measure of damages to dry goods is the difference between what the damaged goods cost plaintiff and their market value after the damage occurred was improper, and properly refused.-Id.
The measure of damages to injured dry goods is the difference between the market value of the goods immediately before they were damag- ed and their market value immediately there- after.-Id.
$113 (Tex.Civ.App.) The measure of damages for injuries to secondhand household goods and wearing apparel is the difference in their actual value just prior to and just after the injury, and not the difference in the market value of similar goods at secondhand stores at or nearest their destination.-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Wallraven, 160 S. W. 116.
Where secondhand household furniture and wearing apparel is wholly destroyed, a proper method of arriving at their value at the time of the loss is to take into consideration the cost of the articles, the extent of their use, whether worn or out of date, their condition at the time, etc., and from these and other pertinent facts to determine the present value.-Id.
$116 (Tex.Civ.App.) A contractor having been prevented by defendants from constructing a building for plaintiff, a negro, and having, with- out right, retained $100 of plaintiff's advance payment, plaintiff could not recover such sum, as a part of the damages, from defendants.- Day v. Hunnicutt, 160 S. W. 134. VII. INADEQUATE AND EXCESSIVE
§ 131 (Ky.) A verdict of $200 awarded to a child, 5 years of age, whose arm was broken by a fall on the sidewalk, who was confined to her bed and room 10 days, with the arm in plaster of paris not fully knit until 30 days, but not resulting in any permanent injury, was
mental suffering.-City of Newport v. Lewis, | troduced without objection to supplement ex- 160 S. W. 507.
§ 131 (Mo.App.) In a street car passenger's action for personal injuries, held, that a verdict for $2,000 for a temporary injury was excessive, and will be reduced to $1,500.-Adams v. Metro- politan St. Ry. Co., 160 S. W. 38.
§ 132 (Ark.) An award of $7,749 in favor of a convicted felon, who was injured by the sud- den jerking of the train, so that one leg had to be amputated, his other foot being mashed and his stomach seriously hurt, is not excessive, even though he was sentenced to the peniten- tiary for the next 11 years.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Hydrick, 160 S. W. 196.
§ 132 (Ky.) A verdict for plaintiff for $6,500 was not excessive where his injured leg is use- less and will cripple him for life, and his health will be permanently impaired, and he also en- dured mental and physical suffering.-New Bell Jellico Coal Co. v. Oxendine, 160 S. W. 737.
§ 132 (Mo.App.) A verdict of $7,500 for a prolapsed uterus is excessive and should be re- duced to $4,000; earning capacity not being re- duced.-Stokes v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 160 S. W. 46.
§ 132 (Mo.App.) A verdict of $4,250 for per- sonal injuries to a woman, 30 years of age, earning $21 per week, who had three ribs frac- tured, suffered a concussion of the brain and injury to her nervous system, resulting in loss of memory, inability to sleep, etc., and who was confined to her bed for four months, and ex- pended $335 for medical treatment, held not ex- cessive. Smith v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 160 S. W. 553.
VIII. PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND
ASSESSMENT.
(A) Pleading.
§ 157 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under a general allega- tion of damage, evidence is admissible of all damages which naturally and necessarily result from the wrongful act, but if the damages sus- tained do not necessarily result from the negli- gent act, plaintiff must allege the particular damage, unless the law infers such damage from the facts alleged.-Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Coffman, 160 S. W. 145.
8158 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under allegations of the petition in a personal injury action that the injury caused a concussion of plaintiff's spine and of the nerves and muscles connected there- with, and caused the loss of sensation and men- tal and physical suffering, evidence of the na- ture of traumatic hysteria, and that plaintiff might be so affected, was admissible.-Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Coffman, 160 S. W. 145.
pert testimony that the goods were damaged 50 per cent., the evidence was sufficient to show the amount of damage.-General Fire Extin- guisher Co. v. Beal-Doyle Dry Goods Co., 160 S. W. 889.
(C) Proceedings for Assessment. $210 (Mo.App.) In action for personal inju- ries, an instruction allowing a recovery for damages for future loss of earnings held within the limitation of the prayer for damages.- Smith v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 160 S. W. 553.
§ 216 (Ky.) An instruction authorizing recov- ery for mental suffering, for mental anguish, ad- ditional damages for permanent impairment of plaintiff's health and strength, and for diminu- tion of his power to earn money, and yet other damages if his injuries were permanent, was erroneous. Lexington & E. Ry. Co. v. Craw- ford, 160 S. W. 267.
Where the value of plaintiff's loss of time did not exceed $285, the court should have charged that, if the jury found for plaintiff, they should allow him such sum as would compensate him for physical and mental suffering, not exceed- ing that amount, and for impairment of earn- ing capacity, if any.-Id.
$217 (Mo.App.) The use of the term "rea- sonable value" in instructions on the issue of the market value of property destroyed by fire was not reversible error.-Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 160 S. W. 907.
See Indictment and Information, § 161.
See Carriers, §§ 241, 331; Contribution; Exec- utors and Administrators, § 438; Judgment, 8860; Limitation of Actions, § 127; Master and Servant, §§ 86, 137, 227, 228, 258, 264, 265, 276, 278; Street Railroads, §§ 103–118; Trial, § 219; Witnesses, § 397.
II. ACTIONS FOR CAUSING DEATH. (A) Right of Action and Defenses. 87 (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1909, § 5425 (Laws 1905, p. 135), providing that every rail- road company "shall forfeit and pay as a pen- alty" for every person dying from negligent in- juries "the sum of not less than $2,000 and not exceeding $10,000" in the discretion of the jury, plaintiff may sue for only $2,000; that being the penal part of the statute.-Johnson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 160 S. W. 5.
§ 9 (Mo.App.) In Rev. St. 1909, § 5425, provid- ing that every railroad "shall forfeit and pay as a penalty" for every person killed by its negli- gence a certain sum, the word "forfeit" implies a penalty.-Johnson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 160 S. W. 5.
§ 174 (Mo.App.) In an action for injuries to a 9-inch wall, testimony as to the cost of build- ing a new wall is not inadmissible, because based on an estimate for a 13-inch wall; it appearing that the ordinances then in force required walls of that thickness for buildings of the height of plaintiff's and that the wider wall would not (F) Trial, Judgment, and Review. cost any more.-Jesel v. Benas, 160 S. W. 528. § 174 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for injuries 1909, § 5425, is penal up to $2.000, and com- $104 (Mo.App.) Recovery, under Rev. St. to secondhand personal property, evidence of the original cost of the property in the market, the pensatory to the extent a plaintiff may recover above that, so that refusal of instruction that manner, time, and place of its use, its appear- the jury could not allow plaintiff "as a penal- ance before and after the injury, and its rela- ty" any sum exceeding $2,000 held erroneous. tive usefulness and physical condition is com- petent.-Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Wall-Lasater v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 160
§185 (Ky.) Evidence held not to show that plaintiff sustained a miscarriage as a result of the accident.-Cumberland R. Co. v. Baird, 160 S. W. 919.
§ 188 (Ark.) Where, in an action for injuries to goods, defendant permitted evidence of the market value of the goods, consisting of the original price, plus freight and profit, to be in-
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
See Assignments for Benefit of Creditors; Bank- ruptcy; Fraudulent Conveyances; Subroga- tion.
See False Pretenses; Fraud.
See Criminal Law, §§ 412, 417; Evidence, §§ See Carriers, §§ 102, 213, 228; Judgment, § 456. 269, 271.
See Banks and Banking, § 47; Equity, § 429; See Warehousemen, § 15. Judgment, § 217.
See Appeal and Error, §§ 1094, 1212; Cove- nants; Estoppel, $ 22; Evidence, §§ 353, 383; Husband and Wife, §§ 194, 271; Judicial Sales; Limitation of Actions, § 96; Mort- gages; Vendor and Purchaser, §§ 97, 231; Waters and Water Courses, § 89; Witnesses, $ 144.
See Principal and Surety, § 126. DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE.
See Criminal Law, § 404.
DEMURRER.
See Pleading, §§ 34, 193-216.
DEPARTURE.
I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY. (B) Form and Contents of Instruments. § 34 (Ky.) Deed, reciting that the property See Pleading, § 248. was the same as that conveyed to O. and that the grantors were the only heirs at law of O., held to show sufficiently the source of the gran- tors' title under Ky. St. § 495.-Gormley v. Overstreet, 160 S. W. 483.
§ 38 (Tex.Civ.App.) A deed conveying a strip "beginning at the northwest corner of that por- tion which was conveyed to C. by M. by deed bearing day of 18-," was not ad- missible in absence of proof showing the loca- tion of the northwest corner of the C. tract.- Sullivan v. Fant, 160 S. W. 612.
The description of the land conveyed held so uncertain as to avoid the deed.-Id.
III. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA-
(A) General Rules of Construction. § 105 (Tex.Civ.App.) Deed held to the property in controversy to H. & Bro. as a firm.-Hollingsworth v. Wm. Cameron & Co., 160 S. W. 644.
$110 (Tex.Civ.App.) The construction of deeds is ordinarily a question for the court and not for the jury.-Sullivan v. Fant, 160 S. W. 612.
(B) Property Conveyed.
§ 114 (Ky.) A conveyance to plaintiff by his father held, in view of the construction by the parties, merely to pass the father's interest, re- ceived from the grantee of the surviving hus- band of the original owner, and not the interest of plaintiff's mother, who took as heir of the original owner.-Shepard v. Browning, 160 S.
See Appeal and Error, §§ 260, 1058; Witnesses, § 389.
$61 (Mo.App.) The deposition of a defendant was admissible against a codefendant, though it was not present when the deposition was taken, if it had notice of the taking thereof.— Irwin v. Kansas City, 160 S. W. 30.
DEPOSITS IN COURT.
§11 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where, in a suit to fore- close a mechanics' lien, the purchaser at a mortgage sale intervened and made a deposit to secure the delivery of the property by the receiver, it could not complain of the payment of plaintiff's claim from such deposit.-Sweet- water Cotton Oil Co. v. Birge-Forbes & Co., 160 S. W. 1125.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION. See Curtesy; Executors and Administrators: Wills; Witnesses, § 144.
III. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF HEIRS AND DISTRIBUTEES. (C) Debts of Intestate and Incumbrances
of covenants of warranty made by his ancestor § 128 (Ark.) An heir is liable for the breach only to the extent of his inheritance from that ancestor, and the property claimed to have been inherited from the ancestor must be properly identified before it can be subjected to lien.- Meyer v. McDill, 160 S. W. 1088.
heirs of a grantor for a breach of the latter's § 147 (Ark.) In a suit to recover against the cient to show what property, if any, descended covenants of warranty, evidence held insuffi- Dill, 160 S. W. 1088. to the heirs from their ancestor.-Meyer v. Me-
(C) Estates and Interests Created. § 125 (Ky.) Under deed conveying land to in- fant but reserving control over the property for the infant's benefit until she attained the age of 21 years, and providing that if she died without issue it should descend to the gran- tor's son and his heirs, held, that grantor took a defeasible title and upon reaching the age of 21 years she acquired a fee-simple title not sub- jeet to be defeated by her subsequent death without issue.-Gormley v. Overstreet, 160 S. See Boundaries, § 3.
(F) Loss or Relinquishment of Rights. § 183 (Ky.) Where a vendee being unable to pay for the land, agreed to deed part of it back See Courts, § 92. and prepared such deed and delivered it to the county clerk, he cannot subsequently claim the land, though the deed was not actually received by his vendor.-Chenault v. Yates, 160 S. W.
See Continuance, §§ 26, 51; Criminal Law, § 598; Specific Performance, § 91.
DIRECTING VERDICT.
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