"Q. For how long a time did that saloon run, Mr. Carrel ?

"Mr. Geib: I object as immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent.

* * *

"The Court: You may answer.

"A. Why, he ran the first year, one year, while I was in business there.

"Q. A year ago you obtained another license for the business of the ensuing year, did you?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. At that time was there an application made to carry on business at the other saloon?

"Mr. Geib: I object as immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent.

"The Court: Objection sustained.

"Q. Was a license refused that saloon by the village board?

"A. It was refused; yes.

"Mr. Geib: I object as immaterial and irrelevant.

"The Court: The objection is sustained. The answer may be stricken out.

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"Q. Was that saloon the one that was conducted in Liebler's building at Caledonia ?

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'Mr. Geib: I object on the same ground.

"Mr. Newnham: I think it is material. It shows the animus of this prosecution.

"The Court: The objection is sustained.

"Q. Do you know whether there was a saloon district made in Caledonia whereby this other saloon was put outside of the district?

"Mr. Geib: I object to that as leading, and as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.

"The Court: Now, I think that this would be a proper defense, providing you connect Mrs. Liebler with it in any way. I think you may state in what way you expect to connect her with it. The objection is sus

tained."

No attempt was made to connect the plaintiff with the matter, whatever it was, to which these repeated statements refer, except to prove by her that the family derived revenue from the rental of the building occupied by the other saloon. It does not appear that defendant was responsible for any action of the village authorities which

affected the tenants of plaintiff's husband. When the rulings of the court are considered, it is evident that defendant relies upon something besides evidence to support the conclusion which is stated in his brief as follows:

"The case is simply one which was brought by the plaintiff because the business of conducting a saloon in the building of her husband was interfered with, thereby depriving the family of certain rents which went to the support of the plaintiff, and incidentally it is claimed that the defendant, as he owned the hotel and the other place of business, was responsible for it. The whole animus of the case was to get even with the defendant and the evidence conclusively shows it."

If, in the opinion of counsel, the questions asked and the statements made by counsel lead to this conclusion, it may be assumed that the jury were in like manner affected.

Plaintiff claimed damages for injury to her feelings, and for no other loss or injury. That she was entitled to recover $50 damages if liquor was sold or furnished to her son by defendant or his agents, is not denied. To this point, at least, her motive in bringing her suit would be immaterial. In proceeding to determine whether a greater sum should be awarded, the jury would be governed necessarily by evidence tending to prove, and to disprove, the fact that her feelings had been outraged by the conduct of defendant. We are not prepared to say that the defendant might not show in mitigation of damages, in excess of $50, that the plaintiff had conspired with persons competing with him for an opportunity to do business in a particular community at whose places. the minor habitually procured liquor, to harass him. See Cramer v. Danielson, 99 Mich. 531. But, if a defendant desires to pursue such a course, he should enter upon it openly, tendering the issue to the plaintiff and accepting the consequences of defeat. No such issue was tendered, either by questions propounded or by offers of testimony. The rulings excluding the testimony sought to be elicited

were right and were to have been expected. We are impressed that the rulings did not avert the mischief which the suggestions of counsel were calculated to produce. Nothing was said upon the subject in the charge.

Testimony showing the drinking habits of the husband of the plaintiff was wholly irrelevant. In view of admissions made by counsel for the plaintiff, we are not called upon to discuss the point. It was entirely immaterial to the issue that plaintiff's husband rented a building for saloon purposes and was surety upon a liquor dealer's bond. There was no testimony tending to prove the assent of the plaintiff to his dealings or her sympathy with the business of selling intoxicating liquors. This is an adversary proceeding to which he is not a party. It will not be presumed that the plaintiff is insensible to the effects of liquor upon her children because her husband supports the business of selling liquor. The court, over the objection of plaintiff, permitted the introduction of testimony of prior sales and of sales during the period when it is claimed the defendant was selling liquor to the minor made by others than defendant. Without setting out the testimony and without considering the exceptions in detail, it is sufficient to say it is competent for defendant to prove that the minor was in the habit of becoming intoxicated prior to the time when it is claimed he furnished him liquor. Bailey v. Briggs, 143 Mich. 303. Whether such testimony would tend to mitigate the damages in a particular case would depend upon the other circumstances disclosed. It is easily conceivable that it might have an opposed tendency in cases where the liquor seller had been given warning by the parent. We are of opinion, also, that, when the plaintiff proves specific acts of intoxication and the defendant denies having made any sales, it is competent to prove that the intoxication was, in fact, caused by liquor furnished by another. But neither as a defense to the action, nor for the purpose of dividing with another the liability imposed by the statute, may prior or contemporaneous sales be considered.

It is not likely that other matters discussed in the briefs will arise upon a new trial.

For the errors pointed out, the judgment is reversed, and a new trial granted.

MONTGOMERY, HOOKER, MOORE, and MCALVAY, JJ., concurred.

ATTORNEY GENERAL, ex rel. ALLIS-CHALMERS CO., v. PUBLIC LIGHTING COMMISSION OF CITY OF DETROIT.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

JUNCTION.

CONTRACTS COMPETITIVE BIDS-IN

Under the charter of a municipal corporation, all contracts for public improvements, if the expense should exceed $200, were required to be let to the lowest responsible bidder, with adequate security. The defendant advertised for bids, and three sealed proposals were received, one from two companies jointly. After the bids were opened, a committee was appointed to investigate the merits of the articles to be furnished and of the bidders. One of the joint bidders thereupon submitted a proposal to the committee which was later adopted by the defendant. Held, that defendant acted beyond the scope of its authority, in that the a eptance of the proposal was contrary to the express provision of the charter above outlined, and was not a competitive bid. A bill filed in the name of the attorney general, on the relation of one of the competing bidders, was a proper proceeding to determine the question, and the only one by which any action could be taken.

Appeal from Wayne; Brooke, J. Submitted November 10, 1908. (Docket No. 142.) Decided December 21, 1908.

Bill by John E. Bird, attorney general, on the relation of the Allis-Chalmers Company, against the public lighting commission of the city of Detroit to enjoin the performance of a contract. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainant appeals. Reversed, and decree entered for complainant.

Brennan, Donnelly & Van De Mark (John J. Speed, of counsel), for complainant.

Richard I. Lawson (P. J. M. Hally, of counsel), for defendant.

MCALVAY, J. Complainant appeals from a decree dismissing the bill filed by him, on the relation of the AllisChalmers Company, for the purpose of declaring the acceptance of the proposal of the Westinghouse Machine Company to furnish and install an electrical generating plant for defendant illegal and void, and for an injunction restraining defendant from entering into any contract pursuant thereto. Defendant advertised for sealed proposals "for the installation of an electrical generating plant, in accordance with specifications on file in the office of the commission." The advertisement and specifications were general. No particular style or make of machine was called for. It was required that proposals should state the amount of money allowed for old machinery displaced by the new plant. It is admitted that these proposals were solicited in the usual and ordinary way provided by the city charter. This provision is as follows:

"No contract for the purchase of any real estate, or for the construction of any public building, sewer, paving, graveling, planking, macadamizing, or for the construction of any public work whatever, or for any work to be done, or for purchasing or furnishing any materials, printing or supplies for said corporation, if the purchase of said real estate, or the expense of such construction, repairs, work, printing, materials or supplies shall exceed two hundred dollars, shall be let or entered into except to