Alliance between Great Britain and Japan. The Great would show a more than ordinary defect of understanding, to confound a war defensive in its principles with a war defensive in its operations. Where attack is the best mode of providing for the defence of a State, the war is defensive in principle, though the operations are offensive. Where the war is unnecessary to safety, its offensive character is not altered, because the wrongdoer is reduced to defensive warfare. So a State, against which dangerous wrong is manifestly meditated, may prevent it by striking the first blow, without thereby waging a war in its principle offensive. Accordingly, it is not every attack made on a State that will entitle it to aid under a defensive alliance; for if that State had given just cause of war to the invader, the war would not be, on its part, defensive in principle (a). A recent example of a treaty of guarantee is that which was concluded between Great Britain and Japan in 1902, in which the contracting parties mutually guaranteed the territorial independence of China and Korea. They further undertook that if either were assailed by more than one foreign Power on any question of dispute arising in Asia, the other would come to her assistance (b). Thus, Article 2 says: If either Great Britain or Japan in the defence of their respective interests as above described [viz., in reference to China and Korea], should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally. Article 3: If in the above event any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it. The Great War of 1914 furnishes examples of the operation of treaties of alliance. Thus the Austro-German alliance, entered into in 1879 by Bismarck and Andrassy, provided to this effect: Should, contrary to the hope and against the sincere wish of the two High Contracting Parties, one of the two Empires be attacked by another Power, the High Contracting Parties are bound to stand by each other with the whole of the armed forces of their Empires, and, in consequence thereof, only to conclude peace jointly or in agreement. The two parties, holding that Russia was the first to commence active hostilities, took common action (a) Vattel, liv. iii. ch. 6, § 90. (b) Annual Register, 1902, p. 58. It has already been pointed out (see supra, p. 68) that in 1904 Japan guaranteed the integrity of Korea, subject to certain reservations; by a treaty of 1905 she established a protectorate over the latter country; and in 1910 annexed it. The AngloJapanese alliance was renewed in August, 1905, and replaced by a fresh agreement, July, 1911. against her. On the other hand, Italy, having been bound to Germany and Austria by a defensive alliance (1882), did not hold that Russia was the aggressor; and accordingly elected to remain neutral, on the ground that the casus fœderis did not in this case apply. Again, Japan, in accordance with the above-mentioned AngloJapanese treaty of alliance, 1902, delivered an ultimatum to Germany (August 15, 1914), calling upon her to evacuate the port of Kiaochau, and to withdraw or dismantle her warships in Japanese and Chinese waters. No reply having been received, Japan declared war on Germany. the execution The execution of a treaty was sometimes secured by hostages Hostages for given by one party to the other. The most recent and remark- of treaties. able example of this practice occurred at the peace of Aix-laChapelle, in 1748, where the restitution of Cape Breton, in North America, by Great Britain to France, was secured by several British peers sent as hostages to Paris (c). tion of treaties. Public treaties are to be interpreted like other laws and con- Interpretatracts. Such is the inevitable imperfection and ambiguity of all human language, that the mere words alone of any writing, literally expounded, will go a very little way towards explaining its meaning. Certain technical rules of interpretation have, therefore, been adopted by writers on ethics and public law, to explain the meaning of international compacts, in cases of doubt. These rules are fully expounded by Grotius and his commentators; and the reader is referred especially to the principles laid down by Vattel and Rutherforth, as containing the most complete view of this important subject (d). The dispute between England and the United States respect- Rules for interpretaing the settlement of the north-west boundary between the Union tion. and Canada, turned on the interpretation to be put upon existing treaties. England submitted to the German Emperor, who was appointed arbitrator, the following rules of interpretation: 1. The words of a treaty are to be taken to be used in the sense in which they were commonly used at the time when the treaty was entered into. 2. In interpreting any expressions in a treaty, regard must be had to the context and spirit of the whole treaty. (c) Vattel, liv. ii. ch. 16, §§ 245 -261. (d) Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac. lib. ii. cap. 16. Vattel, liv. ii. ch. 17. Rutherforth, Inst. b. ii. ch. 7. The Treaty of 3. The interpretation should be drawn from the connection and relation of the different parts. 4. The interpretation should be suitable to the reason of the treaty. 5. Treaties are to be interpreted in a favourable, rather than an odious sense. 6. Whatever interpretation tends to change the existing state of things at the time the treaty was made is to be ranked in the class of odious things (e). Negotiations are sometimes conducted under the mediation of a third Power, spontaneously tendering its good offices for that purpose, or upon the request of one or both of the litigating Powers, or in virtue of a previous stipulation for that purpose. If the mediation is spontaneously offered, it may be refused by either party; but if it is the result of a previous agreement between the two parties, it cannot be refused without a breach of good faith. When accepted by both parties, it becomes the right and the duty of the mediating Power to interpose its advice, with a view to the adjustment of their differences. It thus becomes a party to the negotiation, but has no authority to constrain either party to adopt its opinion. Nor is it obliged to guarantee the performance of the treaty concluded under its mediation, though, in point of fact, it frequently does so (ƒ). It was stipulated at the Treaty of Paris (1856), that "If there should arise between the Sublime Porte and one or more of the other signing Powers, any misunderstanding which might endanger the maintenance of their relations, the Sublime Porte and each of such Powers, before having recourse to the use of force, shall afford the other contracting parties the opportunity of preventing such an extremity by means of their mediation" (g). At a Conference of the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris, their Plenipotentiaries, in a protocol dated 14th April, 1856, expressed "in the name of their Governments, the wish that States between which any serious misunderstanding may arise, should, before appealing to arms, have recourse, as far as circumstances might allow, to the good offices of a friendly Power. (e) Parl. Papers, N. America, 1873 (No. 3), pp. 6-9. Vattel, liv. ii. ch. 17, §§ 271, 285-287, 301; ch. 18, $305; and see ante, pp. 280 seq. For a case relating to the interpretation of treaties generally, and in particular to the interpretation of the 66 most favoured nation clause fre quently inserted in commercial treaties, see Whitney v. Robertson (1887), 124 U. S. 190. (f) Klüber, Droit des Gens Moderne de l'Europe, pt. ii. tit. 2, § 1; ch. 2, $ 160. (9) Art. viii. See Hertslet, Map of Europe, vol. ii. p. 1255. The Plenipotentiaries hope that the governments not represented at the Congress will unite in the sentiment which has inspired the wish recorded in the present protocol " (h). Nevertheless, it can hardly be said that wars have been less frequent since these declarations, even among the Powers actually making them. The protocol was invoked to prevent the DanoGerman war of 1864, and the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, but without effect. The Conference which met at Constantinople in 1876 attempted to settle the dispute between Russia and Turkey in a peaceable manner, but it failed to bring about such a result. Lord Granville, in 1870, appealed to France and Prussia to have recourse to mediation, but in vain (i). Even after hostilities had commenced, Her Majesty's Government assured France that "if at any time recourse should be had to their good offices, they would be freely given and zealously exerted" (k). There have been several recent cases of successful mediation; for example, the mediation of the Pope between Germany and Spain, 1885; that of Spain between Italy and Colombia, 1888; that of Portugal between Great Britain and Brazil, 1895; that of the Great Powers between Greece and Turkey, 1897; that of the United States between Russia and Japan, 1905, resulting in the Treaty of Portsmouth. NATIONAL A great number of international disputes and differences have INTERin the past been amicably settled not only by means of negotia- ARBITRATION. tion, mediation, and good offices, but also by arbitration (1). The theory and practice of arbitration are, indeed, as old as international relationships. There are many records of interstate arbitration in ancient Greece, and some in Rome (m). In the Middle Ages we find monarchs, jurists, ecclesiastics, and especially the Pope, acting as arbitrators between princes and communities. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the practice became much less frequent, and in the seventeenth and eighteenth very rare. From time to time jurists, philosophers, and publicists took up the question, and suggested various schemes (h) Ibid. p. 1279. Annual Register, 1870. Pub. Documents, p. 204. (k) Annual Register, 1871. Pub. Documents, p. 248. (7) On the subject of arbitration, see W. E. Darby, International Tribunals (1904); J. B. Moore, History of the International Arbitrations to which the United States has been a party, 6 vols. (Washington, 1899); (m) Cf. Phillipson, Int. Law and Arbitration for settling disputes by means of arbitral tribunals. Towards From about the middle of the nineteenth century States begin to show a tendency to enter into general arbitration treaties, that is, relating not to specific points of difference, but to all kinds of controversies, present or future, arising out of such comprehensive subjects as commerce or navigation. Since 1862 compromise clauses were agreed to between Great Britain on the one part, and Italy, Greece, Portugal, Mexico, Uruguay respectively on the other; between Belgium on the one hand, and Italy, Greece, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark respectively on the other; between Spain and Sweden and Norway; between Denmark and Venezuela; between Italy and Montenegro; between France and Korea; between Austria-Hungary and Siam; and many other cases. In the treaty of peace concluded at Guadalupe-Hidalgo (1848), between the United States and Mexico, the principle of permanent arbitration was established between the two parties as to any differences that might arise between them. Other States soon entered into treaties of general arbitration, e.g., Belgium with Venezuela (1884), with Ecuador (1887); Switzerland with San Salvador and Ecuador (1888); Spain with Honduras and Colombia (1894). The leading Powers did not manifest the same readiness to bind themselves in this manner; attempts were, in truth, made by Great Britain and the United States in 1897, but they did not prove successful. It may also be mentioned that by the 11th Article of the General Act of the Berlin Conference, 1885, the signatory Powers declared that in case a serious disagreement originating on the subject thereof, or in the limits of the territories mentioned in Article 1 (the Congo Basin and circumjacent regions), and placed under the free trade system, shall arise between any of them, or the Powers which may become parties to the Act, these Powers bind themselves, before appealing to arms, to have recourse to the mediation of one or more of the friendly Powers, and in a similar case reserve to themselves the |