Opinion of the Court.

evidence to show that a demand has been carried into judg ment, and the other executors are precluded by it from pleading prescription or the statute of limitations upon the original cause of action.

But there the testator appointed different executors in two different States. In the case at bar there was but one executrix, and she was a citizen of the domicil of the testator and of the creditor, and the judgment rendered in that jurisdiction was conclusive against her as executrix when she took out the letters testamentary in Tennessee, because it was a judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction upon the same subject matter, between the same parties and for the same purpose. Aspden v. Nixon, 4 How. 467.

She was in privity with the decedent as to his property by the terms of the will, and the judgment against her as executrix in New York bound her in Tennessee upon the probate of the will and her qualification there. It is unnecessary to consider whether the legatees or heirs could have made any defence to the judgment upon the merits, for there was no attempt to do so.

But the adjudication of the Supreme Court of New York, that the deed of Merrill to Mrs. Strange was void so far as affecting the indebtedness of the estate to Mrs. Carpenter, rests upon far different grounds. That suit was instituted against Mrs. Strange solely as executrix, and did not purport to implead her individually. The attack upon the deed seems to have been predicated upon the theory that the realty therein described belonged to the corpus of the estate, and could only be claimed by Mrs. Strange as devisee, and to have been thrown in as ancillary to the main object of the suit, which was the recovery of judgment for the indebtedness against Mrs. Strange as executrix. But Mrs. Strange claimed title as an individual, and, under the pleadings as they stood, it might well be held that dealing in any way with the real estate was not legitimately within the issues. The objection, however, goes deeper than this.

The real estate was situated in Tennessee and governed by the law of its situs, and while by means of its power over the

Opinion of the Court.

person of a party a court of equity may in a proper case compel him to act in relation to property not within its jurisdiction, its decree does not operate directly upon the property nor affect the title, but is made effectual through the coercion. of the defendant, as, for instance, by directing a deed to be executed or cancelled by or on behalf of the party. The court "has no inherent power, by the mere force of its decree, to annul a deed, or to establish a title." Hart v. Sansom, 110 U. S. 151, 155.

Hence, although in cases of trust, of contract and of fraud, the jurisdiction of a court of chancery may be sustained over the person, notwithstanding lands not within the jurisdiction. may be affected by the decree, (Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148,) yet it does not follow that such a decree is in itself necessarily binding upon the courts of the State where the land is situated. To declare the deed to Mrs. Strange null and void, in virtue alone of the decree in New York, would be to attribute. to that decree the force and effect of a judgment in rem by a court having no jurisdiction over the res.

By its terms no provision whatever was made for its enforcement as against Mrs. Strange in respect of the real estate. No conveyance was directed, nor was there any attempt in any way to exert control over her in view of the conclusion that the court announced. Direct action upon the real estate was certainly not within the power of the court, and as it did not order Mrs. Strange to take any action with reference to it, and she took none, the courts of Tennessee were not obliged to surrender jurisdiction to the courts of New York over real estate in Tennessee, exclusively subject to its laws and the jurisdiction of its courts. Story Confl. Laws, § 543; Whart. Confl. Laws, S$ 288, 289; Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25; Northern Indiana Railroad v. Mich. Cent. Railroad, 15 How. 233; Davis v. Headley, 22 N. J. Eq. (7 C. E. Green) 115; Miller v. Birdsong, 7 Baxter, 531; Cooley v. Scarlett, 38 Illinois, 316; Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 327.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Mr. A. H. Garland and Mr. H. J. May for appellants. Mr. W. W. Dudley and Mr. L. T. Michenor were with them on the brief.

Mr. J. McConnell for appellee.

FULLER, C. J.: This case was decided by the Circuit Court in favor of the State National Bank, upon the facts, and after a patient investigation of the record, with the aid afforded by the arguments and briefs of counsel, we are unable to hold that the Circuit Court erred in the conclusions at which it arrived.

The decree will, therefore, be

Affirmed.

In re MAYFIELD, Petitioner.

ORIGINAL.

No. 15. Original. Submitted April 27, 1891. - Decided May 25, 1891.

A member of the Cherokee Nation, committing adultery with an unmarried woman within the limits of its Territory, is amenable only to the courts of the Nation.

THIS was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner averred that on the 19th day of October, 1890, he was indicted in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Arkansas, and subsequently tried, convicted and

Counsel for Parties.

sentenced to the Detroit House of Correction for three years, for the crime of adultery in the Indian country. He further stated that he was "a Cherokee Indian by blood, and a recognized member of the Cherokee tribe of Indians, and resided at the time of his arrest for the crime aforesaid, in the said Cherokee Nation, where the said crime is alleged to have been committed; that he has resided in the said Cherokee Nation all his life; that he verily believes that the said District Court had no jurisdiction of his person, he being a Cherokee Indian by blood and a resident of the Cherokee Nation and subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the laws of said nation for the crime aforesaid." The indictment, a copy of which was annexed to the petition, charged that "John Mayfield, on the first day of January, A.D. 1890, at the Cherokee Nation, in the Indian country, within the Western District of Arkansas aforesaid, did commit the crime of adultery with one Mollie Phillips, a white woman, and not an Indian, and a single woman, by him, the said John Mayfield, having then and there carnal knowledge of the body of the said Mollie Phillips, the said John Mayfield being then and there a married man, and then and there having a lawful wife alive other than the said Mollie Phillips, and the said John Mayfield and the said Mollie Phillips not being then and there lawfully married to each other." Upon the hearing it was admitted by the district attorney who tried the case, which admission also had the approval of the District Judge, that upon the trial of the case "the evidence showed defendant to be one-fourth Indian by blood, and a citizen of the Cherokee tribe of Indians, and that he was lawfully married to a white woman by blood; and that Mollie Phillips, with whom the crime of adultery was charged to have been committed, was a white woman by blood; and that they both resided in the Illinois District of the Cherokee Nation, Indian Territory, at the time of the commission of the adultery of which Mayfield was convicted."

Mr. Van H. Manning and Mr. Duane E. Fox for the petitioner.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Maury opposing.

Argument for Defendant in Error.

The answer to the allegation of the want of sufficient cause for the petitioner's detention, is that he is held by virtue of a judgment of the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Arkansas.

If that court had jurisdiction of the crime of adultery of which the petitioner was convicted, it would seem that the return to the rule shows a complete justification for his detention.

By section 533 of the Revised Statutes, the jurisdiction of the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Arkansas was extended to "the country lying west of Missouri and Arkansas, known as the Indian Territory."

But the jurisdiction of this court over the Indian Territory was considerably abridged by the act of Congress of March 1, 1889, 25 Stat. 786, c. 333, § 17, annexing a part of that Territory to the Eastern District of Texas, and the act of January 6, 1883, 22 Stat. 400, c. 13, § 2, annexing another part to the District of Kansas.

It suffices to say that the residue of the Territory left to the jurisdiction of the District Court for the Western District of Arkansas embraces the venue of the crime as laid in the indictment.

The jurisdiction of the court established for the Indian Territory by the act of March 1, 1889, 25 Stat. 783, c. 333, does not interfere with the jurisdiction of the District Court, because the jurisdiction of the former is limited to offences "not punishable by death or by imprisonment at hard labor." See also section 33 of the act of May 2, 1890, 26 Stat. c. 182, pp. 96,

97.

It is true the offence of adultery is punishable "by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding three years,” but, inasmuch as a prisoner convicted of this offence may, under the provisions of chapter 9, title 70, of the Revised Statutes, be imprisoned in a penitentiary where hard labor is exacted of all prisoners, it may be said with entire propriety that hard labor is a possible punishment for the crime of adultery. In Ex parte Karstendick, 93 U. S. 396, 399, the court used the following language on this subject: "Where the statute re