Argument for Defendant in Error. respect so long as Congress remained silent; but that, whenever Congress spoke, its dictum was supreme. This was the principle on which the majority of the court decided the case of Pierce v. New Hampshire, one of the "License Cases," 5 Howard, 564, where this view was most ably presented by Chief Justice Taney, (pp. 578, etc.,) and where he and Justice Catron (p. 603) seem to us to show very clearly that such was the view of Chief Justice Marshall, as shown by his opinions in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, and Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Company, 2 Pet. 241. The court seems now, however, to have settled that Congress alone has the power to "regulate commerce" in matters susceptible of general and uniform regulation; but that in matters which are affected by local considerations the power to "regulate commerce" is possessed by both the Federal and State legislatures, subject, however, to the modification that whenever Congress speaks on the subject that is the supreme law. Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 492, 493. In other words, in matters best susceptible of local regulation the States have concurrent power with Congress to pass laws that are directly and unquestionably regulations of interstate commerce, and are intended as such; but, as to matters susceptible of uniform regulation, the power to pass laws, the object of which is to regulate interstate commerce, is in Congress alone. But even upon a matter which might be said to be susceptible of uniform regulation, under a law the object of which was to "regulate commerce," the State may make a police regulation which may affect it, but which, if it appears to be a bona fide police regulation and not a mere covered attempt to regulate commerce, will still be valid unless a conflict arises between this regulation and some regulation by Congress under its commercial power. New York y. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465; Railroad Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96. No question can be made of the good faith of the State in requiring evidence that the foreign corporation doing business Opinion of the Court. within it is solvent. Such a law is not in conflict with any law of Congress. Does Congress by its silence mean to say that it will not make any regulation on this subject, and that no State shall have the right to do so; but that any corporation may go into a foreign State where it is not known, either as to the extent of its legal or financial powers or as to the agents that are accredited by it, and may then refuse to make known any of these facts, and insist on carrying on this important business and making important contracts with, and securing valuable property of the citizens of this State, though it (the corporation) may be utterly irresponsible? Surely this cannot have been the intention of Congress. On the contrary, it must be presumed that Congress understood the propriety and necessity of such regulations, and left them to the States to make, according to the character of the corporations concerned and the necessities of the case. MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. We regret that we are unable to concur with the learned Court of Appeals of Kentucky in its views on this subject. The law of Kentucky, which is brought in question by the case, requires from the agent of every express company not incorporated by the laws of Kentucky a license from the auditor of public accounts, before he can carry on any business for said company in the State. This, of course, embraces interstate business as well as business confined wholly within the State. It is a prohibition against the carrying on of such business without a compliance with the state law. And not only is a license required to be obtained by the agent, but a statement must be made and filed in the auditor's office showing that the company is possessed of an actual capital of $150,000, either in cash or in safe investments, exclusive of stock notes. If the subject was one which appertained to the jurisdiction of the state legislature, it may be that the requirements and conditions of doing business within the State would be promotive of the public good. It is clear, however, that it Opinion of the Court. would be a regulation of interstate commerce in its application to corporations or associations engaged in that business; and that is a subject which belongs to the jurisdiction of the national and not the state legislature. Congress would undoubtedly have the right to exact from associations of that kind any guarantees it might deem necessary for the public security, and for the faithful transaction of business; and as it is within the province of Congress, it is to be presumed that Congress has done, or will do, all that is necessary and proper in that regard. Besides, it is not to be presumed that the State of its origin has neglected to require from any such corporation proper guarantees as to capital and other securities necessary for the public safety. If a partnership firm of individuals should undertake to carry on the business of interstate commerce between Kentucky and other States, it would not be within the province of the state legislature to exact conditions on which they should carry on their business, nor to require them to take out a license therefor. To carry on interstate commerce is not a franchise or a privilege granted by the State; it is a right which every citizen of the United States is entitled to exercise under the Constitution and laws of the United States; and the accession of mere corporate facilities, as a matter of convenience in carrying on their business, cannot have the effect of depriving them of such right, unless Congress should see fit to interpose some contrary regulation on the subject. an - It has frequently been laid down by this court that the power of Congress over interstate commerce is as absolute as it is over foreign commerce. Would any one pretend that a state legislature could prohibit a foreign corporation, English or a French transportation company, for example, from coming into its borders and landing goods and passengers at its wharves, and soliciting goods and passengers for a return voyage, without first obtaining a license from some state officer, and filing a sworn statement as to the amount of its capital stock paid in? And why not? Evidently because the matter is not within the province of state legislation, but within that of national legislation. Inman Steamship Co. Opinion of the Court. v. Tinker, 94 U. S. 238. The prerogative, the responsibility and the duty of providing for the security of the citizens and the people of the United States in relation to foreign corporate bodies, or foreign individuals with whom they may have relations of foreign commerce, belong to the government of the United States, and not to the governments of the several States; and confidence in that regard may be reposed in the national legislature without any anxiety or apprehension arising from the fact that the subject matter is not within the province or jurisdiction of the state legislatures. And the same thing is exactly true with regard to interstate commerce as it is with regard to foreign commerce. No difference is perceivable between the two. Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 205, 211; Phila. Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 342; McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104, 110; Norfolk & Western Railroad v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114, 118. As was said by Mr. Justice Lamar, in the case last cited, "It is well settled by numerous decisions of this court, that a State cannot under the guise of a license tax, exclude from its jurisdiction a foreign corporation engaged in interstate commerce, or impose any burdens upon such commerce within its limits." We have repeatedly decided that a state law is unconstitutional and void which requires a party to take out a license for carrying on interstate commerce, no matter how specious the pretext may be for imposing it. Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 117 U. S. 34; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489; Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640; Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141; McCall v. California, 136, U. S. 104; Norfolk & Western Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114. As a summation of the whole matter it was aptly said by the present Chief Justice in Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161, 166: "We have repeatedly held that no State has the right to lay a tax on interstate commerce in any form, whether by way of duties laid on the transportation of the subjects of that commerce, or on the receipts derived from that transportation, or on the occupation or business of carrying it on, for the rea Opinion of the Court. son that taxation is a burden on that commerce, and amounts to a regulation of it, which belongs solely to Congress." We do not think that the difficulty is at all obviated by the fact that the express company, as incidental to its main business, (which is to carry goods between different States,) does also some local business by carrying goods from one point to another within the State of Kentucky. This is, probably, quite as much for the accommodation of the people of that State as for the advantage of the company. But whether so or not, it does not obviate the objection that the regulations as to license and capital stock are imposed as conditions on the company's carrying on the business of interstate commerce, which was manifestly the principal object of its organization. These regulations are clearly a burden and a restriction upon that commerce. Whether intended as such or not they operate as such. But taxes or license fees in good faith. imposed exclusively on express business carried on wholly within the State would be open to no such objection. The case is entirely different from that of foreign corporations seeking to do a business which does not belong to the regulating power of Congress. The insurance business, for example, cannot be carried on in a State by a foreign corporation without complying with all the conditions imposed by the legislation of that State. So with regard to manufacturing corporations, and all other corporations whose business is of a local and domestic nature, which would include express companies whose business is confined to points and places wholly within the State. The cases to this effect are numerous. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Liverpool Insurance Company v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566; Cooper Manufacturing Company v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727; Phila. Fire Association v. New York, 119 U. S. 110. But the main argument in support of the decision of the Court of Appeals is that the act in question is essentially a regulation made in the fair exercise of the police power of the State. But it does not follow that everything which the legislature of a State may deem essential for the good order |