FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
See CONTRACTт, 3, 4.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.

A conveyance by a debtor in Texas of his real estate there, made with intent
to delay, hinder or defraud his creditors, being void as to the latter
under the statutes of that State, a judgment sale and transfer of such
property, in an action commenced by the levy of an attachment upon
it as the property of the debtor, made after the fraudulent sale, is
upheld in this case as against a bona fide purchaser from the fraudulent
grantee, taking title after the levy of the attachment. Thompson v.
Baker, 648.

GOODS SOLD AND DELIVERED.
See CONTRACT, 2;
EVIDENCE, 2.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See LOCAL LAW, 1.

INDIAN.

See JURISDICTION, E, 1, 2.

ILLINOIS.

See TAX SALE;

TRUST;

USURY, 1 to 5.

INSURANCE.

The plaintiff took out fire insurance policies upon a vessel in 10 companies
to the amount of $40,000 in all. The vessel took fire, and, in order to
save it, it was scuttled and sunk, and the fire thus extinguished. It
was then raised, taken to port and repaired. The loss by fire, exclu-
sive of the expense of raising the vessel, etc., was $15,364.78. The
owner made claim upon the insurers for this amount for "loss and
damage by fire and water as per agreement," stating that he would
make further claims "for expenses of raising the propeller," and was
"preparing the statement of such expenses to submit with his subse-
quent claim." The companies declined to pay such subsequent claim,
but paid in advance the amount of the loss by fire so stated, taking
receipts, expressed to be in full of all claims for loss or damage by
fire, and in which it was further stated that the policies were can-
celled and surrendered. The parties further signed a paper in which
"the loss and damage by fire" was certified at that aggregate amount,
"payable without discount upon presentation," and the amount was
apportioned among the several companies. In an action brought by

the owner to recover from the companies the amount of the claim for
raising and saving the vessel, some $15,000, it was Held, (1) That
parol evidence was admissible to explain the receipts, and to show
that they were not intended to cover the claim for raising, etc.; (2)
That the paper so signed by the parties was not in the nature of a
contract on the part of the owner. Fire Insurance Association v.

Wickham, 564.

INTEREST.

See JUDGMENT, 1;

PATENT FOR INVENTION, 16;
USURY, 1.

JUDGMENT.

1. Upon rendering a decree for the plaintiff in a suit in equity, brought in
behalf of a State, pursuant to statute, to recover the amount of a tax
with interest thereon at the rate of twelve per cent until paid, a sum
tendered and paid into court by the defendant, for part of that amount
and interest thereon at that rate, is to be applied to the payment of
both principal and interest of the sum so admitted to be due; interest
at the rate of twelve per cent is to be computed on the rest of the prin-
cipal until the date of the decree; and from that date interest on the
lawful amount of the decree is to be computed at the ordinary rate of
six per cent only, notwithstanding the final disposition of the case is
delayed by appeal. Massachusetts v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 40.
2. In an action in the Supreme Court of New York (the court having juris-
diction of the parties) between two sisters, the defendant being sued
in her representative capacity as testatrix of her father's will, the mat-
ters in controversy were: (1) whether the plaintiff had accepted or
rejected a provision made for her by her father's will; (2) whether
she was entitled to recover from her father's estate an amount claimed
to be due on account of a fund which came to him as trustee for her,
and which he had never accounted for; and (3) whether a certain con-
veyance of real estate in Tennessee made by the father in his lifetime
to the defendant should be adjudged to be fraudulent, and be vacated.
That court, after hearing the parties, adjudged (1) that the plaintiff
had not accepted the provision so made for her; (2) that the plaintiff
was entitled to recover the full amount so claimed; and (3) that the
deed was "absolutely null and void from the beginning," so far as it
affected the testator's said indebtedness. A litigation in equity then
took place in Tennessee, in which the plaintiff and defendant in New
York were, respectively, plaintiff and defendant. There were other
parties, whose presence was not material to the points here decided.
This litigation resulted in the Supreme Court of Tennessee deciding:
(1) That the plaintiff had elected to take the share so devised to her;
(2) that having so elected she was not entitled to recover on her
claim; (3) that the Supreme Court of New York was without power ·

to adjudge the conveyance by the testator to the defendant of lands in
Tennessee fraudulent and void, or to annul the same. Held:
(1) That this decree did not give to the judgment of the Supreme Court
of the State of New York the full faith and credit to which it was
entitled under the Constitution as to the 1st and 2d points so decided.
(2) That, as to the 3d point, the courts of New York had no power to
decree that a deed of land in Tennessee was null and void. Carpen-
ter v. Strange, 87.

JURISDICTION.

A. OF THE SUPREME COURT.

1. A party cannot, by proceedings in the Circuit Court, waive a question
of the jurisdiction of that court, so as to prevent its being raised and
passed upon here. Parker v. Ormsby, 81.

2. This case is dismissed by the court because the amount involved is not
sufficient to give it jurisdiction. Reynolds v. Burns, 117.

3. The only question open in a case brought up under the act of February
25, 1889, 25 Stat. 693, c. 236, where the judgment does not exceed
$5000, is the question of jurisdiction of the court below. St. Louis &
San Francisco Railway Co. v. McBride, 127.

4. Although it is true as a general rule that where judgment goes for the
defendant, the amount of the plaintiff's claim is the test of jurisdic-
tion, this rule is subject to the qualification that the demand shall
appear to have been made in good faith for such amount; and if it
appear clearly from the whole record that under no aspect of the case
the plaintiff could recover the full amount of his claim, this court will
decline to assume jurisdiction of the case. Gorman v. Havird, 206.

1

5. A pleading presenting only a question of error in a judgment of a state
court does not go to the jurisdiction. Griswold v. Hazard, 260.

6. The appeal was dismissed as to the claims of the appellees, which did
not exceed $5000. Kneeland v. Luce (2), 491.

7. This court is bound to assume that decisions of state courts on matters
of state law have been made after thorough consideration, and that
they embody the deliberate judgment of the court. Cross v. Allen,

528.

8. Where an action at law was tried by a District Court without a jury,
which found the facts and conclusions of law, and entered judgment
for the plaintiff thereon, and a bill of exceptions was signed, which
stated that the defendant moved the court to direct a verdict for him,
on the ground that, as matter of law, no action could be maintained
by the plaintiff, and the Circuit Court, on a writ of error affirmed the
judgment, and the defendant then sued out a writ of error from this
court: Held, (1) The Circuit Court could not properly consider any
matter raised by the bill of exceptions, nor can this court do so, be-
cause the trial was not by a jury nor on an agreed statement of facts;
(2) all that the Circuit Court could do was to affirm the judgment of

the District Court, and all that this court can do is to affirm the judg ment of the Circuit Court, as the latter court had jurisdiction and this court has it. Rogers v. United States, 548.

9. Nearly two years after the entry of a decree dismissing a bill in equity relating to title to real estate, the complainant, without notice to the respondent, filed his affidavit to show that its value was more than $5000, appealed to this court, and the appeal was allowed below and was entered in this court. The respondent thereupon filed counter affidavits in the court below and, after notice to the complainant, moved to set aside the appeal upon the ground that the value of the property was shown to be less than $5000. The complainant was present at the hearing of this motion, which resulted in an order vacating the order allowing the appeal. The respondent as appellee in this court, on all these facts as shown by the original and supplemental records, moved to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Held, that, under the circumstances, it was no more than right that this court should consider the subsequent affidavits, and that they showed that the amount in controversy was not sufficient to give this court jurisdiction, and that therefore the appeal must be dismissed. Rector v. Lipscomb, 557.

66

10. Under section 5 of the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826, "to establish Circuit Courts of Appeal," etc., the appeal or writ of error which may be taken from the existing Circuit Courts direct to the Supreme Court," "in any case in which the jurisdiction of the court is in issue," can be taken only after final judgment; when the party against whom it is rendered must elect whether he will take his writ of error or appeal to this court upon the question of jurisdiction alone, or to the Circuit Court of Appeals upon the whole case. McLish v. Roff, 661.

11. In an action against the county treasurer of a county in the State of Washington and the sureties on his official bond to recover moneys received by him officially, rulings of the state court that his settlements with the county commissioners were not conclusive, that that body acted ministerially in settling with him and could not absolve him from the duty to account and pay over, and that the denial by the trial court of an order to furnish a bill of particulars would not be disturbed in the absence of anything indicating that the defendants had been prejudiced thereby, do not deny the validity of the territorial code enacted under the authority of Congress, and confer no jurisdiction in error upon this court. Ferry v. King County, 668.

12. The validity of a statute is not drawn in question every time that rights claimed under it are controverted; nor is the validity of an authority every time an act done by such authority is disputed. Ib. 13. In a suit brought in a state court of Kentucky by the city of Henderson against the Henderson Bridge Company, to recover for taxes assessed by the city on the bridge of the company, which spanned the Ohio

River at the city, the Court of Appeals of the State held that the city, as a taxing district, could tax the property of the company, and that, under an ordinance of the city, accepted by the company, the city acquired a contract right to tax the bridge to low-water mark on the Indiana shore, it being within the city limits, in consideration of rights and privileges granted to the company by the ordinance. On a motion to dismiss a writ of error from this court, sued out by the company: Held, (1) that although it was claimed in the pleadings, by the company, that the taxing ordinance impaired the obligation of a prior contract with the company, yet as the decision of the Court of Appeals was based wholly on the ground that the proper interpretation of the ordinance first above referred to was that the company voluntarily agreed that the bridge should be liable to taxation, and that did not involve a Federal question, and was broad enough to dispose of the case, without reference to any Federal question, and this court could not review the construction which was given by the state court to the ordinance, as a contract, in view of the constitution and laws of Kentucky, the writ of error must be dismissed; (2) that the taxation of the bridge was not a regulation of commerce among the States, or the taxation of any agency of the Federal government. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 679.

14. This court has no jurisdiction to review in error or on appeal, in advance of the final judgment in the cause on the merits, an order of a Circuit Court of the United States remanding the cause to the state court from which it had been removed into the Circuit Court. Chicago, St. Paul &c. Railway Co. v. Roberts, 690.

15. The payment, whether voluntary or compulsory, of a tax, to prevent the payment of which a bill in equity has been filed, leaves no issue for the court to pass upon in that case. Singer M'f'g Co. v. Wright,

696.

See EVIDENCE, 1;

NATIONAL BANK, 10;

PRACTICE, 1;
Receiver, 3.

B. OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS.

1. Only questions of gravity and importance should be certified to this court by the Circuit Courts of Appeals, under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 828, c. 517, § 6. Lau Ow Bew, Petitioner, 583.. 2. Whether the Chinese restriction acts, in the light of the treaties between the United States and China, apply to a Chinese merchant, domiciled in the United States, who temporarily leaves the country for purposes of business or pleasure, animo revertendi, is such a question of gravity and importance. Ib.

C. OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

1. In a suit by the assignee of a promissory note payable to the order of the payee, where the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court depends upon